Janian v. Barnes

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Janian v. Barnes

2 A.D.3d 1033, 768 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13175

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 11, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 2 A.D.3d 1033 (Janian v. Barnes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Janian v. Barnes, 2 A.D.3d 1033, 768 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13175 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

Rose, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (O’Shea, J.), entered October 4, 2002 in Tioga County, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order.

When this matter was last before us, we found that the only pertinent issue of fact concerning the effectiveness of plaintiffs’ quitclaim deed was whether or not defendant accepted the deed (284 AD2d 717, 718 [2001]). Subsequently, at his deposition, one of the plaintiffs was unable to recall signing the deed, but acknowledged that the signature appeared to be his. When defendant then sought further disclosure as to the deed’s execution, Supreme Court found no relevant issue of fact as to the deed’s execution and granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order. As defendant sought information neither relevant nor necessary to resolving the only issue remaining for trial, we find that Supreme Court did not abuse its considerable discretion in controlling disclosure (see e.g. Mitchell v Stuart, 293 AD2d 905, 906 [2002]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Rose, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (O’Shea, J.), entered October 4, 2002 in Tioga County, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order.

When this matter was last before us, we found that the only pertinent issue of fact concerning the effectiveness of plaintiffs’ quitclaim deed was whether or not defendant accepted the deed (284 AD2d 717, 718 [2001]). Subsequently, at his deposition, one of the plaintiffs was unable to recall signing the deed, but acknowledged that the signature appeared to be his. When defendant then sought further disclosure as to the deed’s execution, Supreme Court found no relevant issue of fact as to the deed’s execution and granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order. As defendant sought information neither relevant nor necessary to resolving the only issue remaining for trial, we find that Supreme Court did not abuse its considerable discretion in controlling disclosure (see e.g. Mitchell v Stuart, 293 AD2d 905, 906 [2002]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

2 A.D.3d 1033, 768 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13175, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/janian-v-barnes-nyappdiv-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack