THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., REESE and BROWN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
June 24, 2021
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A21A0331. PRUITT v. THIGPEN.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
In this personal injury case arising from a car crash, defendant Jamichael Troy
Pruitt appeals from an order entering a judgment against him for $125,000 after he
moved to enforce a settlement agreement he entered into for the same amount with
plaintiff Lisa Maria Thigpen. Pruitt contends that the trial court erred by (1) entering
a judgment instead of a dismissal, and (2) entering a judgment that does not track the
terms of the settlement. Because the judgment entered by the court varied from the
terms of the settlement agreement, we vacate the judgment and remand the case.
The relevant record is undisputed and shows that in June 2019, Thigpen sued
Pruitt, alleging that he was driving under the influence of alcohol and caused a
collision with her vehicle, injuring her. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, and Pruitt filed an answer raising various defenses and denying
liability.
As the case developed, in May 2020, Thigpen sent an offer of settlement to
Pruitt pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68. The offer stated that it was being made:
to settle any and all claims made by [Thigpen] . . . stemming from the incident that forms the basis of this lawsuit . . . including [claims for] . . . special damages, general damages, medical damages, punitive damages, [and] attorneys’ fees. . . . The offer is in the total and global amount of $125,000 (One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars) in full and final settlement of any and all claims brought in this action. . . . Although the above amount specifically includes and disposes of all claims for punitive damages, $100.00 are being allocated to punitive damages, as such are warranted in this case[.] If accepted upon with prejudice, [Thigpen] will execute a general release and settlement agreement prepared by [Pruitt].
The offer was silent as to the manner of payment.
Within a month of the offer, Pruitt replied by accepting it “without variance,
thereby forming an enforceable settlement agreement.” About three weeks after that,
Pruitt moved to enforce the settlement agreement and dismiss the action with
prejudice. Thigpen opposed the motion and pointed out that she had only received the
$25,000 automobile policy limit from Pruitt’s insurer, and $100,000 remained to be
2 paid by Pruitt. Thigpen attached to her response a proposed consent order, stating that
“in the event that [Pruitt] is unwilling to agree to the entry of a judgment, [Thigpen]
will agree to file a dismissal with prejudice upon payment of the total settlement of
$125,000.”
Upon a review of the pleadings, the trial court entered an order prepared by
Thigpen. The order read as follows, in relevant part:
It is here by ordered . . . that [j]udgment is and shall be entered in favor of [Thigpen] against [Pruitt], in the amount of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000), plus interest at the rate of 6.25% per year. This [j]udgment shall include compensatory damages as well as punitive damages. The punitive damages portion of this [j]udgment are based upon [Thigpen’s] cause of action that alleged [Pruitt’s] violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, driving while impaired by alcohol or drugs.
Following the order, Pruitt filed an emergency motion to vacate and set aside
the order, arguing that the terms of the order did not track the settlement agreement,
which contemplated a release instead of a judgment and specified that only $100 was
allocated to punitive damages. Pruitt attached a proposed order to substitute for the
order already entered, which proposed order stated that judgment shall be entered for
$125,000, and $100 is allocated to punitive damages. It made no mention of the DUI
allegation. Thigpen opposed the motion, and before the trial court ruled on the motion
3 to vacate, this appeal followed when Pruitt filed a notice of appeal of the original
order.
1. Pruitt contends that the trial court erred by entering the judgment against him
because the settlement agreement contemplated a dismissal rather than a judgment.
As to the nature of the resolution, we find no basis for reversal.
A trial court’s order on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is subject to de novo review, under the same standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Where parties to litigation have entered into a definite, certain, and unambiguous mutual release of their claims, which is not denied, the trial court should make that settlement the judgment of the court, thereby terminating the litigation.1
When considering a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, courts must be
mindful that such agreements are “governed by state law applicable to contracts in
general. The cardinal rule of construction is to determine the intention of the parties.
But no construction is required or even permissible when the language employed by
1 Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, LLC, 265 Ga. App. 812, 817 (2) (595 SE2d 633) (2004).
