Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. v. Ostroff

59 A.2d 738, 191 Md. 87, 1948 Md. LEXIS 350
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJune 17, 1948
Docket[No. 190, October Term, 1947.]
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 59 A.2d 738 (Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. v. Ostroff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. v. Ostroff, 59 A.2d 738, 191 Md. 87, 1948 Md. LEXIS 350 (Md. 1948).

Opinion

Grason, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was instituted in the Baltimore City Court by Louis C. Ostroff against Modern Shoe Company, a corporation, and Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. for breach of a contract. At the conclusion of all the testimony in the case, the court directed the jury to find a verdict for the Modern Shoe Company, which was accordingly done, *90 and judgment entered thereon, from which no appeal was taken. At the same time the court overruled a demurrer prayer and permitted the case to go to the jury, as to Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. A verdict was rendered by the jury in favor of the plaintiff against that defendant, and, after the court overruled a motion N. O. V. and a motion for a new trial, judgment was entered on the verdict, and an appeal therefrom was taken to this court.

No exception to. the evidence nor to the charge of the court to the jury is presented. The sole question argued in the briefs of counsel and at the bar, is whether the lower' court committed error in refusing to rule as a matter of law that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff (appellee) to recover against the Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. (appellant) and to direct a verdict in its favor. This involves the question of whether or not there was a conflict in the material evidence. If such was the case, it was the province of the jury to resolve the conflict and find the fact. The jury, in our system, is the fact finding body. A case is never taken from the jury unless, on all of the evidence submitted, there is no conflict of fact. If the testimony clearly shows there is no conflict of fact, a question of law is then presented. If the court, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom most favorably to the plaintiff, finds as a matter of law that there is no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it is its duty to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury and direct it to find a verdict for the defendant.

A discussion of the law in a case such as this is to be found in the cases of Williar v. Nagle, 109 Md. 75, 71 A. 427, 16 Ann. Cas. 982, and Id., 113 Md. 614, 77 A. 680. In the latter case at page 618 of 113 Md., at page 682 of 77 A., the court said:

“This is the second time this case has been before us, the former decision being reported in 109 Md. 75, 71 A. 427 [16 Ann. Cas. 982]. We then held that, if *91 an architect is employed to prepare plans and specifications for a building which is not to cost more than a specified amount, he is not entitled to recover compensation for them unless the building can be constructed, in accordance with them, at a cost which is not greater than or reasonably near that amount, and that ordinarily whether it can be so constructed is a question for the jury.”

In Schwender v. Schrafft, 246 Mass. 543, 141 N. E. 511, at page 512, it is stated:

“One who proposes to build may in his contract of employment of an architect state an amount as the limit of cost of the building which is to be erected and provide that at least reasonable conformity to this requirement shall be a condition under which the services shall be rendered; or it may result from the terms of the agreement that the cost of the proposed building shall not be in excess of a definite maximum. If either result follows from the construction of the contract, liability for services is negatived unless the building can be built for an amount reasonably within restrictions upon expenditure. But a contract may be made in which the sum named is only by way of estimate, and where the instructions given require the preparation of plans and specifications for the construction of a building according to the expressed wishes of the owner as to size, method, and details of construction. In such a case, mere non-conformity in the cost of construction under the plans and specifications with the amount so estimated does not prevent a recovery, * * *.”

The evidence shows that Jay Dee Shoes, Inc. and the Modern Shoe Company, a body corporate, were closely connected in business and management. Bour is the president of the appellant, and Kaplan is the superintendent of the Modern Shoe Company. The latter is engaged in the manufacturing of shoes; the appellant sells the shoes that the latter manufactures, at retail. These corporations, according to the testimony of appellee, “were interested in making certain changes in *92 property they had acquired at 17 South Hanover Street, Baltimore, Maryland, * * * which was occupied as a garage, with various factory lofts above.” There was “a ramp going down into the basement”. They desired to convert this garage into a large, two-story, modern, and rather luxurious retail shoe store.

Bour and Kaplan consulted the appellee with a view of employing him to draw plans and specifications for, and supervise the conversion of this old garage into a retail shoe store, generally described above. Appellee’s offices are in New York City. Bour and Kaplan met Ostroff in his office in January, 1946. Thereafter Ostroff came to Baltimore and went over the premises with Bour and Kaplan and spent practically an entire day with them in going over the property. He was told by these men just what they wanted done, and he made suggestions to them as to how he thought the work should be done, and took measurements at the premises. They gave him “a small plot plan, which is a diagrammatic sketch of the building, that is, the particular area to be occupied”. He was with them on that occasion for six hours; he says “practically the whole day”. The inference is, from this testimony, that this project was gone over in detail by Bour and Kaplan with Ostroff, and he was informed what they wanted to do.

The matter of price was brought up, and Ostroff would not name a specific price for the completed project, because of general market conditions as to material and labor, which were fluctuating from day to day. Ostroff testified that he “told them I couldn’t, under the circumstances, give them any accurate price, but the job would run approximately between $25,000 and $30,000 and they told me they would like to keep as close to $25,000 as they could.” He then detailed what these people wanted done to the property.

Thereafter Bour saw in New York and in Florda some material which he wanted to use in this work, which was found by Ostroff. Ostroff submitted to* Bour preliminary sketches and a blue print “showing the work in *93 detail.” The preliminary- sketches, according to Ostroff, show how the work that was to be done appeared on paper. Bour went to Ostroff’s office in New York, with his associate, and discussed these drawings and the blueprint.

Ostroff says that upon his return from a visit to Baltimore he mailed to Bour, at his address in Baltimore, a copy of an agreement under which he would do this work. He says that when Bour came to New York to look at the sketches he had this agreement, which he had submitted to his lawyers, and certain changes were made therein by his lawyers, which Ostroff would not accept.

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59 A.2d 738, 191 Md. 87, 1948 Md. LEXIS 350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jay-dee-shoes-inc-v-ostroff-md-1948.