iv.'J l-i:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Marriage of: No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with JANETTE R. PEACOCK, No. 73150-5-1)
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
and
WILLIAM R. PEACOCK, UNPUBLISHED
Appellant. FILED: March 28, 2016
Cox, J. — William Peacock appeals the decree of dissolution and the
order denying his CR 60(b) motion to vacate that decree. Because the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm.
Janette Wells1 and William Peacock married in 1994. Wells petitioned for
dissolution of marriage in 2012. Peacock requested appointed counsel "pursuant
to GR 33 due to cognitive and mental [health] impairments." The trial court
granted this request, appointing Elise Buie to represent him.
In January 2014, Buie e-mailed the trial judge's bailiff for guidance, stating
there were no remaining funds, which were disbursed on the basis of her
appointment, to take Wells's deposition. Further e-mail communications between
counsel and the bailiff ensued.
We adopt the parties' naming conventions. No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/2
The next day, the bailiff e-mailed both counsel to schedule a pre-trial
conference. At the conference, the trial judge discussed with counsel how the
case should proceed due to the case's "unusual trajectory" and approaching
March 2014 trial date. The judge stated that she was authorized to grant Buie a
limited amount of additional attorney fees and that counsel needed "to move as
efficiently as possible."
The judge was also concerned about the scheduled mediation. She
stated that it may be "most efficient" for her to hear and decide the case, and that
the parties were "free to negotiate on their own." The judge ultimately waived the
mediation.
She also prohibited depositions without her prior approval, stating she did
not "see a reason for a deposition [of Wells] in this case" and that "a lot of money
and time and energy has already been spent."
At Peacock's request, the judge granted his motion for new counsel, who
was substituted for Buie. The judge also extended the discovery deadline.
The trial judge heard the case on March 17 to 19. The judge entered
findings, conclusions, and a decree of dissolution on April 18, 2014. Peacock
appealed.
He later moved under CR 60(b)(11) to vacate the dissolution decree. A
different judge heard this motion. The motion judge denied Peacock's request
for relief and awarded Wells attorney fees for responding to the motion. Peacock
also appealed this order.
We consolidated both appeals for decision. No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/3
Peacock's dissatisfaction with the trial judge's distribution of property is at
the core of these appeals. Accordingly, we first address his challenges to the
findings, conclusions, and decree of dissolution.
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
Peacock argues that the overall distribution of assets is inequitable
because it does not leave the parties in similar positions. We hold that the trial
judge properly exercised her discretion in distributing the parties' assets.
In dissolution proceedings, the trial court "has broad discretion to make a
just and equitable distribution of property based on the factors enumerated in
RCW 26.09.080."2 We defer to trial courts "because '[t]he emotional and
financial interests affected by such decisions are best served by finality . . . .'"3
Additionally, the "'policy interest favoring finality in property settlements' militates
against setting aside dissolution decrees, except in . . . 'extraordinary
circumstance[s]."'4
Under RCW 26.09.080, courts must equitably distribute the parties'
property and liabilities after considering all "relevant factors." The factors listed in
the statute "are not exclusive."5
2 In re Marriage of Wright. 179 Wn. App. 257, 261, 319 P.3d 45 (2013).
3 In re Parentage of Jannot. 149 Wn.2d 123, 127, 65 P.3d 664 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Parentage of Jannot, 110 Wn. App. 16, 21, 37 P.3d 1265(2002)).
4 Wagers v. Goodwin. 92 Wn. App. 876, 882, 964 P.2d 1214 (1998) (quoting In re Marriage of Jennings. 91 Wn. App. 543, 548, 958 P.2d 358 (1998)).