4 the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable
interpretation.”2
Based on the terms of the settlement agreement, which offered a general release
in return for $125,000, the trial court entered an order creating a judgment for
$125,000, with annual interest, against Pruitt. Pretermitting whether the acceptance
of an offer to execute a general release indicates the parties’ intent that a dismissal (as
opposed to a judgment) would follow,3 it is undisputed that Pruitt’s motion to vacate
in the trial court included a proposed order entering a judgment for the agreed upon
$125,000 settlement offer. Accordingly, Pruitt abandoned in the trial court his
challenge to the nature of the resolution (judgment or dismissal), and this argument
presents no basis for reversal on appeal.4
2 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 815-816 (1), quoting Darby v. Mathis, 212 Ga. App. 444, 444-445 (1) (441 SE2d 905) (1994). 3 Both parties agree that settlements can take the form of either dismissal or judgment under OCGA § 9-11-68 (a): “[E]ither party may serve upon the other party . . . a written offer, denominated as an offer under this Code section, to settle a tort claim for the money specified in the offer and to enter into an agreement dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly.” (Emphasis supplied.) 4 See SunTrust Bank v. Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. 794, 804 (824 SE2d 717) (2019) (on motion for reconsideration); Roberts v. Community & Southern Bank, 331 Ga. App. 364, 372 n.5 (771 SE2d 68) (2015). As noted above, as part of the trial court proceedings, Thigpen has offered to dismiss her claim upon payment, and Pruitt has
5 2. Pruitt also challenges the terms of the judgment entered, arguing that they
varied from the terms of the settlement agreement. We agree.
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THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., REESE and BROWN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
June 24, 2021
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A21A0331. PRUITT v. THIGPEN.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
In this personal injury case arising from a car crash, defendant Jamichael Troy
Pruitt appeals from an order entering a judgment against him for $125,000 after he
moved to enforce a settlement agreement he entered into for the same amount with
plaintiff Lisa Maria Thigpen. Pruitt contends that the trial court erred by (1) entering
a judgment instead of a dismissal, and (2) entering a judgment that does not track the
terms of the settlement. Because the judgment entered by the court varied from the
terms of the settlement agreement, we vacate the judgment and remand the case.
The relevant record is undisputed and shows that in June 2019, Thigpen sued
Pruitt, alleging that he was driving under the influence of alcohol and caused a
collision with her vehicle, injuring her. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, and Pruitt filed an answer raising various defenses and denying
liability.
As the case developed, in May 2020, Thigpen sent an offer of settlement to
Pruitt pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68. The offer stated that it was being made:
to settle any and all claims made by [Thigpen] . . . stemming from the incident that forms the basis of this lawsuit . . . including [claims for] . . . special damages, general damages, medical damages, punitive damages, [and] attorneys’ fees. . . . The offer is in the total and global amount of $125,000 (One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars) in full and final settlement of any and all claims brought in this action. . . . Although the above amount specifically includes and disposes of all claims for punitive damages, $100.00 are being allocated to punitive damages, as such are warranted in this case[.] If accepted upon with prejudice, [Thigpen] will execute a general release and settlement agreement prepared by [Pruitt].
The offer was silent as to the manner of payment.
Within a month of the offer, Pruitt replied by accepting it “without variance,
thereby forming an enforceable settlement agreement.” About three weeks after that,
Pruitt moved to enforce the settlement agreement and dismiss the action with
prejudice. Thigpen opposed the motion and pointed out that she had only received the
$25,000 automobile policy limit from Pruitt’s insurer, and $100,000 remained to be
2 paid by Pruitt. Thigpen attached to her response a proposed consent order, stating that
“in the event that [Pruitt] is unwilling to agree to the entry of a judgment, [Thigpen]
will agree to file a dismissal with prejudice upon payment of the total settlement of
$125,000.”
Upon a review of the pleadings, the trial court entered an order prepared by
Thigpen. The order read as follows, in relevant part:
It is here by ordered . . . that [j]udgment is and shall be entered in favor of [Thigpen] against [Pruitt], in the amount of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000), plus interest at the rate of 6.25% per year. This [j]udgment shall include compensatory damages as well as punitive damages. The punitive damages portion of this [j]udgment are based upon [Thigpen’s] cause of action that alleged [Pruitt’s] violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, driving while impaired by alcohol or drugs.
Following the order, Pruitt filed an emergency motion to vacate and set aside
the order, arguing that the terms of the order did not track the settlement agreement,
which contemplated a release instead of a judgment and specified that only $100 was
allocated to punitive damages. Pruitt attached a proposed order to substitute for the
order already entered, which proposed order stated that judgment shall be entered for
$125,000, and $100 is allocated to punitive damages. It made no mention of the DUI
allegation. Thigpen opposed the motion, and before the trial court ruled on the motion
3 to vacate, this appeal followed when Pruitt filed a notice of appeal of the original
order.
1. Pruitt contends that the trial court erred by entering the judgment against him
because the settlement agreement contemplated a dismissal rather than a judgment.
As to the nature of the resolution, we find no basis for reversal.
