Jason Mills v. Valhalla Golf Partners, LLC, D/B/A Valhalla Golf Club

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-1037-MR

JASON MILLS; JAYLA DILBECK; APPELLANTS LISSA MILLS; AND LOGAN MILLS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SARAH E. CLAY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-000013

VALHALLA GOLF PARTNERS, LLC, D/B/A VALHALLA GOLF CLUB; AMERICAN ZURICH INS. CO.; CORNERSTONE PARKING GROUP, INC; FULLINGTON TRAILWAYS, LLC; PGA TOURNMENT CORPORATION, INC; PROFESSIONAL GOLFERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. A/K/A THE PGA OF AMERICA; TAMARA CHAPMAN; THE CONVENTION STORE, INC., D/B/A TCS TRANSPORTATION; AND THE PGA CORPORATION APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: In this wrongful death case, the circuit court dismissed the loss of parental consortium claims of the Appellants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. CR1 12.02(f). The circuit court made that otherwise interlocutory decision final for purposes of this appeal pursuant to CR 54.02(1). We review this legal conclusion de novo. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010). We are again2 asked to expand the loss of parental consortium claim provided by KRS3 411.135 or the common law pertaining to adult children. We affirm the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2024, John Mills was struck by a bus and killed while attending a golf tournament. The personal representatives of John’s estate brought this wrongful death action. John’s widow Donna made a claim for loss of consortium as did his four children. It is conceded by the Complaint that all four children are adults over the age of 18.

ANALYSIS

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 We were recently asked to declare KRS 411.135 unconstitutional because there was no rational basis for distinguishing minor children from adult children. That case presented the converse of a parent seeking consortium for the death of an adult child rather than a claim by an adult child for the loss of a parent as in the present case. We rejected the constitutional claim in Louisville Cement Assets v. Snyder, Nos. 2023-CA-1383-MR & 2024-CA-0007-MR, 2026 WL 1623047, at *16-20 (Ky. App. Jun. 5, 2026), petition for reh’g filed (Jun. 25, 2026). 3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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Under the common law, there was no claim for wrongful death. Loss of consortium was a separate claim in personal injury cases and to some extent allowed. Consortium claims between spouses and for a parent due to loss of a child was limited to proven interruption in the relationship before death. It had no application when death was essentially immediate as in the present case. See Eden v. Lexington & F. R. Co., 53 Ky. 204 (1853).

The Court in Eden invited legislative action to regulate this subject.

Taking the hint, a wrongful death statute was promptly enacted, which still exists. See KRS 411.130.

At the time of the convention to craft our current state constitution, a recent case had caught the attention of the delegates. In Henderson Administrator v. Kentucky Central Railroad Co., 5 S.W. 875 (Ky. 1887), our then highest court recognized that a statute permitted recovery of punitive damages for wrongful death but identified problems with the statutory scheme as to who could make that claim and recover the damages.

Again, taking the hint, the delegates discussed and passed4 Section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution enacted in 1891. Section 241 protected the right to recover damages resulting from wrongful death but also provided: “The General Assembly may provide how the recovery shall go and to whom belong[.]”

4 4 Debates, Constitutional Convention 1890, 4686-87, 4715-20 (1890).

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Soon after the adoption of this Constitution, our courts recognized that the legislature had essentially occupied the field as to who could recover what damages arising from a wrongful death, and this impacted the common law consortium claims. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McElwain, 34 S.W. 236 (Ky. 1896) (if a wrongful death action was maintained for the benefit of the husband of a deceased wife, then the husband could not maintain a separate claim for loss of consortium).

But Section 241 must be considered along with other constitutional provisions. Section 14 guarantees “remedy by due course of law” for any injury to a person. And Section 54 states: “The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.” How is the potential tension among these provisions to be resolved? We find this answer in how the spousal loss of consortium claim evolved in Kentucky.

Under the common law, only the husband had a right to recover damages for the loss of the services of his wife. This antiquated if not embarrassingly paternal view of women had to go. The courts acted first by recognizing as a matter of common law that the right to consortium for spouses had to become reciprocal. Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970). Within months, the legislature agreed to this result and codified it in KRS 411.145. This

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codification rendered moot to some extent any question of the authority of the courts to have altered spousal consortium in the context of wrongful death.

The language of KRS 411.145 was silent as to the duration of the consortium loss. Did it end with the death of the injured spouse or continue after death? In Martin v. Ohio County Hospital Corporation, 295 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2009), the Court recognized that an “enacted statute supersedes the common law.” Id. at 111. But the Court took the silence in the statute as not limiting the loss of spousal consortium to only the period before death. In other words, a common law clarification on this point did not contradict the statute, and older cases were overruled to allow damages for the loss experienced after the death of the injured spouse.

The loss of parental consortium took a different legal path. The legislature acted first with the enactment of KRS 411.135 in 1968. The statute says: “In a wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the surviving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that would have been derived from such child during its minority, in addition to all other elements of the damage usually recoverable in a wrongful death action.”

