Jarvis v. Liggett

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: June 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-8046
• Status: Published

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 10, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

DANNY JOSEPH JARVIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-8046

LAWSON LIGGETT, a/k/a Weston County Detention Center Officer Liggett; LARAMIE FRANK, individually, a/k/a Weston County Sheriff's Department Officer Frank; JASON JENKINS, individually, a/k/a Weston County Detention Center Administrator,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

WESTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER; BRYAN COLVARD, Weston County Sheriff; AUSTIN WELLS, a/k/a Weston County Sheriff's Department Officer Wells,

Defendants. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00103-SWS) _________________________________

Megan Mooney, University of Colorado Law School Appellate Advocacy Program (Matthew Cushing, Counsel of Record; Cleo Williams, and Zachary Thompson, with her on the briefs), Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 2

Prentice Olive, Assistant Attorney General (Timothy W. Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with him on the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Defendants- Appellees. _________________________________

Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

Plaintiff-Appellant Danny Joseph Jarvis was incarcerated at the Weston

County Detention Center (“WCDC”) in Wyoming from May to July of 2023. While

incarcerated, he suffered dental pain that resulted in three trips to the emergency

room. Mr. Jarvis sued several WCDC officials—including Defendants-Appellees

Lawson Liggett, Laramie Frank 1, and Jason Jenkins (collectively, “Defendants”)—

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Mr. Jarvis

did not provide sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that Defendants

1 The docket incorrectly lists Defendant Laramie Frank’s name as Frank Laramie. The record and appellate briefing, however, indicate that his first name is Laramie, and his last name is Frank. We therefore direct the Clerk to correct this error and identify Laramie Frank accordingly. 2 Throughout his brief, Mr. Jarvis claims his right to be free from detention officers’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs is a right protected by the Eighth Amendment. At all times relevant to this claim, Mr. Jarvis was a pretrial detainee, meaning his claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2018). We will thus refer to Mr. Jarvis’s claim as one asserting a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

2 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 3

acted with deliberate indifference toward his dental needs. Exercising jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History 3

1. Mr. Jarvis’s Incarceration at WCDC

Mr. Jarvis was incarcerated at WCDC from May 22 to July 24, 2023. WCDC

is a small detention center in Wyoming with only thirty-two available beds and

staffed with only seven detention officers. The facility does not have contracted

medical professionals on-site, so detention officers must either schedule medical

appointments for inmates or transport them to the emergency room when they need

medical attention.

WCDC’s Standard Operating Practices (“SOPs”) ensure that inmates are

entitled to receive any necessary medical or dental care, regardless of their ability to

pay. To request care, inmates submit a medical request, and the detention officer who

receives it then places it in a folder in the booking room. If the request is “of a

serious nature” and “should not wait,” however, the detention officer will instead

“call the nurse or physician immediately to advise them of the medical situation.”

ROA Vol. 1 at 54. The officer “shall then follow the nurse or physician’s orders as

necessary.” Id.

3 “Because this case arises from an appeal of summary judgment, we present the . . . factual background in the light most favorable to [Mr. Jarvis] as the non- moving party, unless contradicted by the record.” Litzsinger v. Adams Cnty. Coroner’s Off., 25 F.4th 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2022). 3 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 4

Detention officers transport inmates to the emergency room when needed.

Upon return, the transporting officer will place a copy of the discharge papers from

the emergency room visit in the inmate’s file. On-duty officers or the incoming shift

will then review the medical documents in the file and take any necessary follow-up

actions, such as writing down medications that need to be administered or scheduling

follow-up medical appointments. Sheriff Bryan Colvard, WCDC’s official

policymaker, stated that day-shift officers and the jail administrator, who was

Lieutenant Jenkins during Mr. Jarvis’s time at WCDC, are responsible for scheduling

inmates’ medical appointments. To keep track of appointments, WCDC officers write

them on a whiteboard at the facility.

2. Mr. Jarvis’s Emergency Room Visits

While incarcerated, Mr. Jarvis experienced “severe[,] excruciating pain” due to

missing, broken, and cavitied teeth. Suppl. ROA Vol. 2 at 42. Because of Mr. Jarvis’s

pain, he went to the emergency room three times during the two months he was in

WCDC custody. We describe each visit and the events that followed below.

a. First Emergency Room Visit

On May 28, 2023, Officer Frank transported Mr. Jarvis to the emergency

room. Mr. Jarvis’s chief complaint was leg pain, but he also complained of a broken

tooth. The nurse practitioner who treated him, Patrick Gleason, observed that

Mr. Jarvis had multiple missing and broken teeth but that there was “[n]o evidence of

acute abscess.” ROA Vol. 2 at 244. Nurse Practitioner Gleason prescribed Mr. Jarvis

Ibuprofen for his pain. He also instructed Mr. Jarvis to rinse his mouth several times

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daily with saltwater and peroxide rinses and to avoid hot or cold beverages and

crunchy or chewy foods. Finally, he instructed Mr. Jarvis to see a dentist within two

days. Officer Frank was present and heard Nurse Practitioner Gleason give these

instructions to Mr. Jarvis. Officer Frank also signed and received Mr. Jarvis’s

discharge papers, which included an after-visit summary detailing Nurse Practitioner

Gleason’s instructions and prescriptions.

After the visit, Officer Frank took Mr. Jarvis back to WCDC. It was a Sunday

evening when they returned. Officer Frank gave Mr. Jarvis’s discharge papers from

the emergency room to the incoming shift. When Officer Frank returned to WCDC

for his subsequent shifts, he “was aware . . . that detention officers at [WCDC] were

attempting to make an appointment” for Mr. Jarvis to see a dentist. ROA Vol. 1 at

161. However, no appointment was scheduled for Mr. Jarvis to see a dentist within

the two-day timeframe instructed by Nurse Practitioner Gleason.

On June 1, 2023, after the two-day timeframe had passed, Mr. Jarvis submitted

an inmate request form reminding WCDC staff that he needed a dental appointment

and asking when he would go to the dentist. Officer Frank received Mr. Jarvis’s

request, and Officer Zach Benshoof, who was not named as a defendant in this suit,

responded, stating that an appointment would be made at Mr. Jarvis’s expense. 4

4 Although it is not entirely clear from the record why Officer Benshoof told Mr. Jarvis he would need to pay for the appointment, the record suggests that Mr. Jarvis may have been able to go to a different dentist at an earlier date if he met the dentist’s requirement to prepay a down payment. 5 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 6

After Mr. Jarvis’s first emergency room visit, he “persistently reminded

Officer Frank of the pain [he] was in, and that [he] was told to see a dentist within 2

days.” Suppl. ROA Vol. 2 at 44. Seven times, Officer Frank brought Mr. Jarvis

Ibuprofen or Tylenol for his pain, and on each instance, Mr. Jarvis told Officer Frank

that he “was long overdue on going to the dentist.” Id. at 42. Officer Frank told

Mr. Jarvis that he “would eventually be taken to the dentist.” Id. at 44.

Although Officer Frank provided Mr. Jarvis with pain medication, he gave

Mr. Jarvis an oral rinse only once, despite Nurse Practitioner Gleason’s instruction

that Mr. Jarvis rinse his mouth several times daily, alternating between saltwater and

peroxide. Mr. Jarvis asked Officer Frank to provide him with saltwater or peroxide

rinses multiple times but never received the rinses. When Mr. Jarvis asked about the

rinses, Officer Frank said he would “check into it.” Id.

b. Second Emergency Room Visit

On June 16, 2023, Mr. Jarvis submitted a medical request asking to go to the

emergency room for his dental pain. Officer Liggett, who was not working a regular

shift, was called in so he could take Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room. During the

appointment, Officer Liggett sat a few feet away from Mr. Jarvis. Mr. Jarvis told the

doctor, Deborah Weems, that his pain amounted to a seven on a ten-point scale and

that he had not received the oral rinses that Nurse Practitioner Gleason instructed him

to use during his first emergency room visit.

