Opinion by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER: Dissent by Judge O’SCANNLAIN
BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Jaswant Lai and his family, citizens of Fiji of Indo-Fijian ethnic origin, petition this court for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In May 1994, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted asylum to the family, finding persecution based on religion and political opinion. The INS appealed and the BIA reversed, ordering the petitioners deported to Fiji. We grant the timely petition for review, find eligibility for asylum, order withholding of deportation, and remand to the BIA for exercise of discretion as to the grant of asylum.
I.
The BIA’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We owe deference to legal decisions rendered by the BIA under [1001]*1001the rubric of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). See Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995); Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir.1999); Santamaria-Ames v. INS, 104 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1996). We may reverse if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude that a well-founded fear of persecution has been established. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481, 112 S.Ct. 812; Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1998); Chand, slip op. at 9392. When, as here, the BIA has conducted an independent review of the record, we review its decision rather than the IJ’s. See Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1996).
II.
Jaswant Lai and his family1 suffered very serious persecution in Fiji on account of Mr. Lai’s political opinion and religious beliefs. Their problems began in the late 1980s, when Mr. Lai was a prominent member of the Fijian Labor Party, a legitimate, non-violent organization consisting mostly of Hindu Fijians of Indian descent. Mr. Lai served as branch secretary for a local division of the Labor Party. During the run-up to the 1987 elections, Mr. Lai recruited for the Party, distributed posters, and coordinated events in his region. On election day, he provided transportation services.
The Labor Party was successful in its 1987 electoral bid, winning a majority of seats in Parliament. The Fijian military, which was controlled by members of the native Fijian population, opposed the results and staged a coup in May 1987. The army then set out to terrorize those who had worked to secure the electoral victory of the Labor Party.
In the aftermath of the coup, Mr. Lai was dragged from his home by soldiers, who held guns to his head. He was placed in detention and held for three days by the army. His captors beat and tortured him, explaining that his treatment was in retaliation for his work on behalf of the Labor Party. Mr. Lai was stripped of his clothes, urine was forced into his mouth, and he was cut with knives and singed with burning cigarettes. For three days, he was deprived of food and water. When he asked for something to drink, army officiáls mocked him by offering meat, which they knew he could not eat because of his Hindu religious beliefs. While Mr. Lai was in jail, Fijian soldiers appeared at the Lai home, stole money and jewelry, and threatened Mrs. Lai and the couple’s son.
Sometime after he was released from detention, soldiers returned to the Lais’ home and sexually assaulted Mrs. Lai. Mr. Lai was forced to watch the assault at gunpoint. Before they left, the soldiers told the Lais that “people like” them were not welcome in Fiji and would be shot down in the streets. The Lais understood that this comment referred to Fijians of Indian descent.
During the next four years, Mr. Lai was detained again — at least three times — by the government. Each time soldiers forced him from his home at gunpoint. His house was set ablaze twice by the government; extensive damage resulted. The Lai home was placed under constant surveillance. On one occasion, Mr. Lai’s Hindu temple was ransacked by soldiers who accused him of holding a political [1002]*1002meeting inside the temple. Soldiers forced Mr. Lai to eat meat, told him and his fellow worshippers that they must become Christian, and said they were not welcome in their own country. After burning the temple’s sacred text and denigrating Hindu religious figures, the soldiers warned the worshippers that they should leave Fiji or face death. The Lais’ son was mocked and taunted, and was denied a place in a well-known school because of his race and religion.
The Lais tried to escape Fiji in 1987, 1988, and 1990, but each time they were turned back at gunpoint at, an airport checkpoint because the family had been blacklisted. In 1991, Mr. Lai was detained for the final time. During his 24-hour detention, he was tortured and beaten by soldiers. Searching for a means of escape, the Lais took advantage of an opening: the airport checkpoint that had held the Lais back so many times was gone. With a U.S. visa, Mr. and Mrs. Lai traveled to this country with their son, hoping to escape from their persecutors forever.
III.
An asylum applicant must demonstrate that he is “unwilling or unable” to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1994) (defining “refugee”). To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant must demonstrate that his fear is both objectively reasonable and subjectively genuine. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Establishing past persecution triggers a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1999). The INS can rebut this presumption by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions “have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he or she were to return.” Id.