A trial court’s order on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is subject to de novo review, under the same standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Where parties to litigation have entered into a definite, certain, and unambiguous mutual release of their claims, which is not denied, the trial court should make that settlement the judgment of the court, thereby terminating the litigation.1
When considering a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, courts must be
mindful that such agreements are “governed by state law applicable to contracts in
general. The cardinal rule of construction is to determine the intention of the parties.
But no construction is required or even permissible when the language employed by
1 Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, LLC, 265 Ga. App. 812, 817 (2) (595 SE2d 633) (2004).
4 the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable
interpretation.”2
Based on the terms of the settlement agreement, which offered a general release
in return for $125,000, the trial court entered an order creating a judgment for
$125,000, with annual interest, against Pruitt. Pretermitting whether the acceptance
of an offer to execute a general release indicates the parties’ intent that a dismissal (as
opposed to a judgment) would follow,3 it is undisputed that Pruitt’s motion to vacate
in the trial court included a proposed order entering a judgment for the agreed upon
$125,000 settlement offer. Accordingly, Pruitt abandoned in the trial court his
challenge to the nature of the resolution (judgment or dismissal), and this argument
presents no basis for reversal on appeal.4
2 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 815-816 (1), quoting Darby v. Mathis, 212 Ga. App. 444, 444-445 (1) (441 SE2d 905) (1994). 3 Both parties agree that settlements can take the form of either dismissal or judgment under OCGA § 9-11-68 (a): “[E]ither party may serve upon the other party . . . a written offer, denominated as an offer under this Code section, to settle a tort claim for the money specified in the offer and to enter into an agreement dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly.” (Emphasis supplied.) 4 See SunTrust Bank v. Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. 794, 804 (824 SE2d 717) (2019) (on motion for reconsideration); Roberts v. Community & Southern Bank, 331 Ga. App. 364, 372 n.5 (771 SE2d 68) (2015). As noted above, as part of the trial court proceedings, Thigpen has offered to dismiss her claim upon payment, and Pruitt has
5 2. Pruitt also challenges the terms of the judgment entered, arguing that they
varied from the terms of the settlement agreement. We agree.
Here, the terms agreed to by the parties are clear: $125,000 to settle all claims
arising from the car collision, including $100 for punitive damages, in return for a
general release of liability. The order entered by the trial court came close to these
terms, but it varied in two ways.
First, the judgment did not capture the concept that $100 of the judgment was
allocated toward punitive damages, instead stating that “[t]his [j]udgment shall
include compensatory damages as well as punitive damages,” without noting the
proportionality agreed to by the parties.
Second, the judgment added a provision stating that the unspecified portion
allocated punitive damages is “based upon Plaintiff’s cause of action that alleged
Defendant’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, driving while impaired by alcohol or
drugs.” Nothing in the offer of settlement referred to the factual background of
Thigpen’s claims, nor the basis for punitive damages or the nature of any alleged
tortious conduct. Instead, the offer simply referred to the dispute as “the above-
offered to accept a judgment against him that is consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement. The nature of disposition does not appear to be the crux of the dispute.
6 captioned lawsuit” and the car crash as “the incident.” The offer did state that $100
in punitive damages was “warranted in this case,” and Pruitt unequivocally accepted
this characterization for purposes of settlement. But his acceptance does not go
farther than the terms of the offer.5
Based on these discrepancies, the trial court’s order puts Pruitt in a position
that he did not agree to. Although the parties debate the practical effects of these
discrepancies, for example in any future bankruptcy proceeding, we need not resolve
every potential effect of these arguments. Rather, our holding is controlled by the
axiom that, when construing a contract, “[t]he cardinal rule of construction is to
ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention is clear and it contravenes no
rule of law and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced
irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction.”6 The parties’ intention
was made clear by the terms of the offer accepted by Pruitt, which terms control the
entry of any judgment entered on the agreement.
5 Cf. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, 853 (797 SE2d 814) (2017) (“[I]t is . . . a fundamental principle of contract law that an offeror is the master of his or her offer[]and free to set the terms thereof.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Atkinson v. Cook, 271 Ga. 57, 58 (518 SE2d 413) (1999). 6 OCGA § 13-2-3.
7 Because the trial court’s order varied from those terms, we vacate the entry of
that order. On remand the trial court is directed to enter a judgment in favor of
Thigpen consistent with this opinion.7
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Reese and Brown, JJ.,
concur.
7 We note that the proposed order Pruitt prepared in support of his motion to vacate does capture the agreed-upon terms of settlement. There is nothing “magic” about that language, but it offers a guide.