Jarren Duff v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-02787
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Tavitas

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Jarren Duff, Jun 22 2026, 9:40 am

CLERK Appellant-Defendant Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

June 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2787 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable James B. Osborn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D21-2412-F3-35691

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 1 of 14 Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary [1] Jarren Duff was convicted of aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, and battery

resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Duff argues

that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

aggravated battery, that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him,

and that his sentence is inappropriate. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues [2] Duff raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether sufficient evidence supports Duff’s conviction for aggravated battery.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Duff.

III. Whether Duff’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Duff’s character.

Facts [3] Billy Brown, the assistant manager at a Walgreens in Indianapolis, hired Duff

as a customer service associate in late November 2024. Duff arrived late on his

first day, and Brown advised Duff that he would be terminated if he arrived late

three times. Duff arrived late a second time and then missed a shift without

calling in, a “no call, no show.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. When Duff arrived at work on

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 2 of 14 December 10, 2024, he approached Brown in an aisle and asked where Brown

wanted him to work that day. Brown informed Duff that he was terminated

because of his poor attendance, and Duff argued that he had not been scheduled

on the day he missed work.

[4] Duff refused to leave the store, and Brown called the police to have Duff

removed. Duff told Brown that he would leave if Brown showed him on the

posted schedule that he was scheduled on the day he missed work. Brown

agreed and led Duff to the back office to view the schedule.

[5] After viewing the schedule, Duff asked Brown if he should return his badge.

Brown said yes, and Duff then smacked Brown across the face with the badge

in his hand. Brown grabbed Duff by the arm and tried to pull him out of the

break room and into the store where there were cameras and other employees.

Brown was unsuccessful, and Duff began to swing at Brown, hitting him

repeatedly on the face, head, and chest. Brown fell to the floor, and Duff

repeatedly kicked him on the ribs and struck him around the head, face, and

neck. Duff got on top of Brown and continued to hit him.

[6] Buddy Dickerson, an employee working in the store, heard a loud crashing

noise from the break room. Dickerson went into the break room and attempted

to pull Duff off Brown. Duff then turned and began to strike Dickerson while

Brown was still on the floor. Brown told Dickerson to let Duff leave, Dickerson

moved out of the way, and Duff left the building.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 3 of 14 [7] Once the police arrived, they called an ambulance, and Dickerson was taken to

a nearby hospital. Dickerson suffered four broken bones around his right eye

and facial bruises. Dickerson was hospitalized for four days, and he had

surgery two days after the attack. The surgeon put plates and screws above and

below his right eye—two plates and four screws in total. The plates and screws

will never be removed. Dickerson has scars from the incision under his right

eye and on eyebrow, but the scars are not readily visible. At the time of trial,

Dickerson still needed crowns for a few broken teeth.

[8] Although he did not seek medical attention, Brown had facial bruises and

swelling. Brown believed, from past experience, that he had broken ribs; he

had rib pain for six weeks after the attack.

[9] On December 16, 2024, the State charged Duff with Count I, aggravated

battery, a Level 3 felony, for causing “serious permanent disfigurement” to

Dickerson; and Count II, battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6

felony, for the injuries to Brown. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 18. On July 31,

2025, the State amended the charges to include Count III, aggravated battery, a

Level 3 felony, for causing “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a

bodily member or organ, to-wit: head and/or face and/or jaw and/or teeth” of

Dickerson. Id. at 109.

[10] At the bench trial on September 5, 2025, Duff maintained that he acted in self-

defense. The trial court rejected this claim and found Duff guilty of Counts I

and II. The trial court vacated Count III due to double jeopardy concerns.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 4 of 14 [11] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) the

harm was greater than necessary to prove the elements of the crime; and (2) one

of the victims, Dickerson, was cognitively impaired. As to mitigating factors,

the trial court found that: (1) the crime was unlikely to recur; (2) Duff had no

criminal record; and (3) Duff was likely to respond to short-term imprisonment

or probation. The trial court found that the mitigating factors outweighed the

aggravating factors. 1

[12] On Count I, the trial court sentenced Duff to eight years, with six years

executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to

probation. On Count II, the trial court sentenced Duff to a consecutive term of

one year. Duff’s aggregate sentence, thus, is nine years with two years

suspended to probation. Duff now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Duff’s conviction for aggravated battery.

[13] Duff argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for aggravated battery. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a

deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor

judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the

1 “[T]he trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence . . . .” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 5 of 14 [fact-finder].” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A

conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of

probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the

fact-finder’s determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We

affirm the conviction “‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary

that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support

the verdict.’” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[14] The trial court convicted Duff of aggravated battery pursuant to Indiana Code

Section 35-42-2-1.5, which provides: “A person who knowingly or intentionally

inflicts injury on a person that creates a substantial risk of death or causes: (1)

serious permanent disfigurement; . . . commits aggravated battery, a Level 3

felony. . . .” Duff argues that the evidence the State presented failed to establish

that the injury to Dickerson caused serious permanent disfigurement. Duff

makes two arguments: the permanent plates installed around Dickerson’s eye

did not cause visible scarring, so the injury is not a disfigurement, and crowns

could fix Dickerson’s broken teeth, so the injury is not permanent.

[15] Although the legislature has never defined the term, this Court has defined

“‘permanent’” as “‘continuing or enduring without fundamental or marked

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 6 of 14 change,’” and “‘disfigure’” as “‘to make less complete, perfect, or beautiful in

appearance or character: deface, deform, mar.’” Cornelious v. State, 988 N.E.2d

280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting James v. State, 755 N.E.2d 226, 230 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2001)). In Haverstick v. State, this Court defined “mar” as “to detract

from the perfection or wholeness of.” 648 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind. Ct. App.

