Jared E. Parks v. Belinda J. Carver

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 291, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JARED E. PARKS,1 § § Petitioner Below, § No. 291, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Family Court v. § of the State of Delaware § BELINDA J. CARVER, § File No. CK23-02408 § Petition No. 23-21632 Respondent Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: December 5, 2025 Decided: February 11, 2026

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) The appellant (“Ex-Husband”) filed this appeal from orders deciding

matters ancillary to his divorce from the appellee (“Ex-Wife”) and denying his

motion seeking to reopen the judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse

the Family Court’s judgment to the extent that the court awarded Ex-Wife more than

70% of the proceeds from the prospective sale of the marital home.

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). (2) The parties were married on April 14, 2017. On September 14, 2023,

Ex-Wife filed a petition for an order of protection from abuse (“PFA”) alleging that

Ex-Husband perpetrated various acts of abuse against her.2 On October 6, 2023, a

Family Court Commissioner entered a PFA order against Ex-Husband; the

Commissioner found that Ex-Husband abused Ex-Wife when he showed her a

paintball gun that she believed to be real and made her sign a quit-claim deed to the

marital residence.

(3) Ex-Husband filed a petition for divorce on October 6, 2023; he did not

ask the court to retain jurisdiction over ancillary financial matters. He did file a

petition for custody of the parties’ minor child. A divorce decree issued on

November 22, 2023. Five days later, Ex-Wife filed a motion to reopen the matter

for the purpose of resolving property division and alimony. Ex-Husband did not

respond, and the Family Court granted the motion on December 15, 2023.

(4) The docket reflects no further activity until March 4, 2024, when

counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Ex-Wife in the ancillary proceeding.

The parties had both been self-represented until then. On March 22, 2024, the court

sent notice to the parties that jurisdiction over ancillary matters was retained. The

notice informed the parties that they were required to file a Rule 16(c) ancillary

2 The Court has taken judicial notice of the entire docket in Family Court File No. CK23-02408.

2 financial disclosure report.3 On April 22, 2024, the court sent the parties notice that

a telephonic case management conference was scheduled for June 27, 2024. The

scheduling notice reiterated the rules as to the financial disclosure reports.

(5) Ex-Husband did not answer his telephone for the June 27, 2024

conference and therefore did not participate. Following the conference, the court

issued an order scheduling a pretrial teleconference for September 12, 2024, and the

ancillary hearing for September 24, 2024. The order provided that the parties were

required to submit an ancillary pretrial stipulation at least seven days before the

pretrial conference. The order further provided that Ex-Wife would initially

complete the stipulation and forward it to Ex-Husband at least twenty days before

the pretrial conference, after which Ex-Husband would complete the document and

deliver it to the court and Ex-Wife’s counsel at least seven days before the pretrial

conference.

(6) Neither party filed the pretrial stipulation before the pretrial conference.

During the conference on September 12, 2024, Ex-Husband committed to filing the

completed pretrial stipulation by September 16, 2024. He did not do so. On

September 17, 2024, Ex-Wife’s counsel submitted the pretrial stipulation with only

3 Under Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)¸ the financial disclosure report is due within thirty days of the entry of the divorce decree. The rule does not establish deadlines for circumstances, as here, in which the court takes ancillary jurisdiction after the entry of the decree. The March 22 notice described the deadlines under Rule 16(c) and did not establish any deadlines for the parties’ financial disclosures in light of the fact that the divorce decree had already issued.

3 Ex-Wife’s portion completed. The document stated Ex-Wife’s position that there

were no marital debts in dispute and identified the marital home as the only asset in

dispute. It estimated the value of the home as $550,000 and indicated that the home

was not subject to a mortgage. Ex-Wife requested that the court order that the home

be sold and the proceeds divided 70%-30% in her favor. The stipulation indicated

that Ex-Wife was seeking alimony but did not specify an amount. It provided

information as to Ex-Wife’s monthly expenses and stated that she was between jobs

but acknowledged that she should be attributed with income consistent with her

earnings from her previous position working as a full-time hotel clerk. 4

(7) On September 17, 2024, Ex-Husband moved for a continuance of the

ancillary hearing on the grounds that he had an attorney who would take his case.

The court granted the continuance and rescheduled the hearing to February 17, 2025.

No counsel entered an appearance for Ex-Husband in the ensuing months, nor did

Ex-Husband submit his portion of the financial disclosure or pretrial stipulation,

despite the continuance of the hearing.

(8) On January 27, 2025, Ex-Husband moved for a continuance of the

February 17 hearing, indicating that he needed to care for his sick mother in

Connecticut for a few months. The court denied the motion on February 11 but

4 Ex-Wife was between jobs because she had left the marital home and moved out of state, where she initially lived in a women’s shelter.

