In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–1879
Submitted April 15, 2026—Filed May 15, 2026
Javonte Hines-Miller,
Appellee,
vs.
Ashlea Teter,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Christopher C.
Polking, judge.
A mother seeks further review of the court of appeals decision affirming
the denial of her petition to modify the physical care provisions of a custody
decree. Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment
Reversed and Case Remanded.
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Thomas L. Hillers (argued) of Hillers Legal, P.C., State Center, for
Jason Springer (argued) of Springer Law Firm, PLLC, Madrid, for appellee. 2
Christensen, Chief Justice.
“[I]f the legis[la]ture does not trust a domestic abuser to choose their
child’s dentist, it certainly does not trust that same abuser to care for the child
on a daily basis,” observed the dissenting court of appeals judge in this case.
And while that may be the case, the legislature’s statutory definitions and word
choice in Iowa Code chapter 598 say otherwise. Therefore, the rebuttable
presumption against awarding joint legal custody when a history of domestic
abuse exists under Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b) (2023) does not apply equally
against awarding primary physical care to a parent with a history of perpetrating
domestic abuse.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that a parent’s history of domestic abuse
is irrelevant in physical care determinations. In fact, it remains a significant
consideration, especially when the parent is a serial abuser. Because the district
court found that a substantial change in circumstances existed and that Ashlea
had provided evidence of stability and a home free of domestic violence, she
established herself as the superior parent. The district court should have granted
her petition to modify. Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals decision,
reverse the district court ruling, modify the decree to award the mother physical
care of the child, and remand for the district court to establish a visitation
schedule and calculate child support.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Ashlea Teter and Javonte Hines-Miller are parents to K.M., who was born
in 2016. They never married and eventually separated. They first sought a court
decision concerning legal custody and physical care of K.M. in 2019 when
Javonte petitioned for sole legal custody with “reasonable and liberal visitation
rights” for Ashlea. The district court issued a ruling on temporary matters in
August 2019 that ordered the parties to have joint legal custody of K.M. during 3
the pendency of the matter, with Ashlea having primary physical care. In that
ruling, the district court wrote, “[Javonte] acknowledges having hit [Ashlea], and
has some criminal history related to domestic abuse assault/assault. [Javonte]
was evasive in his testimony regarding abuse.” It also observed that “[e]ach party
has used the child as a pawn in an attempt to get the other to comply with their
wishes.”
The case proceeded to trial in December, and the district court entered a
decree in January 2020 that granted joint legal custody but named Javonte as
K.M.’s primary caretaker. Although it found each parent was a suitable
caretaker, it maintained that Javonte was more attentive to K.M.’s needs and did
a better job supporting K.M.’s relationship with Ashlea, even though both
parents demonstrated hostility toward each other.
The district court reached this decision despite Javonte’s history of
domestic abuse, which was an issue at trial and remains an issue in this case.
At the 2019 trial, Javonte acknowledged the following three instances of assault:
• 2012: Javonte was convicted of disorderly conduct and took an
eight-hour assault behavior class while he was still in high school
because he hit a fan, which then hit a girl he was dating.
• 2015: Javonte was charged with felony domestic assault including
strangulation with Ashlea as the victim. His testimony was “that Ashlea
got physical and slapped him”; he then clarified, “[W]ell both of us kind
of [did].” The charges were dismissed after Ashlea signed and filed an
affidavit stating that nothing had happened, that she was unharmed
and not afraid of Javonte, and that the charge was not fair. At the 2019
trial over legal custody, she testified that Javonte pressured her to say 4
that nothing happened, and he had pushed her to the floor and over a
couch, strangled her, and thrown her to the ground by her hair.
• 2016: Javonte pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault and completed
twenty-six weeks of batterer’s education for an attack on Ashlea. He
claimed that he tried to leave with K.M., but Ashlea blocked him and
spat in his face, so he responded by headbutting Ashlea. Javonte was
later granted a deferred judgment and had his conviction expunged.
In examining these incidents, the district court “found the testimony of
each party to be not very credible,” given their “great hostility to each other.”
