Jaterin Mikeal Tyler v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
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Opinion
Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 12, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00293-CR
JATERIN MIKEAL TYLER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1814124-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Goldstein Appellant Jaterin Mikeal Tyler was charged with the felony offense of
aggravated kidnapping. He judicially confessed to committing the crime with a
firearm, pled guilty, entered into a plea agreement, and was placed on five years of
community supervision. After his subsequent arrest for aggravated sexual assault
and impersonating a public servant, the State moved to revoke his community
supervision or to adjudicate his guilt. Appellant pled “not true” to the alleged
violations. After a hearing, the trial court found the State’s allegations to be true
and sentenced appellant to thirty years of confinement. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s adjudication
of guilt and two separate rulings admitting out-of-court statements over timely
hearsay objections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence did not sufficiently support
the trial court’s adjudication of guilt. The State’s motion to revoke or adjudicate
alleged multiple grounds, including appellant’s arrest for impersonating a public
servant during a subsequent sexual assault. The record reveals the trial court heard
evidence supporting this allegation and that it found the allegation to be true.
Although appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support many of the
State’s allegations, his brief contains only one reference to his arrest for
impersonating a public servant averring that appellant “was a security officer, not a
policeman, and was misidentified by the complainant.” This solitary reference
lacks argument, citation to any facts, or citation to any authorities. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(g) & (i).
“Where, as here, the State alleges multiple violations of the terms of
community supervision, proof of any one of the alleged violations is sufficient to
support revocation.” Kilpatrick v. State, No. 05-21-00500-CR, 2022 WL 4591273,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted);
see also Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “We must
affirm a trial court’s judgment if an appellant does not challenge each ground on
–2– which the trial court revoked community supervision.” Austin v. State, No. 05-21-
00941-CR, 2023 WL 3964004, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2023, no pet.)
(citing Olabode v. State, 575 S.W.3d 878, 880–81 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet.
ref’d)). Based on appellant’s failure to challenge the trial court’s finding of true
with respect to the impersonation of a public servant charge and the evidence it
heard in support thereof, we overrule his first issue.
Appellant’s second issue challenges the trial court’s overruling of a timely
hearsay objection after the State elicited testimony from Detective Gloria Doll
concerning a complainant’s out-of-court statements that she was an escort, that she
had made a date with someone, and that she had ended the date. Our review of the
record, however, reveals that neither the State’s query nor Detective Doll’s answer
concerned the State’s allegation that appellant impersonated a public servant.
Therefore, we need not decide whether the trial court erred when it overruled
appellant’s objection because any such error was harmless under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Johnson v. State, No. 05-21-00964-CR, 2023 WL
3476377, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Specifically, (1) we have already overruled appellant’s legal
sufficiency challenge because he did not address the trial court’s adjudication of
guilt based on the impersonation of a public servant charge and (2) the record
reveals that the out-of-court statement at issue is unrelated thereto. Thus, any
potential error concerning appellant’s hearsay objection is harmless because a
–3– ground other than the alleged sexual assault supported revocation and adjudication.
See Hood v. State, No. 05-20-00902-CR, 2022 WL 2071111, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Appellant’s third and final issue is initially framed as a challenge to the trial
court’s overruling of a timely hearsay objection after the State elicited additional
testimony from Detective Gloria Doll about the alleged sexual assault. Appellant’s
brief, however, argues that the trial court’s overruling of his hearsay objection
denied him his rights under the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Confrontation clause claims must be preserved via a timely and specific
objection. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Deener v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d). The record
reveals appellant did not object to Detective Doll’s testimony based on the
Confrontation Clause; instead, his objection to the trial court was limited to
hearsay. Thus, we overrule appellant’s third issue because he did not preserve it.
See Rimes v. State, No. 05-21-00038-CR, 2022 WL 3593282, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).1
1 As appellant combined his arguments relative to Issues 2 and 3, to the extent he challenges Issue 2 as a Confrontation Clause due process violation, we overrule the second issue for failure to preserve it as well.
–4– Finally, our review of the record reveals two errors in the judgment.
Specifically, the judgment states appellant pled true to the motion to adjudicate and
that the terms of his plea bargain were “30 YEARS TDC”; neither statement
reflects the truth. Instead, there was no plea agreement with respect to the motion
to revoke or adjudicate, appellant pled not true to the motion, and after finding the
State’s allegations to be true the court sentenced him to 30 years.
When a record contains the necessary information, we may modify an
incorrect judgment to correct clerical errors. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.
State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d
526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). Here, the record shows
that appellant pleaded not true to the allegations prior to the hearing on the motion
to revoke. Because the trial court’s judgment states otherwise, we modify the
section of the judgment entitled “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” to state “Not
True.” See Luna v. State, No. 05-22-00308-CR, 2022 WL 5113139, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Additionally, because the record
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