3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JARVIS ALLEN ARAGON, Case No. 3:25-cv-00456-MMD-CSD
7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8
9 DEBORA BORGAS,1
10 Respondent.
11 I. SUMMARY 12 Petitioner Jarvis Allen Aragon, a Nevada prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of 13 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 4 (“Petition”).) Currently before the 14 Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition. (ECF No. 14 (“Motion”).) Aragon 15 opposed the Motion,2 and Respondent replied. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) For the reasons 16 discussed below, the Court grants the Motion in part. 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 Aragon pleaded guilty under Alford3 to attempted sexual assault of a minor under 19 the age of 14 and was sentenced to 42 to 120 months in prison. (ECF No. 10-33.) Aragon 20 did not file a direct appeal but instead filed a state habeas petition on June 5, 2024. (ECF 21 No. 10-35.) The state court denied the petition. (ECF No. 10-42.) Aragon appealed, and 22 23 24 1The state corrections department’s inmate locator page shows that Aragon is 25 incarcerated at Ely State Prison. Debora Borgas is the current warden for that facility. Accordingly, at the end of this Order, the Court kindly requests the Clerk of Court 26 substitute Debora Borgas for Respondent Terry Royal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 27 2Aragon’s opposition was filed as a motion to deny Respondent’s Motion. 28 1 the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed on June 16, 2025 (ECF No. 10-51) and issued a 2 remittitur on July 7, 2025 (ECF No. 10-52). 3 Aragon commenced this action on August 27, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) Aragon raises 4 the following grounds for relief in his Petition:
5 1. His trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. 2. He did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. 6 3. The trial court erred (a) by denying his freestanding claim of actual innocence, (b) by denying his abuse of process and Brady claims, 7 (c) by failing to appoint post-conviction counsel, (d) by denying his state habeas petition without conducting a hearing, and (e) due to 8 cumulative error. 9 (ECF No. 4.)4 Respondent argues that Aragon’s Petition contains claims that are 10 unexhausted, not cognizable, and/or conclusory. (ECF No. 14.) 11 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 12 A. Exhaustion 13 A state prisoner first must exhaust state court remedies on habeas claims before 14 presenting those claims to the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 15 exhaustion requirement ensures that the state courts have the first opportunity to address 16 and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees. See Coleman v. 17 Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). “A petitioner has exhausted his federal claims 18 when he has fully and fairly presented them to the state courts.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 19 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 20 (1999) (“Section 2254(c) requires only that state prisoners give state courts a fair 21 opportunity to act on their claims.”)). A petitioner must present the substance of his claim 22 to the state courts, and the claim presented to the state courts must be the substantial 23 equivalent of the claim presented to the federal court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 24 270, 278 (1971). The state courts have been afforded a sufficient opportunity to hear an 25 issue when the petitioner has presented the state court with the issue’s factual and legal 26
27 4Respondent separates grounds 1 and 2 into various subclaims. The parties are instructed to use the Court’s numbering of claims going forward. 28 2 1 basis. See Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Scott v. 2 Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582–83 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Full and fair presentation additionally 3 requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a 4 reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the 5 petitioner to relief.”). A petitioner may reformulate his claims so long as the substance of 6 his argument remains the same. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78. 7 B. Cognizable Claims 8 When conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 9 conviction violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2254(a). Unless an issue of federal constitutional or statutory law is implicated by the 11 facts presented, a claim is not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 12 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 13 C. Conclusory Claims 14 Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 15 Courts (“Habeas Rule(s)”) requires a federal habeas petition to specify all grounds for 16 relief and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Notice pleading is not sufficient to 17 satisfy the specific pleading requirements for federal habeas petitions. See Mayle v. Felix, 18 545 U.S. 644, 655–56 (2005) (noting that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 requires only “fair notice” whereas Habeas Rule 2(c) “is more demanding”). Mere 20 conclusions of violations of federal rights without specifics do not state a basis for habeas 21 corpus relief. See id. at 649. A claim for relief is facially plausible when the pleading 22 alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the petitioner is 23 entitled to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), 25 conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts are subject to summary dismissal. 26 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 27 /// 28 3 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Ground 1 3 Respondent argues that the following subclaims within ground 1 are unexhausted: 4 Aragon’s trial counsel’s failure to (1) conduct a reasonable investigation, (2) advise him 5 that by pleading guilty the prosecutor would not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 6 doubt, and (3) file a motion regarding witnesses. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) The Court 7 understands these as arguments in support of ground 1 and not as subclaims that need 8 to be individually exhausted. The legal theory of ground 1 remains the same as the legal 9 theory presented to the state courts—Aragon’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of 10 Strickland because he coerced Aragon into pleading guilty—and the factual basis of 11 ground 1 is not altered by the incorporation of these arguments that are based on the 12 same set of facts. Respondent also argues that Aragon’s cumulative error subclaim in 13 ground 1 is unexhausted. (Id. at 8.) Again, the Court does not read this as a standalone 14 claim.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JARVIS ALLEN ARAGON, Case No. 3:25-cv-00456-MMD-CSD