4 ordered that Ex-Husband could appear by Zoom. On February 13, 2025, court staff

sent Ex-Husband a Zoom link for the hearing. They also attempted to telephone Ex-

Husband that same day to advise him that the Zoom link had been sent, but he did

not answer the call.

(9) Ex-Husband did not appear for the hearing. The court attempted to

contact him by telephone, but he did not answer. The hearing therefore proceeded

in default of his appearance. Ex-Wife requested that the court order the home sold

and the entire proceeds awarded to her or, alternatively, divided 80%-20% in her

favor, in lieu of alimony. As to her income and expenses, she testified that she had

resumed working a full-time job earning $19 per hour. Her monthly expenses were

estimated to be $6,000 per month, as indicated on the pretrial stipulation that she

submitted, which included expenses for the parties’ minor child, who was in Ex-

Wife’s care and for whom Ex-Husband was not paying any child support.

Estimating her take-home pay to be 70% of her gross income, the court calculated

her budget deficit to be $3,783 per month.

(10) Ex-Wife testified that Ex-Husband worked at the Pepsi factory and as

a landscaper, but she was not aware of his income because he had concealed that

information from her throughout their marriage. Taking “a shot in the dark, because

we have to because [Ex-Husband] hasn’t cooperated at all,”5 the court estimated Ex-

5 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-113.

5 Husband’s post-tax monthly income to be $5,833 and his expenses to be $4,000.6

The court therefore determined that Ex-Husband could afford to pay $1,833 per

month in alimony. Based on an alimony period of 39 months,7 the court determined

that Ex-Wife was entitled to a total of $71,487 in alimony.

(11) The court then evaluated Ex-Wife’s request for 80% of the house

proceeds in the context of that potential alimony award. The court observed that if

the parties realized $500,000 from the sale of the house and Ex-Wife received 80%

of the proceeds, or $400,000, she would receive $150,000 more than she would from

a 50%-50% split. 8 The court observed that “she probably should realize closer to

$75,000” based on the alimony calculation described above. 9 After hearing

argument from Ex-Wife’s counsel about why the court should award Ex-Wife a

higher amount, the court decided to order a 75%-25% split in favor of Ex-Wife.

(12) On May 6, 2025, the court issued a decision ordering that the house

would be listed for the market price and sold, the costs of any required repairs

deducted from the proceeds, and then the net proceeds divided 75%-25% in favor of

Ex-Wife. The court ordered that Ex-Wife receive “at least $71,487 from the sale

6 The court derived the $5,833 net monthly income figure from assuming a $100,000 gross annual income, minus 30% for taxes. The court proposed the $100,000 figure. Ex-Wife’s counsel stated that it was unlikely that Ex-Husband “made more” than that, but neither Ex-Wife nor counsel indicated whether $100,000 was a reasonable estimate of Ex-Husband’s income. Id. at A-113-14. 7 See 13 Del. C. § 1512(d) (“A person shall be eligible for alimony for a period not to exceed 50% of the term of the marriage . . . .”). 8 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-116. 9 Id.

6 proceeds in lieu of alimony.” Two weeks later, counsel entered an appearance on

behalf of Ex-Husband and filed a motion seeking to reopen or set aside the judgment

under Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In the motion, Ex-

Husband asserted that he never received the Zoom link for the hearing. He stated

that he “left work to appear at Court on February 17, 2025, after being contacted by

his daughter, but the matter had concluded by the time he arrived.”10 The motion

asserted that Ex-Wife misrepresented or failed to disclose to the court facts relating

to the parties’ financial means, assets, and debts. It requested that the court reopen

and set aside the ancillary order “based on Rule 60(b) due to him not receiving the

Zoom link and subsections (3) and (6).”11

(13) The court denied the motion. The court determined that Ex-Husband’s

conduct leading to his nonappearance for the hearing was not that of a reasonably

prudent person and he therefore had not shown that the judgment was the result of

excusable neglect.

(14) On appeal to this Court, Ex-Husband argues that the Family Court erred

by considering only whether Ex-Husband entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and

not also considering Rule 60(b)(3) and (6). He emphasizes that neither party

10 Id. at A-53. 11 Id. at A-54. This was the only reference to any specific provision of Rule 60(b). The motion did not set forth the legal standards applicable to a motion under Rule 60(b) or any subsection thereof, nor did it attempt to apply those standards to the factual assertions in the motion.

