Jane Doe v. County of Solano, Solano Sheriff’s Office, John B. Robertson (in his individual and official capacities), Thomas A. Ferrara (in his individual and official capacities), Bradley

Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JANE DOE, No. 2:25-cv-03155 WBS AC 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTY OF SOLANO, SOLANO 16 SHERIFF’S OFFICE, JOHN B. ROBERTSON (in his individual and 17 official capacities), THOMAS A. FERRARA (in his individual and 18 official capacities), BRADLEY DEWALL (in his individual and 19 official capacities), and JACKSON HARRIS (in his 20 individual and official capacities), 21 Defendants. 22 23 ----oo0oo---- 24 This action arises out of events of alleged violent 25 sexual assault within the workplace context. 26 On or about October 4, 2021, plaintiff Jane Doe 27 commenced her employment as a Sheriff’s Deputy with the County of 28 1 Solano (“the County”) and the Solano County Sheriff’s Office 2 (“the Office”). (Docket No. 1 (Compl.) at 8.) Following her 3 initial orientation, plaintiff entered a “pre-field training 4 period” as a bailiff at a local courthouse. (Id.) During that 5 period, plaintiff was prohibited from leaving the courthouse 6 premises without a senior or lateral deputy escort pursuant to 7 the County’s and the Office’s policies. (Id.) 8 Senior Deputy John B. Robertson “positioned himself as 9 the primary person to escort” plaintiff from the courthouse “for 10 her breaks and meals.” (Id. at 9.) He further functioned as 11 plaintiff’s “supervisor and de facto supervisor through multiple 12 bases of authority.” (Id.) 13 Around November 2021, Robertson began to drastically 14 escalate his conduct as to plaintiff. Among other things, he 15 invited plaintiff to his home; insisted on paying for plaintiff’s 16 meals when alone with her; made a so-called “joke” that he would 17 “rape” plaintiff’s “gay friend”; and stated that he was “the only 18 one” plaintiff could trust regarding her workplace frustrations 19 and directed her to not speak to other deputies regarding such 20 frustrations. (Id. at 10.) 21 On approximately August 14, 2022, when plaintiff was 22 visiting Robertson at his home upon his insistence, Robertson 23 “physically assaulted and raped her” despite plaintiff repeatedly 24 “refus[ing] both verbally and by her attempts to create physical 25 distance” to have sexual intercourse with Robertson. (Id. at 26 11.) Over the following months, Robertson raped plaintiff “no 27 less than eight . . . more times, with his last, most violent 28 1 rape” involving “strangulation” that caused plaintiff to believe 2 that “she was going to die.” (Id. at 11-12.) 3 Plaintiff reported Robertson’s assaults to the 4 Vacaville Police Department on December 18, 2024. (Id. at 13.) 5 The following day, Robertson was placed on administrative leave. 6 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that her reporting of Robertson’s conduct 7 spurred defendants to engage in a “pattern of retaliatory 8 conduct” described below. (Id. at 13.) 9 First, plaintiff alleges that County Sheriff Thomas A. 10 Ferrara; County Undersheriff Bradley Dewall; Jackson Harris, a 11 Captain in the County’s Sheriff’s Office; the County; and the 12 Office (together, the “Entity Defendants”) conducted an 13 investigation biased heavily in favor of Robertson. (Id. at 15.) 14 To support this allegation, plaintiff states that the third-party 15 consultant the Entity Defendants hired to supplement their 16 investigation declined to interview plaintiff until she 17 “repeatedly insisted that she be interviewed”; and the Entity 18 Defendants permitted Robertson to contact witnesses, bullied 19 plaintiff or alternatively avoided her, and shared confidential 20 details about the investigation throughout the Office. (Id.) 21 Second, on or about March 4, 2025, plaintiff was 22 informed by defendants Dewall and Harris, with the approval of 23 Ferrara, that Robertson was being returned to full duty because 24 of the investigator’s conclusion that Robertson would not be 25 fired; Robertson resumed such duty on March 10, 2025. (Id. at 26 16.) However, the investigator separately informed plaintiff 27 that he never reached that conclusion because his investigation 28 1 was still ongoing. (Id.) Around this time, the Entity 2 Defendants also purported to impose a “stay away” order between 3 Robertson and plaintiff but nevertheless assigned plaintiff and 4 Robertson to “overlapping shifts on the same beat.” (Id. at 16.) 5 Although Robertson violated the order at least five times, 6 plaintiff alleges that the Entity Defendants did not take any 7 disciplinary action against him for having done so. (Id. at 16- 8 17.) 9 Third, two months after plaintiff emailed the Entity 10 Defendants (to no response) documenting the retaliation she 11 allegedly experienced at their behest, those same defendants 12 served her with a “gag order” directing her to not discuss the 13 events giving rise to the investigation with anyone except an 14 Internal Affairs Sergeant, who was later removed from the 15 investigation due to a conflict-of-interest in favor of 16 Robertson. (Id. at 18-19.) 