RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0981-MR
JASON BLANE ROGERS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE NATALIE WHITE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00147
BETHANY ANN ROGERS APPELLEE
OPINION
DISMISSING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES ECKERLE, JUDGE: This matter initiated as an uncontested divorce adopting a Marital Settlement and Custodial Agreement (“the Agreement”) between Appellant, Jason Blane Rogers (“Ex-Husband”), and Appellee, Bethany Ann Rogers (“Ex-Wife”). Ex-Husband appeals two post-dissolution Orders issued by the Trigg Circuit Court granting Ex-Wife’s motion pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 60.02 to set aside the Agreement as unconscionable and to
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require Ex-Husband to pay child support. Due to Ex-Husband’s significant violations of the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”), we strike his brief and dismiss the appeal.
I. Factual and Procedural Background Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife married on July 3, 2004, and separated 18 years later on July 31, 2022. The parties have three children. Prior to their separation in 2022, the parties co-owned and resided in a home that Ex-Husband inherited from his grandparents and that the parties renovated jointly. Additionally, Ex-Husband owned over 150 acres of farmland, some of which he inherited during the marriage. Both parties maintained employment and their own retirement accounts. They shared a joint checking account, and Ex-Husband had a separate banking account for the proceeds from and expenses for the farm. The parties secured outstanding loans from two financial institutions with their home.
After their separation, Ex-Husband, by counsel, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and attached the Agreement. Ex-Wife did not retain counsel to review the documents, negotiate the Agreement, or otherwise represent herself. Ex-Husband’s original pleadings neither included a verified financial disclosure statement nor a child support worksheet as required by Kentucky Family Court Rules of Procedure and Practice (“FCRPP”) 2(1) and 9(4), respectively. Moreover, the Agreement failed to: (1) address the values of the parties’ real
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estate, personal property, or investments; (2) provide the balance of the debt assigned to each party; or (3) explain the nature of the parties’ assets and debts as marital or non-marital.
The Agreement awarded Ex-Husband “free and clear of any and all claims” by Ex-Wife: (1) the possession and value of the marital residence; (2) over 150-acres of farmland; (3) his retirement account; (4) all bank accounts in his name; (5) a 2016 truck; and (6) all personal property in his possession or held in his name. Record (“R.”) at 9. Ex-Husband also assumed one of the parties’ two joint loans. The Agreement conveyed to Ex-Wife the retirement and employee stock accounts in her name, her vehicle, and any personal property in her possession or held in her name. Ex-Wife received none of the value of the marital residence. The Agreement also required her to assume payments of approximately $800 per month toward the balance of the second joint loan.
Additionally, the Agreement provided that neither party owed maintenance to the other; they would share joint custody of the children; and neither would pay child support. However, the Agreement required Ex-Wife to carry health insurance on the children through her employer. An attachment to the Agreement detailed the parties’ parental rights and parenting time. Finally, the Agreement contained several clauses acknowledging that the Agreement was full, fair, just, and not unconscionable. R. 8, 15. The Circuit Court issued a Final
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Decree of Dissolution on November 17, 2022, incorporating and adopting the Agreement.
Within three months after the Final Decree, the parties had a physical altercation, resulting in documented injuries to Ex-Wife. As a direct result of this incident, Ex-Wife obtained an emergency protective order (“EPO”)1 against Ex- Husband, who was also charged with fourth-degree assault. On April 10, 2023, the Circuit Court issued a Mutual Restraining Order protecting both parties from harassing, abusive, or violent actions against one another and ordering that they have no contact except by text for matters regarding their minor children.
Beginning with a motion filed on February 15, 2023, Ex-Wife sought to modify the Agreement as to child support. Ex-Husband opposed any modification and asked the Circuit Court to find Ex-Wife in contempt for violating the Agreement. After initially denying both parties’ motions, the Circuit Court conducted a hearing nearly one year later and, on February 16, 2024, granted Ex- Wife’s motion for child support, which it conditioned upon the parties’ finally exchanging income information in compliance with FCRPP 9. The Order also expressed a deep concern regarding Ex-Wife’s and the children’s “economic
1 Ex-Husband asserts that the EPO against him was dismissed and expunged. The EPO is not included in the record. There is also nothing in the record showing that Ex-Husband filed a separate petition for a protective order, which petition is a prerequisite to the issuance of a mutual protective order under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 456.070(4).
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survival,” and the inequity between the parties’ incomes. R. at 105.
On October 3, 2024, Ex-Wife filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02(f)
seeking to set aside the entire Agreement as unconscionable and for “reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” R. at 109 (quoting CR 60.02(f)). Ex-Wife asserted that she signed the Agreement while suffering from depression and anxiety resulting from domestic violence perpetrated by Ex-Husband during the marriage. Ex-Wife also alleged that Ex-Husband “was controlling and manipulative[,] and she truly believed that she would lose her children if she did not sign the agreement.” Id. Ex-Husband’s response argued that Ex-Wife’s CR 60.02 motion was neither filed within a reasonable time nor sufficient to warrant extraordinary relief. He denied that the Agreement was unconscionable and argued that Ex-Wife acknowledged that she had read, understood, and voluntarily executed the Agreement “without influence or coercion.” R. at 126.
