1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAQUAN DONTE RAMSEY, Case No.: 3:21-cv-00365-AJB-VET
12 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 JEFF MACOMBER, Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and 15 Rehabilitation, 16 Respondent. 17
18 19 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 20 Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and 21 72.3(e). 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 On March 1, 2021, Jaquan Donte Ramsey (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of 24 Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. After the Court twice 25 dismissed the Petition and reopened the case, see ECF Nos. 5, 7, 9, 12, Respondent filed a 26 response on December 29, 2023. ECF No. 20. Petitioner filed a traverse on June 26, 2024. 27 ECF No. 32. Having considered the parties’ arguments, applicable law, and the record 28 1 before it, and for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the 2 Petition be DENIED. 3 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 A. The Underlying Incident 5 Petitioner and the victim began dating in January 2017. People v. Ramsey, No. 6 D074105, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 6232, at *2 (Cal. App. Sept. 19, 2019). By April 2017, 7 the couple moved into Petitioner’s mother’s home in Fontana, CA. Id. The victim worked 8 as a prostitute prior to her relationship with Petitioner. Id. at *2–3. 9 On August 28, 2017, the victim took her belongings and went to a hotel in Riverside, 10 CA, where her friend was staying. Id. at *4. They both used the room for prostitution. Id. 11 The victim subsequently texted Petitioner that their relationship was over. Id. Petitioner 12 went to the Riverside hotel and threatened the victim to come out or he would come in. Id. 13 The victim left the room around midnight. Id. at *4–5. An altercation subsequently ensued 14 between Petitioner, the victim’s cousin, and the victim’s john, and police were called. Id. 15 at *5. The victim was on probation and had an arrest warrant, so she got into Petitioner’s 16 car with Petitioner, her cousin, and her cousin’s girlfriend. Id. They went to the victim’s 17 aunt’s house in Chula Vista, CA. Id. 18 Petitioner, the victim, and the victim’s sister left the aunt’s house on August 29, 19 2017, to drive to an apartment complex in Spring Valley, CA. Id. While driving, Petitioner 20 and the victim got into an argument over the victim prostituting in San Diego. Id. Petitioner 21 parked the car, and the victim got out and began running down the street. Petitioner chased 22 the victim and forced her back into the front passenger seat. Id. at *5–6. Petitioner pulled 23 out a gun and pointed it at the victim’s head as she tried to push him away. Id. at *6. They 24 continued arguing and the commotion caught the attention of nearby construction workers, 25 one of whom saw Petitioner “being extremely violent” with the victim and “jerking her 26 around” by the arm. Id. The victim testified that Petitioner said something like, “bitch, I’m 27 going to kill you.” Id. The victim continued to fight to get the gun away from her head, but 28 Petitioner was able to hold the gun to her head twice more. Id. The gun went off and a 1 bullet went through the victim’s right hand, grazed her breast, and then entered her left 2 arm. Id. 3 The Petitioner pulled the victim out of the car, wrapped something around her arm, 4 and asked the construction workers for help. Id. at *6–7. A construction worker saw 5 Petitioner conceal the gun in a rag, hide it, and walk away from the scene. Id. Police located 6 Petitioner about an hour after the shooting in an apartment complex nearby and arrested 7 him. Id. Petitioner argued that the shooting was accidental and the argument that 8 precipitated the shooting was about a cigarette lighter and lack of sleep, not the victim’s 9 refusal to work as a prostitute for Petitioner. Id. at *8, 11, 25. 10 B. Pre-Trial Rulings 11 Before trial, the prosecution moved to admit evidence of prior acts of domestic 12 violence by Petitioner against the victim and his ex-wife. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 13 6232, at *9. According to the prosecution, the victim had “described prior incidents where 14 [Petitioner] punched and hit her all over her body and left marks” and that “much of it was 15 done in front of his mother, who would intervene on her behalf.” Id. At the motion hearing, 16 the prosecution further explained that the victim’s mother described an incident where 17 Petitioner brandished a gun at the mother and victim a few weeks before the shooting. Id. 18 at *10. The prosecution also intended to seek testimony from the victim that Petitioner was 19 trying to force her to prostitute for him, explaining as follows: “When they were in the car, 20 they were arguing first over a cigarette and then her prostituting for him; and the context 21 was her being a bad mom for being a prostitute. But the only reason she was prostituting, 22 according to her, is because he was forcing her into that situation based on the prior 23 violence.” Id. at *24. 24 The trial court excluded evidence of prior acts concerning Petitioner’s ex-wife. Id. 25 at *11. However, the trial court was inclined to admit all information about the relationship 26 between Petitioner and the victim, including information regarding prostitution, prior acts 27 between them, and the brandishing incident the victim’s mother allegedly saw, noting that 28 1 the jury was entitled to understand the relationship in its entirety because of its relevance 2 to whether Petitioner intentionally fired the gun. Id. at *10–11. 3 Petitioner’s counsel maintained that any evidence of prostitution was highly 4 irrelevant to the case and suggested an evidentiary hearing under California Evidence Code 5 § 402 to determine admissibility.1 Id. at *11. The trial court rejected Petitioner’s position, 6 as it was the prosecution’s theory that the victim’s refusal to work for Petitioner was the 7 basis for the argument before the shooting. Id. at *12. The trial court further ruled that a 8 Section 402 hearing was unnecessary because if the victim denied the argument was about 9 Petitioner forcing her to prostitute, the prosecution would have to live with that answer. Id. 10 Moreover, if the prosecution believed that the prostitution aspect was a large component 11 of the relationship, “then they, likewise, [would] have to suffer whatever prejudicial 12 consequence may be from [the victim’s] extensive cross with regard to [the victim’s felony] 13 history as well on that issue.” Id. 14 C. Trial and Conviction 15 1. Testimony from Victim 16 Based on the prosecution’s theory that Petitioner wanted the victim to prostitute to 17 earn money for him, and the victim’s refusal led to violence on several occasions during 18 the relationship, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the victim regarding prior incidents 19 of violence. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 6232, at *3. The victim testified to four 20 specific incidents on direct examination at trial. Id. at *3–4, 14–15. 21 First, the victim testified that three months into the relationship, she received a text 22 from a former john while she was in the car with Petitioner. Id. at *3, 14. Petitioner parked 23 the car, got out, walked around to the passenger side, and punched the victim in the face 24 through the open window. Id. Petitioner’s counsel asked for a sidebar, where he asserted 25
26 27 1 Cal. Evid. Code § 402 provides, in relevant part, that the “[t]he court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing 28 1 that he was not provided discovery relating to this punching incident. Id. at *14–16. The 2 court allowed the direct examination to continue but agreed to hear argument on the 3 objection outside the presence of the jury. Id. at *16. The victim testified she had never 4 reported, nor told anyone about the punching incident. Id. at *14. 5 Second, the victim testified that on a separate occasion Petitioner ripped her clothes 6 off and left marks on her chest during an argument. Id. at *14. Afterwards, the victim said 7 she wanted to leave the relationship, but Petitioner threatened to beat her up whenever she 8 brought up leaving. Id. at *14–15. Third, she testified that a few weeks before the shooting, 9 the victim and Petitioner argued over her prostituting, so the victim and her mother got into 10 a car to leave. Id. at *3, 15. Petitioner punched the car window and then ran inside, got a 11 gun, and brandished the weapon, while the victim drove away. Id. at *3–4, 15. Lastly, the 12 victim testified that a few days before the shooting, at Petitioner’s mother’s house, 13 Petitioner ripped the victim’s clothes off her and choked her with a belt. Id. at *4, 15. The 14 victim stated she had not reported these incidents to the police. Id. at *14. 15 At the next break, outside the jury’s presence, Petitioner’s counsel objected to the 16 victim’s testimony concerning the punching incident and the choking incident, arguing that 17 he was not made aware of these incidents, through discovery or otherwise, as required by 18 California Penal Code § 1054.7 and California Evidence Code § 1109. Id. at *16. While 19 there was pre-trial motion practice about prior acts of domestic violence between Petitioner 20 and the victim, these two specific incidents were not raised during those proceedings. Thus, 21 in response to Petitioner’s objection, the prosecution noted that the victim had not been 22 forthcoming with details, and it provided the defense with all the information it had in 23 discovery. Id. Because there were no reports on these incidents, and the victim did not 24 disclose the incidents to the prosecution prior to trial, the court overruled Petitioner’s 25 objection to this evidence. Id. at *16–17 (finding that “‘there was no affirmative obligation 26 on the People to continue examining [the] witness to see if they could get even more detail 27 than they had already received’ and that the People had not intentionally withheld any 28 information”). 1 On direct examination, the victim further testified that Petitioner tried to force her to 2 prostitute for him, and when she refused, he was violent with her. Id. at *26. She testified 3 that prior to the shooting, she and Petition were arguing because Petitioner “wanted her to 4 prostitute to earn money for him and she did not want to because she was a mother and was 5 worried about getting arrested.” Id. She further denied ever prostituting for Petitioner. Id. 6 On cross examination, Petitioner’s counsel impeached the victim “with a prior statement 7 she made to police in a recorded interview the day after the shooting,” wherein she admitted 8 to working for Petitioner “as a prostitute a few times in the past.” Id. 9 The victim also testified to Petitioner’s cocaine use. Id. at *29. Specifically, after 10 admitting to using “meth” during the relevant time period, the prosecutor asked the victim 11 whether Petitioner was “using anything?” Id. Petitioner’s attorney objected. Id. The trial 12 court asked the prosecutor to restate the question. The prosecutor then asked, “Would 13 [Petitioner] also use meth with you?” Id. Petitioner’s attorney objected again based on 14 relevance and improper character evidence. Id. at *28–29. The court overruled the 15 objection and the victim testified: “No. [Petitioner] would use coke.” Id. at *29. The 16 prosecutor then asked if the victim and Petitioner used drugs together and the victim 17 responded, “Yes.” Id. In her closing argument, the prosecutor referenced Petitioner’s drug 18 use once: “the victim found herself in a relationship with this guy. He’s carrying a loaded 19 gun, and they are doing drugs and prostituting.” Id. 20 2. Testimony from Detective Guadalupe Catano 21 The prosecution also called detective Guadalupe Catano (“Catano”) to testify. 22 Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 6232, at *30. The day after the victim was shot, Catano 23 and another detective interviewed the victim in the hospital and recorded the interview. Id. 24 On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Catano about the interview and Catano 25 testified, in part, as follows: “[the victim] told me that [Petitioner] had beat her in front of 26 his mom; and his mom, I guess — his mom must have felt really bad. [Petitioner]’s mom 27 told [the victim] that she should leave him because if not, he was going to kill her.” Id. 28 Petitioner’s attorney did not object to this testimony during direct examination. Id. 1 On cross examination, Petitioner’s attorney impeached Catano with a transcript of 2 the recorded interview, showing that Petitioner’s mother did not tell the victim that 3 Petitioner would kill her. Id. at *30–31. Instead, Petitioner’s mother only told the victim 4 that she should leave. Id. Catano then testified that she thought there was another place in 5 the transcript where the victim had said “the mom and her family members were telling her 6 to leave [Petitioner] or he was going to kill her.” Id. at *31. 