Jason Marcum v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
This text of Jason Marcum v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Jason Marcum v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0770-MR
JASON MARCUM APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00053
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
EASTON, JUDGE: Appellant (Marcum) asks this Court to reverse his conviction
based on his conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine. He argues
the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence based upon a
traffic stop. Finding no error by the circuit court, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At about 6:30 p.m. on the evening of December 20, 2021, Kentucky
State Police Trooper Scott Townsend (Townsend) was conducting stationary patrol parked in a gravel area near a four-way intersection of two county roads. He saw
the vehicle in which Marcum was a passenger approach that intersection.
Townsend noticed the vehicle was equipped with an “off-road” or LED1 light bar
attached to the front bumper of the vehicle between the standard headlights.
In his experience of seeing such lights several times before,
Townsend believed that this light bar could not be dimmed; they are either off or
full on. From prior stops, Townsend knew that such lights (especially in
combination with standard headlights) were too bright.2 Townsend cited the driver
for “glaring headlights” in violation of KRS3 189.040.
We need not detail the interaction between Townsend and Marcum
after the stop. Suffice it to say that Townsend found over 70 grams of
methamphetamine on Marcum. Townsend arrested Marcum leading to the
eventual charge and conviction for trafficking.
Marcum filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the
traffic stop. He argued that the off-road light bar was not itself illegal. Townsend
had not seen any vehicles opposite that in which Marcum was a passenger. Thus,
1 Light Emitting Diode. 2 Total lumens of lights used logically may impact distance the light travels before dissipating and reducing glare. 3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2- Marcum argued no one had been subjected to “glaring headlights.” The circuit
court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied it. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We apply a two-part standard in reviewing the denial of a motion to
suppress:
The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clear-error standard. We accordingly defer to the trial court’s fact finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is “evidence, taken alone or in light of other proof, that a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion.” We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. This means we have “a duty to make an independent evaluation of the record,” and will give no deference to the trial court’s ruling.
Cox v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2022) (footnotes omitted).
ANALYSIS
We must read all of KRS 189.040 together to determine what it
prohibits. “The statute must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of
the law. All parts of the statute must be given equal effect so that no part of the
statute will become meaningless or ineffectual.” Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op.
Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky. 2005).
KRS 189.040(5) and (6) govern how drivers may use brighter lights
but must be able to dim their lights by changing the elevation of the light beams
-3- when meeting or following other vehicles. Marcum is right that Townsend may
not have observed a violation of these subsections.
But KRS 189.040(3) governs how vehicles must be equipped with
respect to lights. The statute does permit auxiliary lights (such as fog lights) in
addition to just two standard headlights. But when it comes to the combination of
lights, they must be such that the combination will not violate the dimming
requirements of KRS 189.040(5) and (6). For this reason, the statute requires an
option for the elevation of light beams aimed at others. KRS 189.040(3)(a) and
(b). A violation of KRS 189.040(3) is subject to the same penalty as a violation of
KRS 189.040(5) and (6). KRS 189.990(1).
Townsend knew from his experience that off-road lights were not
usually capable of being dimmed. Thus, on-road use of such lights may violate
KRS 189.040(3). He had probable cause to investigate this issue regardless of
ultimate guilt of the driver for such a violation.
Marcum points out that the violation charged against the driver over
the lights was dismissed without prejudice. Given the more serious criminal
activity discovered after the stop with respect to the passenger, this is not
surprising. It is also largely irrelevant.
Townsend might have been wrong about the separate dimmability of
the off-road light bar. Neither side put any evidence in the record, such as a photo,
-4- about the light bar. No one testified whether the light bar could be dimmed. With
the felony drug arrest that developed, Townsend did not check to see if the light
bar could be dimmed.
But a reasonable belief, even if mistaken, can justify an investigative
stop. “The constitutional validity of a stop is not undermined simply because the
officers who made the stop were mistaken about relevant facts.” Benton v.
Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Ky. App. 2020) (citations omitted). The
fact that the ultimate violation was not proven did not remove probable cause. See,
e.g., Greer v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Ky. App. 2017) (fact that
window tinting on a vehicle was later found to be within legal limits does not
invalidate traffic stop to investigate that issue based on probable cause to believe
such a violation may have occurred).
We briefly note the misplaced reliance on the recent decision in
Vincent v. Commonwealth, 706 S.W.3d 94 (Ky. 2024). Vincent did not reject the
good-faith-legal-mistake rule in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014).
The Court in Vincent held that Heien did not apply to the circumstances of Vincent.
Rather, the officer in Vincent was clearly wrong about the illegal nature of the light
in question, because the law governing it had not yet gone into effect. Vincent,
supra, at 100.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Jason Marcum v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jason-marcum-v-commonwealth-of-kentucky-kyctapp-2026.