Jarrell v. The City of Nitro, West Virginia

CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 26, 2021
Docket19-0907
StatusSeparate

This text of Jarrell v. The City of Nitro, West Virginia (Jarrell v. The City of Nitro, West Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jarrell v. The City of Nitro, West Virginia, (W. Va. 2021).

Opinion

FILED No. 19-0907 – Timothy Jarrell v. The City of Nitro, West Virginia March 26, 2021 released at 3:00 p.m. EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK Wooton, Justice, dissenting: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

The central issue before the Court is whether Sgt. Timothy Jarrell with the

Nitro Police Department was properly terminated from his employment with the

respondent The City of Nitro, West Virginia, for using a lateral carotid restraint 1 to effect

the arrest of Jared Hester, an unarmed, nonthreatening individual, for public intoxication.

The circuit court, in reversing and vacating the Decision Order of the Nitro Police

Department Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”), found that the evidence

supported the officer’s termination from employment. However, the majority reverses the

circuit court’s order and orders the officer’s reinstatement. Because I would affirm the

circuit court’s decision that the Commission’s decision was clearly wrong and contrary to

the evidence, I respectfully dissent.

This Court has held that “‘[a] final order of a police civil service commission

based upon a finding of fact will not be reversed by a circuit court upon appeal unless it is

clearly wrong or is based upon a mistake of law.’ Point 1, Syllabus, Appeal of Prezkop,

154 W.Va. 759, 179 S.E.2d 331 (1971).” Syl. Pt. 1, City of Logan v. Dingess, 161 W. Va.

377, 242 S.E.2d 473 (1978) (emphasis added). While this Court, and the circuit court, do

give deference to the factfinder in an administrative hearing, see Frymier-Halloran v.

1 As the majority states in note 2 of the opinion, “the parties and the record also refer to this maneuver as a ‘lateral vascular restraint’ or a ‘choke hold.’” 1 Paige, 193 W. Va. 687, 458 S.E.2d 780 (1995), 2 we have also said that “‘in no case will

this Court [or the circuit court] act as a rubber stamp.’” See In re Hamrick, 204 W. Va. 357,

359, 512 S.E.2d 870, 872 (1998) (quoting In re Browning, 192 W. Va. 231, 234 n.4, 452

S.E.2d 24, 37 n.4 (1994)).

Despite this Court’s clear admonition that it will not act as a “rubber stamp”

of an administrative body’s determination, that is exactly what occurred in this case. There

are two predominate fallacies in the majority’s decision. The first fallacy arises from the

majority’s attempt to portray Sgt. Jarrell as being weaker than Mr. Hester and in fear of

receiving serious injury. Apparently, the majority finds these characterizations necessary

as a means of rationalizing why the officer was justified in using a lateral carotid restraint

in effecting Mr. Hester’s arrest on a petty offense. The majority states: “Sergeant Jarrell

had attempted to handcuff Mr. Hester, who is ‘a larger man of superior size and perceived

strength,’ but Mr. Hester resisted; . . . Sergeant Jarrell reasonably perceived the threat of

receiving serious injury if Mr. Hester was not brought quickly under control.” Let there be

no mistake, it was Sgt. Jarrell who had the upper hand in this case. According to Nitro

Police Department Arrest Report of Jared Devone Hester, which was admitted into

evidence below, he was twenty-nine years old, was 6’4’’, and weighed 235 pounds. Sgt.

2 In Frymier-Halloran, the Court found that the “clearly wrong” standards of review “are deferential ones which presume the agency’s actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence . . . .” 193 W. Va. at 695, 458 S.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added).

2 Jarrell testified that he weighed the same as Mr. Hester and was just over 6’1’’. The video

evidence obtained from a hotel security camera 3 (“the security video”) of the encounter

confirms that the two men were roughly the same build, a fact admitted by Sgt. Jarrell

during cross-examination. The majority, however, glosses over the fact that Sgt. Jarrell is

a well-trained police officer 4 and holds a second-degree black belt in judo, a second-degree

black belt in jiu-jitsu, a second-degree black belt in taekwondo, a second-degree black belt

in karate, and a third-degree black belt in taiho-jutsu. Sgt. Jarrell testified that he was

certified as an instructor in those disciplines of martial arts and is “recognized as a martial

arts – or a defensive tactics instructor through[out] the State, as well as a use of force

instructor through[out] the State[.]” Conversely, Mr. Hester was an intoxicated,

nonthreatening, unarmed man. The security evidence plainly shows that he “made no

threatening movements or gestures before being placed in a choke hold[.]” As a matter of

fact, the security video evinces little, if any, movement by Mr. Hester at the time the officer

rendered him unconscious.

3 The majority adopts the Commission’s position that the security video “is black and white, [and] has low resolution,” and also finds that the camera was positioned “some distance away from Mr. Hester and Officer Jarrell.” While the security video is without audio and is not high quality, the camera was not positioned so far away that its video did not clearly capture the encounter between Sgt. Jarrell and Mr. Hester which results in Mr. Hester being rendered unconscious. 4 Sgt. Jarrell testified that he had training in “defense tactics and use of force.” 3 The second fallacy stems from the majority’s mischaracterization of the

review undertaken by the circuit court, all in order to support its decision to reverse and

remand this case so that the officer is reinstated to his employment. In this regard, the

majority focuses upon the circuit court’s review of the Commission’s decision as one in

which the circuit court merely “overturn[ed] findings of fact simply because [it] would

have decided [them] differently.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va.

223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996) (“[A] reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the [lower

tribunal’s] account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety.”). That is simply not what occurred in this this case; the record demonstrates that

the circuit court undertook a thorough review of all the evidence supporting the

Commission’s decision, focusing upon the critical evidence surrounding Mr. Hester’s

arrest, to wit: the testimony of Mr. Hester, the testimony of Sgt. Jarrell and the security

video. The appropriate standard of review is set forth in syllabus point one of In re Tiffany

Marie S.: “[F]indings [of fact] shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the

finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id., Syl. Pt. 1, in part (emphasis added).

There is ample evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s judgment

in this case. First, Mr. Hester testified that Sgt. Jarrell approached him while he was

4 standing in front of the hotel and instructed him to “[p]ut your hands behind your back.”

Mr.

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Related

In Interest of Tiffany Marie S.
470 S.E.2d 177 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1996)
City of Logan v. Dingess
242 S.E.2d 473 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1978)
In Re Appeal of Prezkop
179 S.E.2d 331 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1971)
Frymier-Halloran v. Paige
458 S.E.2d 780 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1995)
Matter of Browning
452 S.E.2d 34 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1994)
Matter of Hey
452 S.E.2d 24 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1994)
Russell v. Austin
1 Paige Ch. 193 (New York Court of Chancery, 1828)
In re Hamrick
512 S.E.2d 870 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1998)

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