United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2004 _____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III No. 03-30957 Clerk Summary Calendar _____________________
BRIJ M. JANMEJA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
versus
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE; WILLIAM JENKINS, Individually and in his capacity as President Louisiana State University System; WILLIAM J. NUNEZ, III, Individually and in his capacity as Chancellor Louisiana State University at Eunice; STEPHEN R. GUEMPEL, Individually and in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs Louisiana State University at Eunice; THERESA A. DEBECHE, Individually and in her capacity as Head, Division of Nursing and Allied Health Louisiana State University at Eunice; JACKIE BUSH, Individually and in her capacity as Former Program Director of Respiratory Care Louisiana State University at Eunice,
Defendants/Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana District Court Cause No. 02-CV-382 _________________________________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PRADO, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of
1 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
1 the appellant’s Title VII employment discrimination claims. In
his complaint, the appellant, Brij M. Janmeja, alleged that the
appellees, Louisiana State University at Eunice, et al.,
discriminated against him based on his race by denying him
adequate pay increases. The appellees moved to dismiss the
appellant’s claims on grounds the claims were time-barred. In
the alternative, the appellees moved for summary judgment. After
considering the motion, the district court found the appellant’s
claims were time-barred and dismissed the appellant’s claims.
The appellant challenges that action in this appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the district court's dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) de novo and therefore applies the same rules as the
district court.2 In considering a motion to dismiss, the
district court must accept the allegations presented by the
plaintiff as true and determine whether those allegations state a
claim for which relief can be granted.3 The court will grant a
motion to dismiss only when it appears the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
2 See Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996); Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 1996). 3 See Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 762 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1985).
2 relief.4 When matters outside the pleadings are presented to the
court and not excluded, the court must treat the motion as one
seeking summary judgment and must give the opposing party the
opportunity to present summary judgment evidence in opposition.5
In this case, the district court relied on a document
outside the pleadings–specifically, a copy of the appellant’s
EEOC charge. The district court, however, extended the time for
discovery and did not dismiss the appellant’s claims until months
after the discovery deadline passed. As a result, this Court
will uphold the dismissal of the appellant’s claims so long as no
genuine issue of material fact exists about whether the
appellant’s claims are time-barred.6
Whether the Appellant’s Claims Are Time-Barred
The district court determined the appellant’s claims are
time-barred because the appellant complained about conduct that
did not occur within the 300 days preceding the filing of the
appellant’s EEOC charge. In his first issue, the appellant
maintains the district court erred in dismissing his claims
because the date shown on his EEOC complaint is not the actual
date he filed his charge. Although his EEOC charge is dated
4 See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). 5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
3 August 9, 2001, the appellant contends he actually filed his
charge on April 25, 2000. To support that claim, the appellant
relies on a letter and answers to an EEOC questionnaire that he
purportedly sent to the EEOC on April 22, 2000 and that were
received by the EEOC on April 25, 2000.
Generally, a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the
EEOC within a certain time frame after the alleged conduct.7 In
a deferral state like Louisiana where the appellant’s lawsuit was
filed, a plaintiff must file his charge within 300 days of the
complained-of conduct.8 As a result, the plaintiff must file his
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory conduct.
In his complaint, the appellant complained about conduct
that occurred outside of the 300-day filing period.
Specifically, the appellant complained about a comment made in a
performance evaluation dated May 19, 1999; a March 9, 2000 email
allegedly referring to him as a disgruntled faulty member; and a
March 13, 2000 meeting in which he maintains he was harassed.
None of these events occurred within the 300 days preceding the
date reflected on the appellant’s EEOC charge–i.e, August 9,
2001. As a result, no question exists about whether the
appellant’s claims are time-barred.
7 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(1). 8 See id.
4 Although the appellant maintains he actually filed his
charge on April 25, 2000, he presented this argument to the
district court after the district court dismissed his claims.
