Jaswinder Pal Singh Sandhu v. FMCSA, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 26, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01625
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASWINDER PAL SINGH SANDHU, Case No. 1:25-cv-01625-KES-CDB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 13 v. (Doc. 2) 14 FMCSA, et al., FIRST SCREENING ORDER REQUIRING 15 Defendants. RESPONSE FROM PLAINTIFF

16 (Doc. 1)

17 21-DAY DEADLINE

18 Clerk of the Court to Send Plaintiff Civil Rights Complaint Form 19 20 Plaintiff Jaswinder Pal Singh Sandhu (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, initiated this action 21 with the filing of a complaint on November 24, 2025. (Doc. 1). 22 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 23 Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis without prepaying fees or costs 24 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 2). The Court finds Plaintiff has made the showing required 25 by § 1915, and the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 26 (authorizing the commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person 27 who is unable to pay such fees). 28 1 II. Screening Requirement 2 As to the status of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), federal courts must 3 screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails 4 to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief against an immune 5 defendant. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 6 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to 7 state a claim.”); see also id. at 1129 (“section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, 8 not just those filed by prisoners.”). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 10 is entitled to relief…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required but 11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. 13 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for 14 failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient 15 facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 16 (9th Cir. 1990). 17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 18 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, “the liberal pleading standard … applies only to a 19 plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n .9 20 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 21 elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 22 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not 23 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 24 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 III. Plaintiff’s Allegations1 2 In the complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 3 Administration (“FMCSA”), Ryan Snyder (FMCSA Director of Governmental and Legislative 4 Affairs), Jesse Elison (FMCSA Chief Counsel), Derek D. Barrs (FMCSA Administrator), and Sean 5 Duffy (United States Secretary of Transportation). Plaintiff also names as Defendant Michael 6 Hampton but provides no further details as to Mr. Hampton’s identity. (Doc. 1 at 1-3). Plaintiff 7 does not provide whether the aforementioned Defendants are sued in their individual or official 8 capacities. See id. 9 Plaintiff includes few assertions of fact in the complaint and the contentions therein are 10 difficult to follow. Insofar as the Court can comprehend, Plaintiff appears to state that he was 11 denied a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) by the FMCSA, due to a change in the law by 12 Defendant Duffy, resulting in his inability to work as a truck driver and the loss of his job. Id. at 13 5-7. Plaintiff includes the language “[s]exually harass” but provides no other particulars or 14 allegations concerning any sexually harassment. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff requests “help for 15 unemployment.” Id. 16 IV. Discussion 17 A. Jurisdiction 18 The Court has a duty to consider its own subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether 19 the issue is raised by the parties, and is required to dismiss an action over which it lacks 20 jurisdiction. See Morongo Bank of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 21 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and 22 can adjudicate only those cases which the United States Constitution and Congress authorize them 23 to adjudicate. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 551 U.S. 375 (1994). “To proceed in federal 24 court, a plaintiff’s pleading must establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, 25 there are two potential bases for the federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question 26 jurisdiction, or (2) diversity jurisdiction.” Martinez v. Hoff, No. 1:19-cv-00923-LJO-SKO, 2019 27