Regarding Ashlea’s 2015 affidavit denying Javonte’s abuse, the district court
noted, “This sets up the classic conundrum of was she lying then or is she lying
now? . . . It was the uncontroverted testimony of Javonte that Ashlea had a
friend with her during the incident. Ashlea called no witnesses to corroborate
her version of events.” It also remarked that “Javonte called several witnesses
who corroborated large and important parts of his testimony,” which left the
district court “with the impression that if Ashlea had evidence and testimony
favorable to herself, she could and would have presented it.”
While Javonte’s “abusive incidents” gave the district court “pause,” it
determined Javonte had rebutted the presumption against awarding joint legal
custody when a history of domestic abuse exists under Iowa Code
section 598.41(1)(b). It explained that the 2012 incident occurred when Javonte
was still in high school, did not involve Ashlea, and was characterized as
disorderly conduct rather than domestic assault. The district court again
documented that Ashlea recanted her 2015 allegations against Javonte and 5
“either lied in that sworn statement or lied under oath to the court at trial.”1
Finally, it gave Javonte credit for successfully completing a deferred judgment in
the 2016 case and documented the absence of any incidents of assault since.
A. 2021 Modification Action. About a year and a half after the district
court issued this decree, Ashlea petitioned to modify the physical care provisions
partly due to a new May 2020 domestic abuse charge against Javonte involving
a girlfriend with whom he had been living. On November 30, 2020, Javonte
pleaded guilty to charges of stalking in violation of a no-contact order and
domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. He received a suspended sentence
but initially spent some time in jail. The district court presiding over Ashlea’s
modification petition found “no evidence that this situation affected [K.M.] in any
way.”
It continued to document the parents’ hostility toward each other and
explained that it did “not believe that these convictions constitute a substantial
change in circumstances” because they “appear to be an isolated incident that
is not likely to reoccur, particularly considering that it happened in May of
2020—more than a year and a half before the modification trial.” The district
court also found “it significant that the victim of this offense is no longer part of
Javonte’s life and that [K.M.] was not present during this incident and was
apparently unaffected by it.” Plus, Javonte’s girlfriend at the time of the
modification trial, Kaylee, “testified that Javonte has never been violent with her
and that there is not violence in the home.”
Moreover, the district court rejected Ashlea’s claims that Javonte failed to
support her relationship with K.M. Although it found neither parent “particularly
1We have previously acknowledged that the complex dynamics of domestic abuse can
lead victims to recant, ask to drop the criminal case, refuse to testify, or downplay their risks. See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 187–88 (Iowa 2016). 6
credible,” it found Javonte’s witnesses contradicting Ashlea’s claims credible. It
also based this credibility finding on Javonte’s testimony that “Ashlea has
contacted [H]HS multiple times to make reports about him but these reports
have all been unfounded”2 and an audio recording in which Ashlea tells Javonte
to get off her and claims he is trying to sexually assault her—while also laughing.
In sum, the district court concluded Ashlea failed to meet her burden and denied
the modification petition.
B. Current Modification Action. In February 2023, Ashlea petitioned
again to modify the physical care portion of the custody decree. She did so based
on Javonte’s guilty plea to yet another charge of domestic assault stemming from
his January 2023 altercation with his fiancée, Kaylee, whom he later married in
July 2024. According to police reports,
[Javonte] had attempted to pull an engagement ring off of [Kaylee’s] finger causing swelling and redness to the left ring finger of [Kaylee]. [Javonte] also pulled [Kaylee] down by the hair and got on top of her and put both hands around [Kaylee’s] neck which caused [Kaylee] to feel as if she was going to pass out. [Kaylee] stated that she could not get up immediately after feeling as though her eyes were rolling into [the] back of her head. [Kaylee] has visible marks on both sides of her neck.
The report also noted that the altercation “happened in bed where two
children were present” and “[t]he children were woken up due to the altercation.”
K.M. was not in the home at the time, and the two children involved were Javonte
and Kaylee’s young daughters. There is a thirty-minute bodycam video in the
record of the police responding to Kaylee about the altercation, along with
photographs of Kaylee’s injuries. Javonte pleaded guilty to domestic assault
2It is unclear from our record on appeal whether there was any other evidence of these
unfounded reports during the 2021 modification action. 7
causing bodily injury, received probation, and was ordered to complete a
batterer’s education class.
The modification trial occurred on October 2, 2024. At the time, Ashlea
had an eleven-year-old daughter who lived with her full-time and a nine-year-old
son who was in her care every other weekend. They had lived in a home in Boone
for approximately four years with her fiancé, Brandon, and his six-year-old
daughter. Ashlea worked night shifts as a tech for the Boone County Hospital,
and her fiancé was a member of the National Guard and watched the kids while
she worked.
