Jason Sharp v. Board of Trustees, Etc.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: A-1728-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1728-24

JASON SHARP,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent. ___________________________

Argued April 15, 2026 – Decided April 27, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PFRS No. xx0624.

Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader PC, attorneys; Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).

Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy Director, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Petitioner Jason Sharp appeals from the final agency decision of the Board

of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System (the Board), which denied

his application for accidental disability retirement benefits following a May 25,

2019 incident in which he sustained injury to his left shoulder while subduing a

combative inmate at the Camden County Correctional Facility. This matter

comes before us a second time, after a remand from a prior Appellate Division

decision that vacated the Board's previous denial of accidental disability benefits

and directed the Board to determine whether a principled legal distinction could

be drawn between the facts of this case and those in Richardson v. Board of

Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007). In that

seminal case, the Supreme Court found a corrections officer was entitled to

accidental disability retirement benefits for an injury he suffered while subduing

an inmate. Following the remand here, the Board issued another final agency

decision, again denying petitioner accidental disability retirement benefits

because it concluded the facts of this case are legally distinguishable from

Richardson based on the relative level of violence involved in each incident.

We disagree and reverse and remand the Board's decision with direction

that petitioner be awarded accidental disability retirement benefits. The facts of

A-1728-24 2 this case are materially indistinguishable from Richardson, and the Board's basis

for distinguishing the two cases, the degree of force the inmate used, is contrary

to Richardson's espoused principle that the traumatic event standard requires no

particular amount of force.

I.

We incorporate the facts from this court's prior decision, Sharp v. Bd. of

Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., No. A-0643-22 (App. Div. Oct. 7, 2024),

which neither party disputes. On May 25, 2019, Sharp was employed by

Camden County as a corrections officer. He was assigned to perform his regular

duties at the Camden County Correctional Facility, which included serving

meals to inmates in the special needs unit. Sharp was working with two other

officers and a sergeant.

The officers arrived at the cell of an inmate who appeared to be agitated.

Because of the inmate's condition, Sharp attempted to pass the inmate's meal

through a pass-through door cut into the cell door. At the time, Sharp was

holding ten Styrofoam trays of food, five in each hand. The sergeant was unable

to open the pass-through door with a key. The sergeant decided to open the cell

door to permit Sharp to deliver the meal. In doing so, the sergeant did not follow

established protocol requiring her to call for back-up officers or a reaction team

A-1728-24 3 to assist in controlling the inmate after the cell door was opened. When she

opened the cell door, the inmate charged out of the cell.

The three officers attempted to push the inmate back into the cell. As they

tried to close the door, they realized it remained locked in the open position.

The door bounced back open and the inmate charged out a second time. Sharp

dropped the food trays and engaged in a struggle with the inmate.

The officers brought the inmate to the ground. As Sharp attempted to pin

one of the inmate's arms, the sergeant pepper sprayed the inmate, who jerked

and tensed up, attempting to pull his hands up to cover his face. At that time,

Sharp heard and felt a pop in his left shoulder. He held the inmate down until

assistance arrived. The parties do not dispute the injury to Sharp's shoulder

rendered him totally and permanently disabled from the performance of his

duties as a corrections officer.

Sharp applied for accidental disability retirement benefits as a result of

the injury.

In an initial decision, the ALJ recommended the Board deny Sharp

accidental disability retirement benefits. The ALJ found the three events on

which Sharp relied were not the direct cause of his disability and could not,

A-1728-24 4 therefore, be the basis on which to award him accidental disability retirement

benefits. The ALJ explained:

Here, the traumatic event was the petitioner's interaction with the attacking inmate. The traumatic event was not the unexpected issue with the pass through door, the unexpected issue of the cell door bouncing back because it was in the locked position, or the failure of the sergeant to follow proper protocol and call for back-up prior to entering the cell. While those three events may have been undesigned and unexpected on that day, the fact that those three events were undesigned and unexpected is not the controlling issue. They were simply events that led up to the interaction with the attacking inmate. The controlling issue is whether the traumatic event, which was the petitioner's interaction with the attacking inmate, and having to restrain that attacking inmate, was undesigned or unexpected.

The ALJ found no "unexpected happening" resulted in Sharp's disability.

According to the ALJ, Sharp "stated that he assisted in restraining an inmate.

This is part of his job and expected as a corrections officer in a prison setting."