17 Plaintiff filed this action shortly thereafter, in 18 which she brings ten claims. Relevant here, she brings two 19 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): one against the 20 Entity Defendants in their individual and official capacities for 21 retaliating against her for engaging in constitutionally 22 protected speech, and the other against the County, the Office, 23 and Ferrara and Dewall pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 24 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 25 Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, in 26 which they seek to dismiss as against Harris, Dewall, and 27 Ferrara, and argue that plaintiff has not adequately pled her 28 1 First Amendment and Monell claims. (See Docket No. 18-1.) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 3 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 4 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 5 The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the 6 allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 7 inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a 8 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 9 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of 10 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 11 statements, do not suffice.” Id. 12 I. First Amendment Retaliation 13 To properly plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, 14 plaintiff must demonstrate that she “spoke on a matter of public 15 concern”; “spoke as a private citizen,” as opposed to a “public 16 employee”; and that her “protected speech was a substantial or 17 motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Eng v. 18 Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 a. Matter of Public Concern 20 “Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can 21 fairly be considered to relate to ‘any matter of political, 22 social, or other concern to the community.’” Johnson v. 23 Multnomah Cnty., Or., 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 24 Connick v. Myers, 416 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). As such, “speech 25 that concerns ‘issues about which information is needed or 26 appropriate to enable the members of society’ to make informed 27 decisions about the operation of their government merits the 28 1 highest degree of [F]irst [A]mendment protection.” McKinley v. 2 City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting 3 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). Conversely, 4 “speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and 5 grievances and that would be of no relevance to the public’s 6 evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies” is 7 generally not of public concern. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 8 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). 9 Plaintiff alleges that she reported Robertson’s 10 behavior to the Vacaville Police Department, the County, and the 11 Office, and that her reports addressed “law enforcement 12 misconduct, sexual violence by peace officers, workplace 13 retaliation, and sexual harassment [and] discrimination.” (See 14 Compl. at 13, 26.) To this end, the Ninth Circuit has held that 15 the “reporting . . . [of] instances of possible . . . 16 discrimination[] or misconduct” by public safety officers “and 17 following up on those complaints” is “clearly a matter of public 18 concern.” See Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 19 2009) (quotations omitted). 20 Indeed, whether a police department “treats complaints 21 of misconduct seriously or fails to follow[-]up is . . . a matter 22 of ‘relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of 23 governmental agencies’ and consequently independently a matter of 24 public concern.” Id. at 823 (quoting Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 25 973). Specifically, the ability to discern whether a police 26 force competently handles internal allegations of violent sexual 27 assault is undoubtedly a matter of concern to the public that may 28 1 report similar conduct to that same organization. Cf. id. 2 Accordingly, plaintiff has satisfied her burden of 3 demonstrating that she spoke on a matter of public concern. 4 b. Private Citizen or Public Employee 5 “The Supreme Court has observed that the inquiry into 6 whether employee speech is pursuant to employment duties is a 7 practical one.” Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 8 2007). Under this “practical” inquiry, id., “[s]tatements are 9 made in the speaker's capacity as citizen if the speaker had no 10 official duty to make the questioned statements, or if the speech 11 was not the product of performing the tasks the employee was paid 12 to perform,” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. 13 “[P]articularly in a highly hierarchical employment 14 setting such as law enforcement, whether or not the employee 15 confined h[er] communications to h[er] chain of command is a 16 relevant, if not necessarily dispositive, factor in determining 17 whether [s]he spoke pursuant to his official duties.” Dahlia v. 18 Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). Correspondingly, 19 “[w]hen a public employee communicates with individuals or 20 entities outside of h[er] chain of command, it is unlikely that 21 [s]he is speaking pursuant to h[er] duties.” Id. 22 Plaintiff alleges that, at minimum, she reported 23 Robertson’s conduct to the Vacaville Police Department, an 24 external entity necessarily sitting “outside of h[er] chain of 25 command.” See id. Further, plaintiff’s complaints concerned 26 departmental “abuse,” making it “unlikely that such complaints 27 c[ould] reasonably be classified as being within the job duties 28 1 of an average public employee.” See id. at 1075. 