Dr. Weems observed that Mr. Jarvis had cavities, missing teeth, and broken

teeth down to the gumline. She prescribed Mr. Jarvis penicillin to treat his infection

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and instructed him to see a dentist in seven days when he finished his weeklong

course of medication. Dr. Weems noted that Mr. Jarvis had not been receiving oral

rinses, but she did not repeat the instruction that Mr. Jarvis had received at his first

emergency room visit to rinse his mouth with saltwater and peroxide. Dr. Weems

explained that Mr. Jarvis’s pain would “not go away until the tooth is fixed or

pulled.” ROA Vol. 2 at 308.

After the visit, Officer Liggett transported Mr. Jarvis back to WCDC and

placed the discharge papers in a file for the incoming officers to review. Officer

Liggett then returned home because he was called into WCDC for the sole purpose of

transporting Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room.

On seven instances during Officer Liggett’s subsequent shifts, he brought

Mr. Jarvis medication to treat his pain. Each time, Mr. Jarvis told Officer Liggett that

he was in serious pain and needed to see a dentist. But after Mr. Jarvis’s emergency

room visit on June 16, 2023, Officer Liggett noticed on WCDC’s whiteboard that

Mr. Jarvis had an upcoming dental appointment scheduled for August 4, 2023.

Officer Liggett understood “that this dentist appointment would address

[Mr.] Jarvis’s current dental complaint and any other dental complaints he made

before that appointment.” ROA Vol. 1 at 190. He also understood “that the

appointment . . . was the earliest that detention officers had been able to schedule for

[Mr.] Jarvis to see the dentist.” Id. As a result, Mr. Jarvis did not go to the dentist

within the seven-day timeframe that Dr. Weems had instructed.

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Mr. Jarvis also communicated with other officers about his appointment

between his emergency room visits. For example, Mr. Jarvis testified in a deposition

that another officer, who he identified as Officer Drew, told him he could write a

letter to his family to ask for money so he could go to an earlier dental appointment

at a dentist that would require Mr. Jarvis to pay upfront. The jail administrator,

Lieutenant Jenkins, also responded to Mr. Jarvis’s inquiries as to the amount of the

deposit his family would need to pay so he could visit a different dentist at an earlier

date. Lieutenant Jenkins informed Mr. Jarvis that he could ask his family or friends

for that information.

c. Third Emergency Room Visit

On June 29, 2023, Officer Liggett was again called in to WCDC to transport

Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room. This time, Mr. Jarvis reported that his pain had

increased to a nine on the ten-point scale. The physician who treated him, Dr. Cary

Bybee, prescribed antibiotics and gave Mr. Jarvis an injection for his pain. Dr. Bybee

did not instruct Mr. Jarvis to schedule a follow-up dental appointment.

On July 24, 2023, Mr. Jarvis was released from WCDC on bond so he could go

to a drug addiction treatment facility. Accordingly, his upcoming dental appointment

was cancelled.

B. Procedural History

Based on the events described above, Mr. Jarvis brought this civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several entities and officials, including Defendants

Frank, Jenkins, and Liggett. Mr. Jarvis alleged that Defendants violated his

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Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by

(1) failing to schedule a dental appointment within the timeframe ordered by medical

professionals and (2) denying him the oral rinses that a nurse practitioner instructed

him to use.

Mr. Jarvis and Officer Liggett filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Officer Frank and Lieutenant Jenkins did not move for summary judgment; however,

the district court informed the parties it was “considering granting summary

judgment in favor of non-movants Defendant Laramie Frank and Defendant Jason

Jenkins.” ROA Vol. 1 at 13. It gave the parties additional time to make arguments or

file materials they wanted the district court to consider. All three Defendants invoked

the doctrine of qualified immunity, arguing they were not deliberately indifferent to

Mr. Jarvis’s dental needs and that, even if they were, they did not violate clearly

established law.

The district court agreed with Defendants and granted summary judgment for

them on qualified immunity grounds. First, the district court held Defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Jarvis’s claim that they violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by failing to schedule a dental appointment within the two-day and

seven-day timeframes that medical professionals had prescribed during Mr. Jarvis’s

emergency room visits. It concluded that Mr. Jarvis did not provide sufficient

evidence establishing that Defendants had a duty to schedule his dental appointment

under the relevant WCDC policies. And the district court further held that the

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evidence did not show that Defendants “intentionally delayed or denied him from

receiving an earlier appointment.” ROA Vol. 1 at 379.

Second, the district court considered Mr. Jarvis’s claim that Officer Frank

failed to provide him with the saltwater and peroxide rinses that he was instructed to

use daily after his first emergency room visit. The district court held that Officer

Frank was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, too, because Mr. Jarvis did

not establish that Officer Frank personally participated in the alleged constitutional

violation, or that Officer Frank was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Jarvis’s dental

needs.

Third, the district court held that even if a constitutional violation occurred,

Defendants did not violate clearly established law. Thus, they were entitled to

qualified immunity, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants. Mr. Jarvis timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Jarvis contends that the district court erred when it granted Officers Frank

and Liggett (the “Officers”) summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 5

The district court granted summary judgment for Officer Frank, 5

Officer Liggett, and Lieutenant Jenkins. Mr. Jarvis did not expressly limit his appeal to the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Officers Frank and Liggett. But he did not make any arguments regarding whether Lieutenant Jenkins was entitled to qualified immunity. Nor did he respond to Defendants’ argument that Mr. Jarvis waived any argument as to Lieutenant Jenkins by not raising it in his opening brief. Thus, we consider any argument as to Lieutenant Jenkins’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 waived. See United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181, 1201 (10th Cir. 2025) (“It is well-settled that arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.” (quotation marks omitted)). 10 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 11

First, he asserts that the Officers violated his constitutional rights by failing to timely

schedule a dental appointment for him and that Officer Frank violated his

constitutional rights by failing to provide him with saltwater and peroxide oral rinses.

Second, Mr. Jarvis argues that the Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity

because it was clearly established in 2023 that failing to schedule a medically ordered

follow-up appointment, substantially delaying medical care, and denying an inmate

medically prescribed treatment violates the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We view the evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Lowther v. Child. Youth & Fam. Dep’t, 101 F.4th 742, 756 (10th Cir. 2024). We

review a district court’s “grant[ ] of summary judgment based on qualified immunity

de novo.” McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1044 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks

omitted).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields officials from civil

liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v.

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009)). Once asserted, it “creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from

suit.” Crowson v. Wash. Cnty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation

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marks and brackets omitted). To overcome this presumption at the summary

judgment stage, the plaintiff must “show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts

supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at

the time of the defendant’s conduct.” Est. of Smart ex rel. Smart v. City of Wichita,

951 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff fails

to make either showing, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.” Lowther,

101 F.4th at 756.

B. Constitutional Violation

Mr. Jarvis argues that two constitutional violations occurred. First, he asserts

that both Officers violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by

failing to schedule his dental appointment within the timeframes that the emergency

room providers instructed. That is, he argues Officer Frank should have scheduled a

dental appointment for him by May 30, 2023, two days after Mr. Jarvis went to the

emergency room for the first time on May 28, 2023. And he contends that Officer

Liggett should have arranged for Mr. Jarvis to go to the dentist by June 23, 2023,

within seven days of his second emergency room visit on June 16, 2023. Second,

Mr. Jarvis argues that Officer Frank violated his constitutional rights by denying him

access to the saltwater and peroxide oral rinses that the nurse practitioner at his first

emergency room visit instructed him to use. Even viewing the evidence in

Mr. Jarvis’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not find that the Officers

committed a constitutional violation.

