Jamiel Williams v. Brenda Francois

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 24, 2023
• Docket: 22-3339
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-087 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-3339 ___________

JAMIEL L. WILLIAMS, Appellant

v.

BRENDA V. FRANCOIS; SCOTT M. ORLOFF, Attorney I.D. #57505; WILLIG, WILLIAMS & DAVIDSON; PHILADELPHIA COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FAMILY DIVISION ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-03404) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 9, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 24, 2023) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Jamiel Williams, an inmate in state prison proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint.

We will summarily affirm.

In his complaint, Williams sued his ex-wife, his former lawyer and the lawyer’s

firm, and the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Division, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Williams alleged that, during his divorce proceedings, he was not given

an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit for alimony, which resulted in monetary losses

and mental anguish. Dkt. No. 2 at 3. He also alleged that his ex-wife stalked him by

repeatedly calling the facility where he is incarcerated. Id. He sought compensatory

relief. Id. at 5.

On November 28, 2022, the District Court screened Williams’ complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The District Court dismissed Williams’ federal claims with

prejudice for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 16 at 8. To the extent Williams alleged

state law claims, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, concluded that

Williams had failed to establish diversity jurisdiction, and dismissed the claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice to Williams’ right to raise the claims in

state court. Id. at 7. Williams filed this timely appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1 We exercise plenary review over

the dismissal of the complaint. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

1 This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal even though a without-prejudice dismissal generally is neither final nor appealable. See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the

2 Upon review, we will affirm because no substantial question is presented on appeal. See

3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.

The District Court properly dismissed Williams’ federal claims against his

ex-wife, former lawyer, and the lawyer’s firm because Williams did not allege that any of

these defendants were state actors. Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005)

(recognizing that “to state a claim of liability under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must allege that

[he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor”). The

complaint contains no facts supporting a reasonable inference that any of these

defendants were state actors and there is no indication that William could allege facts

demonstrating that there was “‘such a close nexus between the State and the challenged

action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”

Id. (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295

(2001).

The District Court also properly dismissed Williams’ federal claims against the

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Division as barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment protects a state or state agency, as well as state

officials, when the suit is in fact against the state, from suit in federal court unless

District Court dismissed Williams’ state law claims without prejudice to Williams’ ability to bring those claims in state court. Because Williams cannot cure the lack of original subject matter jurisdiction, Borelli does not preclude the Court’s review. See id. at 951- 52; cf. Pa. Fam. Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Borelli does not apply ‘where the district court has dismissed based on justiciability and it appears that the plaintiffs could do nothing to cure their complaint.’”) (citation omitted).

3 Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity, or the state has waived it. See

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984); Karns v.

Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 513 (3d Cir. 2018). “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless

of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100. As the District Court

noted, we have held that Pennsylvania’s judicial districts—of which the Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas is a part—are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as

arms of the state. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193,

198 (3d Cir. 2008). Congress has not abrogated Pennsylvania’s immunity, nor has

Pennsylvania consented to suit in federal court or waived its immunity here. See

Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§§ 8521(b), 8522(b).

Given Williams’ failure to state a claim under federal law, the District Court acted

within its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law

claims. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A court

may [decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction] under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it

dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). The Court also correctly

dismissed Williams’ state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on

Williams’ failure to adequately allege the citizenship of any party to the action. See

Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2015)

(explaining that, when pleading diversity jurisdiction for natural persons, a plaintiff must

allege that each person is a citizen of a different state than him).

4 Lastly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

amendment was futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir

2002).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.