7 The prosecution moved to admit into evidence the victim’s recorded interview in its 8 entirety. Id. Petitioner’s counsel objected, arguing that the interview was cumulative and 9 hearsay. Id. The trial court admitted the interview for the non-hearsay purpose of showing 10 the victim’s state of mind. Id. The court ordered the parties to highlight the statements in 11 the interview transcript that were not being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and 12 then gave the jury a limiting instruction. Id. at *31–32. The court explained to the jury that 13 they could not consider the highlighted portions for their truth but only their effect on the 14 victim in what she did or said “during the course of the action.” Id. at *32. The recorded 15 interview was played for the jury and the jury was provided the highlighted transcript. Id. 16 In the transcript, the victim’s statement that “everybody kept saying the[y] felt like . . . 17 [Petitioner] was gonna kill me” was highlighted. Id. 18 3. Conviction 19 The jury convicted Petitioner for attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 20 664, Count 1), assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b), Count 21 2), corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), Count 3), and making a 22 criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422, Count 4). Id. at *1. With respect to Count 1, the jury 23 found true the enhancement allegations that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily 24 injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm 25 (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm 26 causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). Id. With respect to 27 Counts 2–4, the jury found that Petitioner personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, 28 subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)). 1 Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 6232, at *1–2. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 30 2 years in prison. Id. at *2. 3 D. California Court of Appeal 4 The Court of Appeal upheld Petitioner’s convictions. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. 5 LEXIS 6232, at *2. On appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred by (1) admitting 6 evidence of two instances of prior domestic violence against the victim (the punching and 7 choking incidents), unknown to his counsel prior to trial; (2) admitting evidence of 8 Petitioner’s prior pimping;2 (3) admitting the victim’s testimony that Petitioner previously 9 used cocaine; and (4) admitting hearsay testimony by the victim to an investigating 10 detective. Id. Petitioner further argued that even if these errors individually were not 11 sufficient to overturn the jury’s verdict, cumulatively they required reversal. Id. 12 The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in allowing evidence of the 13 punching and choking incident under California Evidence Code §§ 1109 and 352. Id. at 14 *23. The appellate court explained that Section 1109 is limited to evidence “that is expected 15 to be offered.” Id. at *22. Because the record supported the trial court’s finding that the 16 prosecutor disclosed all the information she had about the prior acts of domestic violence 17 against the victim, there was no violation. Id. There was also no unfair advantage created 18 by the new testimony as both the prosecution and the defense were required to adjust to the 19 new information. Id. Furthermore, California Evidence Code § 1109 and Penal Code 20 § 1054.7 did not require detailed statements of the exact testimony a witness is expected to 21 provide. Id. at *23. The appellate court reasoned that the prosecution’s disclosure in motion 22 in limine—“that the victim had ‘described prior incidents where [Petitioner had] punched 23 and hit her all over her body and left marks’ and that ‘much of it was done in front of his 24 mother’ . . .”—was sufficient to cover the two prior incidents at issue. Id. 25 26
27 2 The appellate court did not include this claim in their introductory list but addressed 28 1 The Court of Appeal further found that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing 2 evidence of Petitioner’s prior pimping acts as it was the defense that introduced this 3 evidence through impeachment, effectively waiving an evidentiary challenge. Id. at *27. 4 Moreover, the appellate court found that California Evidence Code §§ 1101 and 1109 did 5 not govern the admissibility of the victim’s testimony on this topic and this evidence was 6 directly relevant to whether Petitioner intended to shoot the victim. Id. at *28. 7 As to the admission of Petitioner’s prior cocaine use, the appellate court concluded 8 that this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial as the prosecutor did not rely on the evidence 9 or relate it to Petitioner’s crimes in her closing. Id. at *29. Further, there was no reasonable 10 probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of this 11 evidence. Id. 12 Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err in admitting the 13 victim’s statements through Catano’s testimony and the recorded interview. Id. at *33–35. 14 As Petitioner’s counsel did not object to double hearsay during Catano’s testimony and 15 instead chose to use this testimony to his advantage, Petitioner effectively forfeited this 16 claimed error for purposes of appeal. Id. at *33–34. Moreover, the appellate court found 17 that the recorded interview was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of effect on the 18 victim. Id. at *34. Because the prosecution had to prove the victim feared for her life, the 19 victim being told that Petitioner would kill her, regardless of the truth, was highly relevant 20 to support the inference that the victim feared for her safety on the day of the shooting. Id. 21 at *34–35. Given that the trial court also gave a limiting jury instruction regarding use of 22 this evidence, the instruction mitigated the risk that the jury would improperly consider the 23 statement for its truth. Id. at *35. Even if there was error, the verdict would not have been 24 different if the hearsay testimony had been excluded because there was ample other 25 evidence to support the fact that the victim feared what Petitioner would do to her if she 26 stayed in the relationship. Id. at *36. 