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1. Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment prohibits inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments”

on convicted prisoners. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,

463 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1983). “Aside from its prohibition of certain punishments, the

amendment establishes ‘the government’s obligation to provide medical care for

those whom it is punishing by incarceration.’” Johnson v. Sanders, 121 F.4th 80, 88

(10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the

Eighth Amendment protects the rights of convicted prisoners, the Fourteenth

Amendment extends the Eighth Amendment’s “degree of protection against denial of

medical attention” to pretrial detainees like Mr. Jarvis. Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d

1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

Under the applicable standard, state actors violate the Constitution when they

act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104. “The deliberate indifference standard lies ‘somewhere between the poles

of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.’” Johnson, 121 F.4th

at 88 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).

A § 1983 plaintiff must satisfy an objective and subjective component to

prevail on a claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. Quintana v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Commr’s, 973 F.3d 1022, 1028–29

(10th Cir. 2020). The objective component “examines whether the medical condition

or harm claimed by the inmate was sufficiently serious to be cognizable.” Prince v.

Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1044 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks

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omitted). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed

by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Sealock v. Colorado,

218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the subjective component, an “official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A prison official whose role in a medical situation

“is solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other medical personnel capable of treating the

condition” may be liable “if he delays or refuses to fulfill that gatekeeper role due to

deliberate indifference.” Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1211. “But ‘prison officials who

actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from

liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not

averted.’” Est. of Beauford v. Mesa Cnty., 35 F.4th 1248, 1263 (10th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).

2. Failure to Timely Schedule Appointment

The Officers do not dispute Mr. Jarvis’s claim that he “suffered considerable

pain” because his dental appointment was scheduled outside of the timeframe

directed by the medical professionals at his emergency room visits. Appellant’s Br.

at 32. We therefore assume, without deciding, that Mr. Jarvis has satisfied the

objective component of the deliberate indifference standard. See Crowson, 983 F.3d

at 1178 (assuming the plaintiff met the objective component of the Eighth

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Amendment standard without deciding because the defendant argued only that “he

was not deliberately indifferent under the subjective component”); Mata v. Saiz, 427

F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that a delay in medical care may satisfy the

objective component of the deliberate indifference standard if the delay resulted in

“considerable pain”).

The parties’ dispute instead centers on the subjective component of the

deliberate indifference standard. Mr. Jarvis argues that the Officers had a duty to

schedule his dental appointment within the two- and seven-day timeframes the

emergency room providers directed, and he maintains that a reasonable jury could

find that the Officers intentionally delayed or denied him from obtaining a dental

appointment at an earlier date. In contrast, the Officers assert that they did not have a

duty to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment because the day-shift officers who

reviewed his discharge paperwork from the hospital were responsible for doing so.

They also argue that they did not intentionally delay or deny Mr. Jarvis’s dental

appointment and were therefore not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Jarvis’s serious

dental needs.

a. Duty to Schedule Appointments

The Officers contend they did not have the duty to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s dental

appointment because, under WCDC policy, day-shift officers are responsible for

scheduling inmates’ medical appointments, and they were not day-shift officers when

they learned that Mr. Jarvis had been instructed to see a dentist within a prescribed

timeframe. In the following analysis, we first address the Officers’ argument and

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conclude they were not responsible for scheduling Mr. Jarvis’s appointment and were

therefore not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. We then consider, and

ultimately reject, Mr. Jarvis’s three arguments as to why the Officers nonetheless had

a duty to schedule his dental appointment.

i. Analysis

The Officers argue, and the district court agreed, that they cannot be held

liable for the alleged constitutional deprivation because they did not have a duty to

schedule Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment. In any § 1983 case, “a defendant’s direct

personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be

established.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming

the district court’s dismissal of a complaint that failed to allege that the named

defendants were the individuals responsible for the alleged constitutional

deprivation). And the deliberate indifference standard demonstrates the need for this

“individualized assessment,” given its “concern[ ] with a defendant’s knowledge or

actual awareness of facts from which an inference may be drawn.” Johnson, 121

F.4th at 90.

We regularly rely on jail officials’ roles and responsibilities to determine

whether they may be subject to § 1983 liability for an alleged constitutional

violation. For example, we have recognized that an officer has not personally

participated in an Eighth Amendment violation when the officer’s role was limited to

denying or otherwise responding to an inmate’s grievance form. See, e.g., Requena v.

Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1216 (10th Cir. 2018).

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We have similarly limited the reach of § 1983 liability in situations where the

named defendant did not have the responsibility to provide the plaintiff with the

medical care that was allegedly lacking. In one such case, a registered nurse knew an

inmate had heart attack symptoms but followed the prison’s protocol to report those

symptoms to a nurse practitioner. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 756, 759. Because the nurse

fulfilled her “gatekeeper duty” to connect the inmate with a medical professional, any

subsequent constitutional deprivations could not be attributed to her. Id. at 759; see

also Johnson, 121 F.4th at 89–90 (granting summary judgment in favor of a nurse

based on her lack of personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation of

discontinuing medical care because a different official, the doctor, was responsible

for making the decision to discontinue the inmate’s medical treatment).

Our sister circuits have applied similar principles in the context of § 1983

claims involving detention officers’ failure to schedule or timely schedule an

inmate’s follow-up medical appointment. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d

137, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for prison officials who

allegedly failed to schedule the plaintiff’s follow-up medical appointment because

the person responsible for scheduling medical appointments was a different

individual who was not named as a defendant); Norwood v. Ghosh, 723 F. App’x

357, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment for a jail physician based

on a nine-month delay in the plaintiff’s surgery because the defendant physician was

not responsible for the scheduling delay).

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At WCDC, the responsibility of scheduling medical appointments falls on the

jail administrator and day-shift officers. Although the Officers knew the emergency

room providers had instructed Mr. Jarvis to see a dentist, neither Officer Frank nor

Officer Liggett had the responsibility of scheduling Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment

because they were not then working as day-shift officers.

On May 28, 2023, during Mr. Jarvis’s first emergency room visit, Officer

Frank learned the nurse practitioner had instructed Mr. Jarvis to see a dentist within

two days. However, Mr. Jarvis has not presented evidence or made any argument on

appeal that Officer Frank was working as a day-shift officer when he transported Mr.

Jarvis to the emergency room. In fact, Mr. Jarvis appears to agree that Officer Frank

was not a day-shift officer when he took Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room because

his only argument regarding the policy is that it imposed a duty on Officer Frank to

schedule his dental appointment during Officer Frank’s day shifts that occurred after

May 28, 2023.

In contrast, Officer Frank provided evidence that he returned from the

emergency room with Mr. Jarvis after 5:00 p.m. on a Sunday, that “[i]t was not [his]

responsibility to make a dental appointment for [Mr.] Jarvis,” and that he understood

his responsibility to be giving Mr. Jarvis’s discharge papers to the incoming shift to

handle, which he did. ROA Vol. 1 at 161–62. Without evidence controverting Officer

Frank’s stated subjective understanding of his responsibilities, we must accept that

Officer Frank believed that day-shift officers had the responsibility to schedule

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Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment and that his own duties were limited to providing

those officers with Mr. Jarvis’s paperwork.

