Jason Beaurega Mitchell v. Warden, FCI-Herlong

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01213
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASON BEAUREGA MITCHELL, No. 2:25-cv-1213 CSK P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN, FCI-HERLONG, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is a federal inmate proceeding pro se with an application for writ of habeas 18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner paid the filing fee. Petitioner seeks an order 19 directing application of earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”). (ECF No. 1.) 20 Respondent’s motion to dismiss is before the court. 21 As discussed below, respondent’s motion should be granted. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is an inmate currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution -- Herlong. 24 A review of the docket from the District of Hawaii, which this Court takes judicial notice 25 of, reflects that on December 10, 2018, petitioner was charged with illicit drug-trafficking 26 offenses.1 United States v. Mitchell, No. 18-CR-00195-HG (D. Haw.); (ECF No. 8-1 at 94, 28- 27 1 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See, e.g., Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 28 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both 1 34). In March 2019, petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to 2 distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 3 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. (ECF No. 8-1 at 100.) 4 Petitioner was sentenced to 170 months in federal prison, and judgment was entered on 5 March 11, 2021.2 (Id. at 120.) 6 Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) records reflect that petitioner is eligible to earn and apply First 7 Step Act (“FSA”) Earned Time Credits (“ETCs”). (Id. at 7-8.) Petitioner’s current projected 8 release date is January 4, 2030, assuming he receives good conduct credit.3 (ECF No. 18-1 at 3, 9 31-32.) Respondent confirms that under the FSA, petitioner has earned twelve months of earned 10 time credits. 11 II. THE § 2241 PETITION 12 In his first claim, petitioner alleges the BOP has failed to properly calculate and apply 13 petitioner’s FSA ETCs. (ECF No. 1 at 4-6.) Despite meeting all FSA criteria and earning 14 substantial ETCs, petitioner contends that the BOP has arbitrarily limited petitioner to 365 days of 15 credit toward early release, refusing to apply the remaining 1,407 days to his conditional 16 placement. (Id.) 17 In his second claim, petitioner contends that the BOP’s implementation of the FSA 18 violates petitioner’s due process rights and constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action in 19 violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. (Id. at 6-7.) Petitioner contends he has earned 20 1,772 days of ETCs through documented participation in authorized programs while maintaining 21 a low risk score, yet the BOP limits application of the credits to 365 days. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner

22 within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to 23 matters at issue”) (internal quotation omitted).

24 2 When petitioner was charged with the drug trafficking offenses in 2018, petitioner was on federal supervision for a prior 2005 drug trafficking offense, in United States v. Mitchell, No. 25 1:05-CR-0052-HG (D. Haw.). (ECF No. 8-1 at 2-3, 25-26.) Petitioner admitted this violation, and as a result, petitioner was sentenced on March 10, 2021, to a concurrent term of 27-months’ 26 imprisonment. (Id.) 27 3 This date was calculated as of July 29, 2025, the date petitioner’s report was run by the BOP. 28 (ECF No. 8-1 at 17-23.) 1 also claims that the BOP has implemented internal memoranda and program statements that 2 conflict with the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(d)(4) and 3624(g), resulting in the 3 misapplication of lawfully earned credits, including (1) failing to apply credits on a rolling basis; 4 (2) imposing a 365 day cap on credits; (3) improperly sequencing SCA placement before 5 applying ETC’s; (4) delaying recognition of credits until the final year of incarceration. (Id. at 7.) 6 Petitioner contends these applications do not comport with statutory requirements and result in 7 the continued imprisonment of petitioner beyond his lawful release date. (Id.) 8 In his third claim, petitioner argues that this misapplication of FSA credits undermines the 9 statute’s purpose, which in addition to incentivizing inmates to program productively, was to 10 apply credits as they accrue to shorten the actual time inmates remain in prison. (Id. at 7.) 11 Petitioner contends that by capping the accrual of credits to 365 days and delaying sequencing 12 until the final year of incarceration, respondent renders FSA ETCs “functionally meaningless.” 13 (Id. at 8.) Petitioner maintains that Congress designed the FSA to change the actual time served. 14 (Id.) 15 In the fourth claim, petitioner contends that in light of the Supreme Court finding that 16 Chevron deference no longer applies, this Court must exercise independent judgment when 17 interpreting statutes and “may not defer to an agency interpretation simply because a statute is 18 ambiguous.” (Id. (citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 143 S. Ct. 2439 (2023).)4 19 Petitioner argues that after Loper Bright, this court may no longer rely on internal memoranda 20 and policy manuals not subject to public notice and comment to justify limits and sequencing 21 models not found in the statutory text. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Instead, the court is required to apply 22 the statute as written, regardless of internal agency policy, and argues that the 365 day cap is 23 unlawful. (Id.) 24 Further, petitioner argues that requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies is futile 25 and would result in further illegal incarceration. (Id.) In any event, petitioner contends he has 26 exhausted all administrative remedies required by law and made a good faith effort to resolve the 27 4 The citation provided by petitioner is incorrect. The correct citation is Loper Bright Enterprises 28 v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). 1 misapplication of his ETCs. (Id. at 10.) On March 6, 2025, petitioner filed a formal request for 2 administrative remedy, but the BOP did not respond until April 9, 2025, exceeding their 20 day 3 deadline by 14 days. (Id.) Thus, petitioner contends he was entitled to treat the failure to timely 4 respond as a denial, and could seek judicial review. (Id.) 5 Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment, and an order requiring the BOP to recalculate and 6 apply all of petitioner’s ETCs, and direct the BOP to adjust petitioner’s conditional placement to 7 no later than March 24, 2025. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 A. Rule 4 10 Under Rule 4, if a petition is not dismissed at screening, the court “must order the 11 respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response” to the petition. Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. 12 § 2254. A motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus is construed as a request for the 13 court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. O’Bremski v. Maass, 14 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 4, a district court must dismiss a habeas petition if 15 it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 16 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 B. Section 2241 18 A federal inmate challenging the manner, location, or conditions involved in the execution 19 of their sentence, may file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. 20 Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition lies 21 in the district of the prisoner’s confinement. Id. Petitioner’s challenge to the computation of his 22 sentence by the BOP is properly raised in a § 2241 petition since it challenges the manner in 23 which his sentence is being executed. See Zavala v. Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). 24 C. First Step Act 25 On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act was enacted and implemented a number of 26 prison and sentencing reforms, including computation of good time credits, reducing and 27 restricting mandatory minimum sentences, safety valve eligibility, retroactive application of the 28 Fair Sentencing Act, and the availability of early release. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 1 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). The FSA created a system that incentivizes federal prison 2 inmates to participate in evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities 3 by allowing them to earn First Step Act earned time credits against their sentences. See 18 U.S.C. 4 § 3632(d)(4). Those incentives include early release credits of “10 days of time credits for every 5 30 days of successful participation” in such programs. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Inmates with 6 minimum or low risk for recidivism receive an additional 5 days of time credits per thirty 7 completed program days. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). The release is not a shortening of the 8 sentence, but allows BOP to transfer the inmate from incarceration to “prerelease custody” (home 9 custody or in a residential reentry center) and/or to early supervised release, the latter for a 10 maximum of 365 days earlier than otherwise allowed. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2) and (3). 11 Under the terms of the FSA, ETCs can only be earned and awarded for days spent in 12 “successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive 13 activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). Such programming must be assigned by BOP based on, 14 among other things, the inmate’s recidivism risk assessment (“RRA”) score. 18 U.S.C. 15 § 3632(a)(3). The RRA score is determined by BOP “as part of the intake process.” 18 U.S.C. 16 § 3632(a)(1). Therefore, as a practical matter, no ETCs can be earned or awarded until an inmate 17 arrives at a BOP facility, goes through the intake process, is assigned an RRA score, is assigned 18 to a recidivism program or activities, and successfully completes them. 19 While ETCs can be earned and awarded regardless of the inmate’s recidivism risk rating, 20 limits apply to the application of the credits, including: (a) timing; (b) improvement in risk of 21 recidivism; (c) risk status at the time; and (d) approval by warden based on specific criteria. 22 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1). 23 D. Administrative Exhaustion 24 The BOP has adopted an administrative review process for inmate grievances that “seek 25 formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” See 28 C.F.R. 26 § 542.10(a). Initially, inmates are required to first attempt informal resolution by submitting a 27 BP-8 form. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) The BOP inmate grievance procedure involves three formal 28 levels of review starting with the institution where the grievance occurred. See 28 C.F.R. 1 § 542.13. The inmate initiates the formal review by submitting a BP-9 form. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) 2 If the inmate is dissatisfied with the first level of review, he or she may then appeal to the 3 Regional Director by filing a BP-10 form, and then can file a BP-11 form to the General Counsel 4 of the BOP. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15; (ECF No. 8-1 at 3). The decision by the General Counsel 5 constitutes the final administrative decision by the BOP. Id. The specific procedures to be 6 followed at each level of review as well as the timeframe in which the agency is required to 7 respond to the grievances has been established by regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. 8 IV. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 9 A. Respondent’s Position 10 Respondent argues that the petition must be dismissed because petitioner did not exhaust 11 administrative remedies, failing to complete one step in the administrative remedy process, and 12 counters that petitioner’s futility argument is conclusory and insufficient to justify excusing the 13 exhaustion requirement. (ECF No. 8 at 3-4.) 14 As to petitioner’s first, third and fourth claims, respondent argues that the BOP has 15 correctly calculated petitioner’s projected FSA ETC offset. (Id. at 4.) Contrary to petitioner’s 16 claim four, as a matter of law, only a maximum of 365 days of ETCs may be applied toward an 17 inmate’s early transfer to supervised release. (Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g); 28 C.F.R. 18 § 523.44(d); ECF No. 8-1 at 6).) Contrary to petitioner’s first and third claims, the BOP 19 determined petitioner is eligible to earn ETCs, and that as of January 25, 2025, petitioner 20 successfully earned 1,402 days in program activity credit. (Id. at 5-6 (citing ECF No. 8-1 at 7).) 21 Although the BOP disallowed petitioner 50 days outside program during his transit, the BOP 22 properly determined petitioner has earned 295 days in program to be applied toward prelease 23 custody, and earned the statutory 365 days in program to be applied toward early transfer to 24 supervised release. (Id. at 6 (citing ECF No. 8-1 at 86-88).) Respondent points out that these 25 calculations are subject to change because petitioner must meet all of the requirements for the 26 ETCs to be applied toward his sentence computation. (Id.; ECF No. 8-1 at 88; see 18 U.S.C. 27 § 3624(g)(1); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.44(b) - (d).) But accepting these variables, respondent contends 28 that petitioner’s projected statutory release date, with the application of 365 ETCs, is January 4, 1 2031; and his projected satisfaction date, referred to as the “PRD” in Program Statement 5410.01 2 CN-2, is January 4, 2030. (Id. (citing ECF No. 8-1 at 88).) Projecting petitioner’s continued 3 eligibility, respondent argues that the BOP may apply petitioner’s remaining 295 days of ETCs to 4 his projected satisfaction date for possible transfer to a residential reentry center (“RRC”) or 5 home confinement on July 9, 2027. (Id.) 6 Respondent argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant petitioner’s demand to be 7 placed in a halfway house or RRC, because such decision does not fall within the “core of 8 habeas” relief. (Id. at 6-7.) 9 Finally, as to petitioner’s second claim, respondent contends that “Congress explicitly 10 exempted BOP decisions regarding individual inmates under 18 U.S.C. § 3624 from the judicial 11 review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).” (ECF No. 8 at 10 (citing 12 18 U.S.C. § 3625).) Respondent points out that the Ninth Circuit confirmed that review of a BOP 13 decision under the relevant subchapter is improper: 14 [t]here is no ambiguity in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3625. The plain language of this statute specifies that the judicial review 15 provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 – 706, do not apply to ‘any determination, decision, or order’ made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 16 §§ 3621- 3624. 17 Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 In support of the motion to dismiss, respondent submitted a declaration of Christopher 19 Liwag, the Sr. Correctional Programs Specialist with the BOP, who reviewed petitioner’s prisoner 20 records. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2-8.) Mr. Liwag described the three-level administrative review 21 process available to federal inmates challenging BOP actions and confirms that petitioner did not 22 exhaust his administrative remedies through all formal levels prior to filing this action. (Id. at 3- 23 4.) Rather, petitioner began by filing a request for administrative remedy (BP-9), which was 24 received on March 31, 2025, assigned ID 1235224-F1, and denied by the Warden on May 21, 25 2025. (Id. at 4.) After plaintiff filed the § 2241 petition on April 28, 2025, petitioner’s appeal 26 (BP-10) was received at the BOP’s Western Regional Office on June 17, 2025, and assigned ID 27 1235224-R1. (Id.) The regional director issued an informational response on July 9, 2025. (Id.) 28 Thus, the BOP administrative appeals process continued months after petitioner filed the federal 1 petition in this case. 2 B. Petitioner’s Opposition 3 Petitioner argues further exhaustion is not required because he made a diligent attempt, 4 but that in any event, further exhaustion would be futile, and adds that courts routinely waive 5 exhaustion. (ECF No. 9 at 1.) Petitioner contends the BOP has misapplied FSA credits; he 6 claims he has earned 1,762 credits since March 10, 2021, but the BOP only applied 1,397 after 7 subtracting a year and applying unverified sequence. Petitioner argues that the BOP’s incorrect 8 calculation resulted in a projected community transfer date of May 2027, and claims he should be 9 transferred March 8, 2026 or sooner under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). (Id.) Petitioner contends that 10 this court has the authority to correct these miscalculations, citing out of Circuit district court 11 cases. (Id.) 12 Petitioner reiterates that the BOP’s reliance on internal BOP policy to interpret FSA 13 application timing and credit calculation is not entitled to Chevron deference where it contradicts 14 the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g). (Id.) Petitioner contends his claim is ripe because he 15 has earned credits, which are confirmed in BOP records; the issue is that the BOP failed to timely 16 and properly apply them, and petitioner claims he is being held beyond his statutory release 17 window. (Id.) 18 C. Respondent’s Reply 19 Respondent did not file a reply. 