Jathiya Valentine v. Quebec Youth Protection Services (DPG/DYP); Seminole County Family Court, Florida; New York Foundling Foster Agency; Family Court of New York

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-05247
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JATHIYA VALENTINE, Plaintiff, -against- ORDER OF SERVICE QUEBEC YOUTH PROTECTION SERVICES 25-CV-5247 (ER) (DPG/DYP); SEMINOLE COUNTY FAMILY COURT, FLORIDA; NEW YORK FOUNDLING FOSTER AGENCY; FAMILY COURT OF NEW YORK, Defendants. EDGARDO RAMOS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that her “children have been subject to unlawful seizure, medical abuse, physical or sexual abuse, neglect, and systemic mishandling by family court and child welfare systems in both the United States and Canada.” (ECF 1 at 1.) By order dated August 11, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss anIFPcomplaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdictionof the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claims arise out of child welfare proceedings occurring in Manhattan, New York; Quebec, Canada; and Seminole County, Florida. Named as Defendants are Quebec Youth Protection Services (“QYPS”) in Quebec, Canada; the Seminole County Family Court, in Sanford, Florida; New York Foundling (“NYF”), a foster care agency in Manhattan; and the New York State Supreme Court, Family Court, New York County (“New York County Family Court”). The first page of Plaintiff’s original pleading purports to be a motion to “join related child welfare actions under federal jurisdiction.”1 (ECF 1 at 1.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint.2 Plaintiff is the biological mother of

four minor children, three of whom are in kinship foster care with Plaintiff’s maternal aunt, Ella Baker, in Seminole County, Florida, “under temporary placement initiated by [QYPS].” (Id.) On an unspecified date, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) removed Plaintiff’s fourth child, a newborn daughter, AV,3 from her custody. (Id.). AV appears to be in foster care in New York City, under NYF’s supervision. (Id.)

1 Page 5 of the pleading appears to be a motion for pro se representation, dated June 24, 2025, that Plaintiff filed in the New York State Supreme Court, Family Court, New York County. (Id. at 5–6.) 2 The Court quotes from Plaintiff’s submissions verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. 3 Because Plaintiff refers to her minor children by their full names, the Court directed the Clerk’s Office to make her filings party-view only. See Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (requiring submissions to refer to According to Plaintiff, ACS removed AV “without a valid court order or emergency justification,” and the removal allegedly “occurred under threat of arrest, without case planning, safety planning, or investigation.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that AV “has been moved four times in six weeks, taken across state lines without consent, and transported without proper car seat safety,” and she further states that AV underwent surgery without Plaintiff’s consent, and that she

is being excluded from other decisions regarding AV’s health and medical needs. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further claims that NYF has failed to “provide [her with] regular visitation” with AV; that when visits happen, NYF is “hostil[e]” towards her and sabotage[s] bonding” between her and AV, demonstrated by NYF’s failure to accommodate her “nursing needs” or consider Plaintiff’s requests for “alternative placements.” (Id.) She also claims that AV “presented visible injuries to her lower labia,” and that ACS and NYF have “not taken appropriate action to investigate” the “initial foster mother” or to otherwise “address this.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that, in connection with the New York County Family Court proceedings, she has been “denied meaningful access to the courts” and that court-appointed attorneys have failed to

“submit evidence in support of reunification.” (Id. at 2.) On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an “Emergency motion to expedite issuance of summons, immediate injunctive relief and to dismiss unlawful criminal proceedings.” (ECF 8.) This filing contains new information that is not in the complaint. It appears that Plaintiff was charged with burglary in Seminole County, Florida, after she attempted to enter Ella Baker’s home without permission. (Id. ) Attached to the motion are documents from the Florida criminal matter, including a motion filed by Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney requesting that Plaintiff