A similar analysis applies to Officer Liggett. When Officer Liggett transported

Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room on June 16, 2023, he “was not working a regularly

scheduled shift.” ROA Vol. 1 at 190. Instead, he was called in specifically to

transport Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room. He heard the doctor’s instructions and

knew Mr. Jarvis needed to see a dentist within seven days, but he was not working as

a day-shift officer, so he placed the discharge papers in Mr. Jarvis’s file for the

incoming shift and then went home. There is no evidence that Officer Liggett

understood his responsibility to be anything beyond “providing the transport and

placing [Mr.] Jarvis’s discharge paperwork in his inmate file for on duty officers or

the oncoming shift.” Id.

To the extent the Officers had a gatekeeper duty, they fulfilled it when they

placed Mr. Jarvis’s discharge papers in a file for the incoming officers to review. The

incoming day-shift officers then had the duty to schedule the appointment, not the

officers named as defendants in this suit. Officer Frank stated: “I was aware that

following [Mr.] Jarvis’s emergency room visit on May 28, 2023, . . . detention

officers at [WCDC] were attempting to make an appointment for [Mr.] Jarvis.” Id. at

161. And this was Officer Liggett’s understanding, too. He stated that he “was not

involved in attempts to schedule dental appointments for [Mr.] Jarvis,” and that after

Mr. Jarvis’s second emergency room visit, he “observed that a dental appointment

had been scheduled for [Mr.] Jarvis on August 4, 2023.” Id. at 190.

19 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 20

Relying on Hardy v. Rabie, 147 F.4th 1156, 1165 (10th Cir. 2025), Mr. Jarvis

asserts that “[j]ail officials are not given a free pass to deliberately ignore an inmate’s

serious medical needs simply because a shift change was forthcoming that allowed

another jail official to come by and render medical attention later.” In Hardy,

however, the detention officer knew the plaintiff was suffering extreme pain in his

cell that was obvious to any layperson, but the officer left the inmate alone in his cell

and declined to seek any medical assistance. Id. at 1166–67. After “some meaningful

amount of time passed,” a shift change occurred, and the incoming shift obtained

medical assistance for the plaintiff. Id. at 1162, 1164–65. We held that the officer

who initially ignored the plaintiff’s serious medical needs could not avoid liability

simply because after a shift change, the new officers assisted the plaintiff. Id. at

1166–67.

The facts here are different than in Hardy. The Officers did not ignore

Mr. Jarvis’s need to see a dentist. They did not attempt to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s

appointment because they understood the day-shift officers would do so. Contrary to

the officer in Hardy, the Officers did not hold off on fulfilling a responsibility

waiting for a shift change. Rather, they followed WCDC policy and placed

Mr. Jarvis’s discharge papers in his file for the day shift to review and to make any

follow-up appointments. The Officers were not acting with deliberate indifference to

Mr. Jarvis’s needs because they were unaware they had any responsibility to schedule

his dental appointment. Instead, they fulfilled their duty to pass on the instructions

20 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 21

from the emergency room providers to the incoming day-shift officers who were

responsible for making the appointment.

ii. Counterarguments

Mr. Jarvis puts forth three arguments as to why the Officers had a duty to

schedule his dental appointment within the providers’ timeframes, despite not acting

as day-shift officers when they transported him to the emergency room on May 28

and June 16, 2023. First, he argues that the Officers were responsible for scheduling

his dental appointment because they returned to WCDC to work as day-shift officers

in the days following Mr. Jarvis’s emergency room visits. Second, he asserts that the

SOPs governing inmate medical requests at WCDC imposed a duty on the Officers to

schedule his dental appointment. Third, he contends that the Constitution supersedes

WCDC policy, so the Officers cannot rely on jail policy to avoid liability under

§ 1983 for violating Mr. Jarvis’s constitutional rights. We address each of these

arguments in turn and explain why we are not persuaded.

First, Mr. Jarvis argues that the Officers had a duty to schedule his dental

appointment because they returned to WCDC to work as day-shift officers in some of

their shifts after they transported him to the emergency room. But this argument

ignores that when the Officers returned to work subsequent day shifts, they believed

that other WCDC officers had already undertaken the responsibility of scheduling

Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment. Officer Frank, for example, stated in an affidavit

that he believed other officers were scheduling the appointment, and Mr. Jarvis did

not provide any evidence negating that Officer Frank held that subjective belief.

21 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 22

Officer Liggett stated that after Mr. Jarvis’s second emergency room visit, he

understood that a dental appointment had already been scheduled for Mr. Jarvis that

would address his dental needs. Officer Liggett believed that this appointment was

the earliest available appointment that could be scheduled for Mr. Jarvis. Again, there

is no evidence that Officer Liggett knew or suspected that other officers had not

actually scheduled Mr. Jarvis’s appointment or that an earlier appointment could

have been scheduled. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 756 (explaining that the deliberate

indifference standard focuses on the officers’ state of mind at the time he had contact

with the plaintiff and not on events that occurred subsequently). Indeed, the evidence

suggests that officers other than Officers Frank and Liggett had taken on the

responsibility of scheduling Mr. Jarvis’s appointment.

Mr. Jarvis attempts to overcome this conclusion by arguing that WCDC

officers did not even begin scheduling his appointment until after his third emergency

room visit on June 30, 2023. This matters, according to Mr. Jarvis, because it rebuts

the Officers’ evidence that they understood other officers were scheduling

Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment after his emergency room visits. He also argues it

renders irrelevant whether an earlier appointment was available because Mr. Jarvis

could not obtain an earlier appointment if the officers made no attempt to schedule

one until June 30, 2023.

The only evidence marking the temporal point at which WCDC officers

scheduled Mr. Jarvis’s August 4 dental appointment establishes that it was scheduled

after June 16, 2023. Officer Liggett stated in an affidavit that he observed

22 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 23

Mr. Jarvis’s appointment on the whiteboard where WCDC officers write inmates’

upcoming medical appointments after June 16, 2023, the date of Mr. Jarvis’s second

emergency room visit. Mr. Jarvis also testified in a deposition that he was informed

of the August 4 appointment sometime between June 12 and June 16, 2023.

Mr. Jarvis asks us to disregard his deposition testimony because the transcript

suggests that he was confusing events that happened around June 16, 2023, with

events that happened around June 29, 2023. Even disregarding his testimony,

however, he still has not pointed to any admissible evidence that supports his

assertion that his appointment was not scheduled until June 30, 2023. As a result,

Mr. Jarvis has not presented any evidence negating Officer Liggett’s understanding

that after June 16, 2023, other officers had scheduled a dental appointment for

Mr. Jarvis that would take place on August 4, 2023.

Second, Mr. Jarvis points to the SOPs, asserting they imposed a duty on the

Officers to schedule his dental appointment. In particular, he references the SOP

titled “Health Care Request.” ROA Vol. 1 at 54. The SOP sets forth certain

procedures governing how inmates may request medical attention. Relevant here is

§ 3, titled “Procedures,” which states:

3.1 Medical Request 3.1.1 Inmates may obtain a health care request form during normal medical call times. . . . 3.1.2 The inmate must fill out the form as completely as possible describing their medical needs. The inmate must return the form to a Detention Officer who will place the health care request form in the medical care request folder in the booking room.

23 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 24

3.1.3 If the health care request is of a serious nature, and should not wait, the handling officer shall call the nurse or physician immediately to advise them of the medical situation. The Detention Officer shall then follow the nurse or physician’s orders as necessary. Id.

