This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0939
Janella Scott, Relator,
vs.
The Phoenix Residence, Inc., Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
Filed April 15, 2024 Affirmed Ede, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development File No. 49242355-2
Peter B. Knapp, Nicholas E. Gobran (certified student attorney), Mitchell Hamline Law Clinic, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)
Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Security, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
The Phoenix Residence, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Relator appeals from an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) decision that she is
ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her employment without good reason. Relator seeks reversal of the ULJ’s decision, arguing that respondent employer’s
failure to act in response to her reports of the suspected abuse of a vulnerable resident
constituted a good reason for quitting. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Janella Scott was employed as a part-time support professional with
respondent The Phoenix Residence, Inc. (Phoenix) until she submitted her two-week notice
to Phoenix staff on December 1, 2022, which Phoenix accepted effective immediately.
Scott applied for unemployment benefits. Respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) issued an initial determination of
ineligibility, stating that Scott quit “because of alleged harassment, abusive behavior, or a
hostile work environment.” DEED concluded that, because “[t]he evidence [did] not show
that [Scott] complained to the employer about the harassment, abusive behavior, or hostile
work environment[,]” Scott did not have a good reason to quit caused by her employer.
Based on DEED’s determination, Scott was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits
per Minnesota Statutes section 268.095 (2022).
Scott administratively appealed. A ULJ held an evidentiary hearing on Scott’s
appeal in February 2023. Along with Scott’s testimony, the ULJ heard testimony from
A.B., Phoenix’s vice president of community services, and N.B., Phoenix’s director of
human resources. The ULJ later issued findings of fact and a decision, determining that
Scott was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her employment and no
exception applied.
2 Except where otherwise specified, the ULJ found the following facts. As
summarized below, these facts are undisputed on appeal.
In 2014, Scott began employment with Phoenix. In 2020, Phoenix transferred Scott
to a new location to address Scott’s concerns about an unprofessional work environment.
At the new location, Scott reported to D.W., a manager. Scott thought that D.W. was
unprofessional because D.W. would micromanage her.
Scott testified that, as a support professional, she was expected to report and record
“on the daily” when she found bruising or when she thought there were injuries to her
clients. Scott believed that D.W. was responsible for bruising on one of the residents at
Phoenix. Beginning in September 2021, Scott reported the resident’s bruises four times “in
company records, but believed her reports were not addressed.” In the records of her
reports, Scott did not identify any individual as causing bruising to the resident. 1 According
to Scott’s testimony, by recording her reports with a “high” notification level, she alerted
the appropriate management staff. A.B., however, testified that, if Scott felt her supervisor
was the culprit of potential abuse, the correct reporting procedure “in line with . . . [Scott’s]
training” was to notify another superior within the organization by telephone call.
1 Although Scott testified that the records she created were about her suspicions that someone was abusing the resident, the records themselves are unclear on that point. For example, in a record Scott created in March 2022, Scott stated that there was a bruise on the resident that was “of great concern to [her], for [it] was not the first time.” But Scott also reported that staff said the resident fell in the shower, thereby providing an explanation for the bruise that was not abuse. On the other hand, in the last record Scott created on November 12, 2022, Scott implied abuse without expressly saying so, although she did not identify a suspected abuser. More specifically, the November 12 record notes that, after Scott submitted reports about the resident’s bruises, “the bruising would stop for a short time.”
3 Scott’s last written report, which she recorded on November 12, 2022, noted that
Scott had not received a response to her concerns about the resident’s bruises. Scott
believed that D.W. had inappropriately modified the records Scott had created. Aside from
her written reports, Scott had contacted a program manager in 2021 and formally reported
the suspected abuse, but she ultimately felt that her complaints were not addressed. Scott
testified that she did not specifically tell the program manager that she thought D.W. was
responsible for the resident’s bruising and that the program manager “found no fault.”
