IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1082 Filed September 4, 2025
JASON RYAN BARKSLEY, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, John J. Sullivan,
Judge.
Jason Barksley appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Gregory F. Greiner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral arguments by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Jason Barksley appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR) concerning his conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation
of Iowa Code section 709.3 (2020). He alleges ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and that the district court abused its discretion by accepting a written guilty
plea. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On August 7, 2020, law enforcement was made aware of an allegation that
Barksley sexually abused his stepdaughter. When interviewed by police, Barksley
admitted to forcing his stepdaughter to perform oral sex on him and her own
mother.
On August 27, 2020, Barksley was charged with one count of continuous
sexual abuse of a child, which carries a prison sentence of fifty years. Barksley
later entered a guilty plea to the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the
second degree and received a sentence of twenty-five years.
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, an Iowa Supreme Court Supervisory
Order allowed the district court to accept a written plea agreement in lieu of an oral
plea. The written plea informed Barksley of all rights and effects of the guilty plea,
including the minimum and maximum sentence for sexual abuse in the second
degree. Both Barksley and his trial counsel signed the written plea agreement,
which was conditioned on the court accepting the terms. See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.10(3). On January 20, 2021, the district court accepted Barksley’s plea and
sentenced him to a term of twenty-five years in prison. The sentencing order
omitted the mandatory minimum sentence and included a ten-year special 3
sentence of supervision pursuant to Iowa Code 903B.2. But sexual abuse in the
second degree carries a special sentence of lifetime supervision under that statute,
so the district court entered an order correcting the term.
On July 19, 2021, Barksley filed a PCR application claiming (1) his attorney
misled him about the mandatory minimum sentence he was facing and (2) the
district court was required to conduct an in-person colloquy. The district court
heard testimony from Barksley, his trial counsel, and his attorney in a separate
child in need of assistance (CINA)1 matter. The district court denied Barksley’s
PCR application in its entirety, and Barksley appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We generally review denials of PCR applications for corrections of errors at
law. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018). But because ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims raise constitutional issues, we review the denial of
Barksley’s application de novo. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).
III. Discussion
A. Written Guilty Plea
Barksley contends the PCR court erred in finding the sentencing court
complied with the Iowa Supreme Court’s COVID-19 supervisory order. The State
contends that error is unpreserved on this issue or it is foreclosed by statute.
Barksley did not challenge the form of the plea agreement, the taking of a written
plea, or written sentencing in the underlying proceedings. Similarly, he did not
raise the issue on direct appeal.
1 Barksley was involved in a CINA case related to his son in juvenile court and was
represented by a different lawyer than the underlying criminal case. 4
By statute, PCR is not available for claims that could have been raised at
trial or on direct appeal but were not, unless the applicant can show “sufficient
reason.” Iowa Code § 822.8 (2021). Ineffective assistance of counsel can provide
sufficient reason. Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999). However,
Barksley raises this claim independent of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. Because Barksley has not shown a “sufficient reason” for not litigating this
issue in the underlying proceedings, we conclude it is barred by statute.
But even if Barksley’s claim was not barred, we find it fails. Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) governs the acceptance of a guilty plea. The rule
requires the court to address the defendant personally in open court. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.8(2)(b). However, on May 22, 2020, the Iowa Supreme Court issued a
supervisory order stating, “Through December 31, 2020, district courts may accept
written guilty pleas in felony cases in the same manner as in serious and
aggravated misdemeanor cases.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter
of Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services 7 (May
22, 2020). In State v. Basquin, the Supreme Court reviewed a defendant’s due
process challenge to his felony plea pursuant to this order and concluded the plea
was constitutionally permissible. 970 N.W.2d 643, 68–60 (Iowa 2022). Because
the district court followed our Supreme Court’s supervisory order, we find Barksley
cannot establish an abuse of discretion.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, Barksley contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for two
reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to file a failed to file a form waiving Barksley’s right 5
to appear at sentencing and (2) trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the
mandatory minimum sentence.
“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the claimant must
satisfy the two-prong test by proving that his trial counsel failed to perform an
essential duty and prejudice resulted.” State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 391 (Iowa
2020). Both elements must be proved for the claim to be successful. Id. For the
first prong, we presume counsel performed competently unless proved otherwise
by a preponderance of the evidence, measured objectively against the prevailing
professional norms. Id. Because Barksley pleaded guilty, he must show he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial. See State v. Carroll,
767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).
First, Barksley argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he never
filed a written waiver of the appearance at sentencing. We reject this argument
because Barksley cannot show how counsel’s failure to file a written waiver was a
breach of an essential duty.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1082 Filed September 4, 2025
JASON RYAN BARKSLEY, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, John J. Sullivan,
Judge.
Jason Barksley appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Gregory F. Greiner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral arguments by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Jason Barksley appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR) concerning his conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation
of Iowa Code section 709.3 (2020). He alleges ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and that the district court abused its discretion by accepting a written guilty
plea. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On August 7, 2020, law enforcement was made aware of an allegation that
Barksley sexually abused his stepdaughter. When interviewed by police, Barksley
admitted to forcing his stepdaughter to perform oral sex on him and her own
mother.
On August 27, 2020, Barksley was charged with one count of continuous
sexual abuse of a child, which carries a prison sentence of fifty years. Barksley
later entered a guilty plea to the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the
second degree and received a sentence of twenty-five years.