The ALJ noted restraining inmates is listed in the job description of corrections

officers and Sharp received training in controlling inmates through physical

force. He stated that Sharp "was employed at a corrections facility, and it is

reasonable to believe that an inmate would lash out, be involved in altercations,

and that petitioner would have to intervene."

A-1728-24 5 On September 16, 2022, the Board issued a final agency decision adopting

the recommendation of the ALJ and denying Sharp's application for accidental

disability retirement benefits, finding the event causing his disability was not a

traumatic event within the meaning of the relevant statute because his physical

engagement with the inmate was not undesigned and unexpected, but an

expected responsibility of a corrections officer. The Board awarded him

ordinary disability retirement benefits instead. Sharp filed a notice of appeal to

the Appellate Division on the same date.

The Appellate Division issued its decision on October 7, 2024. The panel

"affirm[ed] the Board's decision to the extent it rejected Sharp's claim that the

three events preceding his physical encounter with the inmate were traumatic

events qualifying him for accidental disability retirement benefits," agreeing

with the Board that those events were not the direct cause of his disability.

However, the panel "vacat[ed] the Board's denial of Sharp's application for

accidental disability retirement benefits and remand[ed] the matter for the Board

to determine in the first instance whether a principled legal distinction can be

made between the facts of this case and those in Richardson." The panel

explained "the Board's decision, which adopted the ALJ's recommendation,

contains no analysis of how the events leading to Sharp's injury meaningfully

A-1728-24 6 differ from those before the Richardson Court, where the officer was found

eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits."

On February 10, 2025, the Board issued its second final agency decision

in which it determined no additional witness testimony was needed and again

denied Sharp accidental disability retirement benefits. The Board reasoned

"[t]he facts of Richardson and the facts of the Incident are legally

distinguishable and distinct. The description of the Richardson facts, quoted in

the Appellate decision, is more extensive and more violent than the facts of the

Incident." Sharp filed this second appeal.

II.

"An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained

unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or that it lacks fair support in the record." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.

19, 27-28 (2007)). Our review of an agency's decision considers:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

A-1728-24 7 [In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]

We must affirm an agency's findings of fact if "supported by adequate,

substantial[,] and credible evidence." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)). Moreover, if we are "satisfied after [our] review that the evidence and

the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head's decision, then

[we] must affirm even if . . . [we] feel[ ] that [we] would have reached a different

result . . . ." Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988). The

burden of demonstrating arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable action rests upon

the party challenging it. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super.

544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). We are not bound, however, by an agency's

"determination of a strictly legal issue." Russo, 206 N.J. at 27 (quoting

Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). We review its

purely legal conclusions de novo. In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J.

1, 17 (2020).

Sharp argues the May 25, 2019 incident satisfies the "undesigned and

unexpected" standard pursuant to Richardson and therefore entitles him to

accidental disability retirement benefits. He argues the Board improperly

A-1728-24 8 invented a new requirement by demanding claimants demonstrate a "relative

level of violence" comparable to Richardson. We agree.

N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43(a) provides, in pertinent part, accidental disability

retirement benefits may be obtained "if [an] employee is permanently and totally

disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result

of the performance of his regular or assigned duties." Our Supreme Court in

Richardson clarified the meaning of the phrase "result of a traumatic event" in

the statute in establishing a five-part test a claimant seeking accidental disability

retirement benefits must satisfy. 192 N.J. at 212-13. The list includes:

1. that [the member] is permanently and totally disabled;

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is

a. identifiable as to time and place,

b. undesigned and unexpected, and

c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);

3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;

4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; and

A-1728-24 9 5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.

[Ibid.] "Thus, a member who is injured as a direct result of an identifiable,

unanticipated mishap has satisfied the traumatic event standard." Id. at 213. In

Richardson, the petitioner, also a corrections officer, responded to an emergency

call for assistance from officers dealing with an unruly inmate. Id. at 193. They

attempted to restrain the inmate so they could handcuff him behind his back, and

in doing so, they wrestled the inmate to the ground on his stomach. Ibid. The

petitioner "straddled the inmate to hold him down, but the inmate continued to

struggle by kicking, punching, and throwing his body around." Ibid. As the

petitioner reached for a pair of handcuffs, "the inmate pulled his arm loose and

forcefully jerked up from the ground, knocking [the petitioner] backward." Ibid.