According to Mr. Jarvis, § 3.1.3 of the SOP imposed a duty on the Officers to

schedule his dental appointment within the two-day and seven-day timeframes that

the emergency room providers instructed during his visits on May 28 and June 16,

2023. He argues that his medical requests were “of a serious nature,” that the Officers

were “handling officers” because they took him to the emergency room, and that the

medical professionals’ instructions to see a dentist within a prescribed timeframe

constituted a “nurse or physician’s orders” as contemplated by § 3.1.3. Appellant’s

Reply Br. at 3–4 (quoting ROA Vol. 1 at 54). In contrast, the Officers assert that the

policy does not apply to the procedures governing how follow-up medical

appointments are scheduled. They note that Mr. Jarvis has not established that his

request was “of a serious nature,” that the Officers were “handling officers,” or that

§ 3.1.3 imposed a duty specifically on them, as opposed to any other detention

officer, to schedule the appointment.

The language of § 3.1 supports the Officers’ position. In context, the language

creates general rules governing how detention officers should handle medical

requests from inmates. Although § 3.1.2 provides that detention officers typically

would “place the health care request form in the medical care request folder in the

booking room,” § 3.1.3 creates an exception for medical requests “of a serious

24 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 25

nature.” ROA Vol. 1 at 54. In such a case, detention officers “shall call the nurse or

physician immediately to advise them of the medical situation.” Id. After the

detention officers have called a nurse or physician to advise them of a situation, the

officer “shall then follow the nurse or physician’s orders as necessary.” Id.

Section 3.1.3 does not encompass what happened here. The instruction that

detention officers shall “follow the nurse or physician’s orders as necessary” applies

after detention officers had to call a nurse or physician for immediate medical advice.

But here, even assuming Mr. Jarvis’s medical requests are “of a serious nature,” the

Officers transported Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room so he could be treated by

medical professionals directly. There is no evidence that any officer called a nurse or

physician regarding Mr. Jarvis’s dental condition to receive instructions before taking

Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room as § 3.1.3 describes. Accordingly, the direction

that detention officers follow nurse or physician orders is best read as relating to

situations in which the inmate is treated on site based on medical advice received

from a nurse or physician consulted by telephone.

Even if § 3.1.3 could be read to support Mr. Jarvis’s interpretation, there is no

evidence that the Officers subjectively understood the SOP to impose a duty on them

to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment. It is uncontroverted that the Officers

understood the duty to schedule the dental appointment fell on the day shift. We have

emphasized that a jail officer who has the duty to provide access to medical

personnel must “know[ ] that his role in a particular medical emergency is solely to

serve as a gatekeeper for . . . medical personnel capable of treating the condition.”

25 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 26

Hardy, 147 F.4th at 1166 (quotation marks omitted). But if an officer does not have

knowledge of that responsibility, he cannot be held liable even if he delayed or

refused to fulfill it. Id.; see also Buchanan v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, No. 22-

7029, 2023 WL 6997404, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 24, 2023) (unpublished) (holding that

a nurse who called a doctor for advice instead of applying the jail’s standing order on

“muscular skeletal/sprains” was not deliberately indifferent because she did not

believe the standing order applied to the plaintiff’s condition). 6 Although the Officers

were aware that the SOP existed, they did not understand it to be the authority

governing how to handle nonemergency follow-up appointments after an inmate

visits the emergency room. Thus, the SOP does not establish that the Officers knew

they had a duty to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s dental appointment.

Third, Mr. Jarvis argues that the Officers cannot rely on their lack of duty

under WCDC’s policy because § 1983 liability does not hinge on whether a detention

officer complied with a facility’s policies. True, “correctional policy does not define

the rights and obligations enshrined in the Constitution,” although compliance with a

jail’s policy still “bears on a defendant’s state of mind.” Johnson, 121 F.4th at 91.

But the Officers here are relying on correctional policy only to distinguish

themselves from the detention officers who had the duty to schedule Mr. Jarvis’s

dental appointments. WCDC’s policy does not deny inmates from obtaining

6 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022). 26 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 27

medically ordered follow-up appointments; it simply indicates who has the

responsibility of scheduling them. The Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a

jail from delegating authority and defining responsibilities within its facility. Thus,

we are not persuaded that the Officers who Mr. Jarvis named as defendants may be

held liable under § 1983 for failing to schedule his dental appointment when WCDC

policy did not impose a duty on them to schedule it.

b. Conscious Disregard of Excessive Risk

Regardless of the Officers’ duty under WCDC policy, Mr. Jarvis argues that

they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they knew of

but disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety by not scheduling his

appointment within the prescribed timeframes.

We have already discussed many of the reasons that a reasonable jury could

not find that the Officers consciously disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Jarvis’s

safety: Each gave Mr. Jarvis’s discharge paperwork to the incoming officers, and

each believed that the day-shift officers had taken on the responsibility of scheduling

Mr. Jarvis’s appointment. In addition, the Officers cannot be held liable under § 1983

for not scheduling Mr. Jarvis’s appointment because “they responded reasonably to

the risk” that Mr. Jarvis faced. See Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1239–40 (10th

Cir. 2008) (“In determining whether prison officials acted reasonably, we consider

what actions they took, if any, as well as available alternatives that might have been

known to them.”).

27 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 28

While Mr. Jarvis waited for his dental appointment, the Officers took multiple

steps to address his pain. They administered Mr. Jarvis’s pain medications as

prescribed, with each of the two Officers providing pain medication to Mr. Jarvis at

least seven times. They also transported Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room each time

it was needed for his pain, and the emergency room providers treated his pain on

each visit. 7 Because there is no evidence that an earlier dental appointment could

have been scheduled or that these Officers had authority to schedule one, Mr. Jarvis

has not shown what alternative course of action the Officers could have taken to

reduce his harm during the delay. Cf. Howard, 534 F.3d at 1240–41 (reversing the

grant of summary judgment to defendants who knew of alternative and reasonable

solutions to protect the inmate but did “absolutely nothing to protect [him]”).

Mr. Jarvis resists this conclusion, arguing that the Officers cannot avoid

liability by providing some medical treatment but disregarding specific orders to

schedule an appointment within a specific timeframe. He argues that two of our

7 It is not clear whether Officers Frank and Liggett actually made the decision to take Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room after he requested to go on May 28 and June 16, 2023. On May 28, 2023, the evidence provides only that Officer Frank transported Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room. And before Mr. Jarvis’s emergency room visit on June 16, 2023, Mr. Jarvis informed detention officers at WCDC that he needed to return to the emergency room for his infection since he could not go to the dentist until August 4, 2023. Officer Liggett was called in to take Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room, but there is no evidence suggesting who called Officer Liggett or who approved the visit other than Officer Liggett’s general statement that his duties include “transport[ing] inmates to . . . the emergency room as requested by supervisors.” ROA Vol. 1 at 188. Nonetheless, there is nothing to indicate that the Officers ever refused to take Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room to treat his pain after he requested to go. 28 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 29

cases—Prince and Paugh v. Uintah County, 47 F.4th, 1139 (10th Cir. 2022)—compel

this conclusion.

In Prince, the plaintiff went to the emergency room three times for various

symptoms, including difficulty walking, dizziness, and leg pain. 28 F.4th at 1040.

