Jared Wayne Riipinen v. Dwayne L. Christopher et al

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 JARED WAYNE RIIPINEN, Case No. 3:25-cv-05976-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO AMEND COMPLAINT 9 UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 v. 10 DWAYNE L. CHRISTOPHER et al, 11 Defendants. 12 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Before the Court is self-represented plaintiff Jared Riipinen’s complaint. Dkt. 5. 16 Mr. Riipinen’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) was granted as to the financial 17 criteria, Dkt. 4, but this Court must also review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 18 Because the complaint does not allege enough facts in support of the claims and seeks monetary 19 relief against defendants who have immunity, Mr. Riipinen is ORDERED to file a proposed 20 amended complaint no later than April 13, 2026. If he fails to do so, or the amended complaint 21 has the same defects, his case will be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(e)(2)(B). 23 24 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD The Court must subject each civil action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to 2 mandatory screening and order the dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 3 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 4 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 5 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 6 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to dismiss an IFP complaint that fails 8 to state a claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th 9 Cir. 2014). 10 A self-represented plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other 11 complaint, it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible 12 claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 13 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads 14 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 15 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, the plaintiff must explain to the Court the 16 underlying facts that, if true, would show that the defendant has violated their legal rights—such 17 as the who, what, where, when, and why of the alleged violation. Unless it is clear a self- 18 represented plaintiff cannot fix the problems in their complaint by providing additional facts, the 19 Court will provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint. See United States v. 20 Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ismissal without leave to amend is 21 improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any 22 amendment.” (quoting Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 23 616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010))). 24 1 III. DISCUSSION There are several problems with Mr. Riipinen’s complaint that he must fix if he wants to 2 proceed with his lawsuit. 3 1. Judicial immunity 4 First, Mr. Riipinen names as defendants several judges: Dwayne Christopher, Elizabeth 5 Padula, and Lloyd Oaks. Dkt. 5 at 1. Judges generally have absolute immunity from lawsuits for 6 money damages. See Acres Bonusing, Inc v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 7 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam)). “Courts have articulated only two 8 circumstances in which judicial immunity does not apply”: “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not 9 taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” and actions that “though judicial in nature, [are] taken in 10 the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). 11 In determining if an action is judicial, courts consider whether 12 (1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the 13 judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a 14 confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity. 15 Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 16 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001)). “These factors are to 17 be construed generously in favor of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial 18 immunity.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 19 As to lack of jurisdiction, a judge will be immune for a particular action if their “ultimate 20 acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” even if the motives 21 underlying the ultimate act are “clearly improper.” See id. at 1078 (“Judges’ immunity from civil 22 liability should not be ‘affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed.’” 23 (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985))); see also id. (“[A] conspiracy between 24 1 judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly 2 improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors. As long 3 as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter

4 jurisidiction [sic], immunity applies.” (emphasis added)). 5 If immunity applies, it applies “however erroneous the [judge’s] act may have been, and 6 however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Cleavinger, 474 U.S. 7 at 199–200 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)); see also Schucker v. 8 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Grave procedural errors or acts in excess of 9 judicial authority do not deprive a judge of this immunity.”). Judicial immunity against lawsuits 10 for money damages applies to civil rights claims brought under Section 1983. See Ashelman, 793 11 F.2d at 1075. 12 Here, Mr. Riipinen’s factual allegations against the judges include: (1) that they

13 “unlawfully imposed bail only after he sent emails exposing misconduct by law-enforcement and 14 corrections officers,” Dkt. 5 at 2; (2) that a judge “imposed a no-contact order,” Dkt. 5-2 at 1; 15 (3) that a judge improperly ordered competency restoration, id. at 2; and (4) that a judge violated 16 his speedy trial rights, id. All of these actions are subject to judicial immunity and cannot be the 17 basis of a suit for money damages. 18 2. Prosecutorial immunity 19 Second, Mr. Riipinen also names as defendants several attorneys: Meridith Reynolds 20 D’auteil, Ryan Saunders, and Jonathan Buckles. Dkt. 5 at 1. Based on the surrounding 21 allegations in the complaint, the attorneys appear to be prosecutors. See id. at 2 (“Plaintiff alleges 22 that judges and prosecutors unlawfully imposed bail only after he sent emails exposing