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, an Iowa Supreme Court Supervisory
Order allowed the district court to accept a written plea agreement in lieu of an oral
plea. The written plea informed Barksley of all rights and effects of the guilty plea,
including the minimum and maximum sentence for sexual abuse in the second
degree. Both Barksley and his trial counsel signed the written plea agreement,
which was conditioned on the court accepting the terms. See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.10(3). On January 20, 2021, the district court accepted Barksley’s plea and
sentenced him to a term of twenty-five years in prison. The sentencing order
omitted the mandatory minimum sentence and included a ten-year special 3
sentence of supervision pursuant to Iowa Code 903B.2. But sexual abuse in the
second degree carries a special sentence of lifetime supervision under that statute,
so the district court entered an order correcting the term.
On July 19, 2021, Barksley filed a PCR application claiming (1) his attorney
misled him about the mandatory minimum sentence he was facing and (2) the
district court was required to conduct an in-person colloquy. The district court
heard testimony from Barksley, his trial counsel, and his attorney in a separate
child in need of assistance (CINA)1 matter. The district court denied Barksley’s
PCR application in its entirety, and Barksley appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We generally review denials of PCR applications for corrections of errors at
law. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018). But because ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims raise constitutional issues, we review the denial of
Barksley’s application de novo. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).
III. Discussion
A. Written Guilty Plea
Barksley contends the PCR court erred in finding the sentencing court
complied with the Iowa Supreme Court’s COVID-19 supervisory order. The State
contends that error is unpreserved on this issue or it is foreclosed by statute.
Barksley did not challenge the form of the plea agreement, the taking of a written
plea, or written sentencing in the underlying proceedings. Similarly, he did not
raise the issue on direct appeal.
1 Barksley was involved in a CINA case related to his son in juvenile court and was
represented by a different lawyer than the underlying criminal case. 4
By statute, PCR is not available for claims that could have been raised at
trial or on direct appeal but were not, unless the applicant can show “sufficient
reason.” Iowa Code § 822.8 (2021). Ineffective assistance of counsel can provide
sufficient reason. Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999). However,
Barksley raises this claim independent of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. Because Barksley has not shown a “sufficient reason” for not litigating this
issue in the underlying proceedings, we conclude it is barred by statute.
But even if Barksley’s claim was not barred, we find it fails. Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) governs the acceptance of a guilty plea. The rule
requires the court to address the defendant personally in open court. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.8(2)(b). However, on May 22, 2020, the Iowa Supreme Court issued a
supervisory order stating, “Through December 31, 2020, district courts may accept
written guilty pleas in felony cases in the same manner as in serious and
aggravated misdemeanor cases.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter
of Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services 7 (May
22, 2020). In State v. Basquin, the Supreme Court reviewed a defendant’s due
process challenge to his felony plea pursuant to this order and concluded the plea
was constitutionally permissible. 970 N.W.2d 643, 68–60 (Iowa 2022). Because
the district court followed our Supreme Court’s supervisory order, we find Barksley
cannot establish an abuse of discretion.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, Barksley contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for two
reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to file a failed to file a form waiving Barksley’s right 5
to appear at sentencing and (2) trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the
mandatory minimum sentence.
“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the claimant must
satisfy the two-prong test by proving that his trial counsel failed to perform an
essential duty and prejudice resulted.” State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 391 (Iowa
2020). Both elements must be proved for the claim to be successful. Id. For the
first prong, we presume counsel performed competently unless proved otherwise
by a preponderance of the evidence, measured objectively against the prevailing
professional norms. Id. Because Barksley pleaded guilty, he must show he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial. See State v. Carroll,
767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).
First, Barksley argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he never
filed a written waiver of the appearance at sentencing. We reject this argument
because Barksley cannot show how counsel’s failure to file a written waiver was a
breach of an essential duty. The written plea agreement stated Barksley had a
right to a hearing in open court and that he was waving that right. Barksley initialed
next to that paragraph. That portion of the plea agreement was substantially
similar to the waiver. Trial counsel did not breach an essential duty by not filing a
duplicative document. Instead, counsel filed the plea agreement, which complied
with rule 2.8. See State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 406 (Iowa 2017). Therefore,
we find Barksley’s trial counsel did not breach a duty.
Second, Barksley argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not adequately inform him of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual abuse
in the second degree. The record does not support this claim. The written guilty 6
plea signed by Barksley informed him of the correct penalties for sexual abuse in
the second degree, including the mandatory minimum sentence of seventeen and
one-half years. Trial counsel testified he went over the plea agreement with
Barksley, including the mandatory minimum. When Barksley expressed confusion
to the attorney representing him in another matter, trial counsel went over the
mandatory minimum with him again. Trial counsel testified that he discussed the
mandatory minimum sentence with Barksley “ad nausem.” Other than Barksley’s
self-serving and speculative testimony, the record does not support the contention
that trial counsel failed to inform Barksley of the mandatory minimum sentence.
Thus, we find that Barksley fails to establish his attorney breached an essential
duty, so consequently his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel also fail.
IV. Disposition
Because we find that Barksley has failed to establish a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to either theory submitted, and the district court
did not abuse its discretion in accepting a written guilty plea, we affirm the denial
of his PCR application.