During the first emergency room visit, he was instructed to receive follow-up care

within one week. Id. During the second visit, the doctor specifically warned that if he

did not promptly receive follow-up attention, he could “suffer permanent disability,

pain and possibly death.” Id. The third time, the emergency room providers instructed

that the plaintiff should receive follow-up neurological care within ten days and

specifically directed the jail officials to make a call to schedule the appointment

within one day. Id. The plaintiff’s medical records put the jail nurse “on notice that

follow-up medical treatment was urgent.” Id. at 1046. However, the plaintiff received

no medical evaluations or any of his life-sustaining medications for nineteen days,

despite his condition “rapidly deteriorat[ing]” during that time. Id. at 1040–41, 1045–

46. And despite the nurse’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s symptoms, which amounted

to a medical emergency, she did not order that he be taken to a hospital. Id. at 1046.

Accordingly, we held that a factfinder could conclude the jail nurse was deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Id. at 1045–46.

In Paugh, the plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic alcoholism and withdrawal.

47 F.4th at 1148. The doctor specifically instructed jail officials to administer

medication as needed and to seek medical attention if the plaintiff’s condition

worsened. Id. at 1149. The plaintiff’s withdrawal symptoms began to worsen, and

29 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 30

despite many officers knowing about the deterioration of his condition, nobody took

him to the hospital, attempted to investigate how serious his needs were, or otherwise

attempted to contact a medical professional for advice. Id. at 1148–52. The plaintiff

died. We held that a jury could find the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to

the plaintiff’s needs. Id. at 1158–65.

The facts here are distinguishable. Mr. Jarvis is correct that the inquiry is “not

whether the prison official provided some care but rather whether they fulfilled their

sole obligation to . . . afford access to medical personnel capable of evaluating a

patient’s treatment needs when such an obligation arises.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health

Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Est. of Jensen ex rel.

Jensen v. Clyde, 989 F.3d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a nurse was

deliberately indifferent to a patient’s medical needs by providing Gatorade instead of

referring the patient for serious stomach problems). But here, the only risk the

Officers knew of was Mr. Jarvis’s pain while he waited for a dental appointment.

And his pain is the exact issue the Officers treated when they administered his

prescribed medication and took him to the emergency room. We therefore conclude

that Mr. Jarvis failed to come forward with evidence from which the jury could find

that the Officers were deliberately indifferent to his pain while he waited for his

scheduled dental appointment on August 4, 2023. See Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475,

1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting an inmate’s claim that “he was made to suffer for

eighteen months while the prison failed to provide him with a heart specialist and

30 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 31

surgery” where he was appropriately treated for his pain through medication and

hospital visits before receiving surgery).

3. Failure to Provide Oral Rinses

Mr. Jarvis also claims that Officer Frank was deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs by failing to provide him with the daily saltwater and peroxide oral

rinses that he was instructed to use during his first emergency room visit. Despite

Mr. Jarvis’s multiple requests, Officer Frank only once provided an oral rinse to

Mr. Jarvis and later told Mr. Jarvis that he would “check into” the situation. Suppl.

ROA Vol. 2 at 44. Contrary to Mr. Jarvis’s argument, a reasonable jury could not

conclude that Officer Frank’s conduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

We again assume without deciding that Mr. Jarvis has met the objective

component of the deliberate indifference standard because Officer Frank has not

disputed Mr. Jarvis’s assertion that he had a serious medical need. We conclude,

however, that Mr. Jarvis failed to provide evidence that could meet the subjective

prong. We have held that the “[f]ailure to act in accordance with or intentional

interference with prescribed medical treatment or instructions can give rise to an

Eighth Amendment claim.” Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1162 (quotation marks and emphasis

omitted) (holding a reasonable jury could find that a jail official was deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s medical needs because the official did not provide the

plaintiff with his medication when his symptoms were worsening despite the doctor’s

specific instruction to do so). But we have never held that a jail official’s failure to

follow a doctor’s instruction regarding an inmate’s medical treatment is a per se

31 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 32

constitutional violation. See Ajaj v. United States, 293 F. App’x 575, 579–81 (10th

Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (concluding that jail officials who did not place an inmate in

smoke-free housing even though a doctor recommended it were not deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s health or safety because they took various other

precautions to prevent his exposure to smoke). Although the objective prong of

deliberate indifference may be satisfied by showing that the inmate’s condition is

“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment,” the subjective

prong looks to the defendant’s actions as a whole, considering whether the defendant

“knew [the inmate] faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224

(10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

Even when a jail official knows that a medical provider has instructed a certain

treatment, the jail official must have subjective knowledge that disregarding the

instruction will result in an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. For

example, we have explained that a medical provider’s failure to consistently check an

inmate’s vital signs, despite instructions to do so, would not amount to deliberate

indifference if the medical provider did not know of and consciously disregard the

inmate’s serious medical needs. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 995 n.8 (10th

Cir. 2020); see also Martin v. Bd. of Cnty. Commr’s, 909 F.2d 402, 404, 406 (10th

Cir. 1990) (denying officers’ assertion of qualified immunity where there was

evidence that they knew not only that a medical provider recommended the pretrial

32 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 33

detainee not be moved without using a gurney or wheelchair, but they also knew that

disregarding this instruction could result in the detainee’s paralysis).

Other circuits have emphasized that “deliberate indifference is an onerous

standard for the plaintiff, and forgetting doses of medicine, however incompetent, is

not enough to meet it.” Zentmyer v. Kendall Cnty., 220 F.3d 805, 811–812 (7th

Cir. 2000) (holding that officers’ failure to “occasionally to administer doses of

medicine without knowledge that serious consequences might result from their lack

of diligence in treating an earache” was insufficient to create a jury question on

deliberate indifference); Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corrs., 64 F.3d 14, 18

(1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that an inmate who was denied prescribed medication for

seven days did not provide sufficient evidence of deliberate evidence because the

officers were not subjectively aware that the inmate would suffer serious medical

consequences without the medication). Rather, courts generally require “additional

exacerbating hardships” or a conscious disregard “in the face of medical risks” before

concluding that an officer’s failure to follow a doctor’s instructions amounts to

deliberate indifference. Zentmyer, 220 F.3d at 812 (collecting cases); but see Phillips

v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he knowing failure to

administer prescribed medicine can itself constitute deliberate indifference.”).

Here, Officer Frank did not decline to administer any prescription medication.

Instead, he consistently provided Mr. Jarvis with the pain medication prescribed.

However, the after-visit summary in Mr. Jarvis’s discharge papers from the first

emergency room visit treated oral rinses differently than the Ibuprofen he was

33 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 34

prescribed for pain. In the section indicating Mr. Jarvis’s medications, only Ibuprofen

was listed. So, too, with the section listing medications to be picked up at the

pharmacy. In a separate “Instructions” section of the discharge papers there are

various directions, including taking acetaminophen or the prescribed Ibuprofen for

pain, rinsing his mouth with saltwater and peroxide several times daily, “[a]void[ing]

too hot or too cold beverages,” and “[a]void[ing] crunchy or chewy foods.” ROA

Vol. 1 at 95. WCDC also does not consider saltwater and peroxide to be medications,

so they are not included on the jail’s over-the-counter medication sheet. Instead,

officers may provide oral rinses to inmates upon request.

Although Officer Frank failed to provide oral rinses to Mr. Jarvis after saying

he would check on it, his failure does not rise to the level of subjective deliberate

indifference. The subjective component of the deliberate indifference inquiry looks

not only to the defendant’s knowledge that an inmate has a serious medical need, but

it also considers “the mental state of the defendant regarding the risk of harm.” Est.

of Beauford, 35 F.4th at 1267. Although Officer Frank knew that Mr. Jarvis was

experiencing dental pain, there is no evidence to suggest he understood that the lack

of oral rinses posed a substantial risk to Mr. Jarvis’s health or that it was causing his

pain. Cf. Edmisten v. Werholtz, 287 F. App’x 728, 733 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)

(denying summary judgment for the defendants where the defendants’ failure to

provide the plaintiff with pain medication, antibiotics, and a prescribed diet resulted

in “significant and unnecessary pain”); Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1155 (noting that plaintiffs

34 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 35

must show their harm was caused by the defendant and that the defendant “acted with

the requisite culpable state of mind”).

