Jason Scott Ford v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 0387242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Causey, Friedman and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JASON SCOTT FORD MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0387-24-2 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY FEBRUARY 18, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Claire G. Cardwell, Judge

Paul C. Galanides for appellant.

Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

A jury convicted Jason Scott Ford of malicious wounding. On appeal, Ford argues that

the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear a restraint during trial. Finding no

error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Ford for aggravated malicious wounding. During a pretrial

hearing, Ford “refused to come out of the lockup and began banging his feet on the walls.” Due

to security concerns related to his behavior, on the morning of trial sheriff’s deputies restrained

Ford with waist chains and a shock vest while he was in a holding cell. When deputies were not

looking, Ford removed the waist restraint and inserted bits of cardboard from a toilet paper roll

between the shock vest’s probes and his skin.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). The trial court stated that Ford had previously injured a deputy sheriff while in the same

courthouse to attend a hearing; during an earlier hearing, the trial court also noted on the record

that Ford had needed to be pepper-sprayed because of his disruptive courtroom behavior.1

Having learned that Ford had disabled the restraint that the deputies had employed, and

considering Ford’s history of disruptive behavior, the trial court ordered that Ford be restrained

during the trial, with his hands attached to his waist. So long as he stayed seated, the jury would

not see the restraints, and the trial court instructed Ford to avoid standing in the jury’s presence

to avoid any prejudice. During trial, the trial court ensured that Ford was seated before the jury

reentered the courtroom after breaks.

The jury convicted Ford of malicious wounding. The trial court sentenced Ford to 20

years’ incarceration with 10 years suspended. Ford appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Ford argues the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear physical

restraints during trial.

“[T]he conduct of a trial is committed to the trial judge’s discretion, and absent evidence of

an abuse of this discretion, we will not disturb [her] rulings on that subject.” Justus v.

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 676 (1981). “The abuse of discretion standard draws a line—or

rather, demarcates a region—between the unsupportable and the merely mistaken, between the

legal error . . . that a reviewing court may always correct, and the simple disagreement that, on

this standard, it may not.” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1, 10-11 (2019) (alteration in

original) (quoting Reyes v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 133, 139 (2019)). “[T]he abuse of

discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary

decisionmaker’s judgment that the [reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it would

1 The record is not clear if these incidents were from the same altercation. -2- have come to a different result in the first instance.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73 Va. App.

121, 127 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212

(2013)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can [an appellate court] say an abuse of

discretion has occurred.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, adopted upon reh’g

en banc, 45 Va. App. 811 (2005).

“There is . . . no per se rule which prohibits the use of physical restraints of defendants in

criminal trials.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 370 (1988). When the “defendant

poses a risk of continued disorderly and disruptive behavior, his rights are relative to the

competing interests of others present in the courtroom and of society at large.” Martin v.

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 397, 405 (1990). “A trial court may consider various factors in

determining whether a defendant should be restrained, such as the seriousness of the charge, the

defendant’s temperament, age, and physical attributes, his criminal record, and any past escapes,

escape attempts, or threatened misconduct.” Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 381-82

(1986). “This determination need not be made upon a formal hearing,” id. at 382, but “a record

must be made by the trial court which reflects the reasons for the choice of measures taken,”

Martin, 11 Va. App. at 406.

Trial courts must use “the least restrictive means or alternatives available to control a

defendant, while protecting the public and court participants and maintaining the dignity of the

proceedings.” Id. at 409. The trial court found on the record that Ford had a history of

disruptive behavior, including refusing commands, fighting with a deputy, and requiring bailiffs

to deploy pepper spray to control him. On the morning of trial, Ford escaped his restraints and

attempted to neutralize the trial court’s means of controlling his behavior by removing his waist

restraint and essentially disarming the shock vest. This record supports the trial court’s decision

-3- to use greater physical restraints to protect Ford, the jury, court security officers, and members of

the public during trial.

The trial court took affirmative steps to ensure the jury was unaware of the restraints.

Indeed, Ford concedes there is no record evidence that any juror noticed his restraints; he only

notes the fact of his conviction. With no evidence of prejudice, Ford cannot establish that the

trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear restraints.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

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