In this case, the Immigration Judge found Mr. Lai credible and determined that he had suffered past persecution in Fiji on the basis of his political opinion and religious beliefs. Determining that no record evidence rebutted Mr. Lai’s reasonable fear of future persecution, the judge granted asylum. The INS appealed to the BIA. The Board, relying solely on the State Department’s Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions — Fiji (1994), determined that even though it would not disturb the IJ’s finding of statutory eligibility, country conditions in Fiji had changed to such a degree as to render petitioner’s fear of future persecution no longer well-founded. The BIA then considered Mr. Lai’s case under the humanitarian exception to the changed country conditions rule developed in its own published opinion, Matter of Chen, and later codified in regulations relating to asylum. See Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (BIA 1989); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1999) (“An application for asylum shall be denied if the applicant establishes past persecution under this paragraph but it is also determined that he or she does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution ... unless it is demonstrated that the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his or her country ... arising out of the severity of the past persecution.”). The Matter of Chen exception is based on a “general humanitarian principle,” and it waives the requirement that an individual who has suffered past persecution must also demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. See id. at 19. Instead, those who were subjected to severe forms of past persecution need only demonstrate the severity of their past abuse. In this case, the BIA considered the Matter of [1003]*1003Chen exception, but concluded that Mr. Lai did not show that he suffered from a lasting disability. On this basis, the BIA determined that Mr. Lai’s case did not qualify for Matter of Chen treatment. The Board therefore reversed the IJ and denied Mr. Lai’s application for asylum.
However, the Board’s decision is not due the deference that it otherwise would deserve because it interprets the regulation in a manner inconsistent with its plain language and clear intent. We are further convinced that the Board’s construction of the humanitarian exception strayed imper-missibly from its own case law interpreting the exception, and we reverse on that ground as well. Further, we are bound to hold that Mr. Lai qualifies for asylum under past Ninth Circuit law construing the humanitarian exception. Finally, after careful review of the record in this case, we conclude that the BIA’s changed country conditions decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that reversal is called for on this ground as well.
A. Humanitarian Exception2
Mr. Lai arid members of his family endured repeated arbitrary detentions, painful and humiliating torture, sexual assault, threats, and severe intimidation on the basis of their political opinion and religious beliefs. They suffered the horror of attempting to escape but finding their way barred by government blacklists. Based on the severity of the persecution the Lai family faced in Fiji, the Board was correct to consider this case under the Matter of Chen rule.
1. BIA’s Neto Reqiárement of Ongoing Disability
The Board erred, however, in its treatment of Mr. Lai’s application under the Matter of Chen exception. In its brief consideration of the application, the BIA makes the following statement regarding the humanitarian exception: “there are not compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to Fiji arising out of the severity of the past persecution of the lead respondent. In this regard we observe that the principal respondent does not claim to suffer from lasting physical or emotional disability as a result of past mistreatment.” (citations omitted) No other factors are considered by the Board in this regard. It is apparent, therefore, that the Board required that Mr. Lai demonstrate ongoing disability in order to warrant asylum under the Matter of Chen exception. Such a requirement is an untenable interpretation of the exception.
[1004]*1004a. Deference to the BIA’s Interpretation
The Matter of Chen exception has been codified by the INS at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1999). We owe agency interpretations of their own regulations substantial deference. Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994).3 When the meaning of regulatory language is ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation controls “so long as it is ‘reasonable,! that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations.” Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) .(internal citations and quotations omitted).
However, we need not defer to the BIA’s reading of an INS regulation if an “alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Thomas Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S.Ct. 1306, 99 L.Ed.2d 515 (1988)); see also Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir.1999); Crown Pacific v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 197 F.3d 1036,1038 (9th Cir.1999).
