Javon Justin Keester v. Heartman, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 31, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00566
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JAVON JUSTIN KEESTER, Case No. 3:24-cv-00566-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 HEARTMAN, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Javon Justin Keester brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. (ECF 14 No. 1-1.) On August 28, 2025, this Court ordered Plaintiff to update his address by 15 September 26, 2025. (ECF No. 5.) That deadline expired without an updated address 16 from Plaintiff. The law librarian returned the mail as undeliverable noting that inmate 17 Levya was at Lovelock Correctional Center. (ECF No. 6.) Upon further inspection, the 18 Court found it erroneously docketed Plaintiff’s inmate number as 1258076, which was 19 inmate Leyva’s number, instead of 1258075, Plaintiff’s number. (ECF No. 7.) Consulting 20 the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) inmate database, the Court found 21 Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated. (Id.) On September 30, 2025, The Court extended 22 the deadline for Plaintiff to update his address to October 30, 2025. (Id.) Again, that 23 deadline expired without an updated address from the Plaintiff. 24 I. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 26 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 27 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 28 2 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 3 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 4 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 5 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 6 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 7 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 8 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 10 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 12 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 13 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 14 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 15 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 16 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 17 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 18 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 19 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 20 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 21 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 22 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 23 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 24 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 25 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 26 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 27 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 28 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 1 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 2 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without 3 || the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Plaintiff case-related documents, 4 || filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter another order setting another deadline. 5 || But without an updated address, the likelinood that this additional order would even reach 6 || Plaintiff is low, especially since he has been released from custody, so issuing a third 7 || order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court's finite resources. 8 || Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 9 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 10 |] Ul. CONCLUSION 11 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 12 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 13 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file an updated address in compliance with this 14 || Court's September 30, 2025, order. 15 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 16 || case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to 17 || pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his 18 || current address. 19 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) 20 || is denied as moot. 21 DATED THIS 315! Day of October 2025 22 23 24 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28