Javonte and Kaylee lived in Ames with K.M. and their two daughters, who
were two and three years old. He had worked for Builders FirstSource in
Des Moines for approximately seven years, and his wife was a merchandise store
manager in Ames. Javonte has another child who lived out of state as of the 2021
modification action. According to the record, Javonte is not on the child’s birth
certificate but provides the child’s mother with financial support.
The district court heard testimony from Ashlea, Javonte, Kaylee, and
Kaylee’s parents. Ashlea testified to her concern that K.M. was struggling with
anger but that she could not enroll him in anger management over Javonte’s
objection. She discussed how K.M. has been in three different school districts
and lived in multiple places with Javonte over the past five years, stating, “He
went from Madrid to an apartment in Ankeny, back to Madrid. He’s lived in
Huxley and then Story City, back to Madrid, and now Ames.”
Ashlea testified that she planned to maintain K.M. in his current activities
if she received primary care and enroll him in anger management. She also
claimed that her home would be a better environment for K.M. because “[t]here’s
always either Brandon or I at home. The siblings are there. We have never had
any physical altercations or anything like that in our house.” Additionally, Ashlea 8
claimed that K.M. was supposed to be at Javonte’s house on the night of the
January 2023 domestic assault, but he spent the night at Javonte’s friend
Lindsey’s house.
Javonte acknowledged that K.M. had moved around schools, claiming that
he moved K.M. from Roland-Story due to bullying and then to Ames because he
and Kaylee “wanted a fresh start.” Regarding the 2023 domestic assault causing
bodily injury to which Javonte pleaded guilty, he admitted trying to take the ring
off Kaylee’s finger but downplayed it, explaining, “So she like started pushing me
back or whatever so I -- when I tried to take the ring off her finger, her finger got
swollen, I guess, from me trying to pull it off. And then I ended up just leaving,
getting my keys from her and just leaving. And then I had a warrant.”
He claimed that this arrest warrant was the result of Kaylee’s dad being
friends with a police officer, whom Kaylee had texted about the assault. Javonte
denied the strangulation, getting on top of Kaylee, pulling her hair, and that the
daughters were in the room. He testified that he and Kaylee are in a good place,
proclaiming, “We literally don’t argue with each other. We bicker, but we get over
it. There’s no screaming matches.”
Javonte challenged Ashlea’s claim that K.M. struggled with anger,
maintaining that K.M. was never aggressive at his house. When asked about a
school report that K.M. needs to work on keeping his body to himself, Javonte
reasoned, “[B]oys are boys. They hang on each other. It’s not him hitting anybody
or pushing anybody.” Nevertheless, he did mention a time when K.M. got mad at
football and threw his helmet on the ground, then walked the whole time after
the coach ordered him to run to the pole and back for punishment. Javonte
explained that this is why he makes K.M. run laps as discipline.
Kaylee testified that Javonte did not choke her and denied having any
marks on her neck despite the photographs in the record to the contrary. She 9
acknowledged the police bodycam footage but declared, “I lied about him choking
me ‘cause I was upset and he didn’t come home and it was in a moment.”
According to Kaylee’s description of the incident, they “had a disagreement and
he tried to leave, and I stood in front of the door so he couldn’t leave.” She also
said that he “tried to get my ring off my finger, and he pushed me.” These
explanations contradict what Kaylee previously said in the thirty-minute
bodycam footage when she initially reported the incident to police.
Similarly, Kaylee’s mother testified that she “just knew that there must
have been a disagreement or something and it kind of sounded like maybe -- I
don’t know the details, but maybe that Kaylee got pushed.” The district court
reported that “Kaylee’s mom was extremely evasive and not at all credible,” and
neither of Kaylee’s parents was aware that the 2023 conviction was Javonte’s
fourth for domestic abuse.
The district court subsequently denied Ashlea’s modification request for
primary physical care. It concluded that Javonte’s history of domestic abuse
created a substantial change in circumstances “because the court has twice
anticipated that Javonte’s domestic abuse incidents were isolated, and after
successful completion of the domestic abuse class he would not repeat such
behavior.” However, it found no evidence that Javonte’s convictions had “a direct
negative effect on [K.M.],” noting that “[w]hile Ashlea indicates she has seen
aggressive behavior in [K.M.] at her house, this is not indicated by the most
recent report card to be a problem at school,” and that “[t]here is also not
evidence to show it is a problem at Javonte’s house.”