27 28 1 The California Court of Appeal did not analyze Petitioner’s fifth claim of cumulative 2 error, finding that it was unnecessary since there were no individual errors, and as such, 3 there could be no cumulative error. Id. at *12, n.7. 4 Petitioner appealed to the California Supreme Court, which denied discretionary 5 review. People v. Ramsey, No. S258826, 2019 Cal. LEXIS 9486, at *1 (Dec. 18, 2019). 6 E. The Instant Petition 7 Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief. Petitioner claims he was denied a fair trial 8 and asks the Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial based on the 9 following five issues: (1) improper admission of two prior domestic violence incidents 10 under California Evidence Code §§ 1109 and 352; (2) improper admission of Petitioner’s 11 prior pimping acts under California Evidence Code §§ 1109 and 352; (3) improper 12 admission of Petitioner’s prior cocaine use under California Evidence Code §§ 1101 and 13 350; (4) improper admission of victim’s hearsay statement under California Evidence Code 14 §§ 1201, 1250, and 1252, based in part on the allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel; 15 and (5) the allegedly cumulative prejudicial effect of each error. ECF No. 1 at 25–26. 16 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 This Court can entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 18 custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in 19 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 20 Kasianov v. Gamnoa, No. 2:22-cv-2324 CKD P, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167131, at *5 21 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2025). Habeas relief is not available for errors involving the 22 interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); see 23 also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.2d 1146, 24 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state- 25 court determinations on state-law questions.” Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5 (quoting Estelle, 502 26 U.S. at 67–68). 27 Moreover, federal courts may grant habeas relief for claims “adjudicated on the 28 merits in [s]tate court proceedings,” only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 1 “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 2 clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 3 or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 4 in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 5 Critically, Section 2254(d) “does not repeal the command of § 2254(a) that habeas relief 6 may be afforded to a state prisoner “only on the ground” that his custody violates federal 7 law. Wilson, 562 U.S. at 6; see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (§ 2254(d) “sets 8 forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief . . ., not an entitlement to it.”); Frantz v. 9 Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 10 The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are 11 distinct. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies 12 a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it 13 confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 14 Court but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing 15 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A state court’s decision is an 16 “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” if it is “objectively 17 unreasonable,” and not just “incorrect or erroneous.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 389, 18 409–10. However, a state court decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable 19 application of clearly established federal law unless there is clearly established federal 20 precedent. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2004). “A Supreme Court 21 precedent is not clearly established law under section 2254(d)(1) unless the Court ‘squarely 22 addresses the issue’ in the case before the state court.” Jimenez v. Campbell, No. 1:24-cv- 23 00840-KES-SKO, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85438, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (citing 24 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2008)); see also Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 25 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a state court may draw a principled distinction between 26 the case before it and Supreme Court caselaw, the law is not clearly established for the 27 state-court case.”); White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (“‘[I]f a habeas court must 28 1 extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,’ then by definition the rationale 2 was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state court decision.’”) (citation omitted). 3 As to § 2254(d)(2), “a state court’s ruling based on a factual determination must be 4 ‘objectively unreasonable in light of the record’ to warrant habeas relief.” Baez v. Muniz, 5 No. C-15-01722-WHA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63040, at *18–19 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 6 2016) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348 (2003)). A federal court may not 7 “characterize [] state-court factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [we] 8 would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 9 U.S. 305, 313–14 (2015) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). “Instead, 10 § 2254(d)(2) requires that [federal courts] accord the state trial court substantial deference.” 11 Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 314. “[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might 12 disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede 13 the trial court’s . . . determination.’” Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 14 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)). 15 “[F]ederal habeas relief may only be met with reference to the evidence in the record 16 before the state court.” Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Cullen v. 17 Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–83 (2011)). Moreover, the Court looks to the last reasoned 18 state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 19 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the last reasoned decision is that of the California Court of 20 Appeal. See Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 6232, at *5. 