The Circuit Court2 conducted an evidentiary hearing over two separate days on January 30, 2025, and February 25, 2025. During the course of the hearing, the Circuit Court considered the testimony of the parties and other witnesses and admitted exhibits totaling over 125 pages. On May 23, 2025, the
2 After scheduling a hearing on Ex-Wife’s motion but prior to Ex-Husband’s response, the Circuit Judge for Division 1 recused sua sponte and transferred the case to the Circuit Judge for Division 2. The recusal stated in pertinent part: “Although the undersigned previously disclosed to previous counsel during prior hearings that he formerly represented [Ex-Husband] years ago, and any conflict was waived by the parties, undersigned believes it is best to recuse in this case.” R. at 119.
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Circuit Court issued its written Order granting Ex-Wife’s motion. The Order set aside the Agreement but not the final dissolution. It also required Ex-Husband to pay child support in accordance with the child support guidelines and worksheet, retroactive to the date of Ex-Wife’s initial motion. Upon Ex-Husband’s subsequent CR 60.02 motion to alter, amend, or vacate, the Circuit Court amended the Order, in part, to correct certain factual findings but declined to alter or vacate its ruling.
On appeal, Ex-Husband alleges that the Circuit Court committed reversible error by: (1) granting relief outside the reasonable time required by CR 60.02; (2) setting aside the Agreement on the unpled grounds of duress and coercion, thereby violating his rights to due process; (3) admitting and relying on evidence occurring after execution of the Agreement, which was irrelevant to Ex- Wife’s capacity at the time of the Agreement; and (4) retroactively modifying child support. Ex-Wife calls our attention to Ex-Husband’s notable violations of RAP in his Appellant Brief and asks us to dismiss his appeal and award her attorney’s fees or, alternatively, to affirm the Circuit Court’s Orders.
II. Analysis A. Rules of Appellate Procedure We most recently held that “[i]t is unfortunate when a party does not comply meaningfully with the rules of procedure. We cannot properly get to the
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merits of a dispute when rules are not followed.” W.I.S. v. K.M.B., 722 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky. App. 2025). Our Supreme Court has eloquently explained that: “[p]rocedural rules ‘do not exist for the mere sake of form and style. They are lights and buoys to mark the channels of safe passage and assure an expeditious voyage to the right destination. Their importance simply cannot be disdained or denigrated.’” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Bischoff, 248 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977)). Therefore, we must address the major deficiencies in Ex-Husband’s six- page brief, which fails to comply with at least six significant requirements of the RAP.
First, Ex-Husband’s Appellant Brief contains no statement of points and authorities whatsoever in blatant violation of RAP 32(A)(2). Second, in violation of RAP 32(A)(3), Ex-Husband’s statement of the case does not contain a single pinpoint citation to the Circuit Court record or to the video record of the hearings. Moreover, the statement provides a woefully inadequate factual and procedural background of this case. The certified record consists of three volumes and over 300 pages and is accompanied by six hours of recorded hearings conducted over two days. The necessity of compliance with RAP 32(A)(3) is tantamount and “may, in fact, be the most substantial requirement of [our rules of
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procedure].” W.I.S., 722 S.W.3d at 576 (quoting Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 2019)). To wit, we have stated:
“It is well-settled that an appellate court will not sift through a voluminous record to try to ascertain facts when a party has failed to comply with its obligation under” applicable briefing rules. . . . As the Court, we are not advocates for one or either side in a controversy, and we cannot permit a party to attempt to place us in an adversarial role. Searching for cases and arguments to promote and support one position is not our role. Rather, that is counsel’s job to perform.
W.I.S., 722 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647, 676 (Ky. 2009)). “Even by itself, an appellant’s failure to cite amply to the record justifies striking a brief and dismissing an appeal.” Edwards v. Edwards, 732 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Ky. App. 2026) (citations omitted).
Third, in violation of RAP (32)(A)(4), the argument section of Ex-
Husband’s brief fails to include any pinpoint citations to the certified record or video record. Rather, Ex-Husband’s argument references motions and orders with no identification of the location that they may be found in the record. And, while a party may attach and reference a transcription of the video recorded evidence under RAP(32)(E)(2), the Ex-Husband’s brief contains multiple references to a hearing transcript that he did not include in his appendix.
Fourth, the argument section contains no citations to authority other than passing references to CR 60.02 and CR 15.01. This failure clearly violates
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RAP 32(A)(4), which requires “ample references to the specific location in the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law.”
Fifth, the argument section does not substantially comply with the requirement that it must “contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” RAP 32(A)(4). Ex-Husband’s brief includes only a blanket statement that “[a]ll issues were preserved by timely objection and ruled upon by the Trial Court.” Appellant Brief at 1. “Parties are strictly required to comply with the preservation statement requirements of RAP, and we may strike a brief that does not contain proper preservation statements.” Edwards, 732 S.W.3d at 78 (citations omitted).
Sixth, the appendix to Ex-Husband’s brief does not conform to RAP 32(E)(1)(d). While the brief contains an appendix index listing the two Circuit Court Orders from which he appeals, the index does not “set forth where each document may be found in the record.” Id. Ex-Husband’s “failure to specify where items in an appendix may be located in the [Circuit] Court record ‘is not a mere technical error devoid of practical impact’ because we will ‘decline to rummage’ through the [Circuit] Court record ‘to discern whether, and if so how, the items contained in [an] appendix may be located in the record.’” Edwards, 732 S.W.3d at 78-79 (quoting W.I.S., 722 S.W.3d at 578).
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In W.I.S., we reaffirmed that “there is no more basic element of competency in the practice of appellate advocacy than knowing and simply following the Court’s rules of procedure and brief writing.” 722 S.W.3d at 578-79 (quoting J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 689 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Ky. App. 2024)). “Appellate procedural rules, including those for briefing, cannot be ignored by appellate advocates.” White v. Fowler, 717 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Ky. App. 2025); see also Hallis, 328 S.W.3d at 697 (“[A]ppellate advocates must separate the chaff from the wheat and direct the court to those portions of the record which matter to their argument.”).
RAP 31(H)(1) provides that “[a] brief may be stricken for failure to substantially comply with the requirements of these rules.” See also RAP 10(B). We have held that where a party’s brief “is so irredeemably deficient” as Ex- Husband’s, then “it must be stricken.” Edwards, 732 S.W.3d at 79. In exercising our discretion to strike Ex-Husband’s brief, we must “necessarily” dismiss this appeal. Id. (citing Roth, 567 S.W.3d at 593).
B. Due Process While we are under no requirement to do so, we briefly address Ex-
Husband’s meritless argument that the Circuit Court violated his due process rights. “The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is simply that all affected parties be given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
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meaningful manner.’” Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. Cnty. of Boone, 180 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted). Ex-Husband asserts that he was denied due process when, at the first hearing, Ex-Wife’s counsel argued orally that Ex-Wife intended to prove that she had signed the Agreement under duress and subject to Ex-Husband’s coercion and that the Agreement was unconscionable. Because Ex-Wife did not use the exact words “duress” and “coercion” in her written CR 60.02(f) motion and did not seek leave to amend her motion, Ex- Husband argues that she violated CR 15.01 and failed to provide him with adequate notice of her claim.
CR 15.01 sets forth the process by which a party may amend a pleading. As Ex-Wife’s CR 60.02(f) motion is not a pleading, CR 15.01 is utterly inapplicable. Further, there is no question that Ex-Wife adequately notified Ex- Husband of her allegations. Her motion asserted that Ex-Husband manipulated her into signing the Agreement with his controlling and abusive behavior. It is also notable that Ex-Husband’s response specifically countered that Ex-Wife had signed the Agreement voluntarily and with no influence or coercion, facially belying his claim of lack of notice of the issues that he himself openly noticed. The Circuit Court conducted hearings, listened to the parties’ competing testimony, and weighed the parties’ respective arguments before concluding that the Agreement was unconscionable. Finally, during the hearing on January 30, 2025,
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in the context of an evidentiary objection, counsel for Ex-Husband expressly recognized the duress argument, stating “we’re talking about whether or not she was, um, the Agreement needs to be set aside because she was coerced or unduly influenced in 2022.” Video Record, 1/30/2025 at 2:09:47-2:10:08. Therefore, Ex- Husband’s claim that the Circuit Court denied him procedural due process is as disingenuous as it is erroneous.
C. Attorney’s Fees
Finally, we address Ex-Wife’s request for attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that under RAP 11(B)(3) “an appellate court may properly award attorney’s fees as a monetary sanction for the filing of a frivolous appeal under RAP 11(B)(3).” Bruenger v. Miller, 706 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Ky. 2024) (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”). However, in so doing, an Appellate Court must be mindful “that the imposition of sanctions for litigation conduct ‘must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees[.]’” Bruenger, 706 S.W.3d at 257-58 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991) and citing Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488
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(1980), superseded on other grounds by statute (“Like other sanctions, attorney’s fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record.”)).
Although Ex-Husband’s insufficient briefing impairs any meaningful appellate review, from our own review of the Circuit Court’s thorough and well- reasoned findings of facts and conclusions of law, we observe no abuse of discretion that would merit relief. While we call out the significant violations of the RAP, we cannot say that counsel pursued the appeal for an improper purpose or that the appeal “appears to have been taken in bad faith.” RAP 11(A)(1) and 11(B). Therefore, we decline to award attorney’s fees. However, we caution counsel for Ex-Husband that any future filings “so totally lacking in merit” or meant “to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation” will not be met with such forbearance. RAP 11(A)(1) and 11(B).
III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we hereby order that the brief submitted by the Appellant, Jason Blane Rogers, is stricken, and this appeal is dismissed. Appellee, Bethany Ann Rogers’ request for attorney’s fees is denied.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Olivia A. Adams Jennifer Sacharnoski Nelson Hopkinsville, Kentucky Princeton, Kentucky