Jaunt, Inc v. Harold E Clement, Jr

Court of Appeals of Virginia·Decided January 21, 2003·No. 1156022·Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton and Kelsey Argued by teleconference

JAUNT, INC. AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY

v. Record No. 1156-02-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK JANUARY 21, 2003

HAROLD E. CLEMENT, JR.

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Roger L. Williams (John T. Cornett, Jr.;

Williams & Lynch, on brief), for appellants.

(John R. Walenten, on brief), for appellee.

Appellee submitting on brief.

Jaunt, Inc. (employer), contends the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that Harold E. Clement, Jr. (claimant) sustained an injury arising out of his employment on April 2, 2001 and that he adequately marketed his residual capacity after the injury. Finding no error, we affirm the commission's decision.

I. FACTS

"'Decisions of the commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court.'" WLR Foods v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 230, 494 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1997) (quoting Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413 this opinion is not designated for publication.

Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227, 229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991)). "Where reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence in support of the commission's factual findings, they will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal." Hawks v. Henrico County School Board, 7 Va. App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988). "[The Workers' Compensation Act] has always required the claimant to carry the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . an 'injury by accident' . . . arising out of and . . . in the course of, the employment." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 584, 385 S.E.2d 858, 862 (1989). "On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant, who prevailed before the commission." Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662, 672, 508 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1998) (citations omitted).

So viewed, the evidence proved that on April 2, 2001, claimant, a shuttle bus driver who provided transportation for disabled people, picked up Roy Shull (Shull) and drove him to the hospital. Shull was "tough to transport." He was confined to a wheelchair with his legs extended and surrounded by boards and pillows. When they arrived at the hospital, claimant knelt down and leaned over to unbuckle the straps holding the wheelchair and felt something "pop" in his back. Claimant stated, "I leaned over top of [Shull's] legs to unstrap the left side, and something popped and pulled in my back. Shull testified by deposition that claimant "was down on the floor and

he got up off the floor and that's when he hurt his back." Claimant immediately reported the injury to his employer and sought medical treatment the same day.

Claimant was initially diagnosed with lumbosacral strain and given a work excuse valid through April 4, 2001. He was released to return to work on April 5, 2001 with a five-pound lifting restriction. On April 9, 2001 claimant was restricted to a five-hour workday with no heavy lifting or wheelchair duty on April 10 and April 13. A later MRI revealed a disc herniation, and claimant was excused from all work until June 4, 2001 and later to June 15, 2001 when his treating physician, Dr. J. Devon Lowdon, released him to restricted duty. Claimant testified he is able to sit for only "15 to 30 minutes at a stretch."

During claimant's periods of temporary partial disability, he briefly worked for employer and began his own home-based computer company. He stated he ran a computer business two years prior to his injury, that included "computer hardware, software and training on the internet." After his injury, he modified this business into a "new start-up of remote back up for computers." He invested "a significant amount of money" in the business, purchased the software, developed a marketing plan, bought mailing lists, learned the software and took additional training. He had received no income from this business at the time of the hearing.

The deputy commissioner found that claimant was placed in an awkward position when he tried to unstrap Mr. Shull and his "movement . . . was different from a normal bending down or rising from a squatting position without having been in any twisted position" and thus, the injury arose out of and in the course of claimant's employment. He also found claimant was totally disabled April 3, April 4 and May 21 through June 15 and partially disabled April 5 through April 13, May 18 through May 20 and June 16 through the present and continuing.

The commission, upon review, agreed.

Testimony and medical records all confirm that the claimant was on his knees inside a van leaning over a patient in a wheelchair trying to buckle or unbuckle the seatbelt when he felt a painful pop in his back.

This clearly rises out of the employment.

He was in an awkward position and the injury was related to his working conditions.

The commission also affirmed the deputy commissioner's findings regarding the periods of disability.

As of June 15, 2001, although Dr. Lowdon indicated a reduced work status, he was not yet "fit for office duty." The claimant meanwhile worked part-time for the employer for various periods of time, and invested significant amounts of energy and his own money into trying to start up a home-based computer back-up business. Lacking any assistance from the employer, who denied the claim we find that the claimant has made reasonable and good faith efforts to utilize his residual capacity.

Employer appealed that decision.

II. Injury by Accident Employer first contends the commission erred in finding claimant's accident arose out of his employment. It argues that claimant's act of bending while unstrapping his wheelchair-bound patient is not a risk of employment. The question of "[w]hether an accident arises out of the employment is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewable by the appellate court." Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 483, 382 S.E.2d 305, 305 (1989). An injury arises out of the employment where "[t]here is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and resulting injury." Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938). "It is well established that the commission's determination of causation is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by credible evidence." Corning, Inc. v. Testerman, 25 Va. App. 332, 339, 488 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1997).

"'"In order to carry his burden of proving an 'injury by accident,' a claimant must prove that the cause of his injury was an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and that it resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body."'" Id. at 339, 488 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Ogden Allied Aviation Servs. v. Shuck, 18 Va. App. 756, 758, 446

S.E.2d 898, 899 (1994) (quoting Morris, 238 Va. at 589, 385 S.E.2d at 865)).

"[T]he claimant, at the time of the injury, performed his work task in 'an unusual or awkward position.' As a consequence, because the injury . . . was caused by exertion on that occasion that was peculiar to his employment, his injury arose out of his employment." Shuck, 18 Va. App. at 759, 446 S.E.2d at 899-900.

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