James Williams v. TDCJ Employees, Cynthia Wood, Tim Morgan

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 6, 2005
• Docket: 01-03-01332-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued January 6, 2005

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-03-01332-CV

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JAMES WILLIAMS, Appellant

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE–INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, CYNTHIA WOOD, AND TIM MORGAN, Appellees

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On Appeal from the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 22,133

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, James Williams, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Ellis Unit of the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ-ID”), appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his lawsuit, as frivolous, against TDCJ-ID and two TDCJ-ID employees. In two points of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) “dismissing appellant’s lawsuit without reference to any guiding principles” and (2) failing to grant appellant’s motion for default judgment and his motion for an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

          On July 2, 2003, appellant filed a lawsuit in forma pauperis against appellees, claiming that TDCJ-ID employee Cynthia Wood confiscated all his personal property, including his “legal material,” in retaliation for his having filed a grievance against her. In an unsworn declaration attached to his original petition, appellant admits to having filed “several lawsuits in federal court.” Appellant averred that he could not provide any details regarding those lawsuits “due to defendant Wood[’s] . . . confiscation of my legal material.”

          Despite his assertion that he could provide none of the details regarding his previous lawsuits, appellant subsequently asserted, in a post-dismissal pleading to the trial court, that “the substance” of his federal lawsuits was different. In this pleading, appellant invited the trial court to look at “the Attorney General’s office” records if it wanted to check. Appellant did not re-state his prior assertion that he could provide none of the details regarding his previous litigation; rather, he stated that he could not “substantial comply” with the requirements of section 14.004(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

          We review the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s action as frivolous for an abuse of discretion. Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Because appellant filed an unsworn declaration of inability to pay, the trial court had broad discretion to dismiss the lawsuit as frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2002); Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 722. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 722.

Dismissal as Frivolous

          Section 14.003 allows a trial court to dismiss an inmate’s lawsuit before or after process is served if the court finds, inter alia, that the claim is frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider whether (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b) (Vernon 2002). In making its determination under section 14.003, the court may also take into consideration the requirements imposed by section 14.004. Samuels v. Strain, 11 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).In this case the trial court did not give a reason for finding appellant’s lawsuit to be frivolous, and appellant made no request for findings of fact or conclusions of law. We must, therefore, imply all the necessary findings to support the judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Terry v. Terry, 920 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Because appellant did not comply with the mandatory requirements of section 14.004(a)(2), the trial court could have properly assumed the lawsuit before it was “substantially similar” to the federal lawsuits appellant admits to filing previously. Samuels, 11 S.W.3d at 407.

          The purpose of section 14.004 is to assist the trial court in determining whether a lawsuit is malicious or frivolous under section 14.003(a). Gowan v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). To relieve appellant completely of his duties and to shift the burden onto the trial court would be contrary to the legislature’s intent “for Chapter 14 to reduce frivolous inmate litigation.” See Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. 2004) (noting that legislature’s intent was to reduce frivolous inmate litigation); see also Thompson v. Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (noting that inmate cannot shift burden to trial court to seek necessary information concerning suits”).

          We do not accept appellant’s implicit assertion that he is completely excused from his burden of providing any details regarding his federal lawsuits—even the bare operative facts and outcomes, which his post-dismissal pleading demonstrates he recalled and could have provided. Thompson, 99 S.W.3d at 329-30 (holding affidavit that did not list operative facts and outcomes of previous litigation insufficient, despite inmate’s asserted lack of access to records, because inmate “obviously has some knowledge of them since he filed them”); cf. Gowan, 99 S.W.3d at 321 (concluding that inmate’s affidavit substantially complied with section 14.004 because all that was missing was cause number inmate did not know and, from information provided, “trial court could determine that the substance . . . was different”); see also Bell v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div., 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s dismissal as frivolous because inmate’s affidavit, which listed specific details regarding previous lawsuits, failed to include operative facts and names of parties).

We overrule appellant’s first point of error.

Failure to Grant Appellant’s Motions

          In his second point of error, appellant complains of the trial court’s failure to grant his motion for default judgment and subsequent motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding his motion for default judgment. Appellant did not request a hearing on his motion for default judgment until November 24, 2003, which happened to be the same day the trial court dismissed his lawsuit. A trial court is not required to hold a hearing before dismissing a lawsuit under section 14.003. Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Under the statute, the trial court could find appellant’s lawsuit frivolous and dismiss it at any time, with or without a motion or hearing. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2).

          We overrule appellant’s second point of error.

                                                     CONCLUSION

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

                                                             Sam Nuchia

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Higley, and Hanks.