2 Plaintiff has thus satisfied her burden of showing that 3 she spoke as a private citizen. 4 c. Substantial or Motivating Factor Behind Adverse 5 Employment Action 6 To constitute an adverse employment action, a 7 government act of retaliation must be “reasonably likely to deter 8 employees from engaging in protected activity.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d 9 at 1078. “Depending on the circumstances, even minor acts of 10 retaliation can infringe on an employee's First Amendment 11 rights.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 975. 12 Under this inquiry, “some, perhaps all, of the 13 following acts, considered individually, were adverse employment 14 actions for purposes of plaintiff[’s] First Amendment retaliation 15 suit,” id. at 976: (1) disclosing information regarding the 16 confidential sexual assault investigation to other employees 17 (Compl. at 15), (2) bullying and alternatively ignoring plaintiff 18 (id.), (3) returning Robertson to duty after the investigation 19 and assigning him to “overlapping shifts on the same beat” as 20 plaintiff (id. at 16), (4) refusing to enforce the “stay away” 21 order directing Robertson to avoid plaintiff (id. at 16-17), and 22 (5) conspicuously refusing to identify plaintiff (and plaintiff 23 alone) by her official title at a County event (id. at 18). 24 “When taken together, it is clear that these acts amounted to a 25 severe and sustained campaign of employer retaliation that was 26 reasonably likely to deter plaintiff[] from engaging in speech 27 protected under the First Amendment.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 28 1 977. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately established that she 2 was subject to adverse employment actions. 3 Plaintiff must also demonstrate that “retaliation was a 4 substantial or motivating factor behind . . . defendant[s’] 5 adverse employment actions,” which she can do in at least “three 6 ways.” Id. “First,” she “can introduce evidence regarding the 7 proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly 8 retaliatory employment decision, from which a jury logically 9 could infer that the plaintiff was [harmed] in retaliation for 10 h[er] speech.” Id. (citation modified). “Second,” she “can 11 introduce evidence that h[er] employer expressed opposition to 12 h[er] speech, either to h[er] or to others.” Id. (quotations 13 omitted). “Third,” she “can introduce evidence that h[er] 14 employer's proffered explanations for the adverse employment 15 action were false and pre-textual.” Id. (quotations omitted). 16 Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged retaliation was a 17 substantial or motivating factor under the first approach. 18 Plaintiff initially complained of Robertson’s conduct in December 19 2024 (Compl. at 17); she alleges that defendants engaged in the 20 above-mentioned retaliatory conduct in February 2025 (id. at 18), 21 April 2025 (id. at 18-19), and June 2025 (id. at 27). The 22 minimal amount of time elapsed between plaintiff’s complaint and 23 defendants’ alleged conduct “easily . . . support[s] an inference 24 of retaliation.” See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 (three-to-eight- 25 month time range raises inference of retaliation). 26 Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately alleged a First 27 28 1 Amendment retaliation claim.1 2 II. Monell Claim 3 Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against the County and 4 the Office under failure-to-train and ratification theories.2 5 Because plaintiff adequately alleges a Monell claim against the 6 County and the Office under a failure-to-train theory, the court 7 need not address the viability of plaintiff’s ratification 8 theory. See, e.g., Thomas v. Stanislaus Cnty., No. 2:25-cv-02113 9 WBS CSK, 2026 WL 35695, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026). 10 “In limited circumstances, a local government's 11 decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to 12 avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an 13 official government policy for purposes of § 1983,” but “[a] 14 municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its 15 most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick 16 v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To state a claim for 17 failure to train, a plaintiff must show deliberate indifference 18 on the part of the County in adequately training its law 19

20 1 It may be the case that defendants have an “adequate justification” for engaging in their allegedly retaliatory 21 actions, or that they would have taken such actions “even in the 22 absence of . . . [plaintiff’s] protected conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071-72. However, at the pleading stage, defendants have not 23 yet had an opportunity to present such justification.