A.B. testified that, on November 30, 2022, he received a message from one of
Scott’s coworkers, which stated that Scott had concerns about D.W. potentially harming a
resident, as well as other general concerns about D.W. In addition, A.B. testified that he
spoke with Scott on the phone that same date, that they scheduled a meeting for the next
day to discuss the information A.B. had received from Scott’s coworker, and that A.B. sent
Scott his list of questions for her review before their meeting. A.B., N.B., and Scott met
for about two hours on December 1. This meeting was 19 days after Scott’s final written
report and one day after A.B. received the message from Scott’s coworker relaying Scott’s
concerns that D.W. was potentially harming a resident. At the meeting, Phoenix did not
issue Scott any reprimands or warnings. Scott thought that being called into the meeting
was unfair to her and constituted harassment.
A.B. further testified that, during the December 1 meeting, Scott stated her belief
that D.W. had caused bruising to the resident, but Scott could not provide a reason why she
held that belief. In his testimony, A.B. said that, if a resolution with D.W. was impossible,
management could move Scott to another location. Scott testified that she wanted Phoenix
4 to move D.W. away from the resident, but Scott did not receive a direct answer to her
proposal. Scott expected to receive a specific plan of action or solution at the meeting, but
that did not occur to Scott’s satisfaction. Because Phoenix did not provide Scott with a
specific plan of action, and because Scott “felt anxious and was concerned about her
hypertension and overall health,” Scott submitted her two-week notice during the meeting.
Phoenix accepted Scott’s notice of quitting effective immediately because A.B. and N.B.
did not think that Scott’s continued work during her notice period would be productive. If
Scott had not submitted her two-week notice, Phoenix would have allowed Scott to
continue her employment.
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0939
Janella Scott, Relator,
vs.
The Phoenix Residence, Inc., Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
Filed April 15, 2024 Affirmed Ede, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development File No. 49242355-2
Peter B. Knapp, Nicholas E. Gobran (certified student attorney), Mitchell Hamline Law Clinic, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)
Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Security, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
The Phoenix Residence, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Relator appeals from an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) decision that she is
ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her employment without good reason. Relator seeks reversal of the ULJ’s decision, arguing that respondent employer’s
failure to act in response to her reports of the suspected abuse of a vulnerable resident
constituted a good reason for quitting. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Janella Scott was employed as a part-time support professional with
respondent The Phoenix Residence, Inc. (Phoenix) until she submitted her two-week notice
to Phoenix staff on December 1, 2022, which Phoenix accepted effective immediately.
Scott applied for unemployment benefits. Respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) issued an initial determination of
ineligibility, stating that Scott quit “because of alleged harassment, abusive behavior, or a
hostile work environment.” DEED concluded that, because “[t]he evidence [did] not show
that [Scott] complained to the employer about the harassment, abusive behavior, or hostile
work environment[,]” Scott did not have a good reason to quit caused by her employer.
Based on DEED’s determination, Scott was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits
per Minnesota Statutes section 268.095 (2022).
Scott administratively appealed. A ULJ held an evidentiary hearing on Scott’s
appeal in February 2023. Along with Scott’s testimony, the ULJ heard testimony from
A.B., Phoenix’s vice president of community services, and N.B., Phoenix’s director of
human resources. The ULJ later issued findings of fact and a decision, determining that
Scott was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her employment and no
exception applied.
2 Except where otherwise specified, the ULJ found the following facts. As
summarized below, these facts are undisputed on appeal.
In 2014, Scott began employment with Phoenix. In 2020, Phoenix transferred Scott
to a new location to address Scott’s concerns about an unprofessional work environment.
At the new location, Scott reported to D.W., a manager. Scott thought that D.W. was
unprofessional because D.W. would micromanage her.
Scott testified that, as a support professional, she was expected to report and record
“on the daily” when she found bruising or when she thought there were injuries to her
clients. Scott believed that D.W. was responsible for bruising on one of the residents at
Phoenix. Beginning in September 2021, Scott reported the resident’s bruises four times “in
company records, but believed her reports were not addressed.” In the records of her
reports, Scott did not identify any individual as causing bruising to the resident. 1 According
to Scott’s testimony, by recording her reports with a “high” notification level, she alerted
the appropriate management staff. A.B., however, testified that, if Scott felt her supervisor
was the culprit of potential abuse, the correct reporting procedure “in line with . . . [Scott’s]
training” was to notify another superior within the organization by telephone call.