23 misconduct by law-enforcement and corrections officers.”). Like judges, prosecutors are 24 generally immune from suits for money damages. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. “Where a 1 prosecutor acts as an advocate in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case, 2 absolute immunity applies.” Id. at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ybarra v. 3 Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1984)). Similar to judicial

4 immunity, prosecutorial immunity applies even if the prosecutor is shown to have committed 5 “grave procedural errors,” unless they acted “without . . . authority.” Id. at 1077 (quoting Stump 6 v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). Here, Mr. Riipinen alleges that the prosecutors violated 7 his rights by seeking excessive bail (Dkt. 5 at 2, Dkt. 5-2 at 1); improperly influencing the 8 competency evaluator and withholding his letter from the court (Dkt. 5-2 at 2); and violating his 9 speedy trial rights (id.). All these allegations involve presenting the state’s case and would be 10 subject to prosecutorial immunity. 11 3. Eleventh Amendment immunity 12 Third, Mr. Riipinen names as defendants the Washington Department of Corrections, the

13 Washington Department of Licensing, and the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. 14 Dkt. 5 at 1. Any claims against these agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Mitchell 15 v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016). “Longstanding Supreme Court precedent has 16 interpreted this Amendment to immunize states from suit in federal court by citizens and 17 noncitizens alike.” Kohn v. State Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing cases), 18 cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1465 (2024). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies, 19 which cannot be sued for damages or injunctive relief in federal court. See Savage v. Glendale 20 Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cnty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 A state agency is also not a person for purposes of Section 1983 and cannot be sued for 22 constitutional violations unless it affirmatively waives its sovereign immunity. Cornel v. Hawaii,

23 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022). The State of Washington has not waived sovereign immunity 24 for claims under Section 1983. See Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 667, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) 1 (“[T]here is no express legislative indication that the State here has consented to suit in state 2 court for federal civil rights actions.”). 3 4. Other claims

4 Mr. Riipinen’s other claims appear to be for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, 5 brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must 6 show: (1) that he or she suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by 7 federal statute, and (2) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color 8 of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To satisfy the 9 causation requirement of Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant caused the 10 alleged deprivation by doing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or 11 failing to perform an act which he or she was legally required to do. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 12 Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).

13 A Section 1983 “inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 14 and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 15 caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 Vicarious liability may not be imposed on a supervisory employee for the acts of their 17 subordinates in an action brought under Section 1983. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 18 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). A supervisor may, however, be held liable under Section 19 1983 “if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal 20 connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 21 Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 Except for Defendant Officer Parkett, Mr. Riipinen does not explain how each individual

23 defendant allegedly violated his constitutional rights. This problem, however, can conceivably be 24 cured by the addition of other facts. If he chooses to amend his complaint, for each alleged l constitutional violation, Mr. Riipinen must do his best to explain which defendant committed the 2 || violation, what they did, when it happened, and why he believes it violated his rights. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Mr. Ruipinen is directed to file a proposed amended complaint no later than April 13, 5 2026. The amended complaint must not seek monetary relief against defendants who are

6 immune, and as to other defendants, it must include a short, plain statement of the (1) the legal 7 claims asserted; (2) the specific facts Mr. Riipinen believes support those legal claims, and

g (3) the relief requested. Otherwise, the Court will dismiss the complaint and close the case.

9 The Court encourages Mr. Ruipinen to consult the Court’s resources for self-represented 10 litigants at https://www.wawd.uscourts. gov/representing-yourself-pro-se. To the extent he wishes

ll to seek assistance with this matter, Mr. Riipinen may also contact the Federal Civil Rights Legal 2 Clinic, which offers free, limited-scope assistance to self-represented litigants in federal civil

13 rights cases, including, but not limited to, following court rules and procedures or preparing case

14 documents. Participation is voluntary and the Clinic operates independently from the Court. To

15 || Tequest an appointment, Plaintiffs in Seattle may submit the online form at www.kcba.org/nlc or

16 call 206.267.7070 and press “1” to leave a message. In Tacoma, Plaintiffs may request an

17 appointment by calling 253.368.6690.

18 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and

19 || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.

20 1 Dated this 12th day of March, 2026.

3 TiffanyM. Cartwright United States District Judge 24