The district court remarked that Javonte’s history of domestic violence
“made this a terribly close case where it otherwise would not have been.” It
framed the issue as whether “Ashlea’s lack of a history of domestic abuse [was]
enough to make her a superior parent at this time to Javonte” and concluded 10
that her lack of history was not enough. Moreover, the district court criticized
Ashlea for being “focused on the flaws of Javonte” instead of focusing on proving
that she is the superior parent. While it acknowledged Ashlea’s years of stable
housing, employment, and relationship with her fiancé, the district court stated
that it did not know much else about her or her fiancé and was concerned that
Ashlea did not have primary care of her other son for reasons unknown to the
district court.3
Finally, the district court wrote that Ashlea would likely “continue doing
what Javonte has as far as schooling and extracurriculars like football” and
found no evidence that one parent was more supportive or a better
communicator than the other. In declining to modify the decree, it stated that it
lacked “a clear idea of what parenting strengths Ashlea would otherwise bring
that are not matched by what Javonte is doing.”
Ashlea filed a timely appeal, which we transferred to the court of appeals.
In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. A
dissenting judge would have reversed the district court, explaining, “Javonte’s
domestic violence presents a great enough threat to his child’s safety and
development that the basic display of stability presented by the child’s mother,
Ashlea Teter, demonstrates her superior ability to minister to the needs of the
child.” We granted Ashlea’s further review application and review the case de
novo. In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 332 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). “While
we are not bound by the fact-findings of the district court, we give them weight,
especially as to credibility determinations.” Id. (quoting Thorpe v. Hostetler,
949 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020)).
3The district court’s negative conclusion about Ashlea because she did not have primary
care of her other son despite no evidence is perplexing considering it had no concern over Javonte’s additional child living in another state—also for reasons unknown in the record. 11
II. Analysis.
Ashlea maintains that the district court should have modified the decree
to award her primary physical care. As the party seeking modification, Ashlea
had to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances have
so materially and substantially changed since the decree was entered that the
requested modification is in [K.M.’s] best interests.” In re Marriage of Frazier,
1 N.W.3d 775, 781 (Iowa 2024). She also had to prove that she could minister to
K.M.’s well-being more effectively than Javonte, as physical care decisions
“should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Kisting, 6 N.W.3d at 332
(quoting In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015)). Our primary
focus is “what is best for the child.” Id. (quoting Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 34).
Here, the district court determined that Ashlea met her burden on the first
part by establishing a substantial change in circumstances since the decree
“because the court has twice anticipated that Javonte’s domestic abuse incidents
were isolated, and after successful completion of the domestic abuse class he
would not repeat such behavior.” Javonte concedes as much on appeal. Thus,
the issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that Ashlea
failed to demonstrate her ability to provide superior parenting to K.M.
A. The Rebuttable Presumption Against Joint Legal Custody in Iowa
Code Section 598.41. At the outset, we must clarify whether there is a
rebuttable presumption against awarding physical care to a parent with a history
of domestic abuse. In In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa
2007), we explained that “Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to
physical care decisions,” as opposed to legal custody decisions. Iowa Code
section 598.41 lists factors that the district court must consider in determining
“what custody arrangement . . . is in the best interest of the minor child.” Iowa 12
Code § 598.41(3).4 Relevant here is Iowa Code section 598.41(3)(j), which
requires the district court to consider “[w]hether a history of domestic abuse, as
defined in section 236.2, exists.” Additionally, under Iowa Code
section 598.41(1)(b), “if the court finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a
rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists.” If this
history “is not rebutted, [it] shall outweigh consideration of any other factor
specified in subsection 3 in the determination of the awarding of custody under
this subsection.” Id. § 598.41(2)(c).
