Jane LaSalle v. Prestige Motor Car Imports LLC

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0987
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 24, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________

No. 3D24-0987 Lower Tribunal No. 21-12683-CA-01 ________________

Jane LaSalle, Appellant,

vs.

Prestige Motor Car Imports, LLC, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.

Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., and Jon Polenberg and Kaitlyn N. Silverberg and Gabrielle Sliwka (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellant.

Kula & Associates, P.A., and Elliot B. Kula and Elaine D. Walter; Kluger, Kaplan, Silverman, Katzen & Levine, P.L., and Abbey L. Kaplan, Michael T. Landen, and Jean-Pierre Bado, for appellees.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and LOBREE, JJ.

LOGUE, J. Jane LaSalle appeals various orders entering partial summary

judgments against her and in favor of her former employer, Prestige Motor

Car Imports, LLC, and Brett David, Gilbert Martin, and Nicholas Gamarra,

three individuals who supervised her at Prestige. The partial summary

judgments rejected LaSalle’s claims for defamation against the individual

managers. They also rejected LaSalle’s claims against Prestige for

defamation, for negligent supervision based on allegedly allowing the

defamation, and for wrongful termination in violation of Florida’s

Whistleblower’s Act, section 448.102(3), Florida Statutes.1 The judgments,

however, left pending LaSalle’s additional claims, including her claim that

she suffered further retaliation in violation of the Act based on Prestige filing

counterclaims against her in the underlying action. We affirm the judgments

on the defamation claims but dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the remainder of

LaSalle’s appeal because it is intertwined with her pending claim below for

violation of Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act based on Prestige’s filing of the

1 Section 448.102(3) provides: “An employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the employee has: . . . (3) Objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.”

Further, “‘[r]etaliatory personnel action’ means the discharge, suspension, or demotion by an employer of an employee or any other adverse employment action taken by an employer against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.” § 448.101(5), Fla. Stat. 2 counterclaims.

Background

LaSalle served as the finance director for Prestige, a luxury car

dealership. Her responsibilities included the processing of loans, and she

was compensated in part by commissions. LaSalle was supervised by

appellees Brett David, Prestige’s owner and chief executive officer, Gilbert

Martin, Prestige’s general manager, and Nicholas Gamarra, Prestige’s

general sales manager.

According to the allegations in the operative complaint, LaSalle

informed David, Martin, and Gamarra that customers were fraudulently using

loan proceeds received from the Small Business Administration’s Paycheck

Protection Program to purchase vehicles and to obtain financing for the

vehicles.2 Within three months, David terminated LaSalle, informing her that

the “family had decided to move in a different direction.” LaSalle alleged in

her complaint that she was terminated for disclosing, and refusing to

participate in, fraud in the customer loan applications.

2 The Paycheck Protection Program was enacted under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Stimulus Act (“CARES Act”), which enabled the Small Business Administration to loan small businesses money to keep employees on the payroll and continue operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36).

3 Following her termination, she became convinced that David, Martin,

and Gamarra spread defamatory statements about her, including that she

was terminated for accepting kickbacks and bribes from lending institutions

that provided financial services to Prestige.

LaSalle sued Prestige for defamation, negligent supervision of David,

Martin, and Gamarra, which allowed them to defame her, wrongful discharge

under Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act, and for commissions owed. She also

sued David, Martin, and Gamarra for defamation. Prestige answered and

filed counterclaims relating to LaSalle’s wrongful retention of commissions

and wrongful disclosure of privileged information. LaSalle then amended her

complaint to assert an additional count against Prestige, alleging that

Prestige’s filing of the counterclaims was retaliation in violation of Florida’s

Whistleblower’s Act. After discovery was taken, Prestige and the individual

managers moved for summary judgment.

The trial court entered partial summary judgment for Prestige and the

individual managers on LaSalle’s defamation claims and for Prestige on

LaSalle’s claim for negligent supervision relating to defamation. The trial

court also entered summary judgment for Prestige on LaSalle’s claim for

wrongful discharge under Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act. Thereafter, the

following claims were left pending in the lower court: (1) LaSalle’s claim

4 against Prestige for commissions owed, (2) LaSalle’s claim against Prestige

for retaliation under Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act based on Prestige filing the

counterclaims; and (3) Prestige’s counterclaims against LaSalle. LaSalle

appealed the partial summary judgments.

Analysis

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). “[T]he correct test

for the existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether ‘the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” In re

Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The

required evidence contemplated by the summary judgment rule are facts

presented “in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.510(c)(2). Further, “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose

a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent

to testify on the matters stated.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(4). When presented

by the nonmovant, the purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the

nonmovant’s evidence is “of sufficient weight and quality that ‘reasonable

5 jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the nonmovant] is

entitled to a verdict.’” Rich v. Narog, 366 So. 3d 1111, 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA

2022) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

A viable defamation claim requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the

defendant’s publication; (2) falsity of the information; (3) the actor acted with

knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a

public official or acted negligently on a matter concerning a private person;

(4) actual damages; and (5) the statement must be defamatory. See Greene

v. Times Publ’g Co., 130 So. 3d 724, 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Prestige and the

individual managers filed the testimony of David, Martin, and Gamarra in

which they denied making the defamatory statements. They also noted that

LaSalle and the various witnesses identified by her actually had no personal

knowledge of anyone at Prestige making the alleged defamatory statements

and that LaSalle could not identify any lending institutions that were told the

alleged defamatory statements. Because the record evidence relied on by

Prestige and the individual managers met their initial burden as movants for

summary judgment, it became incumbent upon LaSalle “to identify probative

record evidence that, if believed by a factfinder, would entitle [her] to a

verdict.” Septentriona Domus, LLC v. Keystone Morgan Real Est., 406 So.

6 3d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (alteration added).

In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, LaSalle relied

upon the depositions and declarations of herself, Yessica Torres (a former

employee of Prestige), and Gunars Mansons (LaSalle’s husband). All of

them testified that they heard rumors or stories that LaSalle had been fired

for stealing money or taking kickbacks. None of them, however, were able to

testify to personal knowledge of hearing anyone actually stating those

rumors or mentioning them to anyone in or outside Prestige. At best, they

testified that they heard a second person claim that a third person had made

such a statement. For example, LaSalle testified that a person named Junior

Ravello told her that others repeated the defamation.3

LaSalle maintained that this testimony was not hearsay because she

was not offering it for the proof that she took kickbacks and bribes. The trial

court rejected this argument. We agree with the trial court. For example,

LaSalle’s testimony about what Ravello heard was presented to prove the

3 When deposed, Ravello denied he made these statements to LaSalle. Issues of credibility, however, are not cognizable in a motion for summary judgment. Ortega v. JW Marriott Inv., LLC, 405 So. 3d 473, 477–78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)). As explained below, the problem here is not LaSalle’s credibility, but the fact that her testimony is hearsay. 7 truth that Ravello heard someone repeat the defamatory statements. But,

although LaSalle is the person testifying, she has no personal knowledge of

what Ravello heard. It is Ravello who is being quoted as discussing what he

heard, but Ravello is not testifying so this evidence is not “in a form that

would be admissible in evidence.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(2). This problem

occurs with all of LaSalle’s witnesses.

On this point, however, LaSalle next argues that, even without other

evidence, the existence of the rumor itself is a basis to infer that the rumor

was started and spread by the individual managers. In support, LaSalle cites

to Hoch v. Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, 742 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA

1999). In Hoch, a worker’s compensation judge who was not reappointed to

his position sued a law firm for defamation. The law firm sponsored a series

of seminars about worker’s compensation judges titled, “Sleeping with the

Enemy.” The seminars purported to provide information on outside matters

that influenced the judges, including salacious materials. Many lawyers who

attended a seminar on the judge at issue reported statements that this judge

could be influenced by certain improper considerations, and written reports

of the lawyers’ notes to that effect were circulated. No one, however, could

identify an individual at the firm who made the comments and the presenters

denied making the comments. The Court nevertheless held a sufficient

8 inference could be made from those facts to overcome the firm’s motion for

summary judgment.

We distinguish Hoch on two bases. First, Hoch contained more facts

supporting the inference than the simple fact that a rumor was circulating.

Second, and most importantly, Hoch was decided under “Florida’s old,

subjective summary judgment standard, which disfavored summary

judgments in a lopsided manner[.]” Shands v. City of Marathon, 411 So. 3d

452, 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (Logue, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 4

We hold that LaSalle’s assertation that the existence of a rumor

supports an inference that the managers created and published the rumor

relies too much upon “speculation, surmise and conjecture” to survive a

summary judgment motion even under the old rule. See Gonzalez v. Citizens

Prop. Ins. Corp., 273 So. 3d 1031, 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Because

LaSalle’s defamation claims did not survive summary judgment, LaSalle’s

4 Florida’s old summary judgment standard required that summary judgment be denied “[i]f the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact or the possibility of any issue, or if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist[.]” Raven v. Roosevelt REO US LLC, 278 So. 3d 245, 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Johnson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. Ams., 248 So. 3d 1205, 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)) (emphases added). The Florida Supreme Court has since adopted a more modern and objective summary judgment standard. In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2021).

9 claims that Prestige negligently supervised its employees by failing to

prevent them from defaming her must also fall.

Finally, we address LaSalle’s appeal of the order granting summary

judgment on her claim of wrongful discharge under Florida’s Whistleblower’s

Act. Still pending below is LaSalle’s claim for retaliation in violation of the Act

based on Prestige filing counterclaims against LaSalle in the underlying

action. Because of the risk of inconsistent results, we hold that LaSalle’s

claim for wrongful discharge under the Act is “interdependent with other

pleaded claims” that remain pending below, namely LaSalle’s claim for other

retaliation under the Act. We therefore hold that the order granting summary

judgment on the wrongful discharge claim in violation of Florida’s

Whistleblower’s Act is a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Fla. R. App. P.

9.110; see also Camargo v. Prime W., Inc., 225 So. 3d 912, 913 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2017) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding a partial

summary judgment was a nonfinal, nonappealable order because the

dismissed claims were interrelated with remaining claims).

Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the summary judgments relating to LaSalle’s claims

for defamation against Prestige and the individual managers. As the trial

court properly entered summary judgment as to the defamation claims, it

10 also properly granted summary judgment in favor of Prestige as to LaSalle’s

claim of negligent supervision for allegedly allowing defamation. We dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction the portion of LaSalle’s appeal relating to the summary

judgment entered in favor of Prestige on LaSalle’s claim of wrongful

discharge under the Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act because interrelated

claims remain pending, and therefore, that portion of the order on appeal is

a nonfinal, nonappealable order.

Affirmed, in part; dismissed, in part.