Jan Eady v. Don Siegelman
This text of 239 F.3d 1222 (Jan Eady v. Don Siegelman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ----------------------- JAN 25 2001 No. 00-13920 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK Non-Argument Calendar ----------------------- D. C. Docket No. 00-01065-CV-S
JAN EADY, individually and as class representative of all others similarly situated and in her capacity as a taxpayer residing in Jefferson County, Alabama,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DON SIEGELMAN, Hon., in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, LUCY BAXLEY, Hon., in her official capacity as Treasurer of the State of Alabama, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
------------------------ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ------------------------- (January 25, 2001)
Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Section 36-22-16(a) of the Code of Alabama (1975) provides in part that
“[s]heriffs of the several counties in this state shall be compensated for their
services by an annual salary payable in equal installments out of the county
treasury as the salaries of other county employees are paid.” Jan Eady brought a
class action against several state and county officers in their official capacities on
behalf of herself and the taxpayers of Jefferson County, Alabama, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief, an accounting, and monetary damages on the
grounds that § 36-22-16(a) violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Eady appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims.
“We review the district court's order of dismissal de novo and will uphold a
dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that the allegations in the complaint,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 1271,
1275 (11th Cir. 2000). Upon thorough review of the complaint, we agree with the
district court that Eady has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.1
1 We also agree with the district court that, to the extent Eady seeks retrospective monetary relief, her claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
2 Eady alleges that § 36-22-16(a) is an unconstitutional taking of “property”
from Jefferson County taxpayers without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Eady bases this claim
on the theory that § 36-22-16(a) violates the Alabama Constitution by requiring
counties to pay the salaries of county sheriffs.2 The district court correctly
concluded that Eady’s allegations fail to state a viable claim for relief under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Because Eady did not allege that § 36-22-16(a) violates a fundamental right
or involves a suspect classification, the district court correctly analyzed Eady’s due
process claim under rational basis scrutiny.3 The court found that § 36-22-16(a)
survives rational basis scrutiny because it bears a rational relation to a legitimate
government interest. Specifically, the district court concluded that a statute
requiring counties to pay sheriffs’ salaries is rational because sheriffs are elected in
county-wide elections and because counties are the direct beneficiaries of the
services rendered by sheriffs. Because § 36-22-16(a) passes muster under the
2 The Alabama Constitution provides that county sheriffs are state officers. See Ala. Const. art. V, § 112 (1901). Eady’s Fourteenth Amendment argument appears to presume that this provision entitles Alabama residents in each county to the services of a sheriff who is compensated by the state. 3 Before it addressed Eady’s due process claim, the district court properly found that Eady had no claim based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because she did not allege that § 36-22-16(a) had a disparate impact on her or the putative class members vis-á- vis other Alabama residents.
3 rational basis test, the district court correctly concluded that Eady’s complaint
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth
Amendment. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Eady’s
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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