21 IV. DISCUSSION 22 A. Evidentiary Claims 23 As noted, Petitioner asserts four claims that stem from evidentiary rulings. First, 24 Petitioner claims the trial court abused its discretion under California Evidence Code 25 §§ 1109 and 352, and violated federal due process, by admitting allegedly irrelevant and 26 highly inflammatory details of the two previously undisclosed domestic violence incidents 27 (“Claim 1”). The two incidents—when Petitioner (1) punched the victim in the face 28 through an open car window and (2) ripped her clothes off and choked her with a belt— 1 were not disclosed to the defense before trial. Petitioner claims California Evidence Code 2 § 1109(b) required disclosure by the prosecution before trial and California Evidence Code 3 § 352 required that the trial court engage in a carful weighing before admitting such 4 evidence. ECF No. 1 at 43–46. As neither allegedly occurred, Petitioner argues that the 5 trial court erred in its application of California evidentiary rules and abused its discretion 6 by admitting the evidence. Id. at 46–49. 7 Second, Petitioner argues that the admission of evidence of his alleged prior 8 primping acts was highly prejudicial and violated California Evidence Code §§ 1109(a) 9 and 352 and federal due process (“Claim 2”). Id. at 67. Third, Petitioner argues that the 10 trial court abused its discretion under California Evidence Codes §§ 350 and 1101 by 11 admitting irrelevant “character” evidence of Petitioner’s prior cocaine use (“Claim 3”). Id. 12 at 85. Fourth, Petitioner claims the trial court erred by admitting the following “hearsay” 13 testimony: (i) Catano’s testimony that the victim said Petitioner’s mother told the victim 14 that Petitioner was going to kill the victim if she did not leave Petitioner; and (ii) the 15 victim’s out-of-court interview statement that “everybody kept saying the[y] felt like either 16 he was gonna kill me or something bad was gonna happen because of him” (“Claim 4”). 17 Id. at 91–92. 18 State court evidentiary rulings are subject to analysis under the Fourteenth 19 Amendment Due Process Clause. See Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 88 (2025). This Court, 20 however, may not consider whether the ruling complied with state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. 21 at 71; Walden v. Shinn, 990 F.3d 1183, 1205 (9th Cir. 2021) (“we cannot grant federal 22 habeas relief founded on an alleged non-constitutional state evidentiary error”). Therefore, 23 to the extent Petitioner argues that the evidentiary rulings violated California law, including 24 California Evidence Code §§ 350, 352, 1101, 1109 1201, 1250, and 1252, his claims are 25 not cognizable. See ECF No. 1 at 43–55, 73–81, 86–91, 94–101; see also Sean Ray v. 26 Lynch, No. 2:22-cv-06925-PA (ADS), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127488, at *53 (C.D. Cal. 27 June 9, 2025) (claim that evidentiary rulings admitting out-of-court statements were 28 improper under state law is not cognizable on federal habeas review); Morales v. Sexton, 1 No. CV 17-04179-R (DFM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181915, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2 2018) (“Any contention that admitting the challenged evidence violated California 3 evidentiary law is not a cognizable federal habeas claim.”). 4 To the extent Petitioner asserts any federal due process violations, the Supreme 5 Court recently clarified that “when evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that 6 it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 7 Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Andrew, 604 U.S. at 86; see also Payne v. 8 Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (holding that admission of prejudicial evidence 9 constitutes a due process violation where it renders the trial fundamentally unfair). Thus, 10 on federal habeas review, the court examines “whether a fairminded jurist could disagree 11 that the evidence ‘so infected the trial with unfairness’ as to render the resulting conviction 12 or sentence ‘a denial of due process.’” Andrew, 604 U.S. at 96. 13 In evaluating fundamental unfairness, the Court may consider, among other things: 14 (1) “the relevance of the disputed evidence to the charges or sentencing factors,” (2) the 15 degree of prejudice the petitioner suffered from the evidence’s introduction, and 16 (3) “whether the trial court provided any mitigating instructions.” Andrew, 604 U.S. at 96. 17 Still, it is not enough for Petitioner to argue that the admission of evidence was mistaken 18 or erroneous. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986) (noting “traditional 19 reluctance to impose constitutional constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial 20 courts;” since a “trial judge is called upon to make dozens, sometimes hundreds, of 21 decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence” in any given criminal case). “Evidence 22 introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, 23 some not; . . . Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the 24 evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must ‘be of such 25 quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F. 2d 918, 920 26 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 27 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, the erroneous admission of evidence does not support 28 federal habeas relief unless the evidence “had substantial and injurious effect or influence 1 in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1082 (9th Cir. 2 2008); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2009). A habeas petitioner “bears a 3 heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde 4 v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 5 Guided by these principles, the Court examines each evidentiary ruling in turn. 6 1. Claim 1 – Evidence of Two Prior Domestic Violence Incidents 7 As to Claim 1, Petitioner’s federal due process argument focuses on the 8 prosecution’s purported failure to disclose the domestic violence evidence prior to trial. 9 ECF No. 1 at 45–46. However, as the Court of Appeal concluded, the prosecution disclosed 10 prior to trial all the available information concerning prior acts of domestic violence. 