Javion Nesaj Peroune v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: September 23, 2025
• Docket: 1357242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien, Malveaux and Frucci UNPUBLISHED

JAVION NESAJ PEROUNE MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1357-24-2 PER CURIAM SEPTEMBER 23, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY Richard S. Wallerstein, Jr., Judge

(Anthony L. White; Anthony L. White, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Angelique Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, the court convicted Javion Nesaj Peroune of grand larceny, wearing

a mask in public, and carrying a concealed weapon. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is

insufficient to support his convictions for grand larceny and wearing a mask in public; but he does

not contest the concealed weapon conviction. After examining the briefs and record, the panel

unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.”

Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the convictions but remand the case for the

limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the sentencing summary of the final order.1 See

Code § 8.01-428(B).

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 The “Sentencing Summary” of the sentencing order incorrectly states that Peroune was sentenced to 7 years and 12 months of incarceration with 6 years and 6 months suspended. In fact, Peroune received just one year of active incarceration, as reflected in the body of the sentencing order. Accordingly, we remand the matter for the sole purpose of correcting this clerical error. See Code § 8.01-428(B). BACKGROUND

“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth,’

the prevailing party below.” Diaz v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 286, 295 (2024) (quoting

Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc)). “That principle requires us to

‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc)).

Late at night on November 22, 2023, Justin Tanner, a food delivery driver, arrived at an

apartment complex to deliver an order. As Tanner walked from his car, he heard “doors slam and

tires screech.” Tanner saw his car being driven from the parking lot. Tanner called the police and

reported his car as stolen.

A short time later, Officer Glenn Keough saw Tanner’s car driving on Interstate 64. He

followed the car, and when the car exited the interstate and stopped at a stop sign, Officer Keough

activated his emergency lights. The car did not stop, and Officer Keough turned on his siren as

other officers joined the pursuit. The passenger turned and looked at Officer Keough as the car

“took off at a high rate of speed.” The car sped through a red light without stopping and accelerated

to nearly 100 miles per hour. Using his public address system, Officer Keough commanded the

driver to stop, but the driver continued to flee. Eventually, the car crashed, and the driver and

passenger exited and ran in different directions.

Officer Noori Resen found Peroune “sitting in a bush” behind a tire store building. Peroune

was wearing a mask covering his entire face except his eyes. He wore a glove on his right hand,

and he admitted to Officer Resen that he had a firearm. Another officer found a nine-millimeter

pistol in Peroune’s pants. Peroune denied that he owned the gun and refused to give the officers any

identifying information.

-2- Meanwhile, Officer Keough located the car’s driver, Takaree Fields, a short distance away.

Fields possessed a hammer, a screwdriver, and a USB device. Tanner did not know either Peroune

or Fields.

The court convicted Peroune of grand larceny, wearing a mask in public, and carrying a

concealed weapon. Peroune appeals.

ANALYSIS

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is, upon

review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512).

Peroune argues that the evidence failed to prove that he committed grand larceny as either a

principal in the first or second degree. “Larceny is a common law crime, although it is regulated by

statute.” Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 957 (1991); see Code § 18.2-95. It is defined

“as ‘the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to

another, without [the owner’s] assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof

permanently.’” Bryant v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 183 (1994). To establish a wrongful

taking, the Commonwealth must prove that there was “a carrying away or asportation of the

-3- property.” Id. At the time of the asportation, the thief must act with “the intent to permanently

deprive the owner” of that property. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518 (1998).

Significantly, “[b]ecause larceny is a continuing offense, anyone who knows that personal

property is stolen and assists in its transportation or disposition is guilty of larceny.” Williams v.

Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 638, 643 (2010). Here, the evidence proved that Peroune and Fields

took Tanner’s car from the apartment complex without Tanner’s permission and continued to

occupy it afterwards.

“A principal in the first degree is the actual perpetrator of the crime.” Farmer v.

Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 402, 414 (2013) (quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va.

451, 482 (2005)). “A principal in the second degree is one not the perpetrator, but present, aiding

and abetting the act done, or keeping watch or guard at some convenient distance.” Dunn v.

Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 611, 617 (2008) (en banc) (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va.

96, 99 (1942)). Under Code § 18.2-18, regarding a felony, one who acts as a principal in the

second degree “may be indicted, tried, convicted[,] and punished in all respects as if a principal

in the first degree.” Further, “[t]here may be more than one principal in the first degree.”

Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 774, 781 (1991). In this case, the court found that

Peroune acted as a principal in the first degree and that “alternatively,” Peroune was a principal

in the second degree.

“[T]he unexplained possession of recently stolen goods permits an inference of larceny

by the possessor.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485, 504 (2015) (alteration in original)

(quoting Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251 (1987)). For the presumption to arise,

“the possession must be exclusive, but ‘[o]ne can be in exclusive possession of an item when he

jointly possesses it with another,’ as long as ‘the accused was consciously asserting at least a

possessory interest in the stolen property or was exercising dominion over [it].’” Williams, 56

-4- Va. App. at 644 (alterations in original) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 13

(1997)). Further, anyone “who knows that personal property is stolen and assists in its

transportation or disposition is guilty of larceny.” Id. (quoting Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223

Va. 564, 568 (1982)).

Here, Peroune and Fields were in joint, unexplained possession of the recently stolen car.

Peroune occupied the stolen vehicle, looked back at the officers during the chase, fled the scene

after Fields crashed the car, possessed a firearm during the incident, and hid from the officers.

He had a close relationship with his cohort and made no attempt to stop Fields from fleeing from

the police in the stolen vehicle, which reached speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. Peroune also

tried to hide his identity by wearing a mask, hiding in shrubbery, and refusing to reveal his

identity to the police. These suspicious circumstances, combined with Peroune’s joint

possession of the recently stolen car, support the court’s finding that Peroune committed the

offense as a principal in the first degree.

Peroune also argues that the evidence failed to prove that he wore a mask in a public

place or that he wore a mask in private without written permission of the property owner.

Code § 18.2-422 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person over 16 years of age to, with the intent to conceal his identity, wear any mask, hood or other device whereby a substantial portion of the face is hidden or covered so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, to be or appear in any public place, or upon any private property in this Commonwealth without first having obtained from the owner or tenant thereof consent to do so in writing.

Peroune asserts that no evidence proved he was on public property while he was wearing

the mask and that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not have written permission to

be on the private property behind the tire store. He contends that the court was offered “two

equally plausible interpretations”—that he had prior written consent to wear a mask on the

-5- property of a closed business late at night or that he did not have such permission. The court

determined, from the evidence presented, that Peroune’s theory that he had prior written consent

was absurd and implausible.

“On appeal, this Court ‘consider[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing

from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at

trial.’” Cox v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 339, 342 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting

Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442 (2007) (en banc)). “It is true that a factfinder

cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose, as between two equally plausible interpretations of a fact, one that

incriminates the defendant.” Maust v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 687, 700 (2023) (en banc)

(quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 (2016)). “The choice becomes arbitrary,

however, only when no rational factfinder could believe the incriminating interpretation of the

evidence and disbelieve the exculpatory one.” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250.

Assuming without deciding that Peroune was on private property when he was caught

wearing the mask, we hold that the court’s conclusion that Peroune did not have prior written

permission was reasonable, and we therefore accept that finding of fact. Indeed, the record

supports the court’s ruling. Peroune was involved in a high-speed car chase as he and Fields fled

from the police after stealing Tanner’s car. They stopped only after Fields crashed the car near

the tire store. Nothing suggests that the store was their actual destination. “[W]e give deference

to the factual finding that the evidence sufficed to prove the statutory element, asking only

whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, ‘any rational trier

of fact could have found th[at] essential element[] of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Evans v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 612, 633 (2024) (second and third alterations in original)

(quoting O’Connell v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 719, 726 (2006)). The evidence fully

supports the court’s conclusion.

-6- The Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible, and was

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of grand larceny and

wearing a mask in public.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment, but remand for correction of the sentencing

order.

Affirmed and remanded.

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