(1) Plain Language
It is difficult to reconcile a requirement of “ongoing disability” with the plain language of the regulation. Cf. Vincent v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.1999) (“There is no justification-for adding limiting language to a clear and unambiguous statute and regulation.”). One who has been persecuted and seeks asylum falls within the regulatory exception if they possess “compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his or her country ... arising out of the severity of the past persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(ii). Although we ordinarily owe the BIA some deference to decide what type of past persecution is severe enough, we need not defer if the line they draw is arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. Santamaria-Ames v. INS, 104 F.3d 1127, 1132 n. 7 (9th Cir.1996) (“[D]eference is not afforded if the administrative construction is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the regulation.”); Crown Pacific, 197 F.3d at 1040 (“[I]n examining a regulation, we take into account common sense, the regulatory purpose and the practical consequences of the suggested interpretations.”). The ongoing disability requirement is unreasonable because it treats two applicants who are tortured alike differently if one has the good fortune to fully recover from his injuries and the other does not. “Sound regulation should not be founded on shot of accident [or] dart of chance.” Crown Pacific, 197 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Lai was burned, tortured and cut with knives; his wife and child were harassed and assaulted and his wife was sexually assaulted while he was forced [1005]*1005to watch. According to the BIA, this treatment was not severe enough to qualify him for the exception because he does not, for example, have a permanent limp or suffer a loss of hearing. The plain language of the regulation does not allow for this interpretation.4
(2) Clear Intent
Even aside from the plain language of the regulation, we still need not defer to the BIA’s interpretation because it contravenes the clear intent of the agency in creating the rule. In cases involving regulations originally written to codify a rule created by case law, as long as the agency meant to endorse the rule of the particular case without modification, we can refer to that case for insight into the intent and regulatory history behind the rule. Here, Matter of Chen is the unquestioned progenitor of the regulation, and it serves as a useful, if not dispositive, guide to determining agency intent. See 63 Fed.Reg. 31945, 31947 (June 11, 1998) (calling Matter of Chen the case “which the existing regulatory provisions were intended to codify”); Kumar v. INS, 204 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir.2000) (construing the exception by closely examining the facts of Matter of Chen); Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir.1999) (same). Statements of policy in Matter of Chen are strong indicators of the intent behind the rule.5 This case suggests that the exception codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) cannot be read as narrowly as the BIA does here.
Matter of Chen identifies the exception as a general humanitarian principle which applies to a person who has himself or whose family has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19. In Matter of Chen, the BIA recited the horrible persecution that the applicant had suffered in China during the Cultural Revolution as a result of his religious beliefs. The BIA never refers to the fact that Chen suffered permanent injuries as dispositive, and notes that he qualifies for the exception because his family suffered “more than the usual amount of ill-treatment during that turbulent period.” Id. at 21. See also Matter of N-M-A-, Interim Decision 3368, 1998 WL 744095 (BIA 1998); Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996); Matter of B-, Interim Decision 3251, 1995 WL 326740 (BIA 1995).
It is clear from reading Matter of Chen that the BIA intended to except from the requirement of proving fear of future persecution those applicants who suffered severely under past persecution. These [1006]*1006people are excepted because, as the case explains, “[e]ven though there may have been a change of regime in his country, this may not always produce a complete change ... in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee.” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19. With this focus, there is no reason to limit the exception to those who suffer permanent disability. The focus is on the suffering that other people caused the applicant in the past, not on whether the medical maladies that arose from that treatment extend over the years.
(3) Inconsistent BIA Case Law
The BIA has, through its adjudications, created a set of “established policies” concerning the meaning of the Matter of Chen exception. In Matter of B-, Interim Decision 3251, 1995 WL 326740 (BIA 1995), the Board granted asylum to an individual from Afghanistan who had been interrogated, physically abused, detained for thirteen months, and forced to serve in the army on the basis of his assistance to the mujahidin. Id. at 9. The Board noted that despite the changes in Afghanistan since the abuse had occurred, the applicant should be granted asylum because “the past persecution suffered by the applicant was so severe” insofar as it involved “physical torture and psychological abuse, inadequate diet and medical care, and the integration of political prisoners with criminal and mentally ill prisoners.” Id. at 10. Nowhere does the Board find, much less rely on, the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability.
In Matter of H-, the BIA remanded to the IJ for exercise of discretion when it found that an individual who was detained, beaten, and separated from his family in Somalia on the basis of his clan membership, was eligible for asylum. Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996). In its page-length discussion of the Matter of Chen exception, the Board again did not mention — as a requirement or as a factor — the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. Id. at 16-17. Instead, it noted that the IJ should consider “compelling, humanitarian considerations” when determining whether an applicant qualified under the exception. Id. at 17. Citing Chen, the Board concluded that the rule applies to those applicants who have “suffered such severe persecution that [they] should not be expected to repatriate.” Id.