7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8
9 DEBORA BORGAS,1
10 Respondent.
11 I. SUMMARY 12 Petitioner Jarvis Allen Aragon, a Nevada prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of 13 Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 4 (“Petition”).) Currently before the 14 Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition. (ECF No. 14 (“Motion”).) Aragon 15 opposed the Motion,2 and Respondent replied. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) For the reasons 16 discussed below, the Court grants the Motion in part. 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 Aragon pleaded guilty under Alford3 to attempted sexual assault of a minor under 19 the age of 14 and was sentenced to 42 to 120 months in prison. (ECF No. 10-33.) Aragon 20 did not file a direct appeal but instead filed a state habeas petition on June 5, 2024. (ECF 21 No. 10-35.) The state court denied the petition. (ECF No. 10-42.) Aragon appealed, and 22 23 24 1The state corrections department’s inmate locator page shows that Aragon is 25 incarcerated at Ely State Prison. Debora Borgas is the current warden for that facility. Accordingly, at the end of this Order, the Court kindly requests the Clerk of Court 26 substitute Debora Borgas for Respondent Terry Royal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 27 2Aragon’s opposition was filed as a motion to deny Respondent’s Motion. 28 1 the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed on June 16, 2025 (ECF No. 10-51) and issued a 2 remittitur on July 7, 2025 (ECF No. 10-52). 3 Aragon commenced this action on August 27, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) Aragon raises 4 the following grounds for relief in his Petition:
5 1. His trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. 2. He did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. 6 3. The trial court erred (a) by denying his freestanding claim of actual innocence, (b) by denying his abuse of process and Brady claims, 7 (c) by failing to appoint post-conviction counsel, (d) by denying his state habeas petition without conducting a hearing, and (e) due to 8 cumulative error. 9 (ECF No. 4.)4 Respondent argues that Aragon’s Petition contains claims that are 10 unexhausted, not cognizable, and/or conclusory. (ECF No. 14.) 11 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 12 A. Exhaustion 13 A state prisoner first must exhaust state court remedies on habeas claims before 14 presenting those claims to the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 15 exhaustion requirement ensures that the state courts have the first opportunity to address 16 and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees. See Coleman v. 17 Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). “A petitioner has exhausted his federal claims 18 when he has fully and fairly presented them to the state courts.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 19 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 20 (1999) (“Section 2254(c) requires only that state prisoners give state courts a fair 21 opportunity to act on their claims.”)). A petitioner must present the substance of his claim 22 to the state courts, and the claim presented to the state courts must be the substantial 23 equivalent of the claim presented to the federal court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 24 270, 278 (1971). The state courts have been afforded a sufficient opportunity to hear an 25 issue when the petitioner has presented the state court with the issue’s factual and legal 26
27 4Respondent separates grounds 1 and 2 into various subclaims. The parties are instructed to use the Court’s numbering of claims going forward. 28 2 1 basis. See Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Scott v. 2 Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582–83 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Full and fair presentation additionally 3 requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a 4 reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the 5 petitioner to relief.”). A petitioner may reformulate his claims so long as the substance of 6 his argument remains the same. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78. 7 B. Cognizable Claims 8 When conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 9 conviction violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2254(a). Unless an issue of federal constitutional or statutory law is implicated by the 11 facts presented, a claim is not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 12 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 13 C. Conclusory Claims 14 Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 15 Courts (“Habeas Rule(s)”) requires a federal habeas petition to specify all grounds for 16 relief and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Notice pleading is not sufficient to 17 satisfy the specific pleading requirements for federal habeas petitions. See Mayle v. Felix, 18 545 U.S. 644, 655–56 (2005) (noting that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 requires only “fair notice” whereas Habeas Rule 2(c) “is more demanding”). Mere 20 conclusions of violations of federal rights without specifics do not state a basis for habeas 21 corpus relief. See id. at 649. A claim for relief is facially plausible when the pleading 22 alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the petitioner is 23 entitled to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), 25 conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts are subject to summary dismissal. 