a minor child using only the child’s initials). Plaintiff is instructed that, in any future filings, she should refer to any minor child solely by his or her initials. undergo a competency evaluation, and a court order, dated August 20, 2025, appointing an evaluator; that order states, by way of background, that during a hearing held two days prior—on August 18, 2025—“the issue of [Plaintiff’s] competency was raised.” (Id. at 7–8.) On September 9, 2025, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s competence Under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court must appoint a guardian ad litem – or issue another appropriate order – to protect a[n] . . . incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c); Galanova v. Portnoy, 432 F. Supp .3d 433, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“In cases in which the plaintiff is incapacitated, and therefore unable to proceed pro se, and is unrepresented, the district court must not reach the merits of a claim filed on behalf of an incompetent person who is not properly represented by a suitable guardian and through counsel.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty to consider whether Rule 17(c) applies is triggered by: evidence from an appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or . . . verifiable evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent. Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that either “an appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency . . . [has] adjudicated [her] incompetent” or that “a mental health professional . . . is [treating] . . . or has . . . treated [her] for mental illness of the type that would render . . . her legally incompetent.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to her complaint documents showing that a Florida court ordered her to undergo a competency evaluation in connection with criminal proceedings. That order is dated August 20, 2025, however, and there is no indication that the evaluation has taken place and that Plaintiffwas found to be incompetent. Moreover, Plaintiff’s submissions, including the Florida state court order,provide no context for the determination that such an evaluation was necessary. In short, while Plaintiff may have mental health issues or may be receiving mental health treatment, there is nothing before the Court indicating that a court or public agency has adjudicated her incompetent or that she suffers from a mental illness that

renders her incompetent. See Romano v. Laskowski, No. 22-1896, 2024 WL 4635227, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 2024) (summary order) (“As the district court concluded, this evidence may suggest that Romano ‘almost certainly suffers from some degree of mental illness.’ But the record speaks only to mental illness – not incompetence. And there is no ‘necessary relationship’ between the two.”) (citations omitted). For these reasons, the Court does not find, at this stageandwith the information before it, that a competency hearing is warranted. Plaintiff is directed, however, to provide the Court with: (1)any updates on the outcome of the competency determination inFlorida; and (2) any other information or documentation relevant to the issue of her competency to proceed with this matter. The Court will, if necessary, revisit this issue if any new information is presented.4

B. The Defendants QYPS and Seminole County Family Courtand the motion to “join related child welfare actions under federal jurisdiction” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3)if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this 4Plaintiff is alerted that, if an incompetent person brings suit pro se, and if the court holds that it is “clear that no substantial claim could be asserted . . . [by that incompetent person, the court] may dismiss the complaint . . . without prejudice.” Berrios v. N.Y. City HousingAuthority, 564 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2009). section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For the purpose of Section 1391, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See§1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff asserts claims against QYPS, which is located in Quebec, Canada, regarding events occurring in Quebec. She also asserts claims against the Seminole County Family Court, which is located in Florida, regarding events occurring in Seminole County, Florida. Because Defendants are not alleged to reside in this district, and because none of the underlying events occurred in this district, this court is not a proper venue forthese claims.

Title 28, section 1406(a) vests this Court with the authority to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [a] case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” This provision vests broad discretion with district courts to decline to transfer a case where it would not be in the interest of justice to effect such a transfer. See Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009). Based on the barebones nature of Plaintiff’s submissions to this Court in connection with events occurring in Canada and Florida, the Court finds that it would not be in the interest of justice to transfer the claims arising in those jurisdictions. Instead, the Court dismisses the claims arising in Canada and Florida without prejudice to Plaintiff filing actions in the proper jurisdictions to consider them.

