Jarell J. Brewer v. Peaks and Wolford

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJanuary 12, 2026
Docket3:23-cv-00866
StatusUnknown

This text of Jarell J. Brewer v. Peaks and Wolford (Jarell J. Brewer v. Peaks and Wolford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jarell J. Brewer v. Peaks and Wolford, (N.D. Ind. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JARELL J. BREWER,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:23-CV-866-TLS-AZ

PEAKS and WOLFORD,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Jarell J. Brewer, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two claims: (1) “against Sgt. Peaks in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force against him while handcuffed sometime between July 18, 2023, and July 31, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;” and (2) “against Sgt. Wolford in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to intervene in Sgt. Peaks’ use of excessive force occurring sometime between July 18, 2023, and July 31, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” ECF No. 9 at 7–8. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Brewer did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. ECF No. 141. Brewer filed a response, and the defendants filed a reply. ECF 146, 147. Brewer then filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply which was granted by the court, but Brewer did not file any sur-reply by the deadline. ECF 148, 149. After that deadline passed, the Defendants filed a motion requesting a ruling on their summary judgment motion. ECF 150. The Court will now rule on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). A party

opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends will prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Prisoners are prohibited from bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182

F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[f]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has taken a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, “unless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002). However, inmates are only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are “available.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006). The availability of a remedy is not a matter of what appears “on paper,” but rather whether the process was in actuality available for the prisoner to pursue. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, when prison staff hinder an inmate’s ability to use the administrative process, administrative remedies are not considered “available.” Id. In essence, “[p]rison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a

properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (citations omitted). The Defendants provide Brewer’s grievance records and a copy of the Offender Grievance Process, which show the following facts: In order to fully exhaust a grievance, an inmate must complete three steps: (1) a formal grievance; (2) a Level I appeal to the warden; and (3) a Level II appeal to the Department Grievance Manager. ECF No. 141-2 at 3. Once an inmate submits a formal grievance, the grievance office must “review the grievance form within ten (10) business days of receiving it and shall either accept it and record it, or reject it.” Id. at 10. A grievance form can be rejected if any of the following requirement are not met:

Each completed State Form 45471, “Offender Grievance,” must meet the following standards: 1. Each part of the form shall be completed; 2. It shall be written legibly; 3. It shall avoid the use of legal terminology; 4. It shall relate to only one event or issue; 5 It shall be signed, dated, and submitted by an offender on his or her own behalf, although it can be written by another offender or staff member if the offender is unable to do so due to a physical impairment, language impairment, or other obstacle; 6. It shall explain how the situation or incident affects the offender; and, 7. The offender shall suggest appropriate relief or remedy.

Id. at 9–10. If the grievance office rejects and returns a grievance to an inmate, “It shall be the responsibility of the offender to make the necessary revisions to the grievance form and to return the revised form to the Offender Grievance Specialist within five (5) business days from the date that it is returned to the offender.” Id. at 10. Brewer’s grievance records show the following: On August 1, 2023, Brewer filed Grievance 159868, complaining that Officer Peaks assaulted him and Officer Wolford failed to protect him on August 1, 2023. ECF No. 141-4 at 24–26. In the portion of the grievance form

where Brewer was asked to “State the relief that you are seeking,” Brewer wrote that: (1) he wanted to exhaust his administrative remedies so he could file a lawsuit; (2) he needed protection because his life was in danger; (3) he would have to resort to self-defense if no steps were taken to protect him; and (4) he wanted the defendants to explain their conduct. Id. On September 25, 2023, the grievance office rejected and returned Grievance 159868 to Brewer, explaining, “You have not shown a good faith, as you indicate that you are filing a grievance to exhaust internal remedies and file a suit.” Id. at 27–28. The grievance office did not provide any further explanation as to why it rejected Grievance 159868. See id. Here, the undisputed facts show the grievance office made Brewer’s administrative

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Dole v. Chandler
438 F.3d 804 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Marshall King v. Robert McCarty
781 F.3d 889 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Jarell J. Brewer v. Peaks and Wolford, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jarell-j-brewer-v-peaks-and-wolford-innd-2026.