26 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 27 /// 28 3 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Ground 1 3 Respondent argues that the following subclaims within ground 1 are unexhausted: 4 Aragon’s trial counsel’s failure to (1) conduct a reasonable investigation, (2) advise him 5 that by pleading guilty the prosecutor would not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 6 doubt, and (3) file a motion regarding witnesses. (ECF No. 14 at 5.) The Court 7 understands these as arguments in support of ground 1 and not as subclaims that need 8 to be individually exhausted. The legal theory of ground 1 remains the same as the legal 9 theory presented to the state courts—Aragon’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of 10 Strickland because he coerced Aragon into pleading guilty—and the factual basis of 11 ground 1 is not altered by the incorporation of these arguments that are based on the 12 same set of facts. Respondent also argues that Aragon’s cumulative error subclaim in 13 ground 1 is unexhausted. (Id. at 8.) Again, the Court does not read this as a standalone 14 claim. Rather, the Court interprets Aragon as arguing that his trial counsel’s deficiencies 15 regarding the entering of his plea—when considered altogether—prejudiced him. The 16 Court finds that ground 1 is exhausted. 17 B. Ground 2 18 Respondent argues that the following subclaims within ground 2 are unexhausted: 19 Aragon’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because (1) the trial court 20 accepted his plea without him admitting the elements of the formal criminal charge, (2) 21 his trial counsel misrepresented the facts and law and influenced him to plea, (3) his trial 22 counsel abandoned him, and (4) his trial counsel failed to accept a plea offer in July 2022 23 that he advised her to accept. (Id. at 5.) Relatedly, Respondent argues that the following 24 subclaims within ground 2 are procedurally defaulted: (1) the trial court denied his 25 presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) the trial court admitted his prior bad 26 acts without an evidentiary hearing, and (3) the trial court allowed the parties to meet in 27 chambers without him. (Id. at 12.) Like ground 1, the Court does not read these arguments 28 4 1 as subclaims that need to be individually exhausted and/or dismissed for being 2 procedurally defaulted. The legal theory of ground 2 remains the same as the legal theory 3 presented to the state courts—his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered—and 4 the factual basis of ground 2 is not altered by the incorporation of these arguments that 5 are based on the same set of facts. Respondent also argues that Aragon’s cumulative 6 error subclaim in ground 2 is unexhausted. (Id. at 8.) Again, the Court does not read this 7 as a standalone claim. Rather, the Court interprets Aragon as arguing that the 8 accumulation of issues presented shows that his plea was not valid. The Court finds that 9 ground 2 is exhausted. 10 C. Ground 3 11 In ground 3(a), Aragon argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 12 freestanding claim of actual innocence. Respondent argues that this claim is not 13 cognizable. (Id. at 9.) The Supreme Court has not decided whether a petitioner can bring 14 a freestanding claim of actual innocence under federal constitutional law. See McQuiggin 15 v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). Thus, given the open nature of this question, the 16 Court declines to dismiss ground 3(a). 17 In ground 3(b), Aragon argues that the trial court erred in denying his abuse of 18 process and Brady claims. (ECF No. 4 at 19.) Aragon fails to allege any facts regarding 19 these alleged violations, so the Court dismisses ground 3(b) as conclusory. The Nevada 20 Court of Appeals dismissed this claim for the same reason. (ECF No. 10-51 at 7–8 21 (“Aragon does not support these claims below with specific facts that, if true, would entitle 22 him to relief. He failed to specify what the abuse of the process was or how Brady was 23 violated.”).) 24 In grounds 3(c) and 3(d), Aragon argues, respectively, that the state court erred in 25 failing to appoint post-conviction counsel and denying his state habeas petition without 26 conducting a hearing. “[A] petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review 27 process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 28 5 1 || 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 331-32 (9th 2 || Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claims stemming “from activities arising out of the state 3 || trial court’s consideration of [the petitioner's] last state habeas petition”). Accordingly, 4 || because grounds 3(c) and 3(d) involve alleged errors in the state post-conviction process, 5 || they are not cognizable on federal habeas review and are dismissed. 6 In ground 3(e), Aragon argues that the trial court’s cumulative errors entitle him to 7 || relief. Respondent argues that ground 3(e) is not cognizable. (ECF No. 14 at 8.) The 8 || Court follows the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has concluded that “[t]he 9 || Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple . . . errors 10 || [can] violate[ ] due process.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 || However, given that Aragon only has one remaining trial-court-error claim, meaning that 12 || there are no errors to cumulate, the Court dismisses this ground due to a lack of factual 13 || basis. 14 || V. CONCLUSION 15 It is therefore ordered that Respondent’s Motion (ECF No. 14) is granted, in part. 16 It is further ordered that Aragon’s motion to deny Respondent's Motion (ECF No. 17 || 20) is granted, in part. 18 It is further ordered that grounds 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) of the Petition (ECF No. 19 || 4) are dismissed. 20 It is further ordered that Respondent has up to and including July 13, 2026, to file 21 || her answer to grounds 1, 2, and 3(a). Aragon will then have 30 days to file his reply. 22 It is further kindly ordered that the Clerk of Court substitute Debora Borgas for 23 || Respondent Terry Royal. 24 DATED THIS 12" Day of May 2026.
26 MIRANDA M. DU 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28