Despite stating in Hansen that “Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not
directly apply to physical care decisions,” 733 N.W.2d at 696, we also held in
that same case, “Evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given
considerable weight in determining custody and gives rise to a presumption
against joint physical care,” id. at 698. In doing so, we cited Iowa Code
section 598.41(2)(c). Id. This has created confusion in the lower courts over
whether there is a rebuttable presumption involving a history of domestic abuse
that applies to disputes over physical care, not just legal custody. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Wieland, No. 22–0541, 2022 WL 17826932, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 21, 2022) (“[T]he question of whether the rebuttable presumption against
‘joint custody’ contained in section 598.41(1)(b) applies only to legal-custody—not
physical-care—decisions seems to be unanswered . . . .”).5
4Iowa Code chapter 600B governs this case because Ashlea and Javonte never married,
but we apply Iowa Code section 598.41 to determine their legal custody and physical care arrangements. See Iowa Code § 600B.40(2). 5In In re Marriage of Wieland, the court of appeals summarized the conflicting caselaw in
the following corresponding footnote: In approaching these murky waters, we have found language in cases supporting each side of this argument. Compare In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa 1997) (affirming that section 598.41(1)(b) “merely creates a rebuttable presumption against joint custody”), In re Marriage of Knecht, No. 10-0240, 2010 WL 3894449, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding the rebuttable presumption involving a history of domestic abuse did not apply in a dispute over 13
Whether Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b) also provides a rebuttable
presumption against joint physical care is a matter of statutory interpretation.
We will not resort to our rules of construction when the statutory text and
meaning are clear. Est. of Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc.,
987 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Iowa 2023). Moreover, “When the legislature has defined
words in a statute—that is, when the legislature has opted to ‘act as its own
lexicographer’—those definitions bind us.” In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa
2014) (quoting State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010)).
“[U]nambiguous statutory language is the strongest evidence of the legislature’s
intent,” id., and the legislature’s explicit definitions for certain terms in Iowa
Code section 598.41 prevent us from applying the rebuttable presumption
against joint legal custody to physical care determinations when there is a
history of domestic abuse.
The legislature provided statutory definitions that distinguish “custody”
from “physical care.” Under chapter 598, “joint custody” and “custody” both refer
to “legal custody of a minor child,” which includes but is “not limited to decision
the award of physical care, but noting the parents agreed to share legal custody), and In re Marriage of Mulford, No. 03-1259, 2004 WL 894566, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004) (noting the a history of domestic abuse might give rise to a rebuttable presumption of sole custody but that, in the decision over physical care, it is a significant factor to consider as opposed to a presumption), with Stieneke v. Sargent, No. 15-1643, 2016 WL 2745058, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (finding evidence of domestic abuse creates a rebuttable presumption against an award of joint custody). And there is the inconsistent language found in In re Marriage of Hansen, where the court determined that “Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to physical care decisions” but also said after citing this same section, that “[e]vidence of untreated domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining custody and gives rise to a presumption against joint physical care.” 733 N.W.2d 683, 696, 698 (Iowa 2007). Wieland, 2022 WL 17826932, at *4 n.6. This confusion is on display again in the conflicting majority and dissenting opinions from the court of appeals in this case. The majority concluded that “the rebuttable presumption discussed in section 598.41(1)(b) pertains to the award of legal custody, not physical care,” while the dissent declared that the presumption’s applicability to physical care “is a question left for another day.” 14
making affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular
activities, and religious instruction.” Iowa Code § 598.1(5); accord id. § 598.1(3).
In contrast, “ ‘Physical care’ means the right and responsibility to maintain a
home for the minor child and provide for the routine care of the child.” Id.
§ 598.1(7). Despite separately defining “custody” and “physical care,” the
legislature chose to only create “a rebuttable presumption against the awarding
of joint custody” when a history of domestic abuse exists. Id. § 598.41(1)(b); see
also id. § 598.41(2)(c) (“A finding by the court that a history of domestic abuse
exists, . . . which is not rebutted, shall outweigh consideration of any other factor
specified in subsection 3 in the determination of the awarding of custody under
this subsection.”). This is even though other portions of Iowa Code
section 598.41 establish when a district court may award “joint physical care”
and what that entails. Id. § 598.41(5)(a)–(b).
We question whether the legislature realized that this presumption applies
only to legal custody decisions and does not include physical care. Yet, “We
cannot allow legislative intent to change the meaning of a statute if the words
used by the legislature will not allow for such a meaning.” State v. Mathias,
936 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Iowa 2019); see also State v. Rhodes, 6 N.W.3d 741, 752
(Iowa 2024) (“We cannot give effect to Iowa Code section 724.25(2) by reading out
the language the legislature chose—‘as used in this chapter’—while reading in
language—‘antique firearm’—that does not appear in section 724.26.”).
