Jared Castillo v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion filed August 20, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-25-00054-CR

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JARED CASTILLO, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 106th District Court Gaines County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 24-6264

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Appellant, Jared Castillo, of theft of property valued between $2,500 and $30,000, namely money, a state jail felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2025). The same jury assessed his punishment at twenty-one months’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division, and a $5,000 fine. See PENAL § 12.35(a), (b).

The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered him to pay $17,915 in restitution: $8,966 to Todd Danley and $8,949 to Big Starr Electric, respectively.

In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

In August 2022, Appellant accepted $17,915 as payment for the delivery of an electronic advertising sign to be shared by Big Starr Electric and Danley, cashed their checks, and never delivered the sign to them. A year later, Appellant accepted over $10,000 from a church in Lubbock, cashed its check, failed to deliver a sign it had ordered to it, and was later convicted of felony theft. See id. Testimony at Appellant’s trial revealed that he had committed similar schemes on multiple other occasions.

In the instant case, Appellant unlawfully appropriated money from two businesses: Big Starr Electric, and a crop insurance and real estate brokerage entity owned and operated by Danley. Appellant initially approached the manager at Big Starr Electric, John Unger, with an offer to sell the business an LED sign. Appellant returned to Big Starr Electric a week later and presented a quote of $44,000 for the sign. Big Starr Electric’s General Manager, Cornelius Wall, was interested and texted Unger that they had agreed to a price; the two businesses agreed to share the cost of the sign. Appellant offered a reduced price of $17,915 if this amount was paid in advance; the two businesses each gave him a check—Big Starr Electric’s check was for $8,949, and Danley’s check was for $8,966. The parties’ sales contract stated a delivery period of ten to twelve weeks. Appellant cashed Big Starr Electric’s check the same day that he received it, and he deposited Danley’s check into his girlfriend’s bank account approximately three weeks later.

In November 2022, approximately twelve weeks after their agreement, Unger texted Appellant about the status of the sign, and Appellant told Unger that the sign

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was still “in the process.” Neither Unger nor anyone else at Big Starr Electric heard from Appellant again. In January 2023, Danley texted Appellant to inquire about the sign and stated he was “[g]etting a little concerned about [their] order.” Appellant did not respond and Danley, like Big Starr Electric, never heard from Appellant again.

Appellant testified that he has worked in the sign business for thirty years, and he offered the August 2009 edition of News and Views, a magazine for sign professionals, which displayed his picture on the front cover. He testified that he contracted COVID in 2021, and it still affected him at the time of trial. Appellant testified that he was also a Type 2 diabetic, had hypertension, and suffered a “widowmaker ” heart attack in 2019. He explained that, although he had formed his own company to sell signs in 2020, his health issues prevented him from conducting any business in 2021. Appellant testified that he did not have any bank accounts because they were overdrawn while he was ill, and his girlfriend helped him by allowing him to use her bank account to make business deposits. In 2022, he began selling signs again, but his health problems continued to be an impediment at times. On crossexamination , the State asked Appellant: “Now, when you were doing business and trying to convince Big Starr Electric and [Danley] to do business with them, you didn’t bother to tell them you couldn’t have a bank account because everything was in collections, did you?” Appellant responded, “You don’t lead off with something [like] that.”

According to Appellant, he ordered the sign for Big Starr Electric and Danley from China and paid a deposit for its construction. Appellant claimed that the sign was delivered to “Dallas-Fort Worth” while he was confined at the Lubbock County Jail, but he fell ill and suffered numerous maladies for the rest of the year. Appellant agreed that he should have contacted Big Starr Electric and Danley about the circumstances of their order but explained that his focus at the time was his health

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and survival. Appellant later paid the remaining balance for the sign’s construction and delivery. He testified that the full cost of the sign was $6,000.

Appellant was unable to retrieve the sign at that time because he was confined on the theft charge in Lubbock. He alleged that, to date, he had not retrieved the sign from a warehouse in Dallas because its extended storage there had accumulated $4,000 in fees, which he could not pay. Appellant denied that he ever intended to steal from, defraud, or deceive Big Starr Electric and Danley. He agreed that he charged them $1,465 in sales tax but he did not pay that sum to the Texas Comptroller. Appellant also agreed that he had previously been convicted of felony theft for accepting $10,000 from a Lubbock church and failing to deliver a sign to it, but he asserted that although he had pled guilty to that offense, he was not guilty.

Several witnesses testified that Appellant had engaged in a similar pattern of conduct with them. Matt Wolfington testified that in 2023, as pastor of St. Luke’s United Methodist Church in Lubbock, he gave Appellant a check for $10,312.50 to purchase an LED sign for the church. Appellant attempted to cash the check the same day he received it, and Wolfington authorized the bank to release the funds, though he believed that the immediacy of Appellant’s action was odd. A few months later, after the church inquired about the status of its order, Appellant asked them for more money. Appellant sent Wolfington an invoice as proof that he had ordered the sign, but the invoice was riddled with mistakes, which further alarmed Wolfington. Appellant requested more money multiple times, but the church refused to pay until the sign was delivered and installed. Seven months after Appellant cashed the church’s check, no sign had been delivered, and Appellant had stopped communicating with the church. The church sent a demand letter to Appellant, filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau, and finally filed a criminal complaint with the Lubbock Police Department, the result of which was Appellant’s conviction for felony theft. At trial, Appellant testified that the church refused to accept

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delivery of the sign unless he signed a new contract with additional obligations to which he would not agree. Wolfington denied this and testified that the sign was never delivered.

