Jane Doe v. Salesforce.com Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00435
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 JANE DOE, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C24-435-TL-BAT 10 v. ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART 11 SALESFORCE.COM INC., et al., DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL AND PLAINTIFF’S 12 Defendants. CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 13 The G6 Defendants and defendant SeaTac Hotels LLC (“G6/SeaTac Defendants”) move 14 to compel (1) to reopen plaintiff M.K.’s deposition; (2) to compel her to answer questions she 15 refused to answer in her first examination under oath; and (3) to limit the objections/instructions 16 not to answer by her counsel in her next exam.1 Dkts. 127, 134. The Court GRANTS in-part 17 and DENIES in-part the G6/SeaTac Defendants’ motion to compel without prejudice to moving 18 to reopen the deposition at a later time when the G6/SeaTac Defendants can better explain the 19 timing, scope, and extent to which plaintiff’s history of sexual abuse outside of the trafficking 20

21 1 The Court has considered the G6 Defendants’ supplemental authority, Dkt. 146, and plaintiff’s objection to that authority, Dkt. 147, and the G6 Defendants’ response to the objection, Dkt. 148. 22 Neither the supplemental authority nor the parties’ argumentation over its relevance has been helpful in resolving the motion to compel. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 period, covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 412, is relevant to their challenge to plaintiff’s 2 claim of emotional damages and cannot be obtained except through a deposition. The Court 3 GRANTS in-part and DENIES in-part plaintiff’s cross-motion for a protective order with 4 respect to queries related to Rule 412 and liability (as opposed to damages) and the subject

5 matter, scope, and timing of a reopened deposition.2 Dkt. 137. The Court also addresses other 6 issues raised by the parties’ motions below. 7 BACKGROUND 8 The G6/SeaTac Defendants own, operate, or franchise Motel 6 hotels in King County, 9 Washington. Dkt. 1 [hereinafter “Complaint”] ¶¶ 16, 20–28. Plaintiff alleges that she is a 10 survivor of sex trafficking, and that for several years she was repeatedly forced by her traffickers 11 to engage in commercial sex at certain Motel 6 properties.3 Complaint ¶ 8. Plaintiff asserts 12 claims for (1) perpetrator liability under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 13 (“TVPRA”) against the G6 Defendants and all hotel defendants like SeaTac Hotel, 14 (2) beneficiary liability against all defendants, and (3) vicarious liability for TVPRA violations

15 against the G6 Defendants. Complaint ¶¶ 234–49; see 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff alleges, 16 among other damages, mental anguish and emotional distress. Complaint ¶ 254(i). 17 To state a claim for civil perpetrator liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 18 either (1) committed an act prohibited under Section 1591(a)(1), such as knowingly harboring, 19 maintaining, or transporting a victim or commercial sex acts using force, fraud, or coercion, or 20 2 The Court construes plaintiff’s request for a protective order contained in responsive briefing as 21 a cross-motion for a protective order. Dkt. 137, at 1. That cross-motion was, however, filed without being properly noted for consideration in accordance with Local Civil Rule 7(d)(2). 22 3 In the Complaint, plaintiff refers to a trafficking period of 2015 to 2023. Complaint ¶ 8. In the sealed deposition, plaintiff refers to a trafficking period of 2015 to 2021. Dkt. 130, Ex. A 26:19. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 (2) engaged in a venture under Section 1591(a)(2) that facilitated such acts, knowing or in 2 reckless disregard of the trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). To state a claim for beneficiary 3 liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) knowingly benefitted; (2) from participation 4 in a venture; (3) which they knew or should have known was engaged in conduct that violated

5 the TVPRA. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); Ratha v. Patthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 6 2022). To state a claim of vicarious liability under the TVPRA against a franchisor such as the 7 G6 Defendants via common law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) defendants and their 8 corresponding hotels were in an agency relationship, and (2) the hotels or hotel staff are 9 plausibly liable under Section 1595. See, e.g., Doe v. G6 Hospitality Property LLC, 2025 WL 10 3537626, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2025); A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F. 11 Supp. 3d 921, 939 (D. Or. 2020). In sum, under the facts of this case, to state a claim under 12 perpetrator liability, plaintiff must show defendants’ actual knowledge of trafficking; to state a 13 claim under beneficiary liability, plaintiff must show defendants’ actual or constructive 14 knowledge of trafficking; and to state a claim under vicarious liability, plaintiff must show