The legislature chose to ascribe different meanings to “custody” and
“physical care,” and it only created a statutory rebuttable presumption for legal
custody determinations, not physical care determinations. “[W]e ascertain
legislative intent from the words the legislature used, rather than from what one
could argue it meant to say.” Zimmer v. Vander Waal, 780 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Iowa
2010); see also Doe v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 786 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Iowa 15
2010) (“We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a
statute under the guise of construction.”). Thus, the rebuttable presumption
against joint legal custody under Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b), if the court
finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, does not apply to physical care
determinations.
Notably, other states have specifically included physical care in their
statutes implementing a rebuttable presumption against awarding legal custody
or physical care to a parent with a history of perpetrating domestic abuse.6 Our
legislature can do the same if it sees fit. Nevertheless, as we explain below, the
absence of this rebuttable presumption in physical care determinations does not
render a history of domestic abuse irrelevant. To the extent that the district court
erred in applying this presumption, remand is unnecessary because it also
concluded that Javonte rebutted the presumption and declined to modify the
decree.
B. Whether Javonte’s History of Domestic Abuse Warranted
Modification of the Physical Care Arrangement. Even though the rebuttable
presumption in Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b) does not apply to physical care
determinations, our appellate courts have consistently held that the factors
listed in that statute—including whether there is a history of domestic abuse—are
6See, e.g., Ala. Code § 30–3–133 (2026) (“In every proceeding where there is at issue a
dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption by the court that it is in the best interest of the child to reside with the parent who is not a perpetrator of domestic or family violence in the location of that parent’s choice, within or outside the state.”); Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(g) (2025) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 705A(b) (2026) (“Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no child shall primarily reside with a perpetrator of domestic violence.”); Minn. Stat. § 518.17(1)(b)(9) (2026) (“[T]he court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents.”). 16
relevant in determining which physical care arrangement is best for the child.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 2020) (“[I]n this case,
domestic abuse was a factor to be considered in connection with the question of
joint physical care of the couple’s children.”); Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696; In re
Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Iowa 2007) (“[T]he existence of
domestic abuse is a significant factor in determining whether joint physical care
is appropriate.”); In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Iowa Ct. App.
1997) (“[W]e believe evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given
considerable weight in determining the primary caretaker, and under some
circumstances even foreclose an award of primary care to a spouse who
batters.”). Additionally, we give “[e]vidence of untreated domestic
battering . . . considerable weight.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 698; see also
Daniels, 568 N.W.2d at 55. Ashlea maintains that the district court erred in
concluding that she did not demonstrate a superior ability to minister to K.M.’s
needs. On our de novo review, we agree. See Kisting, 6 N.W.3d at 332; see also
Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (“De novo review means we review
the entire record and ‘decide anew the issues properly preserved for appellate
review.’ ” (quoting Struve v. Struve, 930 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2019))).
“The objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in
the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and
mentally, and to social maturity.” Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Hansen,
733 N.W.2d at 695). The district court concluded that Javonte was most likely
to provide this because K.M. was “doing well” in his placement, and “Ashlea’s
lack of a history of domestic abuse [was not] enough to make her a superior
parent at this time to Javonte.” It also explained that there was “not evidence of
a direct negative effect” of Javonte’s domestic abuse on K.M. 17
Frankly, the district court’s focus on the absence of a “direct negative
effect” of the domestic abuse on the child and its subsequent conclusion
contradict what our appellate courts have said for more than thirty years on the
matter. In In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994),
the court of appeals discussed how “[c]hildren raised in homes touched by
domestic abuse are often left with deep scars, revealed in the form of increased
anxiety, insecurity and a greater likelihood for later problems in interpersonal
relationships.” It cited studies estimating that “child abuse is present in one-half
of homes where spousal abuse is present” and reporting that “[i]t is believed that
about 70% of batterers grew up in violent homes.” Id. at 615 n.2. The court of
appeals reiterated this a few years later, declaring, “Domestic abuse is, in every
respect, dramatically opposed to a child’s best interests.” Daniels, 568 N.W.2d
at 55. These findings still ring true. See In re C.C.W., 440 P.3d 749, 754–55 (Utah
Ct. App. 2019) (discussing and citing various sources indicating “that a parent’s
acts of domestic violence can have adverse impacts on a child, even if that child
is not the direct object of such violence, and even if the child does not directly
witness the violence”).
