Jamie Lynn McCord v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 5, 2019
• Docket: 04-18-00399-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-18-00399-CR

Jamie Lynn MCCORD, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2017CR5049 Honorable Lorina I. Rummel, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 5, 2019

AFFIRMED

A jury found appellant Jamie Lynn McCord guilty of the murder of Ryan Perez. In a single

issue, McCord contends the evidence is insufficient to prove she possessed the required mental

state to support her murder conviction. We affirm. 04-18-00399-CR

BACKGROUND

At about 6:30 p.m. on February 20, 2017, San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”)

Officer Ryan Fuentes was dispatched to Mission Trail Baptist Hospital 1 for a reported gunshot

victim. Officer Fuentes learned from hospital personnel that the victim, Ryan Perez, was in critical

condition and was going to be transported to San Antonio Military Medical Center (“SAMMC”),

which occurred at approximately 7:23 p.m.

Nurse Cheryl Ann Cervantes, who provided care to Perez, described Perez as awake and

alert when he was brought to the emergency room. Perez walked into the emergency room but

then collapsed in the waiting area. Cervantes related that Perez was in respiratory distress and was

not cooperative with nurses. According to Cervantes, Perez stated he was shot in the chest with a

.22 caliber gun by a friend who was cleaning the gun. According to the doctor’s notes, Perez

reported being assaulted prior to arriving at the emergency room. The doctor’s notes also indicate

Perez was brought to the emergency room by his girlfriend.

Officer Fuentes spoke with witness Jamie McCord, who Officer Fuentes described as

nervous and upset. McCord informed Officer Fuentes the accidental shooting occurred in her

apartment, and she gave Officer Fuentes consent to search the apartment.

SAPD Officer Matthew Cuellar, who was acting as a cover officer, observed a crime scene

investigator conduct a gunshot residue test (“GSR”) on McCord. The results for the GSR test

conducted on McCord later returned an indeterminate result, as did the GSR test conducted on

Perez. McCord explained that she shot a gun and gave varying accounts of how or where that

occurred. Officer Cuellar related that McCord told him “that they’re both inside the house and

they’re, to some effect, painting or cleaning a gun and it went off and [Perez] got struck in the

1 During Officer Fuentes’s testimony, the State refers to the hospital as “Mission Trails Hospital.” However, the proper name of the facility is Mission Trails Baptist Hospital.

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chest.” McCord also stated that she shot the gun “outside of her window.” According to Officer

Cuellar, McCord stated she “was inside of her apartment complex and then shot it outside of her

window.” McCord also stated that she shot the gun by the dumpster. McCord informed Officer

Cuellar that she did not retrieve any shell casings.

SAPD Officer Clint Bush was dispatched to McCord’s apartment “as a cover officer to

respond to the location of a possible shooting … to secure the scene.” During a protective sweep

of the apartment, Officer Bush viewed a weapon on a dresser in what was identified as McCord’s

bedroom, along with drug paraphernalia and a crystal substance the officer believed to be

methamphetamine. Officer Bush then obtained consent to search the apartment from the occupant,

McCord’s mother, Sherry. A semi-automatic .22 caliber handgun was retrieved from the scene.

Officers searched for shell casings both inside and outside the apartment. According to

Officer Fuentes, one shell casing was found inside the weapon, but no shell casings were found

elsewhere. Officer Fuentes noted that the window through which McCord said she fired the

weapon was dusty and did not appear to have been touched in months. Officer Fuentes also noted

he did not locate gun cleaning supplies or find any indication in the bedroom or elsewhere in the

apartment that there had been an attempt made to clean the gun.

The supervisor of the Firearms Section and forensic firearm scientist, Ed Wallace, later

testified he examined the firearm retrieved from the apartment and observed the gun had been

altered. Wallace described the paint was flaking off and the manual safety had been removed from

the weapon. Wallace stated the weapon was capable of firing and that the weapon’s trigger was

not light – it required a “reasonable” amount of pressure to fire, which Wallace described as five

and a half to six and a half pounds of pressure. Wallace was not able to determine whether the

bullet retrieved during Perez’s autopsy was fired by the handgun retrieved from the apartment

because “[t]he individual or unique marks weren’t there in sufficient quality to allow [him] to

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determine that.” However, “[t]he markings on the surface of the bullet were consistent with the

barrel of his [sic] particular gun.”

During the course of the investigation at the apartment, Officer Bush asked Sherry what

Perez told her, and Sherry responded that “[h]e didn’t say nothing.” Sherry later testified during

trial that on the day of the shooting, there was a “disturbance” during which “[a] ladder [flew] out

the door.” According to Sherry, McCord threw the ladder out the door. McCord also threw Perez’s

boots and duffle bag out of the apartment. Sherry testified she heard McCord and Perez arguing

and McCord telling Perez to get out. Sherry also heard Perez calling McCord “names” and heard

Perez yell “Do it! Do it!” Sherry then heard what she thought was a gunshot.