20 V. DISCUSSION 21 Respondent submitted undisputed evidence that petitioner did not exhaust administrative 22 remedies prior to bringing this action. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3-4, 42, 48.) Even though Section 2241 23 does not contain an explicit exhaustion requirement, federal inmates are still required to exhaust 24 their administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief. See Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 25 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Courts have engrafted this administrative exhaustion 26 requirement into § 2241 in order to: 1) develop a factual record that is capable of being reviewed; 27 2) conserve judicial resources if relief is granted at the administrative level; and 3) provide the 28 administrative agency with the first opportunity to correct its errors. See Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 1 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The Court finds that these concerns are particularly 2 relevant to the calculation of petitioner’s earned time credits pursuant to the First Step Act. The 3 BOP should be given the first opportunity to address petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to an 4 additional 1,407 days of earned time credits. In addition, waiving “the exhaustion requirement in 5 this case would only encourage other inmates to ignore the BOP’s administrative remedy 6 program.” Cacayorin v. Derr, 2023 WL 2349596, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 3, 2023). Thus, the Court 7 will not excuse petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 8 Petitioner argues that requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile. 9 (ECF No. 1 at 9.) In Section 2241 cases, dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 10 is not required, but is a matter left to the court’s discretion if exhaustion would be futile. See 11 Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, as argued by respondent, 12 petitioner’s contention that further exhaustion would be futile is conclusory. 13 The Court declines to exercise its discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement in 14 petitioner’s case. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting respondent’s motion to dismiss 15 based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Chua Han Mow v. 16 United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that a federal inmate is required 17 to exhaust the BOP’s administrative procedures before seeking habeas relief in order to preserve 18 an adequate record for judicial review)); see, e.g., Alcaras v. Thompson, 2022 WL 3030512, at *2 19 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) (“Whether Petitioner has participated in any activities which could 20 entitle him to earned-time credit, and whether those credits should have already been calculated 21 and applied, are exactly the types of factual questions that extend beyond statutory construction 22 and require a developed record for this Court to consider.”), report and recommendation adopted, 23 2022 WL 16855885 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022); Mohammad v. Thompson, 2022 WL 4484545, at 24 *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2022) (“The BOP should be given the first opportunity to address 25 petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to a total of 180 days of earned time credits. Thus, the 26 court will not excuse petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.”) (citing Chua 27 Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1313); Lister v. Gatt, 2021 WL 4306316, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2021) 28 (“The assessment of whether a prisoner’s programming qualifies for earned time credit status 1 | under the First Step Act and, if so, to what extent, as well as how it affects his sentence, falls 2 || particularly within the BOP’s expertise and should be undertaken by the agency before a federal 3 || court is asked to make such assessment and calculations. . . .”). 4 | VI. CONCLUSION 5 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is 6 || directed to assign a district judge to this case. 7 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 8 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be granted; and 9 2. This action be dismissed without prejudice, but without leave to amend, due to 10 petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 12 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 13 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 14 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 15 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 16 || objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 17 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 18 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 20 | Dated: January 7, 2026 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 || 6/mitel213.mtd.2241 f&rs 27 28 10