28 1 The undersigned accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the 1 WL 3564178, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019). 2 i. Federal Question Jurisdiction 3 A case “arises” under federal law either where federal law itself creates the cause of action 4 or where the vindication of a state law right would “necessarily [turn] on some construction of 5 federal law.” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983)). 7 Stated otherwise, a claim arises under federal law if the complaint cognizably pleads that federal 8 law created the claim asserted or the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolving a 9 substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. Courts determine 10 whether they have federal question jurisdiction by applying the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” 11 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when 12 a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id. 13 Federal question jurisdiction does not arise from the “mere presence of a federal issue in a state 14 cause of action.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986); see Grable 15 & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (holding that passing 16 references to federal issues are not a “password opening federal courts to any state action 17 embracing a point of federal law”). 18 Here, Plaintiff asserts the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction as pursuant to a federal 19 question. (Doc. 1 at 2). However, Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear as to his precise allegations and 20 does not provide discrete claims or causes of action. While Plaintiff’s complaint references the 21 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 1, 6-7), mere references to federal statutes are not enough 22 to establish federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alan v. Equifax, No. CV 19-6588-DMG (ASX), 2019 23 WL 5801891, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2019). In the complaint, Plaintiff fails to articulate how his 24 claims arise pursuant to federal law. Furthermore, Plaintiff includes as Defendant the FMCSA. 25 The federal government and its agencies are entitled to sovereign immunity and cannot be sued 26 absent a waiver of such immunity. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); 27 Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (“It is well settled that the United States 28 1 and consented to be sued.”); Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 2 waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to federal-court jurisdiction.”). Plaintiff has not 3 alleged any waiver of sovereign immunity and therefore, the FMCSA, as part of the federal 4 Department of Transportation and an agency of the United States, is an improper defendant. It 5 follows that any individual Defendant employed by the FMCSA and named in an official capacity 6 is also an improper defendant. See Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1458 (“It has long been the rule that the 7 bar of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided by naming officers and employees of the United 8 States as defendants.”). 9 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction for lack of federal question presented in the face 10 of the complaint. 11 ii. Diversity Jurisdiction 12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) vests district courts with original jurisdiction over all civil actions 13 where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. 14 Section 1332 requires complete diversity, i.e., that “the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from 15 the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1996). A 16 corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the 17 State where it has its principal place of business. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 94 18 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). 19 Plaintiff sets forth no facts establishing either complete diversity or an amount in 20 controversy above the $75,000 threshold and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 21 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 22 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 23 The undersigned finds that, even in the event Plaintiff establishes a basis for the Court’s 24 exercise of jurisdiction, under a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s complaint, the complaint fails to 25 state a cognizable claim. 26 First, Plaintiff pleads no facts or legal theory establishing that the FMCSA can be liable for 27 a denial of a CDL or for sexual harassment. Thus, because Plaintiff’s claims are without “basis in 28 1 (9th Cir. 2005). 2 Second, even if the FMCSA could be a proper defendant, the federal government and its 3 agencies are entitled to sovereign immunity and cannot be sued absent a waiver of such immunity. 4 See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586; Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1458; Tobar, 639 F.3d at 1195. Plaintiff has 5 not alleged any waiver of sovereign immunity and therefore, the FMCSA itself and any employee 6 of the FMCSA named herein in their official capacity are improper defendants. 7 Lastly, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts relating to claims against the individual 8 Defendants, outside of their official capacity. 9 Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. To facilitate Plaintiff’s 10 ability to cure the deficiencies identified above in good faith, Plaintiff will be the opportunity to 11 do so as set forth below. 12 V. Conclusion and Order 13 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the complaint fails to establish the Court’s 14 jurisdiction and fails to state any cognizable claim against any Defendant. Because he may be able 15 to cure the deficiencies in an amended pleading, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his 16 complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez, 17 203 F.3d at 1130. 18 If Plaintiff wishes to file a first amended complaint, any such amended complaint should 19 be brief (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)) but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 20 deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Although accepted as 21 true, the “[f]actual allegation must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 22 level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff may not change 23 the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 24 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining no “buckshot” complaints permitted). 25 Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa 26 Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012). If Plaintiff elects to proceed with this action by filing 27 an amended complaint, the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an amended 28 1 || in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading. Once the amended complaint 2 is filed, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Thus, in the amended 3 || complaint, Plaintiff must re-plead all elements of his claims, including all relevant facts, even 4 || the ones not addressed by this screening order. 5 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 6 1. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and 7 2. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either: 8 a. File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 9 this order; or 10 b. File a notice expressing Plaintiffs desire to proceed on the complaint as filed, 11 following which the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be 12 dismissed; or 13 c. File a notice of voluntary dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)@). 14 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with this order, the Court will recommend that 15 || this action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to obey a 16 || court order, and/or failure to prosecute. 17 || IT IS SOORDERED. Dated: _ November 25, 2025 | nnd Rr 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28