Jarrett v. Starkey
This text of Jarrett v. Starkey (Jarrett v. Starkey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED April 28, 1998
JOHANNA JARRETT, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9706-JV-00223 Cecil Crowson, Jr. ) Appellate C ourt Clerk Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) ) ) v. ) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE ) HAMILTON COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ) ) ) ) TERRY B. STARKEY, ) ) HONORABLE SUZANNE BAILEY, Respondent-Appellee. ) JUDGE
For Appellant For Appellee
JOHANNA JARRETT, Pro Se NO APPEARANCE Chattanooga, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1 In this paternity action, the petitioner, Johanna
Jarrett (“Mother”), the natural mother of Ethan Oliver Starkey
(DOB: November 21, 1989), appealed the trial court’s order
denying her request that the child’s putative father, Terry B.
Starkey (“Father”), be ordered to pay her attorney’s fees, and
that he be further ordered to obtain health insurance for the
parties’ minor child.
This matter was heard below on April 15, 1997.1 That
hearing was preceded by a hearing before a juvenile court referee
on January 22, 1997. The referee’s “findings and recommendation”
provides for prospective child support of $450 per month by wage
assignment, and a judgment for past support of $14,800. The
referee’s findings and recommendation does not mention attorney’s
fees. On the subject of health insurance/expenses, the findings
and recommendation provides as follows:
That [Father] shall not be required to maintain insurance at this time. The parties shall equally divide uncovered medical and dental expenses and [Mother] shall supply [Father] with those bills within 10 days of the receipt of the same.
Mother timely sought a rehearing in Juvenile Court to press her
request for attorney’s fees and health insurance.
At the second hearing, Mother testified that her child
was insured under TennCare. She stated that he was insured until
October, 1997. She further testified that she feared that when
1 At the time of the hearing below, the relevant paternity statutes were codified at T.C.A. § 36-2-101, et seq. (1996 Repl.)
2 his coverage was re-evaluated at that time, it would be
terminated because of the amount of child support to which she
would then be entitled; however, there is no proof in the record
confirming that her fear was justified.
On the subject of attorney’s fees, Mother testified
that she paid a private attorney $500 to represent her in this
action. That attorney was allowed to withdraw at the beginning
of the hearing below, and Mother was represented at the hearing
by a publicly-funded attorney. There is evidence in the record
that Mother had been represented by the same attorney before she
chose to hire a private attorney.
The trial court refused to award Mother her attorney’s
fees; however, it did modify the referee’s recommendation with
respect to the child’s health insurance/expenses by providing
that Father would be responsible for all expenses not covered by
TennCare. The trial court expressed a willingness to revisit the
health insurance issue upon a showing of a change of
circumstances:
Well, what I’m going to do on this, based on the testimony presented today, that the child is covered by TennCare and does have it. At such time as that, if you should get cut off because of this Order, if there’s any change in that, at this point in time Mr. Harpe will tell you [sic] need to do about coming back to the Court, getting a petition before the Court, for the Court to look at that, as a substantial change in what was presented to us today. Because that’s part of the child’s welfare as far as I’m concerned.
3 Our review is de novo; however, the record of the
proceedings below comes to us with a presumption of correctness
that we must honor unless the preponderance of the evidence is to
the contrary. Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.
T.C.A. § 36-2-102(4) (1996 Repl.) provides that a
court, “in its discretion,” may order a putative father to pay a
mother’s “counsel fees.” We must determine if the evidence
preponderates against the trial court’s discretionary
determination not to award fees.
The record reflects that Mother had available to her
the services of a publicly-funded attorney. She was represented
by this attorney both before and after she was represented by
private counsel. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
the State’s attorney did not adequately represent Mother’s
interests in this matter. In fact, in her testimony, Mother did
not complain about the quality of this representation, and
otherwise did not express any reason for hiring a private
attorney. We cannot say that the evidence preponderates against
the trial court’s decision not to award attorney’s fees in this
case. A party is not entitled to attorney’s fees in a paternity
case as a matter of right. As previously indicated, such an
award is a matter that addresses the sound discretion of the
court. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
in this case.
We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s refusal to order Father to secure health insurance for
4 the parties’ child. When this matter was heard below, the child
was covered by insurance under the State’s TennCare program.
There is no evidence in the record that TennCare was going to
drop the child’s coverage when his coverage was reviewed in
October, 1997. With the record in this state, we cannot say that
the evidence preponderates against the trial judge’s decision not
to order Father to secure health insurance for the child. This
is particularly true in view of the trial court’s decision to
burden Father with all unreimbursed health expenses. As
recognized by the trial court, the question of health insurance
in this case properly addresses itself to the future -- that is,
on a petition to modify if and when the child is no longer
eligible for TennCare coverage.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are
taxed to the appellant. This case is remanded to the trial court
for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and collection of
costs assessed below, all pursuant to applicable law.
__________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________ Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
________________________ Herschel P. Franks, J.
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