15 defendants’ principal-agent relationship with those who are liable as perpetrators or beneficiaries 16 such as the hotel staff or hotels. 17 In their motion, the G6/SeaTac Defendants allege that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in 18 misconduct during plaintiff’s deposition that prevented them “from examining issues like 19 ‘commercial sex’ that go to the heart of Plaintiff’s claims.” Dkt. 138, at 2. They have failed, 20 however, to explain how plaintiff’s testimony about consensual sexual activities before or after 21 the trafficking period has any relevance regarding defendants’ liability, i.e., what the defendants 22 knew or should have known about plaintiff being coerced into commercial sex during a fixed 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 period. Moreover, while plaintiff’s sexual trauma before or after the alleged trafficking period 2 may be relevant to the question of emotional damages, the G6/SeaTac Defendants have failed to 3 articulate the timing, scope and extent of such an intrusive exploration of topics protected during 4 discovery and trial by Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The G6/SeaTac Defendants are correct that

5 plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly and improperly coached and instructed plaintiff not to answer on 6 certain topics. Regardless of these shortcomings, which include counsel for plaintiff’s failure to 7 seek a protective order or cessation of the deposition in a timely manner, defendants must 8 provide further information before they are permitted to reopen plaintiff’s deposition about 9 consensual sexual activity, commercial or not, that occurred outside of the alleged trafficking 10 period and only in relation to sexual trauma and damages. As is discussed in greater detail below, 11 the G6/SeaTac Defendants may move to reopen plaintiff’s deposition and use other forms of 12 discovery to rectify these and other issues in light of providing a more detailed explanation about 13 the timing, scope, and subject matter of questioning. 14 DISCUSSION

15 As a general matter, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 16 that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant information 17 need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 18 discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. In this case, however, plaintiff is an alleged victim of sex 19 trafficking. For this reason, the scope of discovery regarding sexual behavior is determined with 20 reference to Federal Rule of Evidence 412. See, e.g., Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 21 3989193 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013), at *4 (collecting cases supporting the proposition “[a]lthough 22 Rule 412 governs the admissibility of sexual behavior evidence rather than its discoverability, the 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 policies underlying the Rule must be considered”); Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 2 2524587, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (same); Barta v. City and County of Honolulu, 16 3 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996) (same). Rule 412 prohibits the following evidence in a case 4 involving alleged sexual misconduct: “1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in

5 other sexual behavior; or 2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual predisposition.” Fed. R. 6 Evid. 412(a). However, in civil cases there is an exception: 7 [T]he court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value 8 substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. The court may admit evidence of a 9 victim's reputation only if the victim has placed it in controversy. 10 Fed. R. Evid 412(b)(2). 11 The purpose of Rule 412 is “to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of 12 privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associate with public disclosure 13 of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process. By 14 affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual 15 misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.” 16 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994 Amendments of Fed. R. Evid. 412. The Committee notes 17 advise: “Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party 18 seeking discovery makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant 19 under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through 20 discovery.” Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994 Amendments of Fed. R. Evid. 412, 21 subdivision (c). The Northern District of California explained how Rule 412 applies to 22 deposition questions involving a plaintiff’s sexual behavior: 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 [O]ne guiding principle in determining the proper scope of deposition questions in this case is that questions delving into 2 plaintiff's sexual behavior or disposition should not be allowed absent an affirmative demonstration by defendants that the 3 information sought is relevant to a claim or defense. 4 On the other hand, another guiding principle here is that defendants have a right to conduct discovery to understand 5 plaintiff's claims and to prepare their defense. Plaintiff cannot use FRE 412 as both a shield and a sword. If plaintiff intends to make 6 affirmative use of evidence regarding her sexual conduct, then defendants should be given an opportunity to test that information 7 through discovery. Stated another way, plaintiff cannot use at trial any evidence that she does not allow defendants to discover. 8 Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 2524587, at *2. 9 With these guiding principles in mind, the Court addresses the subject areas of discovery 10 sought by the G6/SeaTac Defendants. 11 1. Questions About Commercial Sex Before and After Trafficking Period 12 The G6/SeaTac Defendants contend that they should be able to depose plaintiff about 13 consensual sexual activity, specifically about plaintiff M.K.’s participation in commercial sex, 14 outside of the alleged trafficking period. Dkt. 127, at 11–12. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to this 15 line of questioning at the deposition, clarifying that M.K. could be asked about other 16 nonconsensual sex acts outside of the trafficking period, or other commercial sex acts during the 17 period in which M.K. was trafficked, but not consensual sex before or after. Dkt. 137, at 3. “As 18 M.K.’s counsel explained, consensual sex has no relevance to M.K.’s action because M.K.’s 19 injuries were caused by rape and force.” Id. The Court finds that the G6/SeaTac Hotels 20 Defendants have failed to demonstrate in compliance with Rule 412 that evidence of plaintiff’s 21 sexual behavior before or after the trafficking period is relevant with respect to TVPRA liability, 22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 and have yet to provide adequate information to determine the proper scope, proportionality, and 2 timing of inquiry into these matters with respect emotional damages. 3 The G6/SeaTac Defendants make no attempt to square their exploration into plaintiff’s 4 sexual behavior before and after the trafficking period with the Advisory Committee’s