Monte Neil testified that his family’s business, Weekends BBQ and Catering, gave Appellant a check for $3,646.50 to purchase an LED sign in August 2022. As he did with others, Appellant cashed the check the same day that he received it. Upon Appellant’s request, Neil later paid approximately $340 through PayPal for a “change of art fee.” Around January 2023, Neil asked for updates on his order; Appellant texted Neil once, explaining that he had been sick, but after this he stopped communicating with Neil. Neil filed a claim with PayPal and recovered the “artwork” fee, but Weekends BBQ never received a sign or a refund from Appellant. Neil testified he did not initiate any legal proceedings against Appellant because he believed that option would be futile and cost prohibitive. Appellant claimed that the artwork changes delayed the creation and delivery of the sign.

Agatha Wall testified that she owned and operated Southern Rose Cafe, for which she ordered an LED sign from Appellant at a discount in 2008, which he delivered. Wall ordered another sign from Appellant in 2010 and paid him $2,571 in cash for it. This sign was never delivered. Appellant testified that he worked as a dealer for a sign company, Signtronix, at the time and that ensuring delivery of the sign from Signtronix was not his responsibility. He also explained that he cashed checks immediately because that was how the process worked at Signtronix.

II. Analysis

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all

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the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

The trier of fact must resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we must “presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and we defer to the factfinder’s factual determinations. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined in a hypothetically correct charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

A person commits the offense of theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of it. PENAL § 31.03(a). Appropriation of property is unlawful if it is without the owner’s effective consent. Id. § 31.03(b)(1). Consent “induced by deception or coercion” does not constitute effective consent. PENAL § 31.01(3)(A). Section 31.01(1) defines “[d]eception,” in relevant part, as “promising performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction and that the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be

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performed.” Id. § 31.01(1)(E). Under this definition, the “failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.” Id.

A claim of theft that involves unfulfilled contractual obligations requires that the State prove (1) more than the defendant’s intent to deprive the owner of property and the defendant’s subsequent appropriation, and (2) that the appropriation was a result of fraud or false pretext and the accused intended to deprive the owner of the property at the time the property was taken. Taylor v. State, 450 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Evidence that the defendant has previously participated in recent transactions other than, but similar to, the transaction for which the prosecution is based, is admissible for the purpose of showing knowledge or intent. PENAL § 31.03(c)(1). In this regard, “[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [the reviewing court] should look at events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Taylor, 450 S.W.3d at 536 (quoting Wirth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). The issues of knowledge or intent are also raised by the defendant’s plea of not guilty to the charged offense. Id.

Appellant specifically contends that there is insufficient evidence of his intent to deprive Big Starr Electric and Danley of the money they had paid him for the sign. He points out that he immediately cashed one check but waited three weeks before cashing the other, and that he ordered the sign, which was shipped to Dallas where it currently remains. Appellant maintains that health and financial issues delayed his ability to deliver the sign, but he never intended to steal from, defraud, or deceive his customers. Appellant also asserts that the appropriation was not unlawful

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because the victims here—Big Starr Electric and Danley—“voluntarily” paid him for the sign.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The evidence shows that (1) Appellant’s appropriation of the victims’ money was a result of fraud or false pretext, (2) the victims did not effectively consent to the appropriation, and (3) he intended to deprive the victims of their money at the time that he induced payments from them. Taylor, 450 S.W.3d at 538 (The evidence “established a recent trend whereby the appellant would contract to install a sign, take a substantial initial payment on the contract, inexplicably and unreasonably delay the work while (at least sometimes) inducing the customer . . . to make further installment payments, cut off contact with the customer when no further payments were forthcoming, and then ultimately fulfill his contractual obligations, if at all, only under duress.”). Appellant’s history of similar conduct—accepting and immediately cashing checks, then failing to deliver a sign, and terminating all communication with the customer—shows his knowledge or intent to deprive his customers of their money without their effective consent. See PENAL § 31.03(c)(1).

It is the jury’s task to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Although Appellant testified that other, legitimate reasons explain and justify his failure to either deliver the sign or refund the money to Big Starr Electric and Danley, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve some, all, or none of his testimony, and its verdict indicates that it resolved the conflict between Appellant’s explanations and the State’s evidence of his criminal intent in favor of the State. See Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (citing Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903); see also Taylor, 450 S.W.3d at 537 (“[T]he fact that partial or even substantial work has been done on a contract will not invariably negate either the intent to deprive or the deception necessary to establish the unlawfulness of the initial appropriation. . . .

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[A] rational fact-finder [may still] readily conclude that he never intended, even at the outset, to perform fully or satisfactorily on the contract, and always harbored the requisite intent or knowledge to deceive his customer and thereby deprive him of the value of at least a substantial portion of the property thus unlawfully appropriated.”).

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

August 20, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.