Rather, Officer Frank provided evidence that he understood WCDC

medication administration practices to treat oral rinses differently than prescription

medication. So, although Officer Frank knew that a medical professional had

instructed Mr. Jarvis to use the oral rinses, his subjective understanding of the oral

rinses as something less than a prescription medication to treat Mr. Jarvis’s pain

supports his belief that the failure to provide the oral rinses did not pose a substantial

risk to Mr. Jarvis’s health. Indeed, only the first emergency services provider

included the rinses in the discharge papers. In other words, Officer Frank may have

been “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists,” but there is no evidence that he drew that inference with

respect to administration of the oral rinses. See Est. of Burgaz ex rel. Zommer v. Bd.

of Cnty. Commr’s, 30 F.4th 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted)

(“An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no

matter how obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is

not a constitutional violation.”).

Our conclusion here does not mean that an officer’s failure to provide a

treatment other than a prescribed medication can never rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. We have held, for example, that deliberate indifference was a jury issue

where jail officials failed to provide an inmate with both prescription medication and

special diets that a doctor had ordered. Hunt, 199 F.3d at 1223. In that case, we did

35 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 36

not distinguish between the failure to provide insulin and the additional failure to

provide the inmate with a special diet. Id.; see also Edmisten, 287 F. App’x at 733

(same). But we focused on the defendant’s knowledge that deprivation of either the

insulin or the special diet would result in excessive risk to the inmate. See Hunt, 199

F.3d at 1223 (noting that the defendant knew the inmate had a heart attack and

subsequent bypass surgery because of the defendant’s inadequate treatment of his

diabetes and hypertension).

Here, Officer Frank knew that Mr. Jarvis’s dental condition was causing him

pain, but he treated that pain with the prescribed Ibuprofen and knew that other

officers transported Mr. Jarvis to the emergency room for additional care when that

proved ineffective. Under these circumstances, his failure to provide Mr. Jarvis with

oral rinses for the nineteen days between his first and second emergency room visits

does not amount to deliberate indifference to Mr. Jarvis’s serious medical condition.

Instead, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Jarvis could

support, at most, that Officer Frank’s failure to provide Mr. Jarvis oral rinses was

mere negligence. See Lindwurm v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 02-8101, 2003

WL 22969348, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2023) (unpublished) (affirming summary

judgment for the defendants where the plaintiff failed to establish that brief and

isolated lapses in his medication posed an excessive risk to his health that the

defendants knew about yet disregarded); cf. Van Riper v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 67 F. App’x 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (holding that the failure to

give the plaintiff his prescribed medication created a fact issue where “Defendants

36 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 37

offer[ed] no explanation or justification, medical or otherwise, for the repeated

delays”). Thus, Officer Frank’s failure to provide Mr. Jarvis oral rinses does not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation, as opposed to a negligent or inadvertent

failure.

C. Clearly Established Law

Having concluded no constitutional violation occurred, we could affirm the

district court’s decision on the first prong of qualified immunity alone. We proceed,

however, to the second step of the analysis and conclude that even if the Officers’

actions rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the Officers are entitled to

qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.

To overcome a qualified immunity defense, “a right must be clearly

established such that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Hardy, 147 F.4th at 1167 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This generally requires an on-point Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision unless

“the clearly established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right

[was] as the plaintiff maintains.” Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th

Cir. 2021). The plaintiff “need not cite a factually identical case to demonstrate the

law was clearly established.” Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1257 n.9

(10th Cir. 1998). Rather, the question is whether the “rule’s contours [were] so well

defined it [was] clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Est. of Beauford, 35 F.4th at 1268 (quoting City of

Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)). Mr. Jarvis has not met this burden. 37 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 38

1. Failure to Timely Schedule Appointment

a. Cited Precedent

Mr. Jarvis relies on two lines of cases in support of his argument that the

Officers violated clearly established law when they failed to schedule his dental

appointment within the two-day and seven-day timeframes directed by medical

professionals. He discusses cases involving (1) the failure to schedule a medically

ordered follow-up appointment and (2) a substantial delay in medical care.

First, Mr. Jarvis asserts that it is clearly established that “an officer’s failure to

follow a medical professional’s order, including scheduling follow-up treatment with

a non-emergency medical professional, constitutes deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s needs in violation of the constitution.” Appellant’s Br. at 51. Mr. Jarvis

focuses on two of our prior cases, one binding and one persuasive, to support his

argument. See Prince, 28 F.4th at 1048; Palmer v. Bd. of Comm’rs ex rel. Payne

Cnty. Okla., 441 F. App’x 582 (10th Cir. 2011). 8

Mr. Jarvis first relies on Prince. Recall, the inmate in Prince went to the

emergency room three times while he was in custody, and each time the emergency

room providers cautioned that he needed to follow up with nonemergency specialists.

28 F.4th at 1040. In fact, in one of the visits, a doctor warned that the failure to

8 As we discuss, the unpublished decisions relied on by Mr. Jarvis are distinguishable. Even if they were comparable, however, they cannot satisfy the clearly established law prong of qualified immunity. Thompson v. Ragland, 23 F.4th 1252, 1260 n.3 (10th Cir. 2022) (“An unpublished opinion cannot clearly establish the law. . . .”). 38 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 39

schedule a follow-up appointment could result in “permanent disability, pain and

possibly death.” Id. Jail officials never scheduled the plaintiff’s follow-up

appointments, and his condition rapidly deteriorated over nineteen days. Id. The jail

nurse ignored the plaintiff’s obvious need for emergency medical attention, and he

ultimately died. Id. at 1040–41, 1048.

In Palmer, the plaintiff had an infection caused by a staph bacteria, and a

doctor advised him to return for a follow-up visit within two days or to go straight to

the hospital if his fever exceeded 100 degrees. 441 F. App’x at 583. The detention

officer who transported the plaintiff to the hospital conveyed the doctor’s instructions

to the jail administrator when he returned to the jail with the plaintiff. Id. The

plaintiff’s condition worsened, but the jail administrator refused to take the plaintiff

to the hospital or otherwise obtain medical assistance. Id. at 583–84. We held that a

reasonable jury “could surely infer from the circumstances that [the jail

administrator] knew of and intentionally disregarded a substantial risk to plaintiff’s

health” because he “knew that the treating physician’s directions were to take

plaintiff directly to the hospital.” Id. at 585.

The plaintiff in Palmer originally sued the transporting officer. Palmer v. Bd.

of Comm’rs, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1297 (W.D. Okla. 2011). The district court held

that no reasonable jury could find the transporting officer liable under § 1983 for not

scheduling the plaintiff’s medical appointment. Id. at 1298–99. It explained that the

defendant merely transported the plaintiff to the emergency room, had his

prescriptions filled, and passed along the instructions and medications to the

39 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 40

defendant who had the duty to care for the plaintiff. Id. As a result, “the evidence

[was] undisputed that [the transporting officer] took active and reasonable steps to

abate any harm to Plaintiff, and the subjective component of the deliberate

indifference standard cannot be met.” Id. at 1299. The plaintiff did not appeal the

district court’s order as to the transporting officer’s liability, and it was therefore not

at issue in the appeal.