11 Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6232, at *22. Petitioner does not demonstrate or 12 even argue that the prosecution in fact knew of the two incidents prior to trial. Also, because 13 the parties learned of the evidence at the same time during trial, the prosecution did not 14 have any unfair advantage. Id. 15 Further, under California law, specifically California Evidence Code § 1109, 16 evidence of prior acts of domestic violence is relevant to domestic violence crime. Id. at 17 *18; see also Zuniga v. Pfeiffer, No. 5:19-cv-01315-MWF (AFM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 227515, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019) (“In enacting § 1109, the California Legislature 19 determined that evidence of such prior acts of domestic violence is highly relevant and 20 admissible, despite the potential for prejudice, and it is not this Court’s province to second- 21 guess such state Legislative prerogative.”) (internal citations omitted). That same law 22 permits a jury to draw an inference of propensity to commit domestic violence in 23 recognition that one battering episode is frequently part of a larger scheme of dominance 24 and control and an escalating pattern of domestic violence. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. 25 LEXIS 6232, at *18; Morales, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181915, at *23-24 (holding that 26 evidence that the petitioner engaged in domestic violence on past occasions gave rise to a 27 permissible inference that he had a propensity to commit domestic violence and, therefore, 28 was more likely to have committed the charged act of domestic violence); Zuniga, 2019 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227515, at *16 (“section 1109 of the California Evidence Code . . . 2 permits the jury to consider a defendants other acts of domestic violence for the purpose of 3 showing a propensity to commit such crimes”). Notably, California courts have upheld the 4 facial constitutionality of California Evidence Code § 1109 and there is no Supreme Court 5 authority holding that it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 4th 6 410, 412 (2000); People v. Jennings, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1310 (2000) (“the 7 constitutionality of section 1109 under the due process clauses of the federal and state 8 constitutions has now been settled”); Kasianov, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167131, at *8 9 (“The Supreme Court has not ruled as to the constitutionality as to California Evidence 10 Code Section 1109.”). Accordingly, the jury could permissibly infer from the domestic 11 violence evidence that Petitioner had a propensity to commit domestic violence. 12 Additionally, this domestic violence evidence is no more inflammatory than the 13 charged conduct of shooting the victim or other evidence of domestic violence, to which 14 Petitioner does not object, including the incident involving Petitioner brandishing a 15 weapon. 16 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the admission of this domestic 17 violence evidence did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 18 2. Claim 2 – Evidence of Prior Pimping Acts 19 In Claim 2, Petitioner claims errors based on admission of the victim’s testimony 20 that (i) Petitioner previously tried to make the victim work as a prostitute and (ii) the victim 21 did, in fact, prostitute for Petitioner. ECF No. 1 at 73. In asserting a violation of federal 22 due process, Petitioner offers only the conclusory argument that this “prior pimping” 23 evidence was not probative of any material issue and highly inflammatory. ECF No. 1 at 24 81–82. This conclusory assertion falls short of meeting Petitioner’s burden of 25 demonstrating fundamental unfairness. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) 26 (“It is well-settled that conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 27 specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 28 1 Nevertheless, in examining the evidence, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeal 2 that the prior pimping evidence is not propensity evidence but rather evidence regarding 3 the relationship between Petitioner and the victim, and the ongoing dispute between them 4 that led to the shooting. Specifically, the victim’s testimony that Petitioner had repeatedly 5 tried to force her to prostitute for his benefit, and that this issue had led to Petitioner’s 6 violence in the past was highly probative of Petitioner’s motive. More importantly, the jury 7 could permissibly infer from this evidence that Petitioner intended to shoot the victim. 8 As to the victim’s testimony that she prostituted for Petitioner in the past, Petitioner’s 9 attorney elicited this testimony on cross-examination in an effort to impeach the victim 10 after she testified that she never prostituted for Petitioner. Petitioner’s own introduction of 11 this evidence cannot be the basis for a federal due process violation. See Ohler v. United 12 States, 529 U.S. 753, 755 (2000). (“Generally, a party introducing evidence cannot 13 complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.”) 14 3. Claim 3 - Evidence of Prior Cocaine Use 15 As to Claim 3, Petitioner argues that testimony of his alleged cocaine use was 16 inadmissible under state law but does not otherwise assert any argument based on federal 17 law, including federal due process. See ECF No. 1 at 85–91; see also ECF No. 32 at 2 18 (Traverse references only the California Evidence Code). Because Claim 3 is premised 19 exclusively on issues of state law—whether the trial court violated California Evidence 20 Code §§ 350 and 1101 and California case law by admitting the victim’s single reference 21 to Petitioner’s cocaine use—without any alleged violation of federal law, Claim 3 is not 22 cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67–68 (“it is not 23 the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 24 questions”); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does 25 not lie for errors of state law”); King v. California, No. 2:12-cv-01228 DAD P, 2013 U.S. 26 Dist. LEXIS 46187, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013) (summarily dismissing action that 27 challenged evidentiary rulings on state law grounds because it “plainly” appeared “from 28 the face of the petitions that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief”). 