7 engaged in discovery and that both parties had been noncompliant with their pretrial

financial-disclosure obligations. He argues that the judgment should be reopened

under Rule 60(b)(3) because Ex-Wife mispresented the parties’ assets and debts. He

asserts that the court’s speculation about Ex-Husband’s income and expenses was

not supported by any evidence. He contends that “given the potentially drastic

difference in the outcome, the burden of Family Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6) has been

met.” He also argues that Ex-Husband’s actions constituted excusable neglect under

Rule 60(b)(1) because both parties had failed to comply with their procedural

obligations through most of the course of the litigation and, when Ex-Husband called

to inquire about the status of his motion for a continuance, court staff told him that

it had been denied but did not tell him that the court had ordered that he could

participate by Zoom.

(15) A motion to reopen a default judgment under Rule 60(b) is addressed

to the sound discretion of the Family Court. 12 Thus, this Court generally reviews a

trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b) for abuse of

discretion. 13 “A claim that the trial court employed an incorrect legal standard,

however, raises a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” 14 “Rule 60(b) is

12 Harper v. Harper, 826 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. 2003). 13 Simpson v. Simpson, 2019 WL 3763526, at *4 (Del. Aug. 8, 2019). 14 Id.

8 liberally construed in light of the underlying policy in favor of a trial on the merits,

but the movant bears the burden of establishing a basis for relief.” 15

(16) When considering a motion under Rule 60(b), courts consider whether

(i) the movant has established a basis for relief under Rule 60(b); (ii) the outcome of

the case would be different if relief were granted; and (iii) the nonmoving party will

suffer substantial prejudice if the judgment is reopened. 16 Ex-Husband asserts that

he showed a basis for relief under subsections (1), (3), and (6) of Rule 60(b). We

address each provision in turn.

(17) Under Rule 60(b)(1), the Family Court may relieve a party from a

judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”17 The

subsection is “designed to remedy mistakes of fact that operate to keep the litigant

out of court.” 18 Therefore, to obtain relief from a default judgment based on

excusable neglect, the movant must show “excusable neglect in the conduct that

allowed the default judgment to be taken.” 19 The movant “must first establish

excusable neglect before the [trial court] will consider whether a meritorious defense

15 Id. 16 Id. at *5. 17 DEL. FAM. CT. R. 60(b)(1). 18 Ravine v. Ravine, 2006 WL 453213, at *2 (Del. Feb. 22, 2006). 19 Christiana Mall, LLC v. Emory Hill & Co., 90 A.3d 1087, 1091 (Del. 2014); see also DiSabatino v. DiSabatino, 2007 WL 812766, at *2 (Del. Mar. 16, 2007) (reviewing Family Court’s denial of motion to reopen default order and describing first prong as “whether the conduct by the moving party that resulted in the default judgment (or order of dismissal) was the product of excusable neglect”).

9 or prejudice to the [nonmoving party] exists.”20 “To show excusable neglect, the

conduct of the moving party must have been that of a reasonably prudent person

under the circumstances.”21 “Carelessness and negligence do not necessarily rise to

the level of ‘excusable neglect.’”22

(18) The Family Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Ex-

Husband did not demonstrate that the default judgment resulted from excusable

neglect. Ex-Husband did not participate in the June 2024 case management

teleconference. The court sent him several notices of the requirement that he provide

his financial disclosure, but he did not do so. During the September 12, 2024 pretrial

conference, he committed to provide the completed pretrial stipulation by September

16, but he failed to do so. After the court then granted his motion for a continuance

of the ancillary hearing that was scheduled for September 24, 2024, he still did not

submit his financial disclosure in the ensuing five-month period before the

rescheduled ancillary hearing in February 2025. By faulting court staff for not

mentioning—when he called to inquire about the status of his motion for a

continuance of the February 2025 hearing—that the court had ordered that he could

participate by Zoom, Ex-Husband tacitly admits that he knew that the hearing was

20 Christiana Mall, 90 A.3d at 1091. 21 Ravine, 2006 WL 453213, at *2. 22 DiSabatino, 2007 WL 812766, at *3.

10 going forward but chose not to appear anyway. Ex-Husband has not shown that his

failure to attend the ancillary hearing was the result of excusable neglect.

