Jay Stevens v. County of Los Angeles

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedDecember 31, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-06054
StatusUnknown

This text of Jay Stevens v. County of Los Angeles (Jay Stevens v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jay Stevens v. County of Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 JAY STEVENS, BRIANA ORTEGA, CASE NO.: 2:24-cv-06054-DSF-JC ELIJAH ORTEGA, MARIAH ORTEGA, 11 and MARISSA ORTEGA, [Assigned to: Hon. Dale S. Fischer, United States District Judge; 12 Plaintiffs, Hon. Jacqueline Chooljian, United States Magistrate Judge] 13 vs. [DISCOVERY MATTER] 14 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, municipal STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 15 entity; ADAM NELSON, an individual, SHAWN MERRICK, an individual, [CHANGES MADE BY COURT 16 JUSTIN MASRI, an individual; TO PARAGRAPHS 2.1, 3, 8, 9] RICHARD MENDOZA, an individual; 17 DOES 1-10 inclusive,

18 Defendants.

19 20 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 21 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, 22 or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use 23 for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, 24 the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated 25 Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket 26 protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords 27 from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties 1 further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective 2 Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 3 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied 4 when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 5 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 6 Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) contends that there is good cause 7 and a particularized need for a Protective Order to preserve the interests of 8 confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated 9 investigative or confidential records for the following reasons. First, Defendant contends 10 that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a 11 reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably 12 heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa 13 Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 14 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while 15 “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” 16 the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly 17 assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of 18 Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have 19 constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police 20 personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. 21 Defendant further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file 22 information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 23 families/associates. 24 Second, Defendant contends that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 25 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 26 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or 27 attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical 1 self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 2 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 3 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 4 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, 5 and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or 6 rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y 7 v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 8 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 9 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 10 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 11 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendant further contends that such 12 personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of 13 records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to 14 result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party 15 witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 16 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or 17 investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify 18 and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. 19 Third, Defendant contends that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 20 as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the 21 fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled 22 statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 23 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 24 Accordingly, Defendant contends that, without a Protective Order preventing 25 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 26 impair and harm Defendant County of Los Angeles’ public entity’s interests in candid 27 self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and 1 peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers 2 and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 3 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 4 result in litigation. 5 Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt 6 resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect 7 information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are 8 permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the 9 conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends 10 of justice, Defendant contends that a protective order for such information is justified in 11 this matter. 12 Plaintiffs also believe there is good cause for a protective order with respect to 13 categories of documents he may be asked to produce, including, but not limited to 14 medical and psychological records, financial records, employment records, and private 15 communications between and amongst family members and the Plaintiffs. 16 It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential 17 for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it 18 has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why 19 it should not be part of the public record of this case.

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Jay Stevens v. County of Los Angeles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jay-stevens-v-county-of-los-angeles-cacd-2024.