Finally, in Matter of N-M-A-, the BIA determined that an individual who was detained for one month, beaten, and deprived of food for three days by Afghan authorities because he was suspected of being an anti-communist, had not demonstrated that his past persecution was severe enough to establish eligibility for the humanitarian exception. Matter of N-M-A-, Interim Decision 3368, 1998 WL 744095 (BIA 1998). The Board examined Ninth Circuit case law and its own practice, and concluded that “to demonstrate that [an applicant] is eligible for asylum on the basis of his past persecution alone, the applicant must also show that he belongs to the smaller group of persecution victims whose persecution (including the aftermath) is so severe that the ‘compelling reasons’ standard [of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(ii) ] has been met.” Id. at 16-17. While the Board does indicate that it considers the “aftermath” of persecution as part of its evaluation of the severity of the abuse, it also cites to both Matter of Chen and Matter of B- in support of its construction of the governing regulations. Id. at 17. As discussed above, Matter of B- did not refer to an ongoing physical or mental disability.
In sum, then, BIA case law demonstrates that while the existence of lasting physical or emotional disability may sometimes be a factor in determining the severity of an applicant’s past persecution, it has not been a requirement. This means, [1007]*1007by necessity, that the Matter of Chen exception, as interpreted by the Board and now codified in the regulations, does not require the demonstration of an ongoing physical or emotional disability.
By changing its settled practice with respect to this rule, the BIA acted imper-missibly and committed an arbitrary and capricious act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). “Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows — by rule or by settled course of adjudication — a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned .... ” INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996). The Supreme Court has further held:
An additional reason for rejecting the INS’s request for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is “entitled to considerably less deference” than a consistently held agency view.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)). Cf. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting, in dictum, that an agency’s past interpretations of a regulation are more binding on the agency than its past statutory interpretations because “[o]therwise, the agency could evade its notice and comment obligation by ‘modifying’ a substantive rule that was promulgated by notice and comment rulemaking”).
The BIA has consistently interpreted the Matter of Chen exception without requiring ongoing disability. To suddenly change course and add this requirement now is an arbitrary act that is impermissible and, even giving the BIA the deference it is due, should be overturned. Cf. Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 339-40, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (refusing to give Chevron deference to the Census Bureau’s interpretation of a statute regarding statistical sampling because the Bureau had taken the opposite position on the issue for years).
We accordingly find that the Board’s arbitrary use of the physical or emotional disability factor as a requirement in Mr. Lai’s case was contrary to its own regulations and case law. Its rejection of Mr. Lai’s application was therefore an irrational departure from its policy, which must be overturned. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n. 30,107 S.Ct. 1207.
(4) Ninth Circuit Case Law
Our holding is supported by our own case law concerning the humanitarian exception. While we owe deference to the Board’s interpretation of the immigration laws, we do not “explicitly apply the principles of deference to questions already controlled by circuit precedent, because a panel may not reconsider the correctness of an earlier panel’s decisions.” Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir.2000).
We have never required that a petitioner demonstrate ongoing disability to qualify for the Matter of Chen exception. In Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (9th Cir.1999), we found the petitioner eligible for asylum regardless of current country conditions because he had suffered “reeducation,” physical and verbal abuse, and deprivation of food in a Laotian camp. Although his persecution was so severe that he did suffer a “permanent impairment,” id. at 1207, this fact was included in a discussion of the severity of the appli[1008]*1008cant’s abuse, and it was not cited as a requirement. Instead, we held in Vong-sakdy that the proper approach to the humanitarian exception was to determine whether the petitioner’s persecution was roughly comparable to Chen’s in Matter of Chen, without applying a mechanical “minimum showing of ‘atrocity.’ ” Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at 1207 (quoting and citing Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1995)).
Similarly, in Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.1996), we held that the petitioner was eligible for asylum based on the severity of her past persecution, which included rape and physical abuse at the hands of the Sandinista military. We did not find or comment on any ongoing physical or emotional disability to the petitioner.6
Our past case law demonstrates that it is permissible to consider ongoing disability as a factor in applying the humanitarian exception. It is not, however, a requirement that such an impairment exist. The BIA’s requirement of ongoing disability is unwarranted under the Matter of Chen humanitarian rule. For this reason, we reverse.