1995) (quoting Mar, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1989)).

[16] We find that the altered bone structure and permanent plates installed around

Dickerson’s eye constitute a serious permanent disfigurement, even without

evidence of visible scarring. Disfigurement is based on whether a person is

physically less complete or whole, not whether that change is revealed to others

by external scarring. Dickerson was marred because the bone structure

surrounding his eye was altered from its complete and whole condition.

[17] We also find that the damage to Dickerson’s teeth constitutes a serious

permanent disfigurement. In James, this Court found that the State’s evidence

that the victim was fitted with fake teeth and had a hole in his gumline was

sufficient to prove serious permanent disfigurement. 755 N.E.2d at 229. As

with the victim’s teeth in James, Dickerson’s teeth will not heal. Even if crowns

could maintain Dickerson’s ability to use the broken teeth, the underlying

damage to the teeth constitutes a permanent injury.

[18] Duff’s argument is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we

cannot do. The trial court could have reasonably found that Dickerson’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 7 of 14 injuries caused him to become seriously permanently disfigured. Sufficient

evidence supports Duff’s conviction for aggravated battery.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Duff.

[19] Duff argues that the trial court abused its discretion when considering the

mitigating and aggravating factors and rejecting Duff’s testimony that he acted

in self-defense. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial

court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer,

868 N.E.2d at 490 (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002));

Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse occurs only if the

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn

therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v.

State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[20] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868

N.E.2d at 490-91).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 8 of 14 [21] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders

its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler, 132

N.E.3d at 905. Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand

for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have

imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous

aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023).

[22] On appeal, Duff contends that the trial court abused its discretion when

assessing the aggravating and mitigating factors. Here, the trial court

recognized as mitigating that the crime was unlikely to recur. In discussing this

mitigator, the trial court noted: (1) two people wrote letters supporting that

these acts were outside Duff’s character; (2) the pre-sentencing report indicated

that Duff was a low risk to re-offend; and (3) the trial court’s own belief that

Duff lied when he testified that he acted in self-defense and that Duff believed

he acted entirely reasonably. The trial court’s discussion of Duff’s response to

the situation and his self-defense argument was part of this weighing process.

Ultimately, the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion when it found

that the likelihood of recurrence was a mitigating factor.

[23] The trial court did not find that Duff’s maintenance of his innocence was either

an aggravator or a mitigator. 2 Rather, the trial court merely discussed this in

2 To the extent that Duff argues that the trial court erred by considering Duff’s self-defense argument as an aggravator, the record does not reflect that the trial court did so. The discussion of Duff’s self-defense testimony was encompassed within the trial court’s consideration of whether the crime was likely to recur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 9 of 14 the context of determining the weight to give the mitigating factor that the

crime was unlikely to recur. Our Supreme Court, however, has held that “[t]he

relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which

should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Anglemyer, 868

N.E.2d at 491. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.

III. Duff’s sentence is not inappropriate.

[24] Next, Duff argues that his sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution

authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a

trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const.

art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule

7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the

offender.” Deference to the trial court’s sentence should prevail unless”

overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

offense and the defendant’s character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261,

1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant need not show that

both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant

revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against

relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify

relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 10 of 14 [25] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not

limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial

court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the

outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the

perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal

quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the

balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to

others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given

case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[26] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is

the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime

committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). In the case

at hand, Duff was convicted of a Level 3 felony and a Level 6 felony. Indiana

Code Section 35-50-2-5(b) provides: “A person who commits a Level 3 felony .

. . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term between three (3) and sixteen (16) years,

with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years.” The trial court sentenced Duff

to eight years with two years suspended to probation, which is less than the

advisory sentence. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b) provides: “A person who

commits a Level 6 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six

(6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory sentence being

one (1) year.” The trial court sentenced Duff to one year for this offense, which

is the advisory sentence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 11 of 14 Nature of the Offense

[27] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent,

brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). “And

given that sentencing ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial

court’s judgment should receive considerable deference[,]’ a trial court’s

sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling

evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being]

accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s

character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good

character).’” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting

Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[28] Duff argues that this situation was unique and that it is unlikely to recur. We,

however, find that Duff’s attack against Dickerson was brutal. Dickerson had

to undergo surgery, have plates and screws installed to repair broken bones in

his face, and have crowns installed on his broken teeth. Brown experienced

pain for six weeks after the attack. Dickerson’s and Brown’s testimony

indicated that Duff attacked Dickerson repeatedly. The attacks were

unprovoked, and neither Dickerson nor Brown defended himself. This does not

demonstrate the restraint required to portray Duff’s offense in a positive light.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 12 of 14 Character of the Offender

[29] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a

defendant’s qualities, including the defendant’s age, criminal history,

background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165

N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind.

2020). Duff was twenty-nine years old at the time of sentencing and had no

criminal history prior to this case. In its sentencing decision, the trial court

recognized as mitigating factors that Duff was unlikely to reoffend and that he

had no prior criminal history.

[30] Given Duff’s lack of restraint while committing the offense, however, we

cannot find a basis to conclude that the trial court’s imposition of Duff’s

sentence was inappropriate. The trial court considered Duff’s lack of criminal

history when it sentenced him to less than the advisory sentence on Count I and

the advisory sentence on Count II. Accordingly, we find that Duff’s sentence is

not inappropriate.

Conclusion [31] We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Duff’s

conviction for aggravated battery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Duff, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[32] Affirmed.

Weissmann, J. and Foley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 13 of 14 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jan B. Berg Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Eva V. Schmitt Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2787 | June 22, 2026 Page 14 of 14