5 In re Marriage of Larson. 178 Wn. App. 133, 138, 313 P.3d 1228 (2013). No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/4
Each spouses' economic circumstances upon dissolution is "of 'paramount
concern.'"6 The court "is not required to place the parties in precisely equal
financial positions . . . ."7 "A just and equitable division 'does not require
mathematical precision, but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all the
circumstances of the marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the
future needs of [the] parties.'"8
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's disposition of property.9
The trial court abuses its discretion when its "decision is 'manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'"10
A trial court's "decision is based 'on untenable grounds' or made 'for untenable
reasons' if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying
the wrong legal standard."11 We do not decide witness credibility or reweigh the
evidence on appeal.12
6 Urbana v. Urbana. 147 Wn. App. 1, 11, 195 P.3d 959 (2008) (quoting ln_re Marriage of Olivares. 69 Wn. App. 324, 330, 848 P.2d 1281 (1993)).
7 Wright. 179 Wn. App. at 262.
8 Larson, 178 Wn. App. at 138 (quoting In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996)).
9Wright. 179 Wn. App. at 261.
10 State v. Gentry. 183 Wn.2d 749, 761, 356 P.3d 714 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Horslev. 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999)).
11 Hundtofte v. Encarnacion. 181 Wn.2d 1, 6-7, 330 P.3d 168 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rohrich. 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).
12 In re Welfare of A.W.. 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015). No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/5
Here, the trial judge awarded Wells the former marital home together with
certain retirement accounts and other personal property. The judge also
awarded Peacock other retirement accounts and other personal property. In
making these allocations, the trial judge stated in her findings that she
considered the parties' ages, health, and current financial circumstances. We
see nothing in this record that undercuts the judge's stated approach in
distributing assets.
Peacock challenges this distribution on two bases: first, on what he claims
is the ratio of distributed shares of property to each other; second, on the trial
judge's valuation of the former marital home. Neither claim has merit.
First, he claims the distribution favors Wells by a ratio of 42/58. He states
that the judge's "rigid division of separate and community property did not take
into account the relative health and earning capacities] of the parties."
This claim is unsupported by the record. For example, unchallenged
findings 2.21.3 and 2.21.5 detail Peacock's health challenges, his work history,
and his expectation to not work again. We also note that the trial judge denied
Wells's request for attorney fees at trial based on Peacock's alleged
intransigence. The court denied fees because Peacock's health issues did not
evidence intransigence.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge found that Peacock "diminished
community assets imprudently," finding that he "used and/or lost" $30,000 of
community funds. Because this finding is unchallenged on appeal, it is a verity.13
13 See id. No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/6
Assets disposed of before trial cannot be distributed at trial.14 But in In re
Marriage of Griswold, Division Three of this court found no abuse of discretion
where the trial court characterized the proceeds from the wife's sale of her
wedding ring before trial as community property and assigned the value to the
wife.15 Division Three of this court found no abuse of discretion by doing so even
though the ring, and presumably the proceeds, did not exist at trial.
Here, the $30,000 did not exist as trial, and the judge credited Peacock
with these community funds after finding that he "demonstrated financial
mismanagement" and "used them for his separate benefit or lost them." Thus,
the trial judge's claimed lack of equitable distribution is based, in part, on his
squandering of community assets. This determination by the trial judge is not an
abuse of discretion.
Peacock cites, without meaningful discussion, other cases in which a trial
court awarded a greater share of community property either to an older, sicker
spouse or a spouse with lesser earning capacity.16 Of course, the fact that other
courts, based on the facts and circumstances of other cases, chose to divide
assets in ways other than the trial judge did in this case falls far short of showing
that this trial judge abused her considerable discretion in distributing assets.
Peacock also argues that he received no "offset" for contributing to the
children's Uniform Gift to Minors Act accounts. But he cites no authority
14 In re Marriage of Kaseburg, 126 Wn. App. 546, 556, 108 P.3d 1278 (2005).
15 112 Wn. App. 333, 349, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002).
16 In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 243, 170 P.3d 572 (2007); Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. at 557. No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/7
indicating that an offset is required. Accordingly, we need not consider this
argument.17
Peacock also argues that the trial judge failed to take into account his
"exceptionally hard work over the years, which greatly benefited the community."
He cites In re Marriage of Williams18 as support, asserting that the trial court in
that case offset the wife's waste of marital assets with her income contribution to
the community.