(5) Summary of Deference
The plain language of the regulation as well as the intent behind the rule cannot be read to include a requirement of ongoing disability.7 Further, the BIA changed course from its settled policies and ignored Ninth Circuit precedent. Thus, we need not defer to the BIA’s attempt to require an ongoing disability in this case. Thomas Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381. Accordingly, we hold that the regulatory exception cannot be read as limited to applicants who suffer ongoing disabilities. Because the BIA’s interpretation is inconsistent with this holding, it is reversed.
b. Aguirre-Aguirre
We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). We apply the reasoning of that case, but find it to be distinguishable. See 526 U.S. at 415, 119 S.Ct. 1439.8 The Supreme Court reviewed our court’s reversal of the BIA’s conclusion that an asylum applicant was ineligible for withholding of deportation because he had “committed a serious nonpolitical crime.” 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir.1997). In particular, we held that the BIA failed to consider the [1009]*1009rules embodied in two United Nations documents to which the United States was a party, and which gave rise to the immigration statute in question, as well as a United Nations handbook. 121 F.3d at 524. The Supreme Court held that we “failed to accord the required level of deference” that the BIA was due in interpreting the statute which it administers. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439. However, the Supreme Court did not blindly defer to the BIA’s interpretation. It carefully examined the statute and decided that the “BIA’s approach [was] consistent” with its plain language. Id. at 430,119 S.Ct. 1439; see also id. at 426, 119 S.Ct. 1439. We undertake the same analysis in this case and reverse because the BIA’s approach is not consistent with the regulation’s plain language.
In Aguirre-Aguirre we erred and were reversed because we substituted our own interpretation for the BIA’s consistent, reasonable interpretation of a statute that was for the BIA to interpret. In this case, we do not replace the BIA’s interpretation with our own interpretation. Instead, we follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court and examine whether the BIA’s interpretation is contrary to the plain language and intent of the regulation.9 As we have shown, the BIA’s new requirement of ongoing disability is unreasonable and inconsistent with the text of the regulation, the intent of the agency as embodied in Chen, and the past practices of the BIA and this Court. We were admonished in Aguirre-Aguirre to give deference to the BIA in interpreting immigration laws, but the Court in Aguirre-Aguirre acknowledged that while giving deference, we may still identify and reverse decisions of the BIA that are at odds with the text and spirit of our nation’s immigration rules. We are faced with such an inconsistent and unreasonable decision now.
The Matter of Chen exception is an expression of humanitarian considerations that sometimes past persecution is so horrific that the march of time and the ebb and flow of political tides cannot efface the fear in the mind of the persecuted. Long-lasting, genuine fear can be visited upon somebody even if they do not have a crippled arm or leg to remind them of what they have suffered, and any other interpretation of the language of the regulation and the intent behind the rule is so clearly inconsistent and unreasonable as to be undeserving of our deference.
2. Application of Matter of Chen
The dissent suggests that the BIA might have weighed Lai’s lack of an ongoing disability as a factor, not a requirement, in support of its conclusion to deny asylum under Matter of Chen. See infra Part II. This suggestion belies the plain reading of the BIA’s decision, which focuses primarily on ongoing disability and does not list other factors as the basis for its reasoning. Furthermore, it would be legal error, under any applicable test, to conclude that the mistreatment suffered by the Lais did not rise to the level of severity required by Matter of Chen. The Lai family suffered atrociously. Mr. Lai was dragged from his home under force of arms, detained, beaten and tortured with knives and cigarettes, forced to drink human urine, deprived of food and water, subjected to religious and politically-based taunts and threats, and had his home and place of worship burned. He was forced at gunpoint to undergo the additional hor[1010]*1010ror of watching his wife be subjected to sexual assault. Mrs. Lai, herself, was threatened, harassed, and sexually assaulted. The Lais’ child was harassed, mocked, and turned away from school because of his race and religion. Such persecution is comparable to that faced by others to whom we have applied the Matter of Chen analysis. See, e.g., Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir.1999); Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, even were we to assume that the BIA’s decision did not represent a change in policy, its denial of asylum under the humanitarian exception was not supported by substantial evidence.