New York CountyFamily Courtand the City of New York “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. Plaintiff names the New York County Family Court as a defendant. The Family Court, as a part of the New York State Unified Court System, is an arm of the State of New York. Id. at 368(explaining that the Family Court is part of the New York State Unified Court System and

“is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State,’ entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.”). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the New York County Family Court are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to add the City of New Yorkas

a Defendant. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert. C. Motions Motion to “join related child welfare actions under federal jurisdiction” Having already dismissed without prejudice any claims arising from Family Court proceedings occurring in other jurisdictions, the Court considers Plaintiff’s motion for“federal jurisdiction” ofthe proceedings in New York County Family Court. The abstention doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),“generally prohibits [federal] courts from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary friction.” Spargo v. N.Y. State Commissionon Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Lowell v. Vermont Dep’t of Child. & Families,835 F. App’x 637, 640 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that generally the “ability to raise constitutional claims in subsequent state-court judicial review . . . is sufficient . . . and bar[s] federal courts from taking jurisdiction over the same claims while the

state proceeding is pending.”). A civil proceeding is pending for purposes of Younger abstention if further state appellate remedies are available at the time of filing of the federal complaint. Gristina v. Merchan, 131 F.4th 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2025). Younger abstention is limited to three types of cases: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions”; (2) “state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings involving “certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013). The second category, state civil proceedings “akin to criminal prosecutions,” includes state-initiated proceedings to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents. Id.at 79

(citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419–420 (1979)). Younger abstention is not required, however, where there are “special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate.” See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1973) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37). To show bad faith, a plaintiff must show that “the state proceeding was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive” and that she “ha[s] no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.” Lowell, 835 F. App’x at 640 (citing Diamond “D,” 282 F.3d at 199). The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint suggest that Family Court proceedings are ongoing. Moreover, the state-initiated child removal proceeding that Plaintiff challenges is “akin to a criminal proceeding” and thus is a category to which Younger abstention applies. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show that abstention is unwarranted on the grounds that the circumstances of the state prosecution demonstrate bad faith, harassment, or irreparableinjury. Plaintiff contends that she has been “denied meaningful access to the courts”

and that court-appointed attorneys have failed to “submit evidence in support of reunification.” (ECF 1 at 2.) These allegations do not suggest that “the state proceeding was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive,” or that the Plaintiff has“no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.” Lowell, 835 F. App’x at 640 (2d Cir. 2020). The Court therefore abstains under Younger from adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims that involve or call into question theongoingproceedings in New York County Family Court. Motion “to expedite issuance of summons, immediate injunctive relief and to dismiss unlawful criminal proceedings” Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief. To obtain such relief, Plaintiff must show: (1)that sheis likely to suffer irreparable harm and (2)either (a) a likelihoodof success on the merits of hercase or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in herfavor. See UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2000). Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not

be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consolidated EdisonCo. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the reasons set forth in this order, and at this early stage, Plaintiff has failed to show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. Accordingly, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. Because this order is directing service on the remaining Defendants, the motion

for issuance of summonses is denied as moot. D. Order of Service on the City of New York and NYF Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, she is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.5 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process ... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants the City of New York and NYF through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for Defendants. The Clerk of Court is

further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon Defendants. If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the datesummonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service).

5Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have effected service until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that any summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date any summonses issue. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Quebec Youth Protection Services and Seminole County Family Court, Florida. The Court dismisses with prejudice the claims against the New York County Family Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1). The Clerk of Court is directed to add the City of New York as a Defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The Court denies the pending motion without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate it. (ECF 8.) The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses for the City of New York and New York Foundling, complete the USM-285 form with the address for Defendants, and deliver all documents necessary to effect service to the U.S. Marshals Service. Plaintiff may receive court documents by email by completing a Consent to Electronic Service form.° The Clerk of Court is directed to mail an information package to Plaintiff. SO ORDERED.

EDGARDORAMOS/ United States District Judge

6 if Plain consents to receive documents by email, Plaintiff will no longer receive court documents by regular mail.

SERVICE ADDRESS FOR EACH DEFENDANT City of New York 100 Church Street New York, N.Y. 10007 New York Foundling 590 Avenue of the Americas New York, N.Y.10011