That case is distinguishable because the husband did not want the wife's
gambling debts included in their total liabilities.19 The trial court balanced the
wife's "extra income against her excessive spending" and included her gambling
related debts in the total liabilities.20 That is not the case here. So, the case
does not support Peacock's argument.
Peacock also argues that Wells is younger, in good health, and should be
able to obtain full-time employment. Conversely, he argues that he is in
significant debt and will "most likely" be unable to work again.
He cites In re Marriage of Tower21 to support his argument. In that case,
this court determined that "a disproportionate community property award in favor
of the .. . spouse with any significant earning capacity would be an abuse of
17 See Darkenwald v. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 183 Wn.2d 237, 248, 350 P.3d 647 (2015); RAP 10.3(a)(6).
18 84 Wn. App. 263, 927 P.2d 679 (1996).
19 Id at 270.
20 id at 271.
21 55 Wn. App. 697, 780 P.2d 863 (1989). No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/8
discretion were it not balanced by long-term maintenance [to the other
spouse]."22 Peacock uses this case to argue that the trial court did not award him
maintenance to "ameliorate the inequitable property division."
But that case is distinguishable because the trial court "endeavored to
fairly distribute the parties' limited assets without jeopardizing" the wife's eligibility
for social security disability benefits.23 Further, in this case, Peacock received "a
secure and greater income and was awarded substantial cash assets, whereas
[Wells] received the house, which benefits the children." And she was not
working at the time of trial. Thus, the case he cites does not support his
argument.
The second reason Peacock cites for the allegedly inequitable distribution
is the trial judge's decision to value the former marital home based on the
evidence presented by Wells. The judge's view of the evidence Wells offered is
a credibility determination that we do not review.
In sum, Peacock has failed to show this is an extraordinary case that
compels us to overturn the trial judge's exercise of her considerable discretion in
dividing the parties' assets.
MOTION TO VACATE DECREE
Peacock claims the motion judge abused her discretion by denying his CR
60(b) motion to vacate the decree. We hold that the motion judge properly
exercised her discretion.
22 id at 701.
23 Id. at 700. No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/9
CR 60 governs relief from judgments or orders. CR 60(b)(11) provides
that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party .
. . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for. . . [a]ny other reason justifying
relief from . . . the judgment." This section applies "'to situations involving
extraordinary circumstances not covered by any other section of [CR 60(b)].'"24
These extraordinary circumstances must relate to "'irregularities which are
extraneous to [court action] or go to the question of the regularity of its
proceedings.'"25
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to vacate a
judgment or order under CR 60.26
Appearance of Fairness
Peacock argues that the ex parte communication of Peacock's former
counsel, Buie, with the trial judge's bailiff created an appearance of unfairness.
We hold that he has failed in his burden to overcome the presumption that the
trial judge was fair. Accordingly, he fails to show that the motion judge abused
her discretion in denying his motion to vacate the decree.
24 Tamosaitisv. Bechtel Nat'l. Inc.. 182 Wn. App. 241, 254, 327 P.3d 1309 (quoting In re Marriage of Yearout. 41 Wn. App. 897, 902, 707 P.2d 1367 (1985)), review denied. 181 Wn.2d 1029 (2014).
25 Tatham v. Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 100, 283 P.3d 583 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Marriage of Flannagan, 42 Wn. App. 214, 221, 709 P.2d 1247 (1985)).
26 Jones v. City of Seattle. 179 Wn.2d 322, 360, 314 P.3d 380 (2013). No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/10
CR 60(b)(11) is appropriate to raise "a posttrial challenge based on a
violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine . . . ."27 This doctrine "applies to
judges in court proceedings."28 "Washington's appearance of fairness doctrine
not only requires a judge to be impartial, it also requires that the judge appear to
be impartial."29 Washington courts "presume that judicial hearings and judges
are fair."30
"A judicial proceeding satisfies the appearance of fairness doctrine only if
a reasonably prudent and disinterested person would conclude that all parties
obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing."31 The test is "objective" and
"assumes that 'a reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant
facts.'"32 The claimant "'must submit proof of actual or perceived bias to support
an appearance of impartiality claim.'"33 "[M]ere speculation is not enough."34
27 Tatham. 170 Wn. App. at 103.
28 Camarata v. Kittitas County. 186 Wn. App. 695, 713, 346 P.3d 822 (2015).
29 Tatham. 170 Wn. App. at 80.
30 In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen. 180 Wn.2d 768, 787, 329 P.3d 853 (2014).
31 Tatham. 170 Wn. App. at 96.
32 Gentry, 183 Wn.2d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sherman v. State. 128 Wn.2d 164, 206, 905 P.2d 355 (1995)).
