James Wood Lawson v. the State of Texas
This text of James Wood Lawson v. the State of Texas (James Wood Lawson v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Affirm; Opinion Filed December 20, 2021
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00738-CR No. 05-20-00739-CR
JAMES WOOD LAWSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F17-57392-M and F17-57393-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Reichek Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III Appellant James Wood Lawson was indicted for the offense of evading arrest
(Trial Court Cause No. F17-57392-M), and the offense of possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine) in an amount less than one gram (Trial Court Cause No. F17-
57393-M). Both indictments included one enhancement paragraph alleging a prior
conviction for the felony offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon.
Lawson pleaded guilty to both offenses, and true to the enhancement paragraph, and
was placed on deferred adjudication for five years in each case. The State
subsequently moved to revoke and proceed with an adjudication of guilt based on grounds appellant violated certain terms of his community supervision. Appellant
pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations. Following a hearing, the trial court
found some of the allegations in the State’s motions to be true, revoked appellant’s
community supervision, and sentenced him to five years in prison in each case.
Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in both cases. The motions
are supported by briefs in which counsel professionally and conscientiously
examines the record and applicable law and concludes these appeals are frivolous
and without merit.
Counsel certifies that he provided appellant with a copy of the briefs and the
motions to withdraw. The briefs meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967). The briefs present a professional evaluation of the record showing
why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573
S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (determining whether brief
meets requirements of Anders); see also Arevalos v. State, 606 S.W.3d 912, 915–16
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.). The State filed letter briefs stating that it agrees
with counsel’s assessment. We advised appellant by letter of his right to file a pro se
response, but he did not file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313,
319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (noting appellant has right to file pro se response to
Anders brief filed by counsel).
We have reviewed the record and counsel’s briefs. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in
–2– Anders cases). We agree the appeals are frivolous and without merit, and we find
nothing in the record before us that might arguably support the appeals.
Although not arguable issues, the State contends there are clerical errors in
both of the judgments adjudicating guilt. In cause number F17-57392-M, the
judgment adjudicating guilt states that the “Degree of Offense” is a state jail felony.
The State contends that because the offense of evading arrest was enhanced with one
prior conviction,1 the judgment should show that the “Degree of Offense” is a third
degree felony, not a state jail felony.
With respect to the judgment adjudicating guilt in cause number F17-57393-
M, the State contends that the “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” should
reflect that the possession of cocaine offense was enhanced. Further, because the
offense was enhanced with one prior conviction, the judgment should reflect that the
“Degree of Offense” was a third degree felony, not a state jail felony.
We agree with the State in part. Based on the record, we conclude that both
judgment forms correctly designate the “Degree of Offense” as a state jail felony.
However, because both of the state jail felonies were enhanced with a prior felony
conviction, they are punishable as third degree felonies. In cause number F17-
57392-M, evading arrest or detention is a Class A misdemeanor except when, as
1 The record establishes that the trial court found the enhancement paragraph in each case to be true during the sentencing hearing conducted on May 29, 2018. In addition, the orders of deferred adjudication for both cases reflect that appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph, and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph to be true. –3– here, the appellant had been previously convicted of evading arrest or detention, in
which case the offense becomes a state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
38.04(b). In addition, appellant had a prior felony conviction. Thus, under penal code
section 12.35(c)(2), appellant “shall be punished for a third degree felony.” Id. at §
12.35(c)(2). With respect to cause number F17-57393-M, possession of less than
one gram of cocaine is a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
481.115(b). This offense was also enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and is thus
punishable as a third degree felony. See PENAL § 12.35(c)(2). The record establishes
that appellant was punished within the applicable punishment range for a third
degree felony, and we have no indication that the errors were the result of judicial
reasoning. See Garza v. State, 298 S.W.3d 837, 845 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no
pet.) (appellate court reformed judgment to modify notation that appellant was
convicted of third degree felony to correctly note that appellant was convicted of
aggravated state jail felony punishable as third degree felony); see also Bonds v.
State, No. 02-19-00384-CR, 2021 WL 1229972, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.
1, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (judgment’s statement
that conviction was for second degree felony instead of enhanced first degree felony
was clerical error).
When the record provides the necessary information to correct inaccuracies in
the trial court’s judgment, we have the authority to reform the judgment to speak the
truth. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim.
–4– App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991,
writ ref’d). Accordingly, with respect to cause number F17-57393-M, we revise the
judgment to reflect that the “Offense for which Defendant Convicted”—possession
of a controlled substance—was enhanced. With respect to both causes, we add
“punished as third degree felony” in the “Degree of Offense” section of each
judgment to clarify that the offenses are state jail felonies, punished as third degree
felonies.
We grant counsel’s motions to withdraw, and we affirm the trial court’s
judgments as modified.
/Bill Pedersen, III// BILL PEDERSEN, III 200738f.u05 JUSTICE 200739f.u05 Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
–5– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JAMES WOOD LAWSON, On Appeal from the 194th Judicial Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F17-57392-M. No. 05-20-00738-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Pedersen, III. Justices Osborne and THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek participating.
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