5 admonishment that in accordance with Rule 412 courts should presumptively issue protective 6 orders barring such discovery unless the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant 7 under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through 8 discovery. Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994 Amendments of Fed. R. Evid. 412, 9 subdivision (c). The G6/SeaTac Defendants’ only justification for exploring plaintiff’s non- 10 trafficking period sexual behavior in terms of liability comes in the form of the conclusory 11 statement that plaintiff “prevented Defendants from examining issues like ‘commercial sex’ that 12 go to the heart of Plaintiff’s claims” and have “prejudiced Defendants’ ability to defend this 13 case." Dkt. 138, at 2; see, e.g., Dkt. 127, at 12 (stating that plaintiff’s “TVPRA claims require her 14 to plead and prove that she is a victim of sex trafficking—that is, involuntary commercial sex.”).

15 There is no dispute that plaintiff was involved in commercial sex during the trafficking period. 16 To the extent the G6/SeaTac Defendants question whether the commercial sex during the 17 trafficking period was involuntary, and therefore constituted sex trafficking, they have not 18 indicated how plaintiff’s voluntary involvement in commercial sex before or after the relevant 19 period could prove or disprove force or coercion during the relevant period. Furthermore, key to 20 plaintiff proving defendants’ liability is their actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiff was 21 the victim of sex trafficking. That is, it is irrelevant for liability purposes whether plaintiff was 22 engaged in commercial sex outside of the trafficking period because the only relevance of such 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 information comes from what defendants knew or should have known about her involvement in 2 commercial sex that might have informed their decision making (e.g., by turning a blind eye to 3 evidence of it or by ignoring signs that voluntary commercial sex had become coerced), and such 4 evidence is exclusively within the control of the defendants themselves.4 See, e.g., W.K. v. Red

5 Roof Inns Inc., 2024 WL 5114059, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2024) (“As a hypothetical, if one of 6 the Plaintiffs posted an online ad offering commercial sex, it would only be relevant to 7 Defendants’ knowledge if Defendants knew or should have known about the ad. The Defendants 8 cannot introduce this evidence simply to prove that they did not know about it: a contrary 9 holding would contravene the purposes of Rule 412.”). That plaintiff might have a predisposition 10 to invent coercion when none existed because she has previously or is currently engaged in 11 commercial sex work is the kind of evidence that Rule 412 was enacted to forbid in order to 12 protect victims of sexual violence and to encourage reporting such crimes. With respect to 13 liability, the G6/SeaTac Defendants have not demonstrated that the probative value of testimony 14 about plaintiff’s sexual behavior or sexual disposition outside of the trafficking period

15 substantially outweighs the danger of harm and unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid 412(b)(2). 16 Only in passing, and largely with respect to plaintiff’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment 17 regarding control over a social media account (discussed infra), do the G6/SeaTac Defendants 18 refer to plaintiff’s engagement in commercial sex with respect to her claim for emotional 19 damages. See Dkt. 127, at 14; Dkt. 138, at 3. For example, the G6/SeaTac Defendants argue that 20 plaintiff should not be permitted to claim in her interrogatory responses regarding damages that 21