Instead of raising the issue in his response to the appellees’
motion, the appellant raised the argument in a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his claims. In considering
the motion for reconsideration, the district court observed the
appellant failed to present the argument earlier, and failed to
explain the 16-month gap between his April 22, 2000 letter and
the date of his EEOC charge. To clarify the issue, the district
court requested additional briefing. In response to the request,
the appellant still failed to explain why he did not raise the
argument earlier, but suggested additional discovery was
required. After considering that subtle suggestion, the district
court determined the appellant had not been diligent in seeking
additional discovery and denied the appellant’s motion for
reconsideration. To the extent the appellant challenges that
determination on appeal, this Court agrees with the district
court’s assessment.
Although problems with limitations were apparent from the
face of the plaintiff’s complaint, the appellees placed the
appellant on notice that they intended to challenge the
timeliness of the appellant’s claims in their answer. In
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United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2004 _____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III No. 03-30957 Clerk Summary Calendar _____________________
BRIJ M. JANMEJA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
versus
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE; WILLIAM JENKINS, Individually and in his capacity as President Louisiana State University System; WILLIAM J. NUNEZ, III, Individually and in his capacity as Chancellor Louisiana State University at Eunice; STEPHEN R. GUEMPEL, Individually and in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs Louisiana State University at Eunice; THERESA A. DEBECHE, Individually and in her capacity as Head, Division of Nursing and Allied Health Louisiana State University at Eunice; JACKIE BUSH, Individually and in her capacity as Former Program Director of Respiratory Care Louisiana State University at Eunice,
Defendants/Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana District Court Cause No. 02-CV-382 _________________________________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PRADO, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of
1 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
1 the appellant’s Title VII employment discrimination claims. In
his complaint, the appellant, Brij M. Janmeja, alleged that the
appellees, Louisiana State University at Eunice, et al.,
discriminated against him based on his race by denying him
adequate pay increases. The appellees moved to dismiss the
appellant’s claims on grounds the claims were time-barred. In
the alternative, the appellees moved for summary judgment. After
considering the motion, the district court found the appellant’s
claims were time-barred and dismissed the appellant’s claims.
The appellant challenges that action in this appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the district court's dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) de novo and therefore applies the same rules as the
district court.2 In considering a motion to dismiss, the
district court must accept the allegations presented by the
plaintiff as true and determine whether those allegations state a
claim for which relief can be granted.3 The court will grant a
motion to dismiss only when it appears the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
2 See Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996); Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 1996). 3 See Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 762 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1985).
2 relief.4 When matters outside the pleadings are presented to the
court and not excluded, the court must treat the motion as one
seeking summary judgment and must give the opposing party the
opportunity to present summary judgment evidence in opposition.5
In this case, the district court relied on a document
outside the pleadings–specifically, a copy of the appellant’s
EEOC charge. The district court, however, extended the time for
discovery and did not dismiss the appellant’s claims until months
after the discovery deadline passed. As a result, this Court
will uphold the dismissal of the appellant’s claims so long as no
genuine issue of material fact exists about whether the
appellant’s claims are time-barred.6
Whether the Appellant’s Claims Are Time-Barred
The district court determined the appellant’s claims are
time-barred because the appellant complained about conduct that
did not occur within the 300 days preceding the filing of the
appellant’s EEOC charge. In his first issue, the appellant
maintains the district court erred in dismissing his claims
because the date shown on his EEOC complaint is not the actual
date he filed his charge. Although his EEOC charge is dated
4 See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). 5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
3 August 9, 2001, the appellant contends he actually filed his
charge on April 25, 2000. To support that claim, the appellant
relies on a letter and answers to an EEOC questionnaire that he
purportedly sent to the EEOC on April 22, 2000 and that were
received by the EEOC on April 25, 2000.
Generally, a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the
EEOC within a certain time frame after the alleged conduct.7 In
a deferral state like Louisiana where the appellant’s lawsuit was
filed, a plaintiff must file his charge within 300 days of the
complained-of conduct.8 As a result, the plaintiff must file his
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory conduct.