33 GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet. Inc.. 179 Wn. App. 126, 154, 317 P.3d 1074 (quoting Magana v. Hyundai Motor Am.. 141 Wn. App. 495, 523, 170 P.3d 1165 (2007), rev'd on other grounds. 167 Wn.2d 570, 220 P.3d 191 (2009)). review denied. 181 Wn.2d 1008 (2014).
34 In re Estate of Haves. 185 Wn. App. 567, 607, 342 P.3d 1161 (2015).
10 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-IV11
Ex parte communication, alone, is not enough to establish judicial bias or
prejudice.35 If ex parte contact occurs, the question still remains "whether a
reasonable person who knew all relevant facts would conclude that [the judge]
was actually prejudiced or appeared prejudiced."36
State v. Davis37 is instructive. In that case, the issue was whether the trial
judge abused his discretion by failing to recuse himself after communicating ex
parte with prosecutors.38 After granting the defense's request for continuance,
the judge accelerated the trial date and spoke with prosecutors regarding their
preparation of scheduling orders.39 The defense argued that the ex parte contact
was improper and that the judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring
recusal.40 The State conceded that ex parte contact occurred but argued that it
did not require recusal.41
The supreme court stated that a judge's ex parte communication warrants
recusal when "the judge 'may have inadvertently obtained information critical to a
central issue . . . ,' leading a reasonable person to question his impartiality."42
35 State v. Davis. 175 Wn.2d 287, 307, 290 P.3d 43 (2012).
36 id
37175 Wn.2d 287, 290 P.3d 43 (2012).
38 id at 305.
39 id at 304.
40 Id at 305.
41 Id
42 id at 307 (quoting Sherman. 128 Wn.2d at 206).
11 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/12
"[T]he content of the communication is key in evaluating whether the judge
appears partial. .. ."43
The supreme court determined that the judge's communication did not
reveal or imply a bias toward either party "or that his future rulings in the case
would be affected."44 The judge believed that his "decision to accelerate trial. ..
was purely ministerial" and he "did not discuss any substantive issue . .. ."45 The
supreme court concluded that the judge's communication did not show bias
toward the parties but rather, "a desire to complete the penalty phase of Davis's
trial within a reasonable length of time . . . ,"46 "If the desire to finish trial within a
reasonable amount of time shows prejudice, trial judges would be forced to grant
every continuance a defendant requested in order to avoid being considered
partial. This is an untenable position."47
In re Marriage of Davison48 is also instructive. In that dissolution case, the
wife sent a letter to the judge before trial regarding a delay and expressing
concern for her safety.49 The judge then sent a letter to the parties' attorneys,
with the wife's letter attached, stating that she expected the parties to be ready to
43 Id at 308.
44 ]d at 307.
45 id at 307-08.
46 ]d at 308.
47 Id
48 112 Wn. App. 251, 48 P.3d 358 (2002).
49 id at 255-56.
12 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/13
proceed.50 The husband argued that the judge violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct by considering the letter, that her impartiality was reasonably
questionable, and that she should have disqualified herself.51
Division Three of this court disagreed, determining that there was no
evidence "that the judge considered Ms. Davison's letter as anything other than a
plea for a quick resolution of the matter. The judge's letter to the parties carefully
avoided Ms. Davison's factual allegations, suggesting the court was not
considering them as part of its disposition."52 The court also determined that the
"judge took no affirmative action to investigate the allegations" and that "[i]n the
absence of at least an inference that the judge considered an improper
communication, the judge's impartiality may not reasonably be questioned, and
recusal is not required."53
Here, "a reasonably prudent and disinterested person would conclude that
all parties obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing."54 First, Buie was
appointed to represent Peacock pursuant to GR 33. Her e-mail to the bailiff
described her concern regarding additional fees and further work to be done in
Peacock's case based on this appointment. Specifically, the e-mail stated "As
we stand now, there are no funds for [Wells's deposition] yet I was told by [sic]
50 id at 255.
