Janice Denise Baker v. Resnick & Lewis, P.C.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2024
• Docket: 22-13837
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-13837 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/21/2024 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-13837 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

JANICE DENISE BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus RESNICK & LEWIS, P.C., MACY'S FLORIDA STORES, BRIAN L. HARVELL ESQ, ROBERT J. SQUIRRE ESQ, BRYAN BOYSAW ESQ, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81257-AMC ____________________

Before WILSON, LUCK, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Janice Baker, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismis- sal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim un- der 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, she argues that: (1) the defendants committed professional misconduct and violated her disability rights; (2) the district court erred in denying her right to pursue her claim in forma pauperis (“IFP”); and (3) the state court wrongly decided her case. After careful review, we affirm. Section 1915(e) provides that an in forma pauperis action or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if the court determines that it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), using the same standards that govern Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismis- sals. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1997). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwar- ranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 USCA11 Case: 22-13837 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/21/2024 Page: 3 of 5

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F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). To prevail on a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and lib- erally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). However, that “leniency does not give a court li- cense to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an other- wise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168– 69 (quotations omitted). An appellant abandons an issue by failing to challenge it on appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (involving a pro se litigant). An appellant also aban- dons a claim where she presents it only in “passing references” or “in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au- thority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal.” Id. (quoting Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)). We may exercise our discretion to consider a forfeited issue if: “(1) the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party lacked an oppor- tunity to raise the issue at the district court level; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents significant questions of general impact or of great public concern.” United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). USCA11 Case: 22-13837 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/21/2024 Page: 4 of 5

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Additionally, we generally lack jurisdiction to directly re- view state court judgments, as “federal courts are not a forum for appealing state court decisions.” Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988); Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co., 692 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[F]ederal courts below the Supreme Court must not become a court of appeals for state court decisions.”). Here, Baker has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her case, because, even when construing her brief liberally, Baker failed to properly challenge the district court’s dismissal of her case. See Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69; Irwin, 40 F.3d at 347 n.1; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Rather than argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) did not apply to her, Baker repeated her theory that she was wronged by the defendants without a support- ing factual basis. Notably, these minimal and undeveloped allega- tions do not establish how 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applied to her. See West, 487 U.S. at 48. As a result, Baker only provided conclusory allega- tions and failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim, and it was not error for the district court to dismiss her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1489– 90; Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262. Nor do any of the exceptions that may allow us to consider a forfeited issue apply to Baker’s appeal. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. In short, Baker has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her complaint. See Irwin, 40 F.3d at 347 n.1; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Moreover, to the extent she challenges the findings from her state court case, we lack jurisdiction to hear USCA11 Case: 22-13837 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/21/2024 Page: 5 of 5

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an appeal from that court. See Staley, 837 F.2d at 1018; Vasquez, 692 F.3d at 1195. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Baker’s claim and the denial of IFP. See Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1489–90; Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262. AFFIRMED.