1 4. Claim 4 - Admission of Hearsay Testimony 2 In Claim 4, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by admitting multi-level 3 hearsay evidence that the victim told detectives that “everybody kept saying [Petitioner] 4 was going to kill her.” ECF No. 1 at 91–92. This evidence came from two sources: 5 (i) Catano’s testimony that the victim told the detective that Petitioner’s mom told the 6 victim that she should leave Petitioner because “if not, he was going to kill her;” and (ii) 7 the victim’s recorded interview to detectives, a transcript of which was provided to the jury 8 with certain statements highlighted. Id. at 92. According to Petitioner, none of this evidence 9 falls under any valid hearsay exception. Id. at 95–99. Because Petitioner raises ineffective 10 assistance of counsel arguments under the Sixth Amendment, the Court examines Claim 4. 11 Id. at 102–103. 12 First, as to the admission of Catano’s testimony, Petitioner procedurally defaulted 13 this portion of Claim 4. A federal court lacks “jurisdiction when (1) a state court has 14 declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 15 state procedural requirement, and (2) the state judgment rests on independent and adequate 16 state procedural grounds.” Fauber v. Davis, 43 F.4th 987, 1002 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 17 Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011)) “To qualify as independent, a state procedural 18 rule must not rest primarily on federal law, or . . . be interwoven with the federal law.” Id. 19 (internal quotations omitted). “State rules count as adequate if they are firmly established 20 and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Lee, 578 U.S. 605, 606 (2016) (per 21 curiam)). 22 Under California law, a party must make a proper and timely objection at trial to 23 preserve the argument on appeal. See Cal. Evid. Code. § 353; People v. Ramos, 15 Cal. 4th 24 1133, 1171 (1997). Here, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s counsel did not object 25 to Catano’s testimony. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6232, at *33–34. Instead, 26 Petitioner’s attorney elected to call into question Catano’s credibility by impeaching her 27 with a transcript of the victim’s statement. Id. For this reason, the Court of Appeal held 28 that Petitioner “forfeited this claimed error for purposes of appeal.” Id. Thus, the Court of 1 Appeal invoked California’s contemporaneous objection rule when it found that Petitioner 2 waived this claim for failure to object in the trial court. 3 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly recognized California’s contemporaneous 4 objection rule as an ‘adequate and independent state law ground’ that forecloses” review. 5 Fauber, 43 F.4th at 1002; Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) 6 (applying California’s contemporaneous objection rule to affirm denial of a federal petition 7 on grounds of procedural default where there was a complete failure to object at trial); 8 Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Vansickel v. White, 166 9 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). Accordingly, Petitioner’s failure to comply with 10 California’s contemporaneous objection rule resulted in a procedural default. 11 Still, the Court “may review a state court decision that rests on an adequate and 12 independent state ground when a party has shown cause for the forfeiture and prejudice 13 flowing from it.” Fauber, 43 F.4th at 1002. “To show cause, a petitioner must point to 14 ‘some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded his adherence to the 15 procedural rule.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Skurdal, 341 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)) 16 (internal quotations omitted). Attorney error is not sufficient to excuse a procedural default 17 unless the error rises to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 18 Petitioner argues that no waiver occurred, but also claims, in the alternative, 19 ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF No. 1 at 102. To support this contention, Petitioner 20 must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient and prejudiced the defense, that 21 is “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 22 of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 23 687–88, 694 (1984); see also Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1082. “The proper measure of attorney 24 performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In determining whether a defendant received ineffective 26 assistance of counsel, the reviewing court “will neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, 27 nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight,” but rather, will defer to counsel’s 28 sound trial strategy. Id. at 688; see also Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939–40 (9th 1 Cir. 2001) (applying the Strickland standard in the context of a federal habeas petition 2 challenging a state court criminal proceeding). 3 The California Court of Appeal held that “the attorney’s decision not to object does 4 not support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because it was a strategic litigation 5 decision.” Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6232, at *34. This Court agrees. 6 Starting with the performance prong, Petitioner’s counsel made a strategic decision 7 not to object to Catano’s testimony. Indeed, rather than object, Petitioner’s attorney elected 8 to impeach Catano during cross-examination with a transcript of the recorded interview 9 between Catano and the victim, showing the jury that the victim did not tell Catano that 10 Petitioner’s mom told the victim he was going to kill her and instead the victim only said 11 that Petitioner’s mom told her she should leave Ramsey. As the Court of Appeal noted, this 12 cross-examination showed that “Catano was misremembering the exact contents of the 13 interview and called her credibility into doubt.” Id. at *33. 14 “Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a 15 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s 16 conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” People v. Lucas 17 12 Cal. 4th 415, 436–37 (1995) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, “deciding whether 18 to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective 19 assistance.” People v. Hillhouse, 27 Cal. 4th 469, 502 (2002). The decision by Petitioner’s 20 attorney to not object was entirely reasonable, particularly considering the attorney’s 21 subsequent effort to impeach Catano’s testimony. Thus, the Court does not find that the 22 failure to object constitutes deficient performance. Because Petitioner cannot satisfy the 23 performance prong, the inquiry can stop there. 