51 ]d at 256-57.
52 id at 257.
53 id
54 Tatham. 170 Wn. App. at 96.
13 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-IV14
that I was not appointed on a Pro bono basis in this matter. Again, guidance
and/or a fee order is required in this instance."55
The e-mail also stated "If I am being order [sic] to work on a pro bono
basis, please let me know that as that is contrary to what I was told ... but will
follow the Court's orders insofar as they align with my ethical duties as set forth
in the RPC's as well."56 Thus, the e-mail "was purely ministerial" and "did not
discuss any substantive issue . . . ."57
Second, Peacock failed to show that the trial judge considered the e-mail
"as anything other than a plea for a .. . resolution of the matter."58 Specifically,
Buie sought "guidance" or "clarification" from the trial court regarding her concern
with complying with the court orders and her ability to work on Peacock's case.
Third, the trial judge's subsequent decision to set a pre-trial conference,
suspend discovery, and waive mediation demonstrated her desire to have the
case proceed efficiently. A judge always has discretion to control the
administration of justice, including discovery and the requirement for mediation.
Nothing other than Peacock's speculation shows anything unfair.
Thus, Peacock fails to overcome the presumption that the trial judge acted
properly. Accordingly, the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in denying
Peacock's motion to vacate.
55 Clerk's Papers at 167.
56 Id at 168.
57 Davis. 175Wn.2dat308.
58 Davison. 112 Wn. App. at 257.
14 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/15
Peacock argues that the trial court received "prejudicial information." He
argues that Buie's e-mail essentially labeled him "as overly litigious," which
"prejudiced the judge against him throughout the trial."
Although Buie's e-mail included copied language of recommended actions
from Peacock's e-mail, the e-mail was, nevertheless, ministerial. It did not
contain substantive, critical, or prejudicial information. Thus, "a reasonably
prudent and disinterested person would conclude" that the trial court did not have
an actual or perceived bias against Peacock due to Buie's e-mail.59
Peacock also argues that it "appealed] that the Court was influenced by
these communications" because it rejected a majority of his testimony. Similarly,
he argues that the e-mail "had a significant effect on the proceedings" because
the trial court "immediately halted discovery," canceled Wells's deposition, and
"generally sided with" Wells regarding the property division.
The trial judge's decision to suspend discovery and require approval
before the parties conducted depositions was within the court's "authority to
administer its affairs to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of its
docket."60 Additionally, "credibility determinations should be made by the trial
court."61 Thus, the trial judge was free to find Peacock's testimony not credible,
or Wells's testimony more credible. Accordingly, the trial judge's "rejection]" of
Peacock's testimony does not show that she was biased.
59 Tatham. 170 Wn. App. at 96.
60 Winston v. Dep't of Corrections. 130 Wn. App. 61, 66, 121 P.3d 1201 (2005).
61 State v. O'Dell. 183 Wn.2d 680, 698 n.13, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).
15 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/16
Conflict of Interest
Peacock next argues that the manner in which Buie sought additional fees
put her interests above his, creating a conflict of interest. Specifically, he argues
that her disclosure of confidential information prejudiced him. We disagree.
Peacock fails to establish any nexus between the actions of the trial judge
and the alleged actions of his former counsel. The necessary focus of a
challenge to the trial judge's decision is the trial judge, not former counsel for
Peacock. In the absence of any nexus, which is Peacock's burden to establish,
we conclude that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in denying his
motion.
Additionally, RPC 1.7 governs conflicts of interests of counsel. RPC
1.7(a)(2) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if
. . . there is a significant risk that" the lawyer's personal interest will materially
limit the representation.
Even if Buie had a personal interest that materially limited her
representation of Peacock, this is not a basis for relief under CR 60(b)(11). As
previously stated, this rule applies to extraordinary circumstances relating to
"'irregularities which are extraneous to [court action] or go to the question of the
regularity of its proceedings.'" Peacock cites no authority demonstrating that
RPC violations support vacating an order under CR 60(b)(11).
16 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/17
ATTORNEY FEES
Award at Trial
Peacock argues that the motion judge abused her discretion by awarding
Wells attorney fees for having to respond to his motion. We disagree.
"The general rule in Washington is that attorney fees will not be awarded
for costs of litigation unless authorized by contract, statute, or recognized ground
of equity."62 We may award fees under RCW 26.09.140 after balancing the
financial needs of the spouse seeking fees against the other spouse's ability to
pay.63
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's award of attorney fees.64
The motion judge determined that Wells's low income and responsibilities
for the parties' children "put her at an economic disadvantage." The judge also
determined that Peacock had "a secure and greater income and was awarded
substantial cash assets, whereas [Wells] received the house, which benefits the
children." This was an appropriate determination based on the record then
before the motion judge.
Peacock argues that this judge should not have awarded Wells attorney
fees because Wells received a majority of the parties' assets and, as a result,
was in a better position to pay. The simple response to this is that, as the trial
62 Durland v. San Juan County. 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014).
63 In re Marriage of Kim. 179 Wn. App. 232, 256, 317 P.3d 555, review denied, 180Wn.2d 1012(2014).
64 In re Recall of Piper. 184 Wn.2d 780, 786, 364 P.3d 113 (2015).
17 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-l)/18
court stated, Peacock was in a better position to pay because Wells received
less income and bore the parenting responsibilities.
There was no abuse of discretion by the motion judge awarding fees.
Award on Appeal
Wells requests attorney fees on appeal, arguing that Peacock's appeal
was frivolous and that he was intransigent. We disagree.
RAP 18.9(a) provides for attorney fees if a party "files a frivolous appeal."
"An appeal is not frivolous or brought for purposes of delay if it involves
'debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ.'"65 "'An appeal that
is affirmed merely because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous.'"66
A party's intransigence is an equitable basis for awarding attorney fees.67
Courts grant attorney fee awards for intransigence when a party engages in
"'foot-dragging' and 'obstruction'... or simply when one party made the trial
unduly difficult and increased legal costs by his or her actions.'"68
"'Intransigence' may also be shown by 'litigious behavior, bringing excessive
motions, or discovery abuses.'"69
65 O'Neill v. City of Shoreline. 183Wn. App. 15, 26, 332 P.3d 1099 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olsen Media v. Energy Scis., Inc., 32 Wn. App. 579, 588, 648 P.2d 493 (1982)).
66 Enslevv.Mollmann, 155 Wn. App. 744, 760, 230 P.3d 599 (2010) (quoting Halvorsen v. Ferguson. 46 Wn. App. 708, 723, 735 P.2d 675 (1986)).
67 In re Marriage of Chandola. 180 Wn.2d 632, 656, 327 P.3d 644 (2014).
68 [d at 657 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ]n re Marriage of Katare. 175 Wn.2d 23, 42, 283 P.3d 546 (2012)).
69 In re the Matter of Kelly. 170 Wn. App. 722, 740, 287 P.3d 12 (2012) (quoting In re Marriage of Wallace. 111 Wn. App. 697, 710, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002)).
18 No. 71953-0-1 (consolidated with No. 73150-5-IV19
On this record, we conclude that this appeal is not frivolous. Although we
disagree with Peacock's arguments, that alone is not a proper basis for us to
award fees. Moreover, there is no showing of intransigence.
Wells did not expressly request attorney fees on appeal based on RCW
26.09.140. To the extent that Wells's submission of her financial declaration is
an implicit request for fees based on this statute, we conclude that Peacock does
not have the present ability to pay.
We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also deny Wells's request for
attorney fees on appeal.
&2L WE CONCUR:
t^^y^J!L&u£,