1 Although Scott testified that the records she created were about her suspicions that someone was abusing the resident, the records themselves are unclear on that point. For example, in a record Scott created in March 2022, Scott stated that there was a bruise on the resident that was “of great concern to [her], for [it] was not the first time.” But Scott also reported that staff said the resident fell in the shower, thereby providing an explanation for the bruise that was not abuse. On the other hand, in the last record Scott created on November 12, 2022, Scott implied abuse without expressly saying so, although she did not identify a suspected abuser. More specifically, the November 12 record notes that, after Scott submitted reports about the resident’s bruises, “the bruising would stop for a short time.”
3 Scott’s last written report, which she recorded on November 12, 2022, noted that
Scott had not received a response to her concerns about the resident’s bruises. Scott
believed that D.W. had inappropriately modified the records Scott had created. Aside from
her written reports, Scott had contacted a program manager in 2021 and formally reported
the suspected abuse, but she ultimately felt that her complaints were not addressed. Scott
testified that she did not specifically tell the program manager that she thought D.W. was
responsible for the resident’s bruising and that the program manager “found no fault.”
A.B. testified that, on November 30, 2022, he received a message from one of
Scott’s coworkers, which stated that Scott had concerns about D.W. potentially harming a
resident, as well as other general concerns about D.W. In addition, A.B. testified that he
spoke with Scott on the phone that same date, that they scheduled a meeting for the next
day to discuss the information A.B. had received from Scott’s coworker, and that A.B. sent
Scott his list of questions for her review before their meeting. A.B., N.B., and Scott met
for about two hours on December 1. This meeting was 19 days after Scott’s final written
report and one day after A.B. received the message from Scott’s coworker relaying Scott’s
concerns that D.W. was potentially harming a resident. At the meeting, Phoenix did not
issue Scott any reprimands or warnings. Scott thought that being called into the meeting
was unfair to her and constituted harassment.
A.B. further testified that, during the December 1 meeting, Scott stated her belief
that D.W. had caused bruising to the resident, but Scott could not provide a reason why she
held that belief. In his testimony, A.B. said that, if a resolution with D.W. was impossible,
management could move Scott to another location. Scott testified that she wanted Phoenix
4 to move D.W. away from the resident, but Scott did not receive a direct answer to her
proposal. Scott expected to receive a specific plan of action or solution at the meeting, but
that did not occur to Scott’s satisfaction. Because Phoenix did not provide Scott with a
specific plan of action, and because Scott “felt anxious and was concerned about her
hypertension and overall health,” Scott submitted her two-week notice during the meeting.
Phoenix accepted Scott’s notice of quitting effective immediately because A.B. and N.B.
did not think that Scott’s continued work during her notice period would be productive. If
Scott had not submitted her two-week notice, Phoenix would have allowed Scott to
continue her employment.
The ULJ concluded that Scott did not have a good reason to quit caused by Phoenix
because “[t]he work environment even as described by Scott would not cause an average
reasonable person to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
employment.” The ULJ also reasoned that “[a]n average reasonable person might begin to
seek another job under these circumstances, but he or she would not quit and become
unemployed before finding other work.”
Following the ULJ’s findings of fact and decision that no exception applied to
Scott’s quit from employment, Scott filed a request for reconsideration. The ULJ denied
Scott’s request and affirmed the ineligibility decision.
Scott appeals.
5 DECISION
Scott challenges the ULJ’s determination that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits because she quit her employment without good reason caused by Phoenix.
Generally, an employee who “quit[s] employment is ineligible for unemployment
benefits.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1. But a person who “quit the employment because
of a good reason caused by the employer” may be eligible for benefits. 2 Id., subd. 1(1).
A good reason caused by the employer for quitting is a reason: (1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.
Id., subd. 3(a)(1)-(3). When determining whether an average worker would quit their
employment, the correct standard is “‘the standard of reasonableness as applied to the
average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive.’” Nichols v. Reliant Engineering &
Mfg., Inc., 720 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. App. 2006) (quoting Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp.
Servs., 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n.5 (Minn. 1976)).
The analysis of factors set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 268.095,
subdivision 3(a), “must be applied to the specific facts of each case.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
2 Scott has not argued, either on appeal or before the ULJ, that any of the other exceptions to ineligibility for unemployment benefits based on quitting apply. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1. Because no prejudicial error relating to the applicability of any other quit exception is obvious on mere inspection, our analysis focuses on whether the ULJ erred in deciding that Scott did not have a good reason to quit caused by Phoenix. See id., subd. 1(1); see also State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted)).
6 subd. 3(b). The statute also provides that “[i]f an applicant was subjected to adverse
working conditions by the employer, the applicant must complain to the employer and give
the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before
that may be a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Id., subd. 3(c). “The issue
of whether an employee had good reason to quit is a question of law reviewed de novo.”
Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
Assuming without deciding that Scott had a reason for quitting (1) that is directly
related to her employment and for which Phoenix is responsible, and (2) that is adverse to
Scott, see Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(1)-(2), we consider whether Scott’s reason for
quitting would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remain in the employment, see id., subd. 3(a)(3). Based on our de novo review
of the specific facts here, we conclude that Scott’s reasons for quitting would not, and that
Scott did not give Phoenix a reasonable opportunity to correct the allegedly adverse
working conditions after the December 1 meeting.
Scott quit her employment with Phoenix because Phoenix did not provide her with
a specific plan of action for addressing her abuse suspicions, and because Scott had anxiety
and health concerns. Although Scott’s training required that she notify another superior
within the organization by telephone call if she felt her supervisor was the culprit of
potential abuse, she did not do so. Instead, Scott made an oral report to a program manager
in 2021 that did not identify D.W. as responsible for the resident’s bruising, and the
program manager “found no fault.” In addition, between September 2021 and November
7 12, 2022, Scott created written records of the resident’s bruises that likewise did not specify
any individual as having harmed the resident.
On November 30, 2022, after A.B. received a message from one of Scott’s
coworkers about Scott’s concerns about D.W. potentially harming a resident, A.B.
contacted Scott and scheduled a meeting to discuss the matter the very next day. At oral
argument, DEED conceded that the 19-day period between Scott’s November 12 record
and the December 1 meeting was “ample time” for Phoenix to prepare to discuss Scott’s
reported concerns. But the December 1 meeting was also the first time that Scott directly
disclosed to a superior, in line with her training, Scott’s belief that D.W.—or any specific
person, for that matter—was abusing the resident.
After this formal report, Scott needed to give Phoenix a reasonable opportunity to
correct these allegedly adverse working conditions before the conditions could be a good
reason for Scott to quit, caused by Phoenix. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c). Scott,
however, did not allow Phoenix a reasonable opportunity to implement any potential
solutions. Rather than accept a move to another location or await a direct answer to her
proposal that Phoenix move D.W. away from the resident, Scott submitted her two-week
notice at the December 1 meeting, the same meeting in which Scott made her first direct
disclosure to a superior that she believed D.W. had bruised the resident.
We conclude that an average, reasonable person concerned for a resident’s safety
would have followed the correct reporting procedure to disclose suspicions of abuse by a
particular perpetrator—especially a manager—to another superior within the organization,
in the first instance. And an average, reasonable person would have continued the
8 employment to ensure that the employer remedy such concerns. Even if we did not so
conclude, Scott at the very least needed to afford Phoenix a reasonable opportunity to
correct the conditions that she was complaining about, once she directly informed A.B. and
N.B. that she believed D.W. was abusing the resident. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 3(c). Because Scott failed to do so, we conclude that these specific facts do not
amount to a good reason to quit caused by Phoenix. See id.
Affirmed.