22 4 As mentioned earlier, plaintiff does not dispute deposition questions about non-consensual sex outside of the trafficking period. Dkt. 137, at 3. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 she no longer enjoys sex while continuing to engage in commercial sex. Dkt. 127, at 14. Setting 2 aside the conflation of “enjoyment” with “work,” the Court agrees with the G6/SeaTac 3 Defendants that they should be allowed to discover evidence that plaintiff suffered other sexual 4 trauma, either before or after she was allegedly trafficked, as a way to contest causation and the

5 amount of damages plaintiff seeks. See, e.g., Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 6 1997) (holding that evidence of prior relationships was highly relevant to the defendant's liability 7 where plaintiff alleged the defendant gave her herpes); Red Roof Inns, Inc., 2024 WL 5114059, 8 at *4 (holding that the danger of harm or prejudice to plaintiffs by the introduction of their 9 history of sexual trauma is outweighed by its probative value); Lane v. Am. Airlines, 2024 WL 10 1200074, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. March 20, 2024) (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges emotional or 11 psychological injury, evidence of prior sexual abuse or assaults is admissible to show other 12 sources of that injury and to determine damages.”) (citations omitted); Ramsbottom v. Ashton, 13 2023 WL 3098824 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2023), at *3 (ruling that with respect to discovery 14 disputes, the question of whether plaintiff suffered abuse in other relationships is relevant to her

15 damages). 16 Although the Court finds that the defendants are permitted to inquire into evidence 17 regarding sexual trauma plaintiff suffered that occurred outside of the trafficking period for the 18 purpose of challenging causation and damages, the G6/SeaTac Defendants have not 19 meaningfully described how such an inquiry into these matters will be made without eliciting 20 unnecessary details about these traumatic events and unrelated consensual sex. The Court does 21 not presume, as the G6 Defendants appear to imply, that engagement in commercial sex is de 22 facto pleasurable or traumatic; similarly, the Court does not presume, as plaintiff appears to 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 imply, that all consensual sex, commercial or private, is incapable of producing trauma. The 2 Court also recommends that the parties meet and confer about the timing and scope of a 3 deposition and other forms of inquiry into plaintiff’s sexual history to minimize embarrassment, 4 trauma, and needless invasion into M.K.’s privacy. The Court notes, for example, that the parties

5 might seek leave to delay questioning about sexual trauma until after the resolution of a 6 summary judgment motion; the parties might begin discovery regarding emotional damages by 7 exchanging expert opinions about the sources of plaintiff’s trauma, sexual or otherwise; the 8 parties might agree upon a limited scope for a reopened deposition and reserve most inquiry to 9 less intrusive means, such as interrogatories, medical records, and expert opinions. 10 In sum, the Court finds that Rule 412 precludes the defendants from making broad 11 inquiries into plaintiff’s sexual history outside of the trafficking period with respect to liability. 12 Defendants are, however, entitled to inquire into other sexual trauma that plaintiff may have 13 suffered before or after the trafficking period, though only after they have met and conferred 14 about how best to inquire into these sensitive questions via less intrusive means, as well as to

15 explore whether such inquiries can or should be delayed until the resolution of summary 16 judgment motions. Defendants may move to reopen plaintiff’s deposition on such questions, but 17 only by submitting all questions regarding sexual trauma to plaintiff beforehand, explaining how 18 the extent, scope, and timing of the inquiries are more probative than harmful or prejudicial, and 19 adhering to the confidentiality requirements of the Amended Protective Order. The Court notes 20 that an inquiry into whether plaintiff engaged in commercial sex outside of the trafficking period 21 is not prohibited. It is, however, at this time limited to an inquiry about the time periods in which 22 plaintiff has engaged in commercial sex and to what extent plaintiff has (if at all) been 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 traumatized by consensual sex. This order addresses only whether this information is 2 discoverable. The trial judge will also make a later determination about whether such 3 information is admissible otherwise and in accordance with Rule 412. 4 2. Fifth Amendment and Questions About Social Media Account