(19) Under Rule 60(b)(3), the Family Court may relieve a party from a

judgment for “fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party.”23 Rule 60(b)(3) applies

“only in rare circumstances,” and its “application [is] cabined to instances of fraud

that impair a party’s ability to present its case in litigation.” 24 “The rule remains

difficult to satisfy and establishes an exacting standard: (1) the burden of proving

fraud is on the moving party; (2) the fraud must be established by clear and

convincing evidence; and (3) the fraud must have prevented the moving party from

fairly and adequately pleading its case.”25

(20) Ex-Husband has not met that burden. He takes issue with the facts that

Ex-Wife presented to the Family Court in the pretrial stipulation and at the ancillary

hearing. But he had numerous opportunities to present his version of the facts: by

submitting the Rule 16(c) financial disclosure, by participating in the pretrial

stipulation process, and by appearing at the hearing. He did none of those things,

and he has not shown that Ex-Wife’s alleged misconduct prevented him from doing

any of them. He therefore has not met his burden of demonstrating that Ex-Wife

23 DEL. FAM. CT. R. 60(b)(3). 24 Erste Asset Mgmt. GmbH v. Hees, 341 A.3d 1008, 1020 (Del. 2025). 25 Id. at 1022.

11 engaged in fraud that prevented Ex-Husband from fairly and adequately presenting

his case.

(21) Finally, Rule 60(b)(6) permits the Family Court to relieve a party from

a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment.”26 “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of ‘extraordinary

circumstances.’”27 This Court has long held that the phrase “‘any other reason

justifying relief’ [in Rule] 60(b)(6) . . . ‘vests power in courts adequate to enable

them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish

justice.’” 28 We are reluctant to find extraordinary circumstances here, where Ex-

Husband failed to provide his financial information before trial and then did not

appear for the hearing at which he could have challenged Ex-Wife’s version of the

facts, but now seeks relief from the resulting judgment based on purported

misrepresentations of the facts. But Ex-Husband also argues that he did not have

notice that the court might award Ex-Wife 75% of the value of the house, because

Ex-Wife asked for a 70%-30% split in her pretrial stipulation.

(22) In our view, reopening the judgment to the extent that it awarded Ex-

Wife a greater share of the marital home than Ex-Husband had notice might be

26 DEL. FAM. CT. R. 60(b)(6). 27 Dorsey v. Milner, 2026 WL 146552, at *4 (Del. Jan. 20, 2026) (citing Jewell v. Div. Social Servs., 401 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1979)). 28 Jewell, 401 A.2d at 90 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949) (second alteration in original)).

12 awarded in default of his appearance is “appropriate to accomplish justice.”29 Ex-

Wife’s pretrial stipulation did seek 70% of the home proceeds and an unspecified

amount of alimony, which arguably gave Ex-Husband some notice that Ex-Wife

might receive an amount more than 70% of the home proceeds. But to reach the

75% award, the court selected an alimony amount by speculating as to Ex-Husband’s

income and expenses, having received no evidence as to those categories from Ex-

Wife and her counsel.30 Moreover, the structure of the award did not limit Ex-Wife’s

award exceeding 50% of the property division to the calculated amount of alimony.

For example, if the net proceeds from the sale of the house were $500,000,31 Ex-

Wife would receive $250,000 in a 50%-50% split. But in a 75%-25% split, she

would receive $375,000, approximately $53,000 more than if she received 50% of

the proceeds and $71,487 in alimony (the Family Court’s speculative alimony

calculation).32

(23) Having determined that Ex-Husband has shown a “reason justifying

relief” under Rule 60(b)(6), we briefly address the other prongs of the Rule 60(b)

29 Id. 30 It does not appear that Ex-Wife attempted to use any discovery tools to obtain information about Ex-Husband’s income and expenses. 31 Notably, Ex-Wife and her counsel did not present any evidence of the value of the home; counsel indicated that he believed the value recently to have declined from $550,000 to $500,000. Appendix to Opening Brief at A-114. 32 A different award structure would reduce this effect: assuming that the alimony calculation were valid, the court could have ordered that Ex-Wife would receive the first $71,487 of the proceeds and then 50% of the balance.

13 analysis, which require the movant to show that (i) the outcome of the action might

be different if relief were granted and (ii) granting the motion would not cause

substantial prejudice to the non-defaulting party.33 We conclude that these prongs

are satisfied here. Reopening the judgment solely to the extent of capping Ex-Wife’s

portion of the sale proceeds at 70% consistent with the notice to Ex-Husband of the

risk of not appearing at the hearing would change the result of the proceeding. And

we discern no prejudice to Ex-Wife in that result. Her answering brief states that

Ex-Husband is renting the home to tenants, so it appears that it has not yet been sold

and the proceeds divided.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court be REVERSED to the extent explained in this order and REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this order. Jurisdiction is not retained.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice

33 See Simpson, 2019 WL 3763526, at *5 (“In reviewing the Wife’s Rule 60(b) motion, Family Court correctly examined whether: (i) the Wife established a basis for relief under Rule 60(b); (ii) the outcome of the case would be different if the requested relief was granted; and (iii) whether the nonmoving party will suffer substantial prejudice if the judgment is reopened.”).