Janice W. Dunwoody v. Steven M. Dunwoody

2017 ME 21, 155 A.3d 422, 2017 WL 370898, 2017 Me. LEXIS 18

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: January 26, 2017
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 21 Docket: Cum-16-55 Submitted On Briefs: November 29, 2016 Decided: January 26, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

JANICE W. DUNWOODY

v.

STEVEN M. DUNWOODY

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶1] Steven M. Dunwoody appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Portland, Powers, J.) adopting the decision of the Family Law Magistrate

(Najarian, M.) over Steven’s objection. The magistrate granted Steven’s

request to modify child support but denied his request for a declaration that

he did not owe any past due support. Steven argues on appeal that the

magistrate should have determined that he had prevailed on at least one

equitable defense to any attempt to collect child support arrearages. We

affirm the judgment. 2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Steven M. Dunwoody and Janice W. Dunwoody were divorced by a

judgment dated November 13, 2001. Steven, who receives disability benefits,1

was ordered to pay child support pursuant to three orders covering different

periods of time, apparently due to anticipated changes in the parties’ incomes.

[¶3] Steven has never directly paid child support, but the children

received dependent benefits based on Steven’s disability. At some times, the

dependent benefits paid to the children exceeded the amount of child support

ordered by the court, and at other times there was a deficiency. During the

period when Steven’s support obligation exceeded the disability benefits, the

cumulative deficiency was $21,978. Both parties assumed that because the

children were receiving dependent disability benefits, Steven did not have to

make any child support payments himself.

[¶4] Sometime before February 19, 2014, Janice applied for child

support enforcement services from the Department of Health and Human

Services, and the Department issued a notice of debt. On June 24, 2014,

Steven filed a motion in the District Court seeking a modification of his child

support obligation and a declaration that he did not owe any arrearages. See

1 In 1999, Steven was injured in a skiing accident, leaving him paralyzed from the chest down. 3

M.R. Civ. P. 120(a). He argued that he was entitled to a credit against any past

due child support for the period during which the dependent disability

benefits exceeded his monthly child support obligation. Steven alleged that

during this period, the dependent disability payments exceeded his obligation

by a total of $33,000. In the alternative, Steven argued that the equitable

defenses of laches, waiver, and equitable estoppel precluded Janice from

collecting any past due child support.

[¶5] The magistrate issued an order on December 22, 2015, granting

Steven’s motion to modify child support, but denying his request for a

declaration that he did not owe past support. The magistrate concluded that

(1) the child support statutes precluded crediting the excess of the dependent

disability benefits over his support obligation against his past due support and

(2) the undisputed facts did not generate any equitable defenses. The order

established that Steven owed $21,978 in past due child support.

[¶6] Steven filed a timely objection to the magistrate’s final judgment

on January 8, 2016. See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a). The District Court entered an

order adopting the magistrate’s judgment on February 2, 2016. Steven timely

appealed. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3); M.R.

Civ. P. 118(b). 4

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] “When the District Court adopts the magistrate’s order, we review

the magistrate’s order directly.” Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Pelletier,

2009 ME 11, ¶ 14, 964 A.2d 630. Neither party disputes the magistrate’s

factual findings regarding the amount of the deficiency. Steven contends only

that the magistrate erred in failing to find that the defenses of laches, waiver,

and equitable estoppel applied to Janice’s attempt to enforce the established

child support arrearage.

A. Establishment of Arrearage

[¶8] The child support statute provides that when a court orders

support for a child who receives dependent disability payments, (1) the

dependent payments must be credited against the child support obligation but

(2) any excess cannot be credited against past or future child support

obligations. 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 (2016).

[¶9] The statute codifies a policy that in each month during which

support is ordered, the child will receive the greater of the dependent

disability payment or the amount of support ordered by the court. In other

words, when an “excess” exists, the Legislature has determined that the child, 5

not the obligor parent, will receive the benefit. There was no error in the

court’s determination that a child support arrearage existed.

B. Equitable Defenses

1. Laches

[¶10] After the parties had filed their briefs, we explicitly announced

that laches does not apply to the collection of child support arrearages.

Brochu v. McLeod, 2016 ME 146, ¶ 15, 148 A.3d 1220. The magistrate did not

err in concluding that laches did not prevent the collection of Steven’s child

support arrearages.

2. Waiver

[¶11] “Waiver is the voluntary and knowing relinquishment of a right

and may be shown by a course of conduct signifying a purpose not to stand on

a right, and leading, by a reasonable inference, to the conclusion that the right

in question will not be insisted upon.” McCarthy v. Goroshin, 2016 ME 98, ¶ 8,

143 A.3d 138 (quotation marks omitted). “When the trial court determines

that there is no waiver, we review any factual findings for clear error and

review de novo whether the facts are sufficient to constitute waiver.” Id.

[¶12] In the matter before us, the only relevant finding is that both

parties assumed that Steven did not have to make support payments directly 6

because the children received dependent disability benefits. The parties’

shared misunderstanding does not demonstrate that Janice voluntarily and

knowingly relinquished the right to collect child support, and the magistrate

did not err in concluding that there was no waiver.

3. Equitable Estoppel

[¶13] “Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights which

might perhaps have otherwise existed[] . . . against another person who has in

good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his

position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding

right.” Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 17, 964 A.2d 630 (quotation marks omitted).

“Equitable estoppel requires a misrepresentation. A misrepresentation need

not consist solely of an affirmative statement; it may arise through a

combination of misleading statements, conduct, or silence.” Id. ¶ 18 (citation

omitted). “We review a judgment on a defense of equitable estoppel for clear

error as to factual findings and for abuse of discretion as to the application of

principles of equity to those facts.” Id. ¶ 15.

[¶14] The undisputed facts do not include any kind of

misrepresentation by Janice—even by silence. Nor was there any finding that

Steven detrimentally relied on any representation that he did not owe child 7

support. Thus, the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in determining

that Janice was not equitably estopped from collecting Steven’s child support

debt.

III. CONCLUSION

[¶15] There was no error in the magistrate’s determination that Steven

owed a child support arrearage of $21,978, nor in her determination that

there was no legal or equitable theory that would be a defense to Janice’s

attempt to collect on that debt. Although this result may seem harsh

considering Steven’s disability and limited earning potential, we note that the

court can take his circumstances into account if and when it is called upon to

determine how to enforce Janice’s collection of the arrearage.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Timothy E. Robbins, Esq., South Portland, for appellant Steven M. Dunwoody

Susan Schultz McEvoy, Esq., for appellee Janice W. Dunwoody

Portland District Court docket number FM-2000-75 For Clerk Reference Only