5 The G6/SeaTac Defendants contend that that on instruction from counsel plaintiff 6 improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer questions about her control over 7 the same social media account used by the traffickers to advertise commercial sex. Dkt. 127, at 8 13. They are correct that the Fifth Amendment may not be wielded both as a shield and a sword 9 such that, if plaintiff continues to invoke it under these circumstances, the defendants will be 10 entitled to an adverse inference should these issues be raised at trial. See, e.g., Lyons v. Johnson, 11 415 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969); S.E.C. v. Collelo, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998). 12 Plaintiff alleged that during the trafficking period she lacked control over the social 13 media account used to advertise her for commercial sex and that her trafficker used certain 14 photographs in advertisements. Dkt. 130, Ex. A 109–113. Yet those photographs were used on

15 the same account after her alleged trafficking ended. Id. 227–28. Defendants thus asked whether 16 she controlled the account and used it to engage in voluntary commercial sex; counsel instructed 17 her not to answer. Id. This was improper. First, the question was not directed toward plaintiff’s 18 sexual behavior or predisposition. It was directed towards her personal control after the 19 trafficking period of a social media account that she had stated was previously entirely out of her 20 control. Second, to the extent the question was directed towards plaintiff’s sexual behavior or 21 sexual predisposition, Rule 412’s exception applies because the probative value of the evidence 22 substantially outweighs its potential for harm or prejudice. Fed. R. Evid 412(b)(2). Plaintiff’s 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 answers relate to the question of whether plaintiff was being forced or coerced into commercial 2 sex during the trafficking period, impeachment of her testimony, and damages. Defendants are 3 not liable if they had actual or constructive knowledge of commercial sex; they are liable if they 4 knew or should have known that plaintiff was being coerced into commercial sex. See, e.g., A.B.

5 v. Extended Stay America Inc., 2023 WL 5951390, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2023) (finding 6 that allegations consistent with general commercial sex activity, but not rising to the level of sex 7 trafficking, do not give rise to a TVPRA claim). 8 Once the G6/SeaTac Defendants have properly supported a motion to reopen the 9 deposition, they will be afforded the opportunity to question plaintiff about her control over the 10 social media account that she alleges has been used by her traffickers to advertise commercial 11 sex. Defendants may inquire about plaintiff’s control over that social media account both before 12 and after the trafficking period because the discovery of this information appears reasonably 13 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and its probative value substantially 14 outweighs the potential for harm or prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2).

15 While plaintiff may still invoke the Fifth Amendment, the defendants will be afforded the 16 opportunity to seek an adverse inference from the trial judge should circumstances warrant it. 17 3. Questions About Drug Use 18 The G6/SeaTac Defendants contend that counsel improperly instructed plaintiff not to 19 answer questions about drug use because the drug use was remote in time, the questions were 20 unlikely to lead to admissible evidence, and the questions invaded plaintiff’s privacy. Dkt. 127, 21 at 11 (citing Dkt. 130, Ex. A 16:13–25). They are correct. 22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure authorizes instructing a deponent not to answer “only 2 when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present 3 a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).” Plaintiff’s counsel’s instructions to M.K. not to answer questions 4 about drug use were none of these and therefore were improper. Either through interrogatories or

5 in a reopened deposition, or both, plaintiff must answer questions about drug use. Plaintiff’s 6 Complaint refers to her trafficker using alcohol and drugs to force her to engage in commercial 7 sex and alleges that signs of drug use are an indicator of possible sex trafficking. Complaint 8 ¶¶ 106, 123, 142. Whether plaintiff was already using drugs regularly could lead to discoverable 9 evidence regarding plaintiff’s credibility, extent of damages, and a defense that the defendants 10 could be aware of drug use but not of sex trafficking. Whether such evidence is admissible will 11 be a decision for the trial judge. 12 4. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 13 Defendants have accurately cited occasions in which plaintiff’s counsel improperly made 14 speaking objections, coached her client, and improperly instructed plaintiff not to answer. See,

