Jasen Frank Meyn v. Napa County District Attorney

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-06912
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JASEN FRANK MEYN, Case No. 25-cv-06912-WHO (PR)

Petitioner, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9

10 NAPA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 11 Respondent.

13 Petitioner Jasen Frank Meyn was ordered to show cause why his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 14 habeas petition should not be dismissed because he is not in custody within the meaning of 15 section 2254. (Dkt. No. 6.) He has filed a response to the Order. (Dkt. Nos. 7 and 8.) 16 Meyn has not shown that he is in custody within the meaning of section 2254. 17 Consequently, this federal habeas action is DISMISSED. 18 Meyn challenges the 2010 California state convictions he received in the Napa 19 County Superior Court. (Pet., Dkt. No. 1 at 2) In the Order to Show Cause, I stated that I 20 may not have jurisdiction over his petition because he is not in custody. Meyn admits he is 21 not in custody (id.); the four-year sentence that was imposed in 2010 has long since 22 expired; and there is nothing indicating he is under conditions of parole or is otherwise 23 subject to court supervision.1 24 The federal writ of habeas corpus is available only to persons “in custody” at the 25 time the petition is filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 26 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). This requirement is jurisdictional. Id. A habeas petitioner must be 27 1 in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time the petition is filed. 2 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). A petitioner who files a habeas petition 3 after he has fully served his sentence and who is not subject to court supervision is not 4 “in custody” for the purposes of this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and his petition is 5 therefore properly denied. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 6 1990). 7 Meyn asserts in his response that the collateral consequences he suffers as a result 8 of the conviction — housing and employment discrimination because he is a felon; 9 inability to own a firearm; having to register as an arsonist; being labelled a felon in 10 “global databases” might restrict his ability to travel internationally — render him in 11 custody. (Response to OSC, Dkt. No. 7 at 2-5.) He cites various cases in support. (Id. at 12 2, 4-5.) 13 Meyn discusses in particular two bedrock custody cases, Carafas and Maleng, both 14 of which were cited in the Order to Show Cause. He asserts that “[t]he ‘in custody’ 15 requirement of Maleng v. Cook bars habeas for expired sentences unless tied to current 16 custody (e.g., enhancements), but Carafas v. LaValee allows jurisdiction if collateral 17 consequences persist (e.g., civil disabilities).” (Response to OSC, Dkt. No. 7 at 2.) He 18 states that “Maleng does not negate Carafas entirely; it coexists, allowing collateral 19 consequences to preserve jurisdiction only if tied to a ‘current custodial status.’ ” (Id. at 20 2.) 21 Meyn misreads Maleng. The Court there clarified that the petitioner in Carafas 22 satisfied the custody requirement because he “filed his habeas application while he was 23 actually incarcerated under the sentence he sought to attack,” and not because of any 24 collateral consequences. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491. That is not Meyn’s situation. 25 The other cases Meyn cites are not persuasive either. One, Jones v. Cunningham, 26 371 U.S. 236 (1963), predates Carafas and Maleng. The petitioner there was on parole at 27 the time he filed his habeas action, and therefore satisfied the custody requirement. Jones 1 There, the petitioner, who had been released on his own recognizance pending execution 2 of his sentence, satisfied the custody requirement because he was subject to court 3 supervision. “He cannot come and go as he pleases. His freedom of movement rests in the 4 hands of state judicial officers, who may demand his presence at any time and without a 5 moment’s notice. Disobedience is itself a criminal offense.” Id. at 351. Another, United 6 States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), predates both Carafas and Maleng. Morgan 7 relates to challenging a federal conviction and sentence through the writ of corum nobis, 8 and is not relevant to whether Meyn is in custody for his state conviction challenged 9 through a habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505. 10 A lack of custody at the time of filing cannot be cured by even the most grievous 11 collateral consequences (including annual sex-offender registration and the possibility that 12 an expired conviction might be used to enhance a future one) stemming from the 13 conviction under attack because the court is without subject matter jurisdiction. See 14 Alaska v. Wright, 593 U.S. 152, 154 (2021) (rejecting the notion that a habeas petitioner is 15 “in custody” under a conviction “after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely 16 because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences 17 imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted.”); Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 18 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2005) (California law requiring convicted narcotics offenders to 19 register with state authorities is not a restraint on physical liberty so severe as to constitute 20 custody); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1999) (California law that 21 requires convicted sex offenders to annually register with state authorities does not 22 constitute severe, immediate restraint on physical liberty sufficient to constitute custody); 23 Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1998) (Washington law which 24 requires convicted sex offenders to register with state authorities does not amount to 25 custody where there is no significant restraint on registrant’s physical liberty and there is 26 “mere potential” for future incarceration). 27 Meyn is not “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. I therefore lack 1 |} Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 2 A certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of 3 || reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 4 || constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 5 court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 6 The filing fee has been paid. (Dkt. No. 1.) 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. g || Dated: October 29, 2025 | ( “VQe ® ? LLIAM H. ORRICK 10 United States District Judge 11 a 12

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