24 Nevertheless, its bears noting that Petitioner similarly cannot establish the requisite 25 prejudice. The Court is not persuaded that there is a reasonable probability that if counsel 26 had objected to the testimony, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The 27 jury ultimately heard the entire interview between Catano and the victim and could draw 28 their own inferences about the reliability of Catano’s testimony. Additionally, given all the 1 other testimony about Petitioner’s abuse of the victim, it is unlikely that objecting to this 2 one hearsay statement would have reasonably changed the outcome of the proceedings. As 3 such, this Court finds Petitioner is unable to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Second, as to the admission of the victim’s interview, the trial court admitted the 5 evidence not for the truth of the matter asserted but rather for the non-hearsay purpose of 6 showing its effect on the victim and her state of mind. Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. 7 LEXIS 6232, at *31. To support the charge of criminal threat under California Penal Code 8 § 422, the prosecution had to prove that the victim feared for her life. As the Court of 9 Appeal reasoned, “[t]he fact that the victim was told [Petitioner] would kill her, regardless 10 of the truth of that statement, supported the inference that she feared for her safety on the 11 day of the shooting.” Id. at *35. The Court also agrees with the Court of Appeal that 12 “[r]egardless of whether or not others actually believed that Petitioner was going to hurt or 13 kill the victim (the truth of the matter asserted), the fact that she heard the statement 14 supported an inference that she feared he would.” Id. 15 Additionally, any arguable prejudice from the hearsay testimony was negated by the 16 trial court’s limiting instruction. Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 646 (2023) 17 (“Evidence at trial is often admitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting 18 instruction. And, our legal system presumes that jurors will attend closely the particular 19 language of [such] instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, 20 and follow them.”). Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the 21 highlighted statement for its truth, i.e., that others believed Ramsey would kill the victim, 22 and instead should consider the statement for its “effect on the victim” and to “evaluate 23 what she did or what she said during the course of the action the day of the shooting.” 24 Ramsey, 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6232, at *32. This limiting instruction diminished 25 the risk that the jury would improperly consider the statement for its truth. 26 Even without the victim’s statement, there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s 27 findings. As noted by the Court of Appeal, the victim also testified at trial that “[Petitioner] 28 physically abused her, that she was scared of him, [] that she made the decision to leave 1 [Petitioner] in the days before the shooting after he beat her in front of his mother . . . [and] 2 that [Petitioner’s] mother and cousin counseled her to leave him after that beating.” Id. at 3 *36. This evidence supported the conclusion that “the victim feared what [Petitioner] 4 would do to her if she stayed in the relationship with him.” Id. Based on the nonhearsay 5 purpose for admitting the statement, the limiting instruction, and the significant evidence 6 supporting the jury’s verdict, the Court finds that the admission of the victim’s statement 7 did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. 8 In sum, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s 9 rejection of Petitioner’s Claims 1 through 4 was not contrary to, and did not involve an 10 objectively unreasonable application of, federal law and was not based upon an 11 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not 12 entitled to federal habeas relief on Claims 1, 2, 3, and 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 13 B. Culmination of Error Requiring Reversal 14 Lastly, Petitioner contends that even if each of the above claims constitutes harmless 15 error, their cumulative prejudicial effect denied Petition a fair trial (“Claim 5”). ECF No. 16 1 at 103–105. 17 “Cumulative error applies where, although no single trial error examined in isolation 18 is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple errors has 19 still prejudiced a defendant.” Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Whelchel v. Washington, 20 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000)). “[T]he combined effect of multiple trial court errors 21 violates due process where it renders the resulting trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle v. 22 Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v. Miss., 410 U.S. 284, 298 23 (1973)). The cumulative error will render the trial fundamentally unfair where the 24 combined errors have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” 25 Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 26 However, if “no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is 27 possible” Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Waidla v. Davis, 28 1 ||68 F.4th 575, 599 (9th Cir. 2023) (“In assessing a cumulative error claim, we do not 2 || consider the prejudicial effect of nonexistent errors.”’). 3 Because no claim rose to the level of a constitutional error, the combined effect of 4 || Petitioner’s claims cannot be cumulatively prejudicial. As such, Claim 5 does not provide 5 ||a basis for habeas relief. 6 CONCLUSION 7 In summary, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 8 ||District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and 9 || Recommendation; and (2) DENYING the Petition. 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on or before March 31, 2026, any party to this 11 action may file and serve written objections to this Report and Recommendation. The 12 ||document should be captioned “Objection to Report and Recommendation.” 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to objections shall be filed and served 14 || within seven (7) days of the filing of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to 15 || file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 16 appeal of this Order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Ca 18 Dated: March 10, 2026 19 Hon. Valerie E. Torres United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23