Jane Moore v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 21, 2025
Docket20-71909
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jane Moore v. Pamela Bondi (Jane Moore v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jane Moore v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANE ORONI MOORE, AKA Jane Oroni No. 20-71909 Akpara, AKA Jane Oroni Akparanta, Agency No. A099-816-638 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 18, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, *** District Judge.

Jane Oroni Moore (“Moore”), a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for

review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), one

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. recalendaring her appeal after it was administratively closed, and the other

dismissing her appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her

motion for a continuance, denying her request for administrative closure, and

granting her voluntary departure. Where, as here, the BIA cites Matter of

Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994), and provides its own reasoning, “we

review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition for review.

1. Reviewing de novo, Guerrier v. Garland, 18 F.4th 304, 308 (9th Cir.

2021), the BIA did not violate Moore’s due process rights by granting the

Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) motion to recalendar Moore’s BIA

appeal, which had been administratively closed based on Moore’s allegation that

she was separately appealing the denial of her I-360 visa petition. Moore argues

that the BIA violated her due process rights by recalendaring her case despite

DHS’s failure to provide any supporting evidence—such as communications

between DHS and other agencies—to support its claim that Moore had not, in fact,

appealed the denial of her I-360 petition. However, Moore has not shown that the

failure to provide this supporting evidence may have affected the outcome of the

proceeding, as is required to state a due process claim. Pangilinan v. Holder, 568

F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009).

2 2. Moore’s challenge to the IJ’s denial of her sixth motion for a

continuance does not require remand to the agency. We review an IJ’s denial of a

motion to continue for abuse of discretion, Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012

(9th Cir. 2009), and we consider four factors: (1) the importance of the evidence to

be excluded by denial; (2) the reasonableness of the noncitizen’s conduct; (3) the

inconvenience to the court posed by continuance; and (4) the number of

continuances previously granted. Karapetyan v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1118, 1129

(9th Cir. 2008), superseded by statute on other grounds. Here, Moore received

five continuances over the span of two years as she awaited the adjudication of her

pending I-360 visa petition. After her I-360 petition was denied, Moore sought a

sixth continuance based on her allegation that she had appealed the denial of the

visa petition. The IJ denied the motion, citing the number of continuances

previously granted. Even if this denial was an abuse of discretion, Moore has not

alleged that remand would allow her to pursue any form of immigration relief.

Remand for the grant of a continuance would therefore constitute “an idle and

useless formality,” and we decline to do so. See Gutierrez-Zavala v. Garland, 32

F.4th 806, 810 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.

759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion)).

3. Moore’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, raised for the first

time in her petition for review, was not raised before the BIA. Because the

3 Government asserts non-exhaustion, we may not consider Moore’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th

Cir. 2024).

PETITION DENIED.

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Related

National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon Co.
394 U.S. 759 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Ali v. Holder
637 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Karapetyan v. Mukasey
543 F.3d 1118 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Ahmed v. Holder
569 F.3d 1009 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder
568 F.3d 708 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
BURBANO
20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1994)
Jose Gutierrez-Zavala v. Merrick Garland
32 F.4th 806 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Ninoska Suate-Orellana v. Merrick Garland
101 F.4th 624 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)

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Jane Moore v. Pamela Bondi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jane-moore-v-pamela-bondi-ca9-2025.