In a related context, we held that a father’s physical abuse of other family
members and history of domestic violence—without physical abuse of the child
at issue—supported the child’s CINA adjudication because the child was
imminently likely to suffer harmful effects from the father’s behavior. In re L.H.,
904 N.W.2d 145, 152–53 (Iowa 2017). In doing so, we cited studies showing that
children from violent homes are susceptible to impaired social competence and
posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. at 153. We also stressed that the child’s
parents “continue[d] to minimize and/or deny the presence of domestic violence
in their relationship,” akin to the minimization that Javonte and Kaylee
presented in their testimony here. Id. 18
We explained that this failure of the parents in L.H. to address their role
in the abuse was an important aspect of the parents’ care for the child that could
hurt their chances of regaining care. Id.; see also In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144,
150–51 (Iowa 2002) (noting that a “parent’s failure to address his or her role in
the abuse may hurt the parents’ chances of regaining custody and care of their
children” and upholding termination of parental rights for a parent due to the
parent’s continuous refusal “to comply with the case permanency plan”).
Likewise, our appellate courts frequently have upheld decisions not to return
children to their parents due to unresolved domestic abuse issues. See, e.g., In re
B.C., No. 25–1179, 2025 WL 2924724, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2025);
In re R.E., No. 25–0088, 2025 WL 1704916, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025);
In re T.W., No. 20–0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).
In sum, a parent’s history of serial domestic abuse is a significant
consideration in physical care determinations regardless of whether the parent
directly perpetrated that abuse of the child or in the child’s presence. This does
not mean that any evidence of domestic abuse automatically precludes the
offending parent from primary care of the child. Rather, in deciding how much
weight to give a parent’s history of domestic abuse, courts should consider the
following factors: (1) how much time has passed since the last act of abuse;
(2) whether the parent has acknowledged their role in the abuse; and (3) what
steps the parent has taken beyond mere compliance with a court-ordered
treatment to prevent future abuse, including addressing any substance abuse
that has contributed to the parent’s abusive actions. See In re Marriage of Ford,
563 N.W.2d 629, 632–33 (Iowa 1997).
For example, in In re Marriage of Ford, we affirmed the district court’s
decision to award the parents joint legal custody of the children with the father 19
as their primary caretaker despite his history of domestic abuse. Id. at 633–34.
We explained,
It is undisputed that the last incident of domestic abuse occurred over four years ago. Kelvin has acknowledged this abuse and states that he has taken steps to deal with it. He provided credible testimony that he sought the support of his family and church in correcting his problem. Additionally, the record indicates that Kelvin has overcome his drug and alcohol dependency, dependencies that he admits contributed to his violence. The fact that Kelvin never attended a formal treatment program does not necessarily mean that he has not overcome his problem. He has subsequently received his college degree, has full-time employment, and has become an active member of his church. Testimony was adduced by church friends and family that Kelvin has matured and has improved in these areas of his life. His testimony certainly convinced the district court and suggests to us that the domestic abuse is no longer a problem.
Id. at 632–33.
Applying those same factors in Ford here, we find that Javonte’s testimony
and the other evidence in this case have not convinced us that his domestic
abuse is no longer a problem. First, the modification trial occurred a little over a
year and a half after Javonte’s last criminal charges were filed. While there is no
evidence of additional abuse in that time, this offers little consolation,
considering Javonte’s history of domestic incidents dates back to 2012.
The record shows that Javonte has escalated from his first conviction—which
the district court characterized as not involving a “direct physical assault”—to
“g[etting] physical” in 2015; headbutting in 2016; stalking and domestic assault
causing bodily injury in 2020; and, most recently, pulling his now-wife by the
hair, climbing on top of her, and strangling her in bed next to their two young
children. It was a mere coincidence that K.M. was not home at the time of the
most recent episode. 20
Second, Javonte has yet to fully acknowledge his role in the abuse. Despite
his guilty plea and the police reports, photographs, and bodycam footage to the
contrary, Javonte continued to minimize and deny any domestic violence issues
with his wife during the modification trial. He also testified that he and Kaylee
were currently in a good place, stating, “We literally don’t argue with each other.