The force of the fall caused the petitioner to fall back onto his left hand and

hyperextend his wrist. Ibid. It was later found the petitioner had suffered a

complete tear of the ligament, and surgery to repair the injury was unsuccessful.

Ibid. Richardson's injury resulted in his total and permanent disability from

performing his duties as a corrections officer. Ibid.

A-1728-24 10 The petitioner filed for accidental disability retirement benefits, and the

Board denied the application because it found "[the petitioner] did not suffer a

traumatic event as required by the statute." Id. at 194. Similarly, "the ALJ

determined that the . . . incident did not constitute a traumatic event, because

[the petitioner]'s response was part of the ordinary duties of a corrections

officer." Ibid. The Board adopted that decision, and we affirmed, noting the

petitioner's "injury also did not satisfy the great-rush-of-force prong of the

traumatic event standard." Ibid.

Our Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Board's argument "that because

subduing an inmate is part of the anticipated work of a corrections officer and

was not unexpected or unintended, [the petitioner] cannot satisfy the traumatic

event standard." Id. at 213. It concluded the Board "misread[]" the statute. Ibid.

Instead, the Court stressed the statute's requirement the traumatic event "occur

'during and as a result of the performance of [the member's] regular or assigned

duties.'" Ibid. (emphasis and alteration in original). Since then, other courts

have found, in the specific context of correctional facilities, that injuries

sustained by a corrections officer in the context of subduing an inmate a re

unexpected or unintended.

A-1728-24 11 Moreover, the Richardson Court cited favorably to its prior decision in

Gable v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 115 N.J. 212

(1989), noting it "recognized the 'actions of an unruly inmate' as the necessary

qualifying external force distinct from an employee's 'own conduct.'"

Richardson, 192 N.J. at 208 (quoting Gable, 115 N.J. at 222). The Court's

observations in Gable are instructive here, particularly where it noted:

We recognize that a corrections officer's job is dangerous. There is always the possibility that [they] will be attacked violently by an inmate. . . . These occurrences, however, while occupational hazards, do not occur frequently enough to constitute normal stress or strain. Although a corrections officer, such as Gable[,] . . . may realize that there is a "potential that [they] will be called upon to subdue an inmate, an officer does not expect [their] daily routine will normally involve being struck by an aggressive or escaping inmate."

[115 N.J. at 223-24.]

The Court further added, "Merely by performing their jobs, corrections officers

do not 'voluntarily' assume the risk of being assaulted by an unruly inmate"

because they "are not hired to be punching bags." Id. at 224.

The Board's attempt to distinguish Richardson from the present matter by

focusing on the amount of force used is misplaced. The Richardson Court

explicitly recognized "not every case will require a great rush of force" to qualify

A-1728-24 12 for accidental disability retirement benefits. Richardson, 192 N.J. at 213.

"Indeed, no particular amount of force is necessary, and no gravitational force

analysis is implicated in the traumatic event standard." Ibid. The Court

emphasized the "polestar" of the inquiry was "whether, during the regular

performance of [the petitioner's] job, an unexpected happening . . . has occurred

and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Id.

at 214.

In our prior decision, we noted the "numerous similarities" between the

present case and Richardson. Indeed, the facts of Richardson are almost

identical to the facts of the present case; the only tangible difference is the

degree of force the inmate used. Both Sharp and Richardson were corrections

officers who attempted to subdue a combative inmate who was behaving

erratically. Both Sharp and Richardson sustained an injury caused by their

encounter with an inmate and the external force used by the inmate. See

Richardson, 192 N.J. at 214-15. The effort exerted by the corrections officers

in both matters was not part of the normal stress or strain of the job, and there

is no suggestion their injuries stemmed from a pre-existing disease. Although

the assault that took place unfortunately occurs all too often to corrections

officers, it was nevertheless undesigned or unexpected for the purposes of this

A-1728-24 13 inquiry, as Richardson and Gable illustrate. The Board's attempt to distinguish

the two cases on the basis of "the relative level of violence" is wholly

unsupported by the caselaw.

The Board had accepted that Sharp met all the Richardson factors except

for 2(b). Because 2(b) is clearly applicable here, the Board's final agency

decision is reversed, and the Board is directed to award accidental disability

retirement benefits to Sharp.

Reversed and remanded for an award of accidental disability benefits. We

do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1728-24 14