Jatto v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Hilda Jatto, No. CV-21-00604-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 On September 21, 2022, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s 17 non-disability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Docs. 20, 21.) 18 On remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding $78,667.00 in past-due 19 benefits. (Doc. 25-3.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she 20 agreed to pay her attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 25-2.) Counsel 21 recovered $7,200.00 for administrative-hearing-level representation and now moves, 22 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $12,466.75 in fees, which, together with 23 the $7,200.00 previously awarded for administrative-hearing-level representation, equals 24 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 25-1.) 25 Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, 26 the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total 27 past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does 28 not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls 2|| for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield || reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 4|| Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must || first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 6|| 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for 8 || reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation 9 || or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Jd. at 1149-51. When 10 || assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether 11 || the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the 12 || lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. /d. at 1151. 13 Counsel’s contingent-fee request is not greater than 25% of past-due benefits, there 14]| is no evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor 15 || Plaintiff have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 26.) || Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 25) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of 19|| $12,466.75, payable from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with Administration □□ policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the attorney fees previously awarded to counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 24.) 22 Dated this 11th day of February, 2025. 23 24 25 {Z, 26 {UO 27 Sen United States District Judge 28

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