We bicker, but we get over it. There’s no screaming matches.” This evidence does
not suggest that Javonte has meaningfully addressed his domestic violence
issues, especially given that the district court found Javonte and Kaylee’s
“denials [were] not credible[] and unconvincing.”
Finally, the only steps Javonte has taken to prevent future abuse were
court-ordered. He offered no testimony on any other steps he has taken to
meaningfully address his history of abuse and did not provide credible testimony
from anyone else in his life to show that he “has matured and has improved in
these areas of his life.” Id. at 633. It also does not help his case that he has
reoffended multiple times since he first completed the court-mandated batterer’s
education class.
Consequently, we fail to see how the district court concluded that this
“history of domestic abuse,” as the district court remarked, was not “enough to
make [Ashlea] a superior parent at this time to Javonte,” let alone how Javonte
rebutted the presumption against him that the district court erroneously
applied. By all appearances, the district court placed Ashlea and Javonte on
equal footing in reaching its decision, noting Ashlea’s lack of domestic abuse
history was “the only factor in regard to which the court finds evidence that she
would do better than Javonte.”
However, a household free from domestic abuse was not the only way
Ashlea would parent differently. She also sought to address her concerns about
K.M.’s aggressive behavior. The district court’s finding that there was no 21
“evidence of a direct negative effect” on K.M. from Javonte’s abuse dismissed
Ashlea’s testimony that K.M. was showing aggressive behavior. It reasoned that
K.M.’s report card did not list it as a problem, and there was “not evidence to
show it is a problem at Javonte’s house.” Considering the district court found
Javonte, Kaylee, and Kaylee’s mother not credible in their testimony about
Javonte’s abuse, its reliance on their testimony to conclude that K.M.’s
aggression was not an issue is troubling.
Significantly, there is a 2021 email to Ashlea in the record from the
Roland-Story counselor who met with K.M. The counselor wrote, “[A]s of right
now nothing is coming up that I can say might be causing the aggression. I can
only say, I think going back and forth is hard for many kids in this situation and
it comes out in different ways. This could be his.” Javonte also testified about a
situation in which K.M. got upset at football, threw his helmet, and then ignored
the coach’s order to run as discipline by choosing to walk instead. Moreover, the
district court acknowledged that even though Ashlea signed K.M. up for
counseling when he was attending school in Madrid, Javonte canceled it.
Even assuming that aggression was not an issue for K.M. and Ashlea
“would continue doing what Javonte has as far as schooling and extracurriculars
like football,” the district court’s focus on the “general paucity in the record of
the positives that Ashlea is prepared to bring” ignores longstanding precedent
that “stability is the trump card” in modification cases. Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 7
(quoting Rolling v. Hoffman, No. 14–0102, 2014 WL 2600315, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 11, 2014)). The court of appeals illustrated this in Thorpe, in which it
emphasized the mother’s instability based on her “history of short-term
relationships with men and multiple changes in residence as a factor supporting
her instability.” Id. at 8. The record shows a similar sense of instability for
Javonte, and “we look to [that] past performance because it may indicate the 22
quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re C.K.,
558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
The testimony at the modification hearing showed that Javonte, and thus
K.M., had lived in multiple places over the past five years. This included moving
from Madrid to Ankeny before moving back to Madrid, stopping in Huxley and
Story City, then back to Madrid again before moving to Javonte’s current
residence with Kaylee in Ames. He explained that he and Kaylee moved to Ames
because they “wanted a fresh start.” The record also shows that K.M. has been
in three different school districts: Madrid, Roland-Story, and Ames.
In contrast, the district court observed that Ashlea maintained stable
employment as a medical tech and had lived in the same home with her fiancé
and their three other children since 2020. She testified that she planned to
maintain K.M.’s schooling and extracurriculars, and nothing in the record
suggests that she is an inappropriate caregiver. So to answer the district court’s
question of whether “Ashlea’s lack of a history of domestic abuse [is] enough to
make her a superior parent,” under these circumstances, the answer is
overwhelmingly “yes.”
III. Conclusion.
For these reasons, we vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse the
district court ruling, modify the decree to award Ashlea physical care of the child,
and remand for the district court to establish a visitation schedule and calculate
child support.
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment