Jane Doe v. The City of Gauley Bridge
This text of Jane Doe v. The City of Gauley Bridge (Jane Doe v. The City of Gauley Bridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2025 Doc: 31 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-2025
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF GAULEY BRIDGE,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
LARRY CLAY, JR., individually as a member of the Gauley Bridge Police Department,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, Chief District Judge. (2:21−cv−00491)
Submitted: August 23, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Stephen P. New, Russell A. Williams, NEW TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellant. Montè L. Williams, Morgantown, West Virginia, Mark G. Jeffries, Anna V. Pugh, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Bridgeport, West USCA4 Appeal: 22-2025 Doc: 31 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 2 of 4
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2025 Doc: 31 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 3 of 4
PER CURIAM:
Jane Doe appeals from the district court’s August 22, 2022, order granting the City
of Gauley Bridge’s motion to dismiss. The district court also granted the City’s Rule 54(b)
motion, entering a final judgment in the City’s favor. Because that order doesn’t meet Rule
54(b)’s requirements, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Doe sued Police Chief Larry Allen Clay, Jr. and the City of Gauley Bridge, asserting
several claims arising from Clay’s alleged sexual abuse of Doe. The City then moved to
dismiss all claims against it, and the district court granted the motion. As Doe’s claims
against Clay were still pending, the City moved for the entry of a final judgment in its favor
under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court issued a short
order granting the motion without explanation.
We have an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction, even when the parties
don’t dispute it. Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir.
1993). We lack appellate jurisdiction to review a district court order that isn’t “final.” 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, a district court order isn’t “final” unless it resolves all claims
for all parties. Fox v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 201 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2000). But
Rule 54(b) provides a mechanism for district courts to certify for immediate appeal a
judgment that disposes of fewer than all claims and all parties. In an action with multiple
claims or parties, the district court “may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2025 Doc: 31 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 4 of 4
but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
A Rule 54(b) determination requires two steps. First, the district court must
determine that the judgment is final. Braswell, 2 F.3d at 1335. Second, the district court
must “expressly determine[]” whether there is “no just reason for the delay in the entry of
judgment.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Braswell, 2 F.3d at 1335–36.In making the latter
determination, we have instructed district courts to consider several factors. Braswell, 2
F.3d at 1335–36. And when the district court finds that these factors support granting the
motion, it should “state those findings on the record or in its order.” Id. at 1336.
The district court’s order fails the second step. The district court didn’t “expressly
determine[]” that there was “no just reason for delay,” nor provide any reasoning to support
such a finding. Instead, the district court merely granted the City’s Rule 54(b) motion
without explanation. As a result, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the appeal on the
merits. Gelin v. Shuman, 834 F. App’x 41, 42–43 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Given the defects in the Rule 54(b) order, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Jane Doe v. The City of Gauley Bridge, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jane-doe-v-the-city-of-gauley-bridge-ca4-2023.