According to Sherry, McCord then came out of the bedroom, left the apartment, and

retrieved Perez’s truck. Sherry testified McCord told her, “We’re taking him to the hospital.”

Sherry confirmed that in her written statement to police made the night of the shooting, she told

police McCord told her “Let’s get him to the hospital before he dies.” Sherry testified that during

the drive to the hospital, McCord asked Perez, “You shot yourself, didn’t you, [Perez]?” and Perez

replied “Yes.” Sherry confirmed she did not include that exchange in her written statement. Sherry

also confirmed that her written statement included the recitation of another incident in which

McCord “said [Perez] was coming at her or something along those lines.”

Following the initial investigation of the apartment, officers transported McCord to police

headquarters where she was interviewed by SAPD Detective Dennis Cartwright. During the

interview, McCord told Detective Cartwright she obtained a handgun for protection and that while

she and Perez were “checking it out” the handgun “went off.” According to Detective Cartwright,

McCord admitted she and Perez had a “small disagreement.” Detective Cartwright testified

McCord stated she test-fired the handgun. According to Detective Cartwright, McCord did not

note any problems with the handgun. Detective Cartwright testified that “based on the totality of

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everything that we had with the statements and what she [was] claiming, we had enough probable

cause to arrest her for murder.”

Medical examiner Dr. James Feig conducted the autopsy of Perez’s body. Dr. Feig testified

during trial that Perez died as the result of a gunshot wound. The bullet entered Perez through the

center of his chest from front to back, perforated the right lung and heart, which resulted “in the

loss of a lot of blood and pretty rapidly.” Dr. Feig characterized the wound as a distant gunshot

wound and testified there was no evidence indicating Perez shot himself accidentally or

intentionally because there was no evidence the weapon in this case was fired from a close range.

The State charged McCord by indictment with alternative theories of murder: intentionally

or knowingly causing Perez’s death by shooting him with a firearm; and, with intent to cause

serious bodily injury to Perez, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused

Perez’s death by shooting at and in Perez’s direction with a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(b)(1), (2). At trial, the jury charge contained those alternative theories of murder. The

jury found McCord “guilty of murder as charged in the indictment.” McCord elected for the trial

court to assess punishment; the trial court sentenced McCord to thirty-five years’ imprisonment.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In her sole issue on appeal, McCord contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support

her conviction. Specifically, McCord argues the evidence is “insufficient to prove that [she]

possessed the requisite intent to commit murder.”

Standard of Review

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33

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(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The applicable standard of review requires us to resolve any evidentiary

inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the factfinder is the exclusive judge of

the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, and shall determine the weight to give witnesses’

testimony. Id. When there is conflicting evidence, we must presume the factfinder resolved the

conflict in favor of the verdict, and defer to that resolution. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as

probative as direct evidence and, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidence is sufficient if “the inferences necessary to

establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered

in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012). A verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the theories

submitted. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to

a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause

the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). “Bodily injury” means “physical pain, illness or

any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8). “Serious bodily injury” means “bodily

injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement,

or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).

A person commits murder if he “intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly

dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(b)(2).

On appeal, McCord challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence that she intended to

kill Perez or that she intended to cause him serious bodily injury. McCord does not challenge the

jury’s determination that her actions caused Perez’s death. “Direct evidence of the requisite intent

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is not required … .” Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Intent is almost

always proven through circumstantial evidence. Stobaugh v. State, 421 S.W.3d 787, 862 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d); see Tottenham v. State, 285 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (“[B]oth intent and knowledge may be inferred from

circumstantial evidence and proof of a culpable mental state almost invariably depends on

circumstantial evidence.”). “A jury may infer intent from the acts, words, and conduct of the

accused, as well as from the extent of the injuries and the relative size and strength of the parties.”

In re I.L., 389 S.W.3d 445, 456 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). Additionally, a jury may infer

that a criminal defendant intended the natural consequences of her acts. See Ruffin v. State, 270

S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “[T]he specific intent to kill may be inferred from the

use of a deadly weapon.” Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

McCord shot Perez with a semi-automatic .22 caliber handgun — a deadly weapon. The

jury was within its province to presume McCord intended to kill Perez. Further, other evidence

supports the jury’s determination that McCord intended to kill Perez or cause him serious bodily

injury.

Officers Fuentes, Cuellar, and Bush wore body cameras during the investigation. The

recordings from their body cameras were admitted into evidence. Additionally, a redacted

recording of the interview Detective Cartwright conducted with McCord was admitted into

evidence. The jury viewed the recordings of the various statements McCord made to the officers,

as well as McCord’s interview with Detective Cartwright. The jury also heard Sherry’s testimony

describing the events leading to the shooting, as well as her testimony regarding McCord’s

statements following the shooting.

The evidence, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, are sufficient

to show McCord intended to kill Perez or cause serious bodily injury to Perez. Viewing the

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evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude a reasonable juror could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McCord intended to kill or intended to cause serious

bodily injury to Perez. Issue one is overruled.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Irene Rios, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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