Jane Doe, et al. v. Ursuline High School, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 16, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-01822
StatusUnknown

This text of Jane Doe, et al. v. Ursuline High School, et al. (Jane Doe, et al. v. Ursuline High School, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jane Doe, et al. v. Ursuline High School, et al., (N.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE, et al., ) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-01822 ) Plaintiffs, ) ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON v. ) ) URSULINE HIGH SCHOOL, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ) AND ORDER Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF Nos. 79, 88, 89, 96]

The Court considers four motions from Plaintiffs. For the reasons herein, the Court: (1) grants in part their Motion for Extension of Deadline to Serve a Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 79); (2) grants in part and denies in part their Application for Entry of Default (ECF No. 88); (3) holds in abeyance in part and denies in part their Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 89); and (4) denies their Motion to Withdraw Document (ECF No. 96). I. DISCUSSION A. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF SERVICE DEADLINE — ECF NO. 79 1. Law If a defendant is not served within 90 days of a filed complaint, a district court must dismiss the suit against them without prejudice or order service within a specified time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). A court may extend the service window only for “an appropriate period” when the plaintiff shows good cause for failure to serve. See id. 2. Arguments Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on September 2, 2025. See ECF No. 1. Named Defendants in the complaint include Dale Peterman, Benjamin Smith, and [FNU] [LNU] (father of A.B.). See ECF No. 1 at PageID ##: 267–268. Therefore, the cutoff to serve those Defendants was

December 1, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiffs argue that they tried––yet failed––to serve these three Defendants in November 2025. See ECF No. 79 at PageID ##: 1349–51. They contend that their “diligence in attempting to perfect service constitutes good cause for an extension of time” under Fed. R. Civ P. 4(m) so that they “may issue their first set of interrogatories after the case-management conference” that might reveal the locations of these unserved defendants.1 ECF No. 79 at PageID ##: 1344–45. 3. Analysis Plaintiffs err in both timing and substance. First, rather than promptly notifying the Court of their obstacles in obtaining service, they waited until the last day to move for an overly generous extension of three months. Second, rather than timely moving for early discovery to

locate the unserved Defendants, they diluted that request in the instant motion rather than independently requesting and justifying it––seemingly implying the Court should sua sponte order such relief. The Court cannot grant a milquetoast motion-within-a-motion. A motion for pre-service discovery must be made in writing and accompanied by a supporting memorandum of all points and authorities relied on. See Local Rule 7.1. Plaintiffs have, however, through the affidavit of their process server in accord with Fed. R. Civ. 4(m), demonstrated good cause to enlarge the time for service. See ECF No. 79 at PageID ##: 1349–51. Three months is not “an

1 Allegedly from Defendants Layshawna Garner, D.P., Kristen Brown, A.B., Janell Bankston, and B.S. appropriate period” under the circumstances. The motion is, therefore, granted in part. Plaintiffs are provided an additional 30, not 90 days, to serve Dale Peterman, Benjamin Smith, and [FNU] [LNU] (father of A.B.). B. APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT — ECF NO. 88

1. Law When a civil defendant fails to timely plead or otherwise defend and that failure is demonstrated by affidavit or otherwise, the Clerk of Court must enter default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).2 If default is entered, the defendant may formally move to set it aside under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). See United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline RR., 705 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1983). If moved, a court may set aside the entry of default for good cause is shown. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). If it does not set aside the default, the plaintiff may move for default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). If a court grants and enters default judgment, the defendant may later move for post-judgment relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 2. Arguments

Plaintiffs move for entry of default against Defendants D.P., Layshawna Garner, Ta.W., Raylette Robinson, To.W., Todd White, Jr., Migdalia Sauceda, A.B., Kristen Brown, G.C., Anthony Camuso, Rachel Camuso, C.S., Liza Strawn, Michael Rice, B.S., and Janell Bankston. See ECF No. 88. They contend that, despite timely service, these Defendants failed to plead or defend as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and Court order. See ECF No. 19.

2 “Otherwise defend” meaning challenges to service, venue, or the sufficiency of prior pleadings. See 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (4th ed. 2024). 3. Analysis The motion is well-taken against some Defendants but not others. Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on September 2, 2025. See ECF No. 1. The Court directed them to amend their complaint to include the names of all known Defendants under Fed R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3), 10(a),

15(a)(2), and 17(c). See ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs complied with that order. See ECF No. 22. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ second motion to amend their complaint, see ECF No. 20, which Plaintiffs timely filed on November 10, 2025. See ECF No. 45. In the instant motion, Plaintiffs claim that: Based on the Court’s November 21, 2025 Order, which Plaintiffs read in conjunction with the Court’s October 17, 2025 Memorandum of Opinion and Order, Defendants are required to plead or otherwise respond within 14 days of service of the summons and Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint.

ECF No. 88 at PageID #: 1374. This interpretation is incorrect and contradicts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules of Civil Procedure, and plain language of all preceding Orders. On October 17, 2025, the Court stated––in reference to the forthcoming first amended complaint, see ECF No. 22––that “Defendants shall respond to the amended pleading within the time remaining to respond to the original complaint, or within [14] days after service of the amendment––whichever is later.” ECF No. 19 at PageID #: 252 (emphasis added). When it subsequently granted Plaintiffs permission to file a second amended complaint, see ECF No. 20, the Court did not modify the well-established pleading cutoffs, thus leaving intact the off-the- shelf timelines dictated by the Federal and Local Rules. See ECF No. 34. Accordingly, each Defendant has long been locked to the latter of three possible responsive pleading cutoff formulae: (1) 21 days from service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i); (2) 60 days from (the sending of) a returned waiver of service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 4(d); or (3) 14 days from service of an amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

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