Jared Anthony Winterer v. United States, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02670
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 JARED ANTHONY WINTERER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02670-BHS-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE 12 UNITED STATES, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Plaintiff Jared Winterer, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a proposed civil 17 rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”) and a Motion for Counsel. Dkts. 1, 1-1, 18 1-2. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 19 the Court declines to serve the Complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to amend it, if possible, to 20 correct the deficiencies identified herein. In addition, the Court denies the Motion for Counsel 21 (Dkt. 1-2) without prejudice. 22 23 24 1 I. Background 2 Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Monroe Correctional Center (“MCC”), initiated this 3 lawsuit on December 19, 2025. Dkt. 1. The Complaint lists the following as defendants in this 4 action: the United States, Washington State DOC, and Phu Ngo. Dkt. 1-1 at 1.

5 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since recovering from a coma in 2005, he has not 6 received adequate medical care for a plethora of conditions, such as neurological disfunction, 7 decreased muscle mass, and eyesight deterioration. Id. at 4–5. The medical staff at MCC has 8 failed to provide him medication to treat his various brain and hormonal conditions because it 9 was against State protocol. Id. at 5–6. And Ngo failed to diagnose Plaintiff’s thyroid issues by 10 misinterpreting Plaintiff’s blood test. Id. at 8–9. Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court order 11 “to release [him] from state prison,” so that he “can renounce [his] citizenship” and move to 12 Russia. Id. at 6. 13 Based on these allegations, the Court interprets Plaintiff as raising an Eighth Amendment 14 claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Before, assessing that claim, the Court

15 addresses several other legal issues that arise from the Complaint. 16 II. Discussion 17 A. Screening Standard 18 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court is required to screen 19 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 20 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 21 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 23 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington,

24 1 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(g). 3 The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 4 97, 106 (1976). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a

5 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 8(a). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 7 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 8 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute; and (2) the 9 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 10 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to 11 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 12 (1994). 13 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually 14 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the

15 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 16 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right 17 when committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to 18 perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 19 Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. 20 Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but 21 must allege the defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. 22 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–90 (1989). 23

24 1 After informing a pro se litigant of any pleading deficiencies, a court must generally 2 grant leave to file an amended complaint if there is a possibility the pleading deficiencies may be 3 cured through amendment. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, if 4 the claims put forth in the complaint lack any arguable substance in law or fact, then the

5 complaint must be dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 6 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave 7 to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured 8 by amendment.’”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 B. Improper Defendants 10 Plaintiff names the United States as a defendant in this case. The United States cannot be 11 sued under § 1983. See Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). And he 12 cannot sue the Washington State DOC because it is an arm of the State. See Will v. Michigan 13 Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that “[s]tates and governmental 14 entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not

15 “persons” subject to suit under § 1983). 16 C. Possible Habeas Claim 17 In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests that the Court order his release so that he can seek 18 asylum in Russia. Dkt. 1-1 at 6. The Court, however, cannot provide this relief in a § 1983 19 action. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot 20 use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement,” but instead must seek 21 federal habeas corpus relief or the appropriate state relief. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 22 78 (2005); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (reiterating that the 23 Supreme Court has “long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state

24 1 prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 2 action”). 3 D. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need Claim 4 In the Complaint, Plaintiff raises an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Ngo

5 because he failed to diagnose Plaintiff’s thyroid issues. Dkt. 1-1 at 8. The Court interprets this 6 claim as an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 7 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and 8 “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” 9 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment 10 when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer v. 11 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff 12 must satisfy both an objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute 13 cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate indifference.” Snow v. 14 McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).

15 To establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 16 demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury 17 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 18 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must 19 show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and 20 (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, 21 delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which 22 prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a prisoner 23 alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show

24 1 that the delay led to further injury. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 2 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to 3 state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”). 4 The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable claim of deliberate indifference

5 against Ngo. Liberally construing the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Ngo 6 failed to diagnose his thyroid issues. However, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent 7 in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical 8 mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. In addition, Plaintiff has 9 not alleged if the misdiagnosis was intentional and has not identified what harm he suffered as a 10 result of the misdiagnosis. 11 Therefore, the Court declines to serve the Complaint because Plaintiff fails to state any 12 colorable claims. 13 III. Motion for Counsel 14 In his Motion for Counsel, Plaintiff states he requires counsel because he does not have

15 the resources to hire his own counsel. Dkt. 1-2 at 2. 16 No constitutional right to appointed counsel exists in a § 1983 action. Storseth v. 17 Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); see United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. 18 Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[a]ppointment of counsel under this section is 19 discretionary, not mandatory”). However, in “exceptional circumstances,” a district court may 20 appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (formerly 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(d)). Rand v. Roland, 113F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other 22 grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). To decide whether exceptional circumstances exist, the 23 Court must evaluate both “the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the

24 1 [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” 2 Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 3 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). A plaintiff must plead facts showing he has an insufficient grasp 4 of his case or the legal issues involved and an inadequate ability to articulate the factual basis of

5 his claims. Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 In the instant case, the Court does not find exceptional circumstances that warrant the 7 appointment of counsel. Without stating any colorable claims in the Complaint, Plaintiff cannot 8 show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of this case. Therefore, the Court denies the 9 Motion for Counsel (Dkt. 1-2) without prejudice. 10 IV. Instructions to Plaintiff 11 Due to the deficiencies described above, if Plaintiff intends to pursue a § 1983 civil rights 12 action in this Court, he must file an amended complaint and within it, he must write a short, plain 13 statement telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the 14 name of the person or entity who violated the right; (3) exactly what the individual or entity did

15 or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of the individual or entity is connected to the 16 violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered 17 because of the individual’s or entity’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 18 (1976). 19 Plaintiff shall present the amended complaint on the form provided by the Court. The 20 amended complaint must be legibly rewritten or retyped in its entirety, it should be an original 21 and not a copy, it should contain the same case number, and it may not incorporate any part of 22 the original complaint by reference. The amended complaint will act as a complete substitute for 23 the original complaint, and not as a supplement. An amended complaint supersedes the original

24 1 complaint. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on 2 other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the amended 3 complaint must be complete in itself and all facts and causes of action alleged in the proposed 4 complaint that are not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

5 The Court will screen the amended complaint to determine whether it contains factual allegations 6 linking any Defendants to the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights. The Court will not authorize 7 service of the amended complaint on any Defendant who is not specifically linked to a violation 8 of Plaintiff’s rights. 9 V. Conclusion 10 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Complaint (Dkt. 1-1). 11 And the Court denies the Motion for Counsel (Dkt. 1-2) without prejudice. 12 If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to adequately respond to the issues 13 raised herein on or before February 17, 2026, the undersigned will recommend dismissal of this 14 action without prejudice.

15 Finally, the Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff a copy of this Order and the 16 appropriate forms for filing an amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint and for service. 17 Dated this 16th day of January, 2026. 18 A 19 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24