JASBIR MANN & Another v. JONATHAN A. COTTRELL & Another.
This text of JASBIR MANN & Another v. JONATHAN A. COTTRELL & Another. (JASBIR MANN & Another v. JONATHAN A. COTTRELL & Another.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1000
JASBIR MANN & another1
vs.
JONATHAN A. COTTRELL & another.2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This action arises out of a real estate transaction between
the parties. The defendants appeal from the order of a single
justice of this court denying their request to stay execution of
a judgment of the Plymouth Superior Court, pending appeal,
pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 6, as appearing in 494 Mass. 1601
(2024). We affirm.
Background. This case has a detailed procedural history.
In 2021, the plaintiffs sued the defendants in Bristol Superior
Court, alleging several claims related to a real estate
1 Rosemarie Cote.
2 Rebecca Cottrell. transaction. The defendants filed counterclaims, including for
defamation, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The
plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the defendants'
defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H. A judge of the Bristol Superior Court granted the
plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, and also denied the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' opposition to the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judge
also denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration of these
orders. Pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, the defendants sought
review of the interlocutory orders by a single justice of this
court, and all requests for relief were denied. See Mann v.
Cottrell, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 1101 (2023).
In the underlying action, the plaintiffs continued to
pursue discovery, and a Superior Court judge granted several
motions to compel discovery. A Superior Court judge also
granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees pursuant to
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. After the case was transferred from
Bristol County to Plymouth County, the plaintiffs moved for
entry of judgment and sanctions pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.
37 (b) (2) (C), as amended, 390 Mass. 1208 (1984), due to the
defendants' failure to comply with discovery orders. After a
hearing, which the defendants did not attend, a judge granted
2 this motion and ordered judgment to issue in favor of the
plaintiffs; the order also incorporated the previously awarded
attorney's fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. The defendants
filed a motion to vacate and a motion for relief or to stay
proceedings, and a hearing was scheduled. Following a hearing
at which all the parties attended, the defendants' motions were
denied, and the judge again allowed the motion for sanctions and
entry of judgment, reissuing his order. The defendants filed a
timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
After filing a motion for reconsideration and stay pending
appeal in the Superior Court, the defendants filed a motion to
stay execution of judgment pending appeal with a single justice
of this court. After a judge of the Superior Court denied the
pending motion for reconsideration and to stay, the single
justice also denied relief. The defendants now appeal from the
single justice's order denying their request to stay pending
appeal.
Discussion. On appeal, the defendants address the merits
of several underlying orders in this litigation, none of which
are before us on appeal. The only matter properly before us is
the single justice's denial of the motion to stay execution of
judgment pending appeal.
We review the single justice's ruling for error of law or
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394,
3 412 (2020). "The appellate court does not exercise its own
independent discretion to evaluate the request for a stay;
rather, it reviews the correctness of the single justice's
ruling." Id. An appellant seeking a stay pending appeal
ordinarily must meet four tests: "(1) the likelihood of
appellant's success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of
irreparable harm to appellant if the court denies the stay;
(3) the absence of substantial harm to other parties if the stay
issues; and (4) the absence of harm to the public interest from
granting the stay" (citation omitted). C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass.
1016, 1017 (2015).
The defendants have not pointed us to any error of law or
abuse of discretion by the single justice in the denial of their
motion to stay. The defendants have failed to articulate how,
among other requirements, they will be irreparably harmed from
the denial of the stay. Furthermore, regarding the defendants'
requests to render judgments or declare orders to be void, the
single justice did not err in denying these requests where a
single justice is without the authority to take such dispositive
action. See DeLucia v. Kfoury, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 168
(2018). On review, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion by the single justice. See generally Mezoff v.
Cudnohufsky, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 874 (1977) ("Rarely, if ever,
4 can it be said that a single justice is in error in denying
relief").
As to the plaintiffs' request for appellate attorney's fees
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, that issue is not before us.
While attorney's fees are mandatory under G. L. c. 231, § 59H,
when a judge allows such a special motion to dismiss, as
occurred here, and when this court affirms such a ruling
allowing the special motion to dismiss, see Columbia Plaza
Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 493 Mass. 570, 589-590 (2024),
given the procedural posture of this case, our review is limited
to the single justice's denial of the motion to stay.3
Single justice order dated July 24, 2025, affirmed.4
By the Court (Meade, D'Angelo & Tan, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: May 29, 2026.
3 The defendants also raise several new arguments in their brief that were not presented to the single justice. As our review is confined to whether the single justice abused her discretion, we decline to address these late-blooming claims.
4 The plaintiffs' request for appellate attorney's fees, on the ground that this appeal is frivolous, is denied. The defendants' requests for sanctions and for an investigation are also denied.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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