Janoch v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

2010 Ohio 6629
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 13, 2010
Docket2010-07105-AD
StatusPublished

This text of 2010 Ohio 6629 (Janoch v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Janoch v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2010 Ohio 6629 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

[Cite as Janoch v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2010-Ohio-6629.]

Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us

KIM JANOCH

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Defendant

Case No. 2010-07105-AD

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Kim Janoch, filed this action against defendant, Department of Transportation (ODOT), contending her 1997 Chrysler Sebring that her minor son was driving was totally damaged as a proximate cause of negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a hazardous condition in a construction project area on State Route 43 in Aurora, Ohio. Specifically, plaintiff related the front axle, ball joint, and tie rod end on her car were damaged when the vehicle struck “a trench across the road at approximately 181 N. Aurora Rd, Aurora, Ohio” that had apparently been dug by ODOT contractor, Fabrizi Trucking and Paving Company, Inc. (Fabrizi). Plaintiff asserted that Fabrizi, after digging the trench (actually a culvert replacement project) across the roadway “failed to maintain it properly (and) [t]his allowed a hole to develop - 10 X 18-8 inches deep.” Plaintiff noted that when her car struck the roadway depression the axle broke locking the steering wheel causing her son to have no control over the vehicle resulting in the vehicle careening off the roadway approximately fifty feet until coming to a stop in a ditch against a tree. Plaintiff recalled the described damage incident occurred on March 12, 2010 (Friday) at approximately 7:20 a.m. Plaintiff related Fabrizi was not working on the culvert replacement project on March 12, 2010 and after the damage incident “[t]hey were notified immediately and called in workers to fill the hole, posted signs, and put barrels beside the spot that had not been“ stationed there prior to 7:20 a.m. In her complaint, plaintiff requested damage recovery in the amount of $2,500.00, the stated value of her 1997 Chrysler Sebring. The filing fee was paid. {¶ 2} Defendant acknowledged that the roadway area where plaintiff’s property damage incident occurred was within the limits of a working construction project under the control of ODOT contractor, Fabrizi. Defendant advised the particular construction project “dealt with widening, resurfacing, draining, signing and signalizing roadway on SR 43 between milepost 23.59 and 25.74 in Portage County.” From plaintiff’s description, defendant determined the described damage incident occurred “at milepost 23.90 on SR 43 in Portage County” which is located within the project limits. Defendant asserted that this particular construction project was under the control of Fabrizi and consequently ODOT had no responsibility for any damage or mishap on the roadway within the construction project limits. Defendant argued that Fabrizi, by contractual agreement, was responsible for maintaining the roadway within the construction zone. Therefore, ODOT contended that Fabrizi is the proper party defendant in this action. Defendant implied that all duties such as the duty to inspect, the duty to warn, the duty to maintain, and the duty to repair defects were delegated when an independent contractor takes control over a particular section of roadway. Furthermore, defendant contended that plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove her damage was proximately caused by roadway conditions created by ODOT or its contractors. All construction work was to be performed in accordance with ODOT requirements and specifications and subject to ODOT approval. {¶ 3} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed her a duty, that it breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused her injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 472 N.E. 2d 707. Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 198, 30 O.O. 415, 61 N.E. 2d 198, approved and followed. {¶ 4} Defendant has the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 335, 3 O.O. 3d 413, 361 N.E. 2d 486. However, defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 189, 678 N.E. 2d 273; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 67 Ohio App. 3d 723, 588 N.E. 2d 864. The duty of ODOT to maintain the roadway in a safe drivable condition is not delegable to an independent contractor involved in roadway construction. ODOT may bear liability for the negligent acts of an independent contractor charged with roadway construction. Cowell v. Ohio Department of Transportation, Ct. of Cl. No. 2003-09343-AD, jud, 2004-Ohio-151. Despite defendant’s contentions that ODOT did not owe any duty in regard to the construction project, defendant was charged with duties to inspect the construction site and correct any known deficiencies in connection with the particular construction work. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (June 28, 2001), Franklin App. 00AP-1119. {¶ 5} Alternatively, defendant denied that neither ODOT nor Fabrizi had any notice “of the pavement on SR 43 prior to plaintiff’s incident.” Defendant explained “this portion of SR 43 (covering milepost 23.90) has an average daily traffic volume of between 9,110 and 11,100 however, no other complaints were received on this project in this timeframe.” Defendant contended plaintiff failed to offer evidence to establish her property damage was attributable to any conduct on either the part of ODOT or Fabrizi. Defendant further contended plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to prove the construction area was negligently maintained. {¶ 6} In order to find liability for a damage claim occurring in a construction area, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether ODOT acted in a manner to render the highway free from an unreasonable risk of harm for the traveling public. Feichtner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1995), 114 Ohio App. 3d 346, 683 N.E. 2d 112. In fact, the duty to render the highway free from an unreasonable risk of harm is the precise duty owed by ODOT to the traveling public under both normal traffic and during highway construction projects. See e.g. White v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio St. 3d 39, 42, 564 N.E. 2d 462. {¶ 7} Ordinarily to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the accident. McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 247, 517 N.E. 2d 1388. Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice, but fails to reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 31 OBR 64, 507 N.E. 2d 1179. However, proof of notice of a dangerous condition is not necessary when defendant’s own agents actively cause such condition. Bello v. City of Cleveland (1922), 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Sexton v.

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Related

Knickel v. Department of Transportation
361 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1976)
McClellan v. Ohio Department of Transportation
517 N.E.2d 1388 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
Kniskern v. Township of Somerford
678 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1996)
Rhodus v. Ohio Department of Transportation
588 N.E.2d 864 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
Feichtner v. Ohio Department of Transportation
683 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1995)
In Re Estate of Fahle
105 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1950)
Stevens v. Industrial Commission
61 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1945)
Neff Lumber Co. v. First National Bank
171 N.E. 327 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1930)
Bello v. Cleveland
138 N.E. 526 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1922)
Bussard v. Ohio Department of Transportation
507 N.E.2d 1179 (Ohio Court of Claims, 1986)
Cascone v. Herb Kay Co.
451 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
Shinaver v. Szymanski
471 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc.
472 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
White v. Ohio Department of Transportation
564 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1990)
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co.
788 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
2010 Ohio 6629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/janoch-v-ohio-dept-of-transp-ohioctcl-2010.