24 2 Plaintiff also alleges this claim against Ferrara and Dewall. However, “a Monell claim cannot properly be brought 25 against individual defendants.” Lopez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. SA 19:cv-1436 JVS ADSx, 2020 WL 2027597, at *5 26 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020) (citing Guillory v. Cty. of Orange, 731 27 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim against Ferrara and Dewall. 28 1 enforcement officers, and that the inadequate training actually 2 caused a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Merritt v. 3 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 Plaintiff alleges that the County and the Office failed 5 to adequately train its officers regarding: 6 (1) prohibition on sexual harassment and assault of 7 subordinate employees; (2) appropriate boundaries 8 between senior deputies and probationary deputies; (3) 9 mandatory reporting requirements under [state law]; (4) 10 protection of employees who report sexual misconduct; 11 (5) enforcement of ‘stay away’ orders and workplace 12 safety measures; and (6) the prohibition on retaliation 13 against employees who exercise First Amendment rights 14 to report misconduct. 15 (Compl. at 29.) 16 She thus “plausibly allege[s]” that the County and the 17 Office failed to train its officers regarding workplace sexual 18 misconduct and that “this failure to train resulted in” the 19 deprivation of her First Amendment rights. See Estate of 20 Chivrell, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 1238. 21 Plaintiff further alleges that, based on the County and 22 the Office’s checkered history of inadequately handling multiple 23 similar complaints of workplace sexual misconduct (see Compl. at 24 30), the County’s and the Office’s failure to implement such 25 policies amounted to deliberate indifference to constitutional 26 rights. See Estate of Chivrell, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 1238. This 27 is sufficient to state a Monell claim under a failure-to-train 28 1 theory at the pleading stage. 2 III. Individual Defendants 3 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s First Amendment claim 4 must be dismissed against Harris, Dewall, and Ferrara in their 5 individual capacities because the complaint contains insufficient 6 allegations against them, individually. (See Docket No. 18-1 at 7 3-5.) Defendants are correct that “[l]iability under [S]ection 8 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by 9 [each] defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 10 1989). 11 Beginning with Harris, defendants argue in their motion 12 to dismiss that Harris, and only Harris, is entitled to qualified 13 immunity. (See Docket No. 18-1 at 4.) The Ninth Circuit has 14 instructed that, “[o]nce the defense of qualified immunity is 15 raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of 16 showing that the rights allegedly violated were ‘clearly 17 established.’” LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 18 2000). 19 Plaintiff’s counsel did not address defendants’ 20 qualified immunity argument as to Harris either in their papers 21 or at oral argument upon being prompted by the court. At oral 22 argument, the court asked plaintiff’s counsel to define for 23 purposes of a qualified immunity analysis the “clearly 24 established” right that defendants allegedly violated. 25 Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to do so. Assuming that the right 26 at issue is the right to not be in forced proximity to an 27 individual after complaining of that individual’s sexually 28 1 inappropriate behavior, plaintiff’s counsel has been unable to 2 provide any authority clearly establishing such right. 3 Accordingly, this action must be dismissed as against Harris on 4 qualified immunity grounds. 5 As for Ferrara, plaintiff alleges that he issued an 6 approval of Robertson’s return to full duty while the 7 investigation into his conduct was still pending. (Id. at 27.) 8 She further alleges that he, as County Sheriff, contributed to 9 the enactment of the “gag order” against her and ratified 10 subordinates’ retaliatory conduct against her. (Id. at 21.) 11 These individualized allegations suffice. 12 Lastly, regarding Dewall, plaintiff claims that he 13 informed her that Robertson was being returned to full duty 14 because the investigation into his behavior resulted in a 15 conclusion that he would not be terminated, notwithstanding the 16 investigator confirming to plaintiff that he never reached such a 17 conclusion because his investigation was ongoing. (Id. at 16.) 18 Plaintiff also alleges that he failed to introduce her by her 19 official title at a County event, despite introducing other 20 individuals by their official titles at the same event, shortly 21 after she reported Robertson’s conduct. (Id. at 18.) While the 22 court does not doubt that Dewall’s behavior upset plaintiff, it 23 did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 24 Accordingly, the court will dismiss Dewall as a defendant. 25 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 26 dismiss (Docket No. 18) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in 27 part and DENIED in part as follows: 28 ee EN IEE ESE IIE III EIR) SEINE IO This action is DISMISSED as against defendants Dewall and Harris; Plaintiff’s third cause of action is DISMISSED as against defendant Ferrara; and ° Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all other ° claims against the remaining defendants. IT IS SO ORDERED. ° Dated: February 18, 2026 bette 2d. □□ 9 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14