In his complaint, the appellant complained about conduct
that occurred outside of the 300-day filing period.
Specifically, the appellant complained about a comment made in a
performance evaluation dated May 19, 1999; a March 9, 2000 email
allegedly referring to him as a disgruntled faulty member; and a
March 13, 2000 meeting in which he maintains he was harassed.
None of these events occurred within the 300 days preceding the
date reflected on the appellant’s EEOC charge–i.e, August 9,
2001. As a result, no question exists about whether the
appellant’s claims are time-barred.
7 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(1). 8 See id.
4 Although the appellant maintains he actually filed his
charge on April 25, 2000, he presented this argument to the
district court after the district court dismissed his claims.
Instead of raising the issue in his response to the appellees’
motion, the appellant raised the argument in a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his claims. In considering
the motion for reconsideration, the district court observed the
appellant failed to present the argument earlier, and failed to
explain the 16-month gap between his April 22, 2000 letter and
the date of his EEOC charge. To clarify the issue, the district
court requested additional briefing. In response to the request,
the appellant still failed to explain why he did not raise the
argument earlier, but suggested additional discovery was
required. After considering that subtle suggestion, the district
court determined the appellant had not been diligent in seeking
additional discovery and denied the appellant’s motion for
reconsideration. To the extent the appellant challenges that
determination on appeal, this Court agrees with the district
court’s assessment.
Although problems with limitations were apparent from the
face of the plaintiff’s complaint, the appellees placed the
appellant on notice that they intended to challenge the
timeliness of the appellant’s claims in their answer. In
particular, the appellees answered that the appellant’s “Title
VII claims arising more that 300 days prior to his EEOC charge
5 are also time-barred/ prescribed.” The appellees raised the
issue again in the parties’ Rule 26(f) report. In that report,
the appellees maintained the appellant’s “claims occurred outside
of the applicable statutory limitations and/or prescriptive
periods.” The appellees then moved to dismiss the appellant’s
claim based on limitations period. Oddly enough, the appellant
did not address the timeliness of his claims in his response to
the motion to dismiss.
The district court, however, denied the motion initially
because there was no evidence in the record the appellant had
exhausted his administrative remedies and ordered the attorneys
to file documentation showing the appellant had exhausted his
administrative remedies. After the appellees presented the
appellant’s right to sue letter, the district court reconsidered
the motion and dismissed the appellant’s claims. Under these
circumstances, a plaintiff does not act with diligence in seeking
additional discovery. As a result, the district court properly
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Whether the Continuing Tort Doctrine Applies
In his second issue, the appellant contends the EEOC time
limit should not be applied to his claims because of the
continuing tort doctrine. “The continuing violation theory
relieves a plaintiff of establishing that all of the complained-
of conduct occurred within the actionable period if the plaintiff
6 can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls
within the limitations period.”9 None of the conduct that the
appellant complains about, however, occurred within the
limitations period. As a result, the continuing violation
doctrine does not apply.
Conclusion
To survive the appellees’ motion, the appellant was required
to submit evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact
about whether his claims were time-barred. The appellant,
however, failed to present such evidence. Instead of presenting
competent summary-judgment evidence, the appellant presented a
copy of a letter that he purportedly sent to the EEOC. Notably,
the letter was not supported by any indicia of reliability. Even
though competent evidence may exist that the appellant initiated
a charge with the EEOC on April 25, 2000, the appellant did not
present that evidence to the district court. As a result, the
district court properly found that no question exists about
whether the appellant’s claims are time-barred. Because the
conduct the appellant complained about is time-barred, the
continuing tort doctrine does not apply to the appellant’s
claims. Because the appellant’s claims are time-barred, this
Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court dismissing the
9 Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 2001).
7 appellant’s claims and denying the motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.