15 e.g., Dkt. 130, Ex. A 16:11–25, 20:4–19, 139:25–140:3; 156:8–157:12; 238–41; 274:25–275:3. 16 Defendants are also correct that the proper way for plaintiff to have voiced her objections 17 regarding the discoverability of plaintiff’s sexual behavior outside of the trafficking period was 18 to have moved to terminate or limit the deposition via Federal Rule of Civile Procedure 30(d)(3). 19 The G6 Defendants offered to terminate the deposition so that plaintiff could bring a Rule 20 30(d)(3) motion, but plaintiff declined. Dkt. 130, Ex. A 102:17–103:12. The Court therefore 21 finds that plaintiff’s counsel is required to pay the G6/SeaTac Defendants’ reasonable expenses 22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 incurred in making the current motion to compel, including attorney’s fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 37(a)(5). 3 Nevertheless, the Court finds that plaintiff’s objections to inquiries into plaintiff’s sexual 4 behavior outside of the trafficking period were substantially justified by defendants’ failure to

5 acknowledge the saliency of Rule 412 and a lack of specificity, scope, and timing of questions 6 that on the current record can be directed only towards sexual history as it relates to sexual 7 trauma and damages. Thus, in the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs for 8 any future deposition time. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The G6/SeaTac Defendants’ motion to compel is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in- 11 part. Dkts. 127, 134. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for a protective order is GRANTED in-part and 12 DENIED in-part. Dkt. 137. 13 Defendants are currently DENIED the opportunity to reopen the deposition without 14 prejudice to seeking leave to reopen the deposition at a later date. Plaintiffs are GRANTED the

15 protections set forth in this order. The defendants may not inquire about plaintiff’s consensual 16 history outside of the trafficking period with respect to liability; defendants may inquire about 17 plaintiff’s sexual trauma (whether via consensual or nonconsensual sex, or commercial or 18 noncommercial sex) only with respect to damages. Before defendants move to reopen the 19 deposition, the parties must meet and confer about the subject matter, scope, and timing of the 20 reopened deposition, mindful that defendants must make an affirmative showing that the 21 evidence sought regarding sexual trauma is more probative than prejudicial, will afford plaintiff 22 the protections embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and is proportional to the focus on 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 emotional damages in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Such a showing 2 should be supported by evidence that the defendants have first explored emotional damages via 3 medical records, interrogatories, requests for admission, and expert opinions. The Court 4 encourages the parties to consider a joint motion to delay exploration of sexual trauma until after

5 the resolution of any summary judgment motions. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the 6 defendants may move to reopen the deposition for an additional duration of no longer than three 7 hours. 8 The G6/SeaTac Defendants are GRANTED the opportunity to seek through deposition 9 testimony or other forms of discovery information about plaintiff’s drug use and her control over 10 the social media account used to advertise commercial sex. The Court thus will also consider a 11 joint, expedited submission about whether the deposition should be reopened for a portion of the 12 three-hour deposition time to take place earlier and separate from questions regarding plaintiff’s 13 sexual trauma. The Court will not restrict plaintiff’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in 14 response to these inquiries, but an adverse inference instruction by the trial judge would be

15 warranted if related evidence is used at trial. 16 During any reopened deposition, plaintiff should refrain from objections beyond those for 17 form or privilege. The deposition may take place either in-person or via video. The parties 18 should coordinate with Courtroom Deputy Andy Quach at 206-370-8424, 19 andy_quach@wawd.uscourts.gov, to schedule the deposition at a time the undersigned 20 magistrate judge will be available to resolve disputes. The deposition may cover topics not 21 addressed in the current order; however, any questions that implicate Rule 412 shall be provided 22 in writing to plaintiff in advance. Discoverability does not presume admissibility, and the 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 1 admissibility shall be determined by the trial judge. 2 The G6/SeaTac Defendants’ request for costs and attorney’s fees for bringing this motion 3 to compel is GRANTED. Within 30 days of this Order, the G6/SeaTac Defendants should 4 provide the Court with invoices and other details sufficient to show their costs and fees. Upon

5 the Courts’ approval, plaintiff’s counsel shall pay the G6/SeaTac Defendants the costs and 6 attorney’s fees incurred for bringing the motion to compel. The G6/SeaTac Defendants’ request 7 for costs and fees for a future deposition of plaintiff is DENIED. If the deposition is reopened, 8 the parties shall bear their own costs and fees. 9 DATED this 23rd day of January, 2026. 10 A 11 BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA 12 United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN-PART AND DENYING IN-PART DEFENDANTS’