Mr. Jarvis references several other cases explaining that officers are

deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff’s medical needs when a medical professional’s

instructions put them on notice that the plaintiff needed urgent medical attention, yet

they refused to provide the plaintiff access or timely access to medical care. See, e.g.,

Hunt, 199 F.3d at 1222–24 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment

where the plaintiff was denied insulin for his diabetes for over a year even though it

was prescribed to him); Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805–07 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding

that a jury could find deliberate indifference where a doctor specifically ordered that

the inmate needed to return in three weeks for a follow-up appointment, but the

defendants waited seven weeks to obtain medical attention for the plaintiff despite

the doctor’s specific warnings regarding the risk of further delay).

Second, Mr. Jarvis argues that it was clearly established in 2023 “that allowing

substantial delays in medical care violates the Eighth Amendment.” Appellant’s Br.

at 55. In support, Mr. Jarvis first points to Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188,

1190–91 (10th Cir. 2014), in which the plaintiff experienced severe abdominal pain

for several hours but was denied access to evaluation or treatment, despite repeatedly

40 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 41

requesting assistance. The prison nurse knew that severe abdominal pain could

suggest a severe or life-threatening condition, and she knew that the plaintiff’s Type

II diabetes made him particularly susceptible to certain illnesses. Id. at 1191, 1194.

But she declined to seek medical assistance for him, leaving him to suffer in pain for

hours. Id. Under these circumstances, we held that it violated clearly established law

to deny an inmate medical care by ignoring repeated complaints of “recognizable

symptoms which potentially created a medical emergency.” Id. at 1195 (quotation

marks and brackets omitted).

Mr. Jarvis then relies on our unpublished decision in Stack v. McCotter, 79 F.

App’x 383 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). 9 In Stack, the plaintiff complained of

multiple gum infections, which led to sores, bleeding, and infections in his mouth. Id.

at 386. Jail officials denied multiple requests he submitted asking for dental

treatment. Id. at 386–87. They denied one request because no guards were available,

and they denied another because the dentist would perform only extractions,

regardless of what dental work an inmate needed. Id. More than three months after

the plaintiff first complained, he saw a dentist who diagnosed him with advanced

periodontitis. Id. at 387. The dentist informed the plaintiff that he would need a

follow-up evaluation, but when the plaintiff asked the jail about a follow-up, he did

not receive a response. Id. Seven months after his pain started, he finally saw a

dentist and received the care he needed. Id. We held that a factfinder could find the

9 See supra note 7. 41 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 42

officers were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s dental needs because they

knew his condition required dental treatment, they knew his requests were being

ignored, and they used the extractions-only policy “as a device for unreasonably

delaying treatment. Id. at 390.

Mr. Jarvis then asserts that various other cases stand for the similar notion that

substantial delays in medical care demonstrate deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. See, e.g., Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1210–12 (holding that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s medical needs if they knew

the plaintiff was experiencing chest pain, that chest pain poses a dangerous risk to

health or safety, and they failed to summon emergency assistance); Olsen v. Layton

Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that factual

disputes precluded summary judgment regarding an officer’s deliberate indifference

because the evidence could establish that the officer ignored a detainee’s

psychological disorder and withheld medicine to treat it, despite the detainee’s

repeated pleas for assistance).

b. Analysis

These cases follow a similar theme. When we have concluded that an officer

was deliberately indifferent based on a delay in scheduling or otherwise providing

access to medical care, we identified additional evidence beyond the delay itself.

Hunt, 199 F.3d at 1224 (“Delays that courts have found to violate the Eighth

Amendment have frequently involved life-threatening situations and instances in

which it is apparent that delay would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems.”

42 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 43

(quotation marks omitted)). For example, constitutionally impermissible delays have

involved the defendants’ knowledge that the inmate’s condition was worsening but

the defendants did not provide any evaluation or even investigate whether the

plaintiff needed medical attention. See Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1158. And in cases where

the risk of harm has been less severe, the officer has still ignored medical symptoms

or requests that suggested a need for immediate, emergency medical attention. See

Olsen, 312 F.3d at 1317 (concluding a jury could find deliberate indifference where

the plaintiff repeatedly asked for assistance during a psychiatric emergency but was

ignored). Here, the Officers knew Mr. Jarvis needed to see a dentist, but they were

not aware that his symptoms were worsening or that waiting for his dental

appointment in early August posed an excessive risk to his health or safety. When his

pain did suggest that he needed immediate medical attention, they took him to the

emergency room.

Cases where we have held that a reasonable jury could find deliberate

indifference for inadequate medical care involved a higher level of officer culpability

than what the evidence here provides. For example, officers have been deliberately

indifferent for failing to allow an inmate access to medical care where there was

evidence that the defendants could have facilitated access but refused to do so. See

Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1210 (explaining that a jury could find deliberate indifference

where the defendant “allegedly refused to drive appellant to the hospital, and told

appellant not to die on his shift”).

43 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 44

Of course, Mr. Jarvis need not identify a case with identical facts. But the

material facts on which this case hinges are not present in any of the cases Mr. Jarvis

has provided. None of the cases he referenced involve the question of whether

officers can be deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s medical needs despite a jail’s

policy assigning the responsibility to provide that care to someone other than the

named defendants. Nor do any of Mr. Jarvis’s cited authorities involve facts where

the officers believed that those responsible had scheduled an appointment at the

earliest time available. He has thus not established that it would be obvious to every

reasonable officer that the Officers’ conduct was unlawful. See Redmond v.

Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 940 (10th Cir. 2018).

2. Failure to Provide Oral Rinses

Mr. Jarvis argues that Officer Frank is not entitled to qualified immunity for

failing to provide Mr. Jarvis with saltwater and peroxide oral rinses because he was

on notice that denying an inmate medically prescribed treatment constituted

deliberate indifference. Mr. Jarvis again relies on Prince as the primary authority to

support his argument. In Prince, detention officers failed to give the inmate any of

his prescription medication over the nineteen days leading up to his death, including

those “that were specifically listed in his hospital discharge paperwork.” 28 F.4th

at 1040–41. This failure constituted subjective deliberate indifference because the

officers knew the plaintiff needed the medication but refused to provide it. Id.

at 1046; see also Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1162 (explaining that a jail official was

44 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 45

deliberately indifferent by failing to give the plaintiff necessary medication despite a

doctor’s specific order that the plaintiff needed it if specific, urgent symptoms

started); Hunt, 199 F.3d at 1223–24 (concluding that the failure to give a diabetic

patient insulin for over a year, leading to a heart attack, constituted deliberate

indifference).

Mr. Jarvis has not identified a factually analogous case that would permit us to

hold that Officer Frank’s conduct was clearly unlawful. Officer Frank knew

Mr. Jarvis was experiencing dental pain, and he knew that a nurse practitioner

recommended that he rinse his mouth with saltwater and peroxide daily. But there is

no evidence that Officer Frank understood that any specific risk to Mr. Jarvis’s health

or heightened pain would result if Mr. Jarvis did not receive these oral rinses.

Without additional evidence of deliberate indifference, Mr. Jarvis has not established

that Officer Frank’s conduct—providing all the medications that an inmate was

prescribed but failing to provide an oral rinse that was merely recommended—

amounts to a clearly established constitutional violation. As a result, Mr. Jarvis has

not met his burden to show that Officer Frank violated clearly established law.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

45 Appellate Case: 25-8046 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 46

25-8046, Jarvis v. Liggett Matheson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

On the dental appointment issue, I would resolve this appeal on the second step of

qualified immunity—that Mr. Jarvis has not shown that any constitutional violation was

based on clearly established law. I therefore join the opinion’s discussion of clearly

established law and concur in the result. On the oral rinses issue, I join the opinion.