Before we proceed further with our analysis of this statute, an important distinction must be recognized between it and KRS 411.145. KRS 411.145 addresses spousal consortium as a separate claim from the statutory

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wrongful death claim. KRS 411.135 creates the right to parental consortium as an integral part of the wrongful death claim.

The limits of Section 241 of the Constitution would be tested in Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1997). In Giuliani, the bare majority of the Court dismissed the well-reasoned constitutional concerns of the dissent to recognize the right of minor children as well as parents to recover for loss of consortium. As in Kotsiris, the basis for the decision was reciprocity of remedy.

Some words of warning appear in the majority opinion in Giuliani.

The Court conceded that public policy is declared by the legislature through statutes, and that the courts should act to advance the common law only when the legislature has been silent on the subject. Id. at 321. The Court in Giuliani did not rewrite the statute in the context of the minority of the child requirement. The legislature had not been silent on this limitation.

Ever since Giuliani, claimants have advocated further expansion to allow adult children to recover for the loss of consortium of their parents. Soon after Giuliani, this Court rejected that argument. We first recognized the authority of the legislature to regulate who should recover what in cases of wrongful death, and we saw no statutory language to “finesse” with Section 241 of the Constitution to achieve reciprocity as was accomplished in Giuliani. Clements v. Moore, 55 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Ky. App. 2000). This Court rejected the further contention that

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the common law should be expanded for this claim, leaving such an important matter to our Supreme Court or the legislature. Smith v. Vilvarajah, 57 S.W.3d 839 (Ky. App. 2000).

The Appellants insist that dicta in Martin encourages recognition of parental consortium for adult children. Getting past the fact that any comments about KRS 411.135 in Martin are clearly dicta not entitled to precedential weight, there is a difference between spousal and parental consortium claims as we have explained. We have also clearly rejected this argument in Pauly v. Chang, 498 S.W.3d 394, 414-15 (Ky. App. 2015). Our Supreme Court decided that Pauly would be published and become precedential, and neither that Court nor this one has questioned its continued validity as precedent. Having revisited the analysis in Pauly, we find nothing lacking in it and no reason to reconsider the result.

Appellants ask Kentucky courts to get in line with other states which allow recovery of parental consortium for adult children. But they have presented no case with the same constitutional and statutory provisions as Kentucky. Certainly, many states allow such a claim, while some do not. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Adult Child’s Right of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium, 12 A.L.R.6th 241 (2006).

From the foregoing analysis, we believe that the legislature has spoken clearly to limit parental consortium, reciprocal or not, to the loss of minor

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children or the loss such minor children themselves experience. The courts should hesitate to enter the fray to expand the common law in this area. Whether by the legislature or the courts, there are considerations which counsel against such expansion.

The law necessarily involves drawing lines for what is allowed and what is not. With the advent of no-fault divorce, the so-called “nuclear family” of two married biological parents with their children has officially become the exception more than the rule.5 This makes the drawing of any line for such claims more complicated.

For example, some of our sister states have understandably recognized a loss of parental consortium for the benefit of a disabled adult child.6 See Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990). On the other hand, in a wholesale rejection of parental consortium, another court has identified the challenge: “Would such a claim be just as valid for an injured aunt, uncle, or friend, especially if they are guardians or stand in loco parenti? The possibilities are endless.” Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ark. 1985).

5 Juliana Kaplan, The American Nuclear Family is Officially Over, BUS. INSIDER, (Sep. 16, 2023), https://www.businessinsider.com/american-marriage-family-structure-kids-over-2023-9. 6 There is no indication that any of the Appellants are adults with special needs provided by a parent despite the child’s chronological age.

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Indeed, we can think of more possibilities. Should the claim apply to all step-parents, even if the deceased person acted in that capacity for only a short time during one of multiple marriages? After all, a child may be able to show a particularly close relationship with one or more of several step-parents. Many children today are being raised by grandparents, even without official status as legal custodians. Should we draw the line to include only those who satisfy the status of de facto custodians?

If loss of parental consortium is to be expanded to all adult children, as requested here, we believe this is first a matter for the legislature. To the extent we are asked to redraw the line as a matter of common law, we decline to do so.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court correctly dismissed the claims of the Appellants for failure to state a claim under Kentucky law upon which relief can be granted and is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CORNERSTONE PARKING

Chadwick N. Gardner GROUP, INC: Tyler Stewart Savannah R. Nolan W. Douglas Kemper Prospect, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky

Ann B. Oldfather BRIEF FOR APPELLEES R. Sean Deskins THE CONVENTION STORE AND Michael R. Hasken PGA CORPORATION: Louisville, Kentucky Chadwick A. Wells

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

TAMARA CHAPMAN AND

FULLINGTON TRAILWAYS, LLC:

John J. Garvey, III

Fort Mitchell, Kentucky