B. Changed Country Conditions
After rejecting Mr. Lai’s claim to asylum based on past persecution, the BIA also rejected the IJ’s conclusion that he had demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution based on changed country circumstances. The Board found that:
[T]he evidence of record includes the Department of State’s Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions — Fiji (Profile), dated March 15, 1994. This document does not support the principal respondent’s contention that he faces a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. The Profile, while acknowledging “racial tensions,” confirms that neither the Amnesty International 1992 annual report nor the Department of State’s annual country report on Fiji has found evidence of widespread human rights abuse in Fiji. It is noted [in the Profile] that both native Fijians and Indo-Fijians are now leading “tranquil and productive lives” throughout Fiji; and that Indo-Fijians of Moslem, Hindu, Sikh and Christian faiths are economically active and engage in business and professional activities.
BIA Opinion at 2 (citations omitted). This conclusion does not take into account the specific facts on the record that differentiate Mr. Lai’s case from those Indo-Fijians who may have been “leading ‘tranquil and productive lives’” at the time of the Department’s Profile. As we recently explained, the fact that we have upheld similar findings by the BIA concerning changed country conditions in Fiji does not mean that we have adopted “a general proposition that no Indian Fijian can any longer have a reasonable fear of future persecution because conditions in Fiji had improved.” Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing and distinguishing Kumar v. INS, 204 F.3d 931 (9th Cir.2000)). Instead, “we have long held that the determination of whether or not a particular applicant’s fear is rebutted by general country conditions information requires an individualized analysis that focuses on the specific harm suffered and the relationship of the particular information contained in the relevant country reports.” Id. at 1079.
Applying this rule, we first note that the BIA did not undertake the required individualized analysis. Using such an approach, we find that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the changed country conditions information in the record is sufficient to rebut the presumption of fear of future persecution that arose once Mr. Lai had demonstrated past persecution. The State Department’s 1994 Profile included in the record states generally that there is no evidence of “widespread human rights violations in Fiji.” It also states, however, that harassment and intimidation of Indo-Fijians continues, and explains that “[t]he police are sometimes either unable or unwilling to prevent such harassment.” Furthermore, the report admits that while the State Department did not observe “a sustained pattern of police violation of basic human rights,” the Department had confirmed that official “abuse has occurred.” Thus the depart[1011]*1011ment acknowledges that some Indo-Fiji-ans in Fiji continued to be persecuted as late as 1994. The fact that such abuses may not have been widespread or may not have formed a clear pattern does not mean that particular individuals who have been targeted in the past are safe.10
In such a situation, the BIA must ask whether the INS has shown through record evidence that the individual who suffered past persecution is among the general population that is not suffering from a “sustained pattern” of human rights violations, or whether the applicant is among the unlucky few who are most vulnerable to abuse. Such an assessment must take account of the specific attributes of the past persecution on record. See Chand, 222 F.3d at 1079. In this case, there is abundant evidence that Mr. Lai was well-known as a leader and organizer for the Labor Party because of his prominent organizing work during the 1987 elections. In addition, we know from the record that Mr. Lai is not among those Indo-Fijians who were attacked at random in the aftermath of the coup. Instead, he was specifically sought at his home by government representatives, taken into detention, and tortured. Members of his family were attacked and harassed. Nor did the abuse cease during Fiji’s peaceful periods. Instead, Mr. Lai was sought and detained several times, even though he was no longer working as an organizer. His renown was such that his name was placed on a government blacklist.
Perhaps most importantly, these events spanned a four year period. Like the applicant in Chand, then, Mr. Lai “has shown that he has continued to face significant problems in the years after the coup, even after the general conditions improved substantially.” Id. In short, the record compels a result contrary to that of the BIA, and we must reverse.11
Because we reverse the BIA’s well-founded fear decision, we must consider whether Mr. Lai has demonstrated eligibility for withholding of deportation. To qualify for this relief, he must “demonstrate that it is more, likely than not that [he] would be subject to persecution in the country to which he would be returned.” Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (citation omitted)). Because we have found that Mr. Lai would be placed in an extremely vulnerable position were he returned to Fiji, we conclude that Mr. Lai is entitled to withholding of deportation.
IV.
In conclusion, Mr. Lai is eligible for asylum on the basis of past persecution under the humanitarian exception, and he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Further, he is entitled to withholding of deportation.
We accordingly GRANT Mr. Lai’s petition for review, GRANT withholding of deportation, and REMAND to the BIA [